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INTRODUCTORY REMARKS 
 
Das 
Selbe 
hat uns 
verloren, das 
Selbe 
hat uns 
vergessen, das 
Selbe 
hat uns 
 – Paul Celan, “Zu beiden Händen,” Die Niemandsrose 
 
 II n’y a que moi, moi qui ne suis pas, là où je suis 
– Samuel Beckett, L’innommable 
 
 
 
REMAINS OF A SELF? 
After… Always after… As known, ever since Hegel’s famous preface to his 
Phänomenologie des Geistes, an introduction always comes after the fact of 
that which it is supposed to introduce insofar as it is always an introduction 
of something, which therefore it must succeed in order to precede it. 
Accordingly, there is both a constitutive belatedness and an irreducible 
retrospectivity bound to the discipline of writing an introduction, which, as 
we shall come to see in more detail, is not unrelated to the two main 
‘disciplines’ of the thesis that this introduction is about to introduce—
deconstruction and psychoanalysis—nor to its subject matter: ‘the remains 
of a self.’ The difficult, if not impossible, task of writing an introduction 
consists not only in introducing something that, while being written had no 
readymade blueprint, and at times not even an orientation or a direction; and 
yet to simulate that it did, it also consists in presenting something whose 
presentation is already past, and yet presenting it as though it is still to come.1 
Yet, how to present something that is already past and how to begin when 
one is already late to what was supposed to come before? One way to begin 
belatedly is to designate and situate that which the introduction comes after 
in order to introduce it retrospectively, which is what I will attempt to do in 
what follows.  
                                           
1 According to Derrida, the act of writing an introduction or a preface is a ‘ludicrous 
operation’ not only because in confining what it presents to a ‘thematic nucleus’ or a 
‘single guiding thesis’ it tries to close off the textual displacements of the writing to come 
in advance, but also because “l’écriture ne tient en aucun de ces temps (présent, passé ou 
futur en tant que présents modifiés)” (D, 13/7). 
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In 1986, Jean-Luc Nancy sent out a letter of invitation to a number of 
prominent contemporary French thinkers to respond to the question ‘who 
comes after the subject?’ or ‘après le sujet qui vient?,’ which eventually also 
became the titles of the succeeding English and French publications of the 
collection of essays evoked by Nancy’s pertinent question.2 In the 
introduction to this collection, Nancy situates his question on a rupture line 
within the critique and deconstruction not only of the notion of ‘subjectivity’ 
but also of a whole range of interrelated notions such as ‘authority,’ 
‘consciousness,’ ‘interiority,’ ‘ownership,’ ‘selfhood,’ and ‘self-presence,’ 
which Nancy takes to be “une des déterminations majeures de la pensée 
contemporaine.”3  
As the collection of essays testifies, Nancy’s question leaves no room for 
simple answers but calls forth a range of different approaches resulting in a 
series of highly complex and diverse responses. To a certain extent, this 
thesis may also be read as providing a sort of response to Nancy’s question—
even if it is 30 years late. Accordingly, the title ‘Remains of a Self—Solitudes 
and Responsibilities’ can be heard as an echo of Nancy’s initial question in 
the sense that it repeats it in a deferred and displaced manner while 
attempting to respond, not only to the repeated question, but also to the many 
responses that it provoked, and continues to provoke, in and beyond the 
publications immediately following Nancy’s invitation. This requires some 
further explanation.  
In my view, one of the implications of the ongoing deconstruction or auto-
deconstruction of ‘the subject’ or ‘the self’ is that one can no longer speak 
or think of the subject or the self. This implication binds any attempt to 
respond to the questions of ‘who comes after the subject’ or of ‘what remains 
of a self’ in at least a twofold way: first, it implies that one cannot simply 
replace a more ‘classical’ or ‘traditional’ concept, model, structure, or theory 
of ‘the subject’ or ‘the self’ with a new and alternative concept, model, 
structure, or theory of the subject or the self—even if a radically transformed 
one. This is because, I would argue, it is the very position of the definite 
article ‘the,’ around which such attempts are constructed that has been called 
into question. Neither, however, can one simply dispose of all the concepts, 
                                           
2 The collection was first published in English translation in Topoi 7 (2) in September 
1988. One year later, the original French essays along with some new contributions were 
published in the final issue of Cahiers Confrontations (Winter 1989, no. 50). In 1991 an 
English edition of Who Comes After the Subject? edited by Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor 
and Jean-Luc Nancy was published, including all the essays from both the English and 
French editions with the addition of four previously unpublished or untranslated essays 
by Sylviane Agacinski, Luce Irigaray, Sarah Kofman, and Emmanuel Lévinas. 
3 ASQV, 8/5. 
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models, or theories pertaining to ‘the subject’ or ‘the self’ by declaring them 
dead in order to substitute them with other names without, however, 
essentially questioning or altering the very place of such replacement.4 
In this respect, it would be misleading to speak of ‘replacements’ with 
regard to deconstruction at all since it is the very places that the notions of 
‘the subject’ and ‘the self’ have occupied throughout the history of Western 
philosophical thought (if such a unified expression makes any sense today) 
that are destabilized and displaced in deconstructive readings of the seminal 
texts both constitutive of and constituted by this very history. In more precise 
terms, deconstruction puts the place of the subject constructed as the 
underlying seat or stable substance (ὑποκείμενον, subiectum, substantia) of 
the more or less unstable series of predicative attributes said to belong to it 
on trial, as well as the place of the self conceived as the place where the 
subject is constituted as the authoritative proprietor of itself and its properties 
through the abilities of self-consciousness, self-reflection, and self-
                                           
4 One example of such an attempted replacement is to be found in Irving Goh’s study The 
Reject, which directly readdresses Nancy’s question concerning ‘who comes after the 
subject’—in order, as Goh says, to attempt a ‘more adequate response’ than those 
assembled in the collection of essays of which the majority preserve the notion of ‘the 
subject’ even if they tarry with it. Cf. Goh 2015, 4. Instead of preserving ‘the subject,’ 
Goh presents his own attempt at a more adequate response as follows: “To the question 
of ‘who comes after the subject,’ I respond here by saying: the reject” (ibid. 6–7). My 
intention is not to go into the details of Goh’s definition of  ‘the reject’ or his argument 
as to why it should replace ‘the subject’ her, but merely to note what I, despite Goh’s 
admirable and meticulous response, find troublesome with respect to his gesture of 
replacing ‘the subject’ with ‘the reject.’ As I read it, the preservation of the ‘the’ in this 
replacement is as problematic as the preservation of the word ‘subject’ and goes together 
with another troublesome gesture of Goh’s, namely, his insistence that what is called for 
by Nancy’s question, indeed what “we need,” is a “theory of the reject” (ibid. 23. My 
emphasis). Moreover, Goh distinguishes this required ‘theory’ of the reject from the 
“more general experiences or empirical phenomena” (ibid. XII) with which it is said to 
resonate, thus reproducing the traditional dichotomies not only of ‘theory and practice’ 
but also of ‘the noumenal and the phenomenological,’ as of ‘the general and the 
particular,’ all of which have a complex history of subjection to deconstructive scrutiny. 
It therefore strikes me as somewhat odd that Goh resorts to such opposition in order to 
argue for his theory of the reject in place of that of the subject, all the while arguing that 
‘the subject,’ precisely because of its historical subjection to deconstruction, should if not 
rejected then at least be “de-supposed,” that is, neither presupposed nor preserved as 
though “nothing has happened” (ibid. 5). In brief, what I find troublesome about Goh’s 
response is that it seems to insist on the possibility, and even the necessity, of constructing 
a theory of the reject in order to replace the theory of the subject, without, however, really 
questioning the place of such replacement, which appears to be sanctioned by the ‘the’ 
that designates it.  
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presence.5 As Derrida writes in La carte postale, deconstruction in the wake 
of psychoanalysis “oblige à reconsidérer toute la topique de l’autos.”6 
This double bind of thinking, banning both the replacement of the ‘old’ 
subject or self with ‘new’ subjects and selves and the plain and pure break 
with or overcoming of these notions and their history, is what Nancy alludes 
to with his situating of a ‘rupture line’ within deconstruction. Accordingly, 
what this line demarcates is that, on the one hand, deconstruction “n’est pas 
un simple anéantissement du ‘sujet,’”7 that is, deconstruction does not lay 
claim to having liquidated or proclaimed a final end to either ‘the subject’ or 
‘the self,’ even if some readers have read it as doing so.8 On the other hand, 
                                           
5 In the seminal seventh book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle asks ‘what is being?’ (τί τὸ 
ὄν) but immediately adds that this question may be replaced by the more narrow and 
precise question ‘what is substance?’ (τίς ἡ οὐσία) (cf. Met. 1028b). According to 
Aristotle, such a replacement of being with substance can take place because the question 
of substance asks for what is the most basic, fundamental, or primary with regard to the 
being or the region of being that is called into question, and once this has been established 
the rest may be constructed on the basis of such grounds. To Aristotle, then, ‘substance’ 
(οὐσία) refers both to a certain ‘whatness’ that makes ‘a being what it is’ (τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι) 
in itself (καθ᾽ αὑτό) and to the ‘underlying support’ or the ‘fundamental’ (τὸ ὑποκείμενον) 
of such a being, which in a more Latinized way of speaking could be translated into the 
‘essence’ or the ‘subject’ of something that exists (cf. Met. 1028b–1029b). 
Accordingly,‘the subject’ refers to that which is not dependent on anything other than 
itself and to which something else may be attributed or predicated but which itself is not 
the attribute or predicate of anything else. Thus, the subject is related to what is essential, 
fundamental, primary, self-sufficient, or substantial with regard to a being and thus 
already opposed to what would be inessential, auxiliary, insufficient, secondary, and 
supplementary. On Heidegger’s reading, what happens in so-called epoch of ‘modern 
metaphysics’ of which Descartes is a pioneer,  is that the ‘subject,’ which previously 
served as a designation of any substantial being, is now identified exclusively with the 
conscious human being. Thus, the human being is turned into the privileged subject par 
excellence (ausgezeichneten Subjekt) in relation to whom all other beings are henceforth 
determined as ‘objects.’ Cf. GA 41, 106. 
6 CP, 343/322. 
7 ASQV, 7/4.  
8 For instance, Gabriele Schwab writes that even though “poststructuralism and 
deconstruction privilege experimental fragmentations and (dis)figurations of language as 
open and dynamic processes of textualization. The dominant tenor of their discourses 
about the subject is, however, still one that celebrates its end. Foucault, Derrida, 
Baudrillard, Lyotard, and Deleuze and Guattari all in some way convey the sense that we 
are beyond the subject” (Schwab 1994, 5). On my reading, such a general statement about 
such divergent discourses is simply too simple, and risks reducing all the differences that 
would make it questionable. For example, it ignores the whole discussion of the 
(im)possibility of ‘overcoming metaphysics,’ which to Derrida is an unavoidable and 
irreducibly ambiguous issue for deconstruction to tarry with without final resolve, 
whereas to Deleuze this issue has never been an issue.  
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however, neither does deconstruction pave the way for a ‘return to the 
subject,’ nor to a ‘resurrection of the self,’ who would once again become 
present to itself as the selfsame—although, in another sense, deconstruction 
is surely preoccupied with the ‘returns’ and ‘hauntings’ of a subject who has 
received countless death-sentences. 
However, as the epigraph by Celan tells us, “das Selbe hat uns verloren,”9 
and with this abandonment, the self of which we are trying to speak here is 
no longer the same. No longer the same as what? No longer the same as itself, 
to be sure. However, at this point several questions arise: was it ever, has it 
ever been the same as itself? Has the self ever been selfsame? Do we know, 
and have we ever known, what we mean to say when we say ‘the self’? Has 
‘the self,’ as the definite article indicates, ever constituted the referent of 
signifier of an invariant unity of meaning to be unraveled through consistent 
analysis or excavated by a sufficiently hermeneutical or genealogical work? 
Moreover, did the self only cease being selfsame ‘after’ the deconstruction 
of itself, and, if so, when did this auto-deconstruction of the self begin to take 
place? Did it ever begin? Would it be possible to locate a place and time at 
which ‘the self’ began to deconstruct itself—or is the auto-deconstruction of 
the self perhaps already at work from the outset of its very construction?  
Proceeding from such questions of deconstruction and working with a 
view to deconstructive gestures of reading and writing, this thesis will not be 
an attempt to reconstruct an alternative or a ‘new’ concept, model, or theory 
of either ‘the subject’ or ‘the self’—nor of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘selfhood’ for 
that matter. Instead, it will be an attempt to undertake a tracing and an 
interrogation of different contexts, experiences, and situations in which the 
constructs of ‘the subject’ or ‘the self’ begin to tremble, vacillate, and 
deconstruct themselves, thus exposing the destabilizing otherness already 
roaming the foundations of these constructions. Hence, it will be my 
suggestion that, rather than simply obliterating the notions of ‘subject’ or 
‘self’ in order to celebrate their traceless extinction, deconstruction is 
concerned with what or who remains in the abandonment of the subject and 
the self, which have perhaps always already begun to take place. It is to the 
question of such remains that this thesis tries to respond by echoing the initial 
question of Nancy, and asking who remains to pose the question of who 
comes after the subject, which therefore also becomes a question of who or 
what was already there when the subject arrived on the scene.10  
                                           
9 Celan 2000a, 219. 
10 This double questioning of ‘who asks the question of who?’ already reverberates in 
some of the responses provided to Nancy’s question, especially in the brief essay by 
Blanchot entitled ‘Qui?,’ but also throughout the interview between Derrida and Nancy 
entitled “‘Il faut bien manger’ ou le calcul du sujet.” What becomes obvious in these 
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In other words, we will be asking what or who—since it is also a question of 
the distinction between a ‘what’ and a ‘who’—remains to experience the 
auto-deconstruction of the subject and the self, including what is called 
whomever’s or whatever’s ‘own’ subject and self. Where, if anywhere, is 
this who or what situated and where, if anywhere, is its position? 
If, as Nancy suggests in his introduction, the subject can be understood as 
“la propriété de soi,”11 then the thesis could be read as an attempt to trace the 
remains of a self without properties. That is, a self that has no belongings 
since it is no longer the owner of a subject understood as the stable reference 
point of propriety to which these belongings would refer. As such, we are 
asking about a self that would remain in the abandonment of ‘its’ subject, a 
self to which nothing belongs, not even itself. Such a self, abandoned by 
itself, would therefore no longer be the self of a stable property such as the 
subject, but rather a self as instantaneous, unstable, and precarious as ‘pre-
individual singularities’ of “une vie, une saison, un vent, une bataille, 5 
heures…,”12 which Deleuze in his response to Nancy’s question calls 
hecceities. It concerns a self that remains under the erasure of the self, there 
where there is neither a presence to oneself nor to another, nor a simple 
absence of self—since absence (ab-esse) is still a mode of presence—but 
rather a kind of spectral self that remains in the dis-appearance of itself—we 
might say, then, that these remains resemble what Derrida calls ‘the trace,’ 
which always implies “à la fois sa marque et son effacement.”13 Rendered in 
the words of Lacoue-Labarthe, what is of interest to us here is:  
 
[C]e qui, dans le sujet, déserte (a toujours déjà déserté le sujet lui-même et qui 
antérieurement à toute ‘possession de soi’ (et sur un autre mode que celui de la 
dépossession), est la dissolution, la défaite du sujet dans le sujet ou comme le sujet: 
le (dé)constitution du sujet ou la ‘perte’ du sujet, du sujet ou la ‘perte’ du sujet,—
si du moins l’on pouvait penser la perte de ce qu’on n’a jamais au, une sorte de 
perte (de ‘soi’) ‘originaire’ et ‘constitutive.’14  
                                           
responses is that the question of who comes after the subject is always also a question of 
a ‘before’ since, as Derrida explains with reference to Heidegger: “Dès la ‘naissance,’ 
sans doute avant elle, l’être-jeté se réapproprie, ou plutôt s’ex-approprie dans des formes 
qui ne sont pas encore celles du sujet ou du projet. La question ‘qui?’ devient alors ‘qui 
(est) jeté’? ‘qui’ devient ‘qui’ depuis la destinerrance de l’être-jeté? Qu’il s’agisse 
toujours de la trace, mais aussi d’itérabilité, cela signifie que cette ex-appropriation ne 
peut pas se stabiliser absolument dans la forme du sujet” (ASQV, 101/106. My emphasis). 
In other words, the trace not only comes after something that would once have been 
present, the trace also comes from whence we begin. 
11 ASQV, 7/4. 
12 ASQV, 90/95. 
13 D, 11/5. 
14 Lacoue-Labarthe 1979, 151/81–82. 
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Hence, this thesis is not about mourning some subject who was originally 
present to itself but then got lost in the deconstruction of itself; it investigates 
a relation of self that emerges as a relation of originary dispropriation. 
However, as Blanchot points out in L’écriture du désastre, such an originary 
dispropriation of itself also implies that “le ‘moi’ ne se perd pas parce qu’il 
ne s’appartient pas. Il n’est donc moi que comme non-appartenant à soi, et 
donc comme toujours déjà perdu.”15 
Nevertheless, what will be repeated throughout this thesis is that someone 
(but who?) still remains, who relates to itself even if only in the experience 
of the abandonment of itself, as of any properties of its own, or any sense of 
ownership regarding its ‘own.’ Hence, as Derrida describes it, the auto-
deconstruction of ‘the self’ concerns an exploration of the “[f]in ou 
interruption du cercle, césure du tour dans le retour à soi, même quand le soi 
‘reste soi.’”16  
In this regard, we might recall the Kierkegaardian definition, provided 
pseudonymously in The Sickness unto Death from 1849, of a self as “a 
relation that relates to itself and in relating to itself relates to another,”17 
whose conciseness pertains to the way in which it captures the irreducible 
inconciseness of what it means to relate to oneself. With respect to Anti-
Climacus’ definition, the question of this thesis would be how we may come 
to understand a relation of self that relates to itself only in the abandonment 
or withdrawal of itself—that is, as a caesural relation. Anti-Climacus may 
give us an indication of how to approach such a relation of inaccessibility 
when he points out that his definition of a self may lead to an experience of 
a double-bound impossibility that can be quite despairing. On the one hand, 
this understanding of self-relation can lead to an experience of the 
impossibility of “being oneself [være sig selv]” and, on the other hand, to an 
experience of the impossibility of “getting rid of oneself [blive af med sig 
selv].”18  
In a certain sense, then, in the course of this thesis we will be exploring 
this double-bound experience of being stuck with oneself even if this self 
perpetually eludes the one to whom it was supposed to belong. Such a 
double-bound experience appears to be repeatedly articulated in the writings 
of Beckett, as when one of the dispropriated voices of L’innommable utters: 
“les yeux ouverts, les yeux fermés, rien, je ne vois plus rien, ça alors, c’est 
décevant, je m’attendais à mieux que ça, c’est ça ne pouvoir me perdre.”19 
                                           
15 EdD, 105/64. 
16 V, 71/35. 
17 SKS 11, 130/14. 
18 SKS 11, 130/14. Translation modified.  
19 Beckett 2004, 173. 
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On this view, the title ‘Remains of a Self’ is ambiguous. It can be read as a 
questioning of the left-overs, residues, remnants, ruins, scraps, bits and 
pieces left behind in the auto-deconstruction of the subject that would have 
been the property of the self. Yet, it can also be read as a certain resistant 
insistence or rather a certain desistance, as Lacoue-Labarthe will come to 
say, of some irreducible and excessive remainders of self that remains 
despite the abandonment of its own subject or its own self. These remainders 
offer no qualities of stance or stability, no values of permanence or presence, 
and no sustained relation of a self that relates to itself as the selfsame, but 
rather a plurality of interrupted relations to otherness upon which any sense 
of self depends.  
Why then, one might ask, add the subtitle ‘Solitudes and 
Responsibilities’? To which we could respond, because as one is abandoned 
by oneself, in the same stroke one is also delivered over to others in order to 
be able to relate oneself in the first place, and this dependence on others in 
the abandonment of oneself is at once a very solitary experience and an 
experience of responsibility. The suggestion that this thesis explores is 
therefore that a sense of solitude and a sense of responsibility are some of 
the remains of a self that relates to itself in the originary dispropriation of 
itself, and that such relation even intensifies these senses because it calls their 
sense into question. Thus, even if these remaining senses of solitude and 
responsibility are by no means ‘new’ discoveries, the suggestion will be that 
they might have become more conspicuous and importunate in the—in some 
respects ruinous—landscape exposed by what we, for the sake of brevity, 
have referred to simply as the auto-deconstruction of the self. For what does 
it mean to be solitary if I have been abandoned by myself and therefore can 
no longer be alone with myself? What does it mean to be solitary if my being 
is fundamentally bound up and dependent on others, so that the other is more 
intimate to me than I am to myself? Furthermore, what does it mean to be 
responsible or to ‘take’ responsibility if ‘my’ authority and autonomy have 
already been intimately interrupted and infiltrated by multiple instances of 
heterogeneity and heteronomy? 
 To a certain extent, responding to these questions demands another way 
of speaking about solitude and responsibility and a ‘new’ way of writing on 
the subject of a self, in which, as Derrida says the “contrat entre la grammaire 
de sujet ou du substantive et l’ontologie de la substance ou du sujet”20 is 
broken or deconstructed. However, as Artaud will come to say in Chapter I, 
this grammar is still to be found and, as we know from Nietzsche, ceasing to 
believe in grammar is perhaps the most difficult task yet. I do not pretend to 
                                           
20 ASQV, 96/101.  
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invent a new grammar in this thesis, but, perhaps more modestly and with 
Artaud’s encouragement, I venture to challenge language a little, to make it 
go a little out if its joints, in order to make it convey things that may at times 
go against its prevalent logic of sense but that for this reason need not be 
entirely nonsensical. As will become evident in the course of the thesis, we 
will draw resources for this linguistic endeavor not only from deconstruction 
but also from psychoanalysis, which, to a certain extent, is also concerned 
with remainders of a self or a subject that has been deprived of any definite 
article or personal pronoun. In psychoanalysis, these remainders are referred 
to as the ‘subject of the unconscious,’ S or das Es, which despite appearances 
and in the words of Lacan, designates a “sujet dépourvu d’aucun das ou autre 
article objectivant.”21 
Accordingly, the remains of solitude with which this thesis is engaged 
therefore concerns something other than that which might occur when “I 
have withdrawn into seclusion alone [solus secedo],”22 as Descartes 
famously notes in his first meditation, because it is our presentiment that the 
sense of solitude cannot be reduced to the empirical fact of being alone 
without others. Instead, the solitude that we will be questioning depends on 
a being with others, which complicates the sense of solitude as a being alone 
with oneself.23 Moreover, the remains of responsibility which this thesis calls 
                                           
21 Écrits, 417/347. 
22 Descartes 1978, 17. My translation. We will return to this passage from Descartes in 
Chapter II.  
23 For instance, in The Origins of Totalitarianism from 1951, Arendt operates with a 
distinction between ‘solitude,’ understood as a state of being alone with oneself which is 
desirable and may be actively sought in the internal dialogue of one’s soul, and 
‘loneliness’ or ‘isolation,’ understood as a deprivation not only of others, and of the social 
world these others make possible, but ultimately also of oneself, which is undergone 
passively and involuntarily. Arendt explains the distinction as follows: “In solitude, in 
other words, I am ‘by myself,’ together with my self, and therefore two-in-one, whereas 
in loneliness I am actually one, deserted by all others” (Arendt 1973, 476). Even though 
this distinction between a voluntary solitude and an involuntary isolation or loneliness is 
undoubtedly relevant and useful in other contexts—whether political or otherwise—it 
appears to lose its relevance, and even to become obfuscated and undone, with regard to 
the aspects and experiences of solitude that we will be interrogating throughout this thesis. 
This is not least because this distinction presupposes that it is actually possible to be alone 
with oneself in solitude, which is a presupposition that this thesis calls into question. 
Arendt does appear to be attentive towards a possible porosity in the distinction between 
a presumably constructive or creative solitude and a presumably destructive or 
degenerative loneliness or isolation. However, since the concern of her work is to develop 
the hypothesis of an interrelation between loneliness, political isolation, and 
totalitarianism, Arendt does not go into a further questioning of this porosity and therefore 
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to question concerns, as Derrida says in his response to Nancy, a sense and 
an experience of being “responsable sans autonomie, avant et en vue de toute 
autonomie possible du qui-sujet.”24 
Hence, the subtitle of this thesis concerns a solitude of being unable to be 
alone, and a responsibility without and before autonomy, because the very 
autos of whomever is in question only arises as a response to the other on 
which it depends. Put differently, it is a question of a solitude and a 
responsibility on the part of a self, whose relation to itself is already a trace 
of alterity since it only gathers itself together “pour réprondre à l’autre, dont 
l’appel précède en quelque sorte sa propre indentification à soi.”25  
To conclude this introduction on a general note about the relation between 
the remains of a self, solitude, and responsibility this thesis explores how a 
self bereft of ownership of itself still remains as the only one left to answer 
for this originary bereavement, that is, the sole being responsible for the 
disrobement or dispropriation of itself. There therefore remains an 
irreplaceability connected to such remains of a self even if the place of the 
self has deconstructed itself and even if the only place left for such a self 
does not belong to itself. Throughout the thesis, we will be questioning and 
exploring such a self-relation of self-abandonment and its remains of solitude 
and responsibility from different angles and approaches, ranging from 
deconstruction and psychoanalysis to poetry and literature. Even though it is 
the question of solitude that will take center stage, the question of 
responsibility will play a more subdued, but nonetheless consistent and 
significant, role in the side wings of our considerations until it is finally 
brought to the fore in the concluding remarks. Thus, before proceeding with 
some methodological considerations, we will close this introduction with a 
brief outline of the thesis that has gone before it. 
 
 
OUTLINE OF THE THESIS 
The first two chapters focus on the double-bind that the other(s) is both a 
condition of possibility and of impossibility for a solitude of one’s own, 
because without the other(s) everything that one calls one’s ‘own’ ceases to 
exist, including one’s ‘own’ existence. This, it will be argued, implies that 
what we call our ‘own’ is never owned by ourselves alone due to the 
otherness that interrupts our relation to ourselves. Via a specific trope of 
solitude, which we have chosen to call ‘the solitude of not being able to be 
                                           
does not pay attention to the risk of an autoimmune collapse into loneliness inherent to 
solitude, even in its creative form. 
24 ASQV, 95/100. 
25 ASQV, 95/100. 
31 
 
alone,’ the first chapter investigates the experiences of disrobement and 
dispropriation on the part of the solitary one, which may ensue from auto-
heteronomous conditions of existence, as these become manifest in the 
writings of Artaud. The second chapter tries to unfold the dependency on 
others at the heart of a solitude of one’s own, on the one hand, through a 
thinking of the equiprimordiality of ‘being-with-others’ and solitude as we 
find it exposed in Heidegger; and, one the other hand, through the way in 
which this Heideggerian line of thought has been taken up by a range of 
French thinkers such as Bataille, Nancy, and Blanchot, together with the their 
respective thoughts concerning a so-called ‘community without 
community.’ Finally, both of these aspects open up to a discussion of a 
certain ambigous desire for solitude understood as a desire for absoluteness 
and sovereignty and the risk of auto-immunity therein.  
Through a psychoanalytic lens, Chapters III and IV continue and sharpen 
some of the previous discussions by exploring various experiences and 
situations wherein the sense of personal selfhood is exposed to the threat of 
disappearing into a solitude of the impersonal. This exploration takes place 
by focusing on the way in which the impersonal German pronoun Es 
functions in the writings of Freud orientated by his psychoanalytic 
imperative ‘Wo Es was soll Ich werden.’ In Chapter III our reading 
concentrates on Jenseits des Lustprinzips from 1920 whereas in Chapter IV 
our focus shifts to Das Unhemliche from 1919 and its notions of ‘the 
uncanny homely’ and ‘the daemonic.’ These textual focal points lead to 
discussions of various aspects pertaining to the relation between the 
impersonal ‘It’ and the personal ‘I,’ especially in relation to notions such as 
‘the automatic’ and ‘the autonomous,’ and not least to a certain duplicity of 
repetition.  
Chapter V continues the psychoanalytic trajectory by a reading of Lacan’s 
tenth seminar from 1962–1963 on anxiety wherein we try to trace a relation 
of anxiety to the unhomely through what Lacan calls the ‘fading of the 
subject’ all the way to its dissolution in what we in turn have called a 
‘reversal of the mirror stage.’ Finally, this experience of dissolution in 
anxiety leads to a consideration of what Blanchot, in contrast to ‘mundane’ 
or ‘worldly’ solitude, calls ‘essential solitude,’ which signifies precisely a 
solitude of the impersonal.  
Whereas the previous chapters have mainly focused on the solitary one—
its dependence, desires, and exposure to the impersonal in relation to the 
other(s)—the closing remarks to a certain extent overturns or shifts the focus 
to that of the other(s) upon whom the solitary one depend. However, seeing 
as every solitary one is also an other for the other, this shift of focus exposes 
us to questions regarding the responsibility that therefore befalls each and 
32 
 
every one for the solitude of each and every other. For this reason, the thesis 
ends by opening up to questions, which are undoubtedly inseparable from 
the questions that have been pursued up until this point, but which can only 
be indicated tentatively since their unfolding would constitute the beginning 
of another study. Consequently, the closing remarks on the one hand resumes 
some of the findings of the previous chapters, while, on the other hand, 
sketching the contours of a path to be pursued by future studies. 
Finally, the thesis is supplemented with four excursus, which are not 
mandatory for understanding the main arguments but which offer elaborating 
discussions or reflections on particular aspects pertaining to these arguments.  
 
 
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS: 
DECONSTRUCTION AND PSYCHOANALYSIS 
In the development of this thesis, two trajectories of thought have been of 
utmost importance: deconstruction and psychoanalysis. In this regard, the 
‘method’ of this thesis may be considered a ‘double reading,’ attending to 
what Derrida calls the “structure de la double marque”26 in the texts with 
which it engages. From this double perspective, the aim of these 
methodological considerations is not to explain deconstruction or 
psychoanalysis ‘as such’ or in exhaustive terms, if such an endeavor were 
even possible. Instead, these considerations will be guided by two overall 
questions of specific relevance to the context of this thesis: ‘Can 
deconstruction be considered a method?’ And, ‘what are the reasons for 
bringing together deconstruction and psychoanalysis in the course of this 
thesis?’ We begin with the first question. 
In his “Lettre à un ami japonais” from 1985, Derrida makes it explicit that 
“[l]a déconstruction n’est pas une méthode et ne peut être transformée en 
méthode,”27 thereby implying that as soon as ‘deconstruction’ is employed 
as a method it has already ceased being deconstructive. Apparently, then, we 
have already answered our first methodological question: deconstruction is 
not a method, and this thesis will not employ it as one—but, evidently, this 
does not suffice in answering why this is so. In his letter, Derrida does not 
expand on why deconstruction is not a method but there are indications of 
more elaborate answers at other places in his writing. In this section, we will 
therefore attend to these indications in order to provide an outline of what 
can only be a tentative answer, since the methodological question of why 
deconstruction cannot be considered nor employed as a method is 
                                           
26 D, 10/4.  
27 PSY, 390/(II) 4.  
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inexhaustible and the ways of answering it abundant. However, in order to 
begin one answer to this question, it might be advantageous to clarify the 
terms implied within it: ‘method’ and ‘deconstruction.’  
Without pursuing a genealogy of methodology in the history of 
philosophy, we might say that, seeing as ‘method’ derives from the Greek 
juxtaposition of μετά and ὁδός, there appear to be roughly two prevalent 
ways of thinking about method: one way, according to which ‘method’ 
designates a more or less determined way of obtaining knowledge or 
clarity,28 a mode of inquiry, a prosecution, or a set of rules and prescriptions 
about how to approach a given object of investigation; and another way, 
according to which ‘method,’ perhaps less rigidly, designates a ‘following 
of a path’ or a ‘proceeding along a road’ oriented, if not by some ‘intentional 
object,’ then at least, as Heidegger suggests, by something that ‘shows itself’ 
(sich zeigenden Seienden).29 What these two modes have in common, 
however, is that they think of method as a possible form of passage, 
procedure, or transport towards something more or less determinable.30 
Furthermore, methods are often concerned with more or less strategic ways 
of solving a problem that has somehow blocked or interrupted a passage, or 
with locating possible passageways from out of an impasse (a-poria) and 
thus also as a certain way of mastering. There are several reasons why none 
of these ways of understanding method are applicable to deconstruction, of 
which we shall mention but a few. 
First, deconstruction cannot be understood as a method in the sense of a 
general set of rules or formulas external to whatever context they are applied 
to, simply because to deconstruction ‘there is no outside the context,’ to 
paraphrase Derrida,31 which implies at least two things. On the one hand, it 
implies that deconstruction happens ‘infrastructurally,’ to use another term 
from De la grammatologie, meaning that it is already at work ‘within’ the 
structures of the work that is being deconstructed, because of “an 
inadequation, a certain inability to close itself off, to form, to formalize 
                                           
28 For example, in the Physics Aristotle defines his method as an “advance from what is 
more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable 
by nature” (Phys. 184a).  
29 GA 54, 87. 
30 Even if we understand ‘method’ in the more ‘properly’ Greek way that Heidegger 
suggests—that is, not as a technical way of proceeding towards some more or less 
determined end-goal, but rather as a perpetual ‘staying under way’ (Auf-dem-Weg-
bleiben) (GA 54, 87), which is not mapped out between two points marked in advance, 
and which never reaches what it approaches—it is nevertheless still conceived as “der 
Weg, auf dem wir einer Sache nachgehen” (GA 10, 92). 
31 I am of course thinking of the widely (mis)interpreted phrase from De la 
grammatologie, which reads “il n’y a pas de hors-texte” (G, 227/158). 
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itself.”32 On the other hand, as the latter quote makes clear, it also implies 
that a context can never close in on itself, because there is no ‘outside’ to 
close itself off from and as such no demarcable inside to be safeguarded 
either. Therefore, a context can never complete or saturate itself but must 
remain open to ‘other’ contexts and to the ‘otherwise,’ which obliges one to 
take into account a ‘perhaps’ in everything one tries to read, to think, or to 
write.33 Derrida explains:  
 
There are only contexts, and this is why deconstructive negotiation cannot produce 
general rules, ‘methods.’ It must be adjusted to each case, to each moment without, 
however, the conclusion being a relativism or empiricism.34 
 
Hence, the deconstructive insistence on an irreducibility and an insatiability 
of (con)textuality does not amount to the reduction of everything to written 
words on paper or in books, nor to a simple relativism according to which, 
echoing Ivan Karamazov, ‘everything is permitted.’ Rather, the ‘text’—as 
‘archi-writing,’ ‘trace,’ ‘différance,’ or other quasi-concepts in Derrida’s 
writing—designates that which cannot be regulated by a transcendental 
principle nor determined with reference to a ‘transcendent signified’ or a 
‘real referent’ situated somewhere ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the context of that 
which it would regulate or determine. Yet, this lack of external or 
transcendental sanctioning does not amount to an absolutization of interiority 
or immanence; rather it displaces the entire architecture build on the 
foundations of a structure that opposes exteriority to interiority or 
transcendence to immanence, since, as Derrida writes:  
 
S’il n’y a rien hors du texte, cela implique, avec la transformation du concept de texte en 
général, que celui-ci ne soit plus le dedans calfeutré d’une intériorité ou d’une identité à 
soi […], mais une autre mise en place des effets d’ouverture et de fermeture.35  
 
Second, deconstruction cannot be considered as a path by which one 
scientifically obtains more knowledge or clarity about something; or by 
which one dialectically resolves or ‘sublates’ problems of contradiction as 
the method exposes itself as being nothing other than the movement of 
                                           
32 N, 193.  
33 With his thinking of the ‘perhaps,’ Derrida is referring to the passage in Jenseits von 
Gut und Böse where Nietzsche, another important precursor of deconstruction, anticipates 
the arrival of new philosophers who would be “Philosophen des gefährlichen Vielleicht 
in jedem Verstande” (KSA 5, 17). 
34 N, 17.  
35 D, 43/36. 
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science itself as logic;36 nor as the phenomenological approach to something 
‘as such’ (als solche) or as it ‘reveals itself.’37 This is because deconstruction 
is provoked or called forward by experiences of ‘the impossible,’38 that is, 
by that which interrupts all procedure, program, or progression of or towards 
the possible with all its connotations to the ability of mastering and the power 
of realization. Thus deconstruction is an experience of a certain paralysis of 
power and of the possibility of proceeding, or of that which has no possible 
way of coming to pass but which nevertheless remains inescapable and 
undecidable; wherefore deconstruction takes place where “[i]l n’y a plus de 
chemin (odos, methodos, Weg, ou Holzweg).”39 
Exposed to such aporetic experiences, what is required of deconstruction 
is therefore not to seek out possible escape routes from or ways of resolving 
their impossibility, but rather to invent ‘other’ resources and path-breaking 
approaches in order engage and to remain with their irreducible insolvency 
and aporetic undecidability. As Derrida says: “Deconstruction is an 
explanation with, an experience of the impossible.”40 
However, this paralysis of the possible in the experience of impossibility 
is in no way tantamount to a total standstill; it is the paralysis of a certain 
form of approach oriented by axiological, topological, or archeo-teleological 
coordinates operative within the structure that is in the process of 
deconstructing itself. Therefore, deconstruction is not without a certain gait 
(démarche) or a certain movement; in fact, deconstruction is a movement 
that cannot be put to rest by settling in a position or making a decision once 
and for all. Deconstruction is a restless movement of negotiation,41 which is 
concerned with the irreducible remainders that cannot be resolved without 
                                           
36 After claiming that method is the very movement of science and that this movement 
belongs to logic, or rather, is logic, Hegel adds the following explanation in his preface 
to the Phänomenologie des Geistes: “Denn die Methode ist nichts anderes als der Bau des 
Ganzen, in seiner reinen Wesenheit aufgestellt” (HW 3, 47). 
37 According to Heidegger, even if the path we tread along (ή μέϑοδος) is a side way or 
detour that leads us astray (ἀπάτη) from the straight path, it is nonetheless still so that “der 
Ab- und Seitenweg, der somit einen anderen Ausblick zustellt und so unterstellt, als Weg 
sei er doch das ‘gerade aus und hin’ zum Unverborgenen. Der Seiten- und Abweg läßt 
solches entgegenkommen, was das auf dem geraden Weg Erscheinende nicht zeigt” (GA 
54, 87). 
38 Derrida employs this phrase in several places, for instance, in Force de loi where he 
writes that deconstruction “est possible comme une experience de l’impossible” (FL, 
35/243). 
39 AP, 47/21. 
40 N, 192.  
41 With his association of deconstruction with negotiation, Derrida is as always 
emphasizing its Latin heritage and etymological sense as a negation of rest, repose, peace, 
or leisure (neg-otium). In other words, the work of deconstruction is interminable.  
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rest and which therefore calls for infinite responsibility and interminable 
decisions—and this restless movement “ne se contente pas de procédures 
méthodiques.”42  
Does this mean that deconstruction has no rudiments of methodology at 
all and that this thesis is therefore entirely bereft of a method? Not entirely 
no, because, even though deconstruction cannot be considered a method, 
understood as a set of technical procedures applicable to a context from the 
‘outside’ in order to locate viable ways of solving a problem, deconstruction 
still moves in language, which can never become pure idiom but always 
reproduces generalities. Deconstruction is still a reading and a writing, and 
for this reason it is not exempt from certain stylistic or signatory gestures 
that, to some extent, are detachable from a particular context and thus contain 
the rudiments of a method. As Derrida explains: 
  
[I]l y a de l’idiome et il y a aussi de la méthode, de la généralité, et la lecture est un 
mixte d’expérience de l’autre en sa singularité et puis de contenu philosophique, 
d’informations qui peuvent être arrachées à ce contexte singulier. Les deux à la 
fois.43  
 
In what follows, we shall therefore try to sketch out some of these signatory 
gestures by attending to what Derrida refers to as the ‘double gesture’ or the 
‘double writing’ of deconstruction.44 
In “Ousia et grammé” from 1968, Derrida explains how Heidegger’s 
destruction (Destruktion) of metaphysics, as a decisive precursor of 
deconstruction,45 does not so much concern a thinking of the ‘unthought’ in 
the sense of thinking something entirely ‘new’ or wholly ‘other’ than what 
                                           
42 PSY, 35/(I) 23.  
43 PS, 214/201. 
44 Cf. M, 392/329.  
45 In the early texts of Derrida, but also of Gerard Granél, the French word déconstruction 
is employed primarily as a translation of Heidegger’s Destruktion, with a view to its 
affiliation with the Husserlian Abbau, in order to emphasize that this Heideggerian 
destruction is not merely destructive in the negative sense. Rather, as Derrida explains in 
his 1964–1965 seminar Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l’Histoire, “la destruction 
heideggerienne n’est ni la critique d’une erreur, ni l’exclusion simplement négative d’un 
passé de la philosophie. C’est une destruction, c’est-à-dire une déconstruction, c’est-à-
dire une dé-structuration, c’est-à-dire l’ébranlement qui est nécessaire pour faire 
apparaître les structures, les strates, le système des dépôts” (HQE, 34/9). The word 
‘deconstruction,’ however, was not a neologism since it had already figured in the French 
language prior to its inscription in the writings of Derrida and Granél. According to Littré, 
for example, deconstruction may be regarded as a ‘Dérangement de la construction,’ that 
is, as a disturbing displacement of a given construction—whether this construction is of 
a grammatical, semantic, architectonic, or structural constitution.  
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has previously been thought in this tradition. Rather, the Heideggerian 
leitmotif in and of deconstruction concerns a thinking of how and why what 
has been thought could not have been thought otherwise, that is, to think the 
“impossibilité de l’autrement”46 within the metaphysical structures under 
deconstruction, and yet to think about why this impossibility offers reserves 
for the possibility of thinking ‘the same’ otherwise.  
To Derrida, then, what becomes obvious in Heidegger’s writing is that in 
the attempt to overcome metaphysics it still, to a certain extent, remains 
within the metaphysical discourse. However, this remaining in transgression 
is not a fault inherent to Heidegger’s thinking, but rather a condition and 
even a formalizable law of thought and language in general, which dictates 
the necessity of borrowing concepts and terms from the very tradition that 
one seeks to transgress. Accordingly, what is excessive of metaphysics can 
only announce itself in the fissures and the marginal interlacing of the 
metaphysical text itself, such that, for example, the ‘same’ text can contain 
both the resources for developing a substantial concept of subjectivity and a 
certain reserve that can be employed in the (auto-)deconstruction of the very 
same concept.47  
Deconstruction therefore reads the texts of the metaphysical tradition of 
Western philosophy doubly—both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ of this tradition—
by reading the outside that is already encrypted in the textuality of its inside, 
which also means that deconstruction always happens as the auto-
deconstruction of whatever is under deconstruction. In other words, a 
transgression of metaphysics is only possible through a reading of the traces 
of an impossible otherwise already inscribed in its writing, which does not 
imply that deconstruction rejects or refuses traditional matters or problems 
of metaphysical thought. On the contrary, in order to understand 
deconstruction it is prerequisite to understand, and to a certain extent even 
to repeat, the hypotheses, conclusions, and truths of the systematic theories 
and their architectural structures that are under deconstruction—without 
such critical analysis of these metaphysical constructions their 
‘deconstruction’ would turn into empty slogans and ‘dogmatic stupidity 
(niaiserie)’ against which Derrida repeatedly warns.48  
                                           
46 M, 41/38. 
47 Lacan appears to make a similar point when, in L’éthique de la psychanalyse, he writes: 
“On ne dépasse pas Descartes, Kant, Marx, Hegel et quelques autres, pour autant qu’ils 
marquent la direction d’une recherche, une orientation véritable. On ne dépasse pas Freud 
non plus. On n’en fait pas non plus—quel intérêt?—le cubage, le bilan. On s’en sert. On 
se déplace à l’intérieur. On se guide avec ce qu’il nous a donné comme directions” (Sem 
VII, 244–245/206). 
48Cf. M, 42/39. 
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This double reading of the traditional texts of Western philosophical thought 
also results in a double writing or a double gesture of deconstructive writing. 
The first of these gestures consists in a critical–genealogical analysis of the 
historical trajectory of a certain concept in relation to the concept(s) to which 
it is opposed in a hierarchical system. Examples of such traditional 
hierarchical oppositions are substance–attribute, subject–predicate (or 
object), essence–existence, necessary–contingent, original–copy, presence–
absence, inner–outer, universal–particular, or—an opposition that has 
become something of a hallmark for Derridean deconstruction—speech–
writing. During the course of this critical–genealogical analysis, however, 
moments occur in which the hierarchical binary logic interrupts and 
overturns itself in such a way that the seemingly derived, dependent, or 
secondary concept suddenly appears as the more original, fundamental, or 
primary insofar as it functions as the very condition of possibility for the 
concept that represses or excludes it. According to Derrida, these moments 
of reversal or overturning are necessary and unavoidable in order not to avoid 
or ignore the fact that traditional conceptual oppositions are never ‘neutrally’ 
constructed or constructed without bias; rather, as Derrida explains:  
 
Un des deux termes commande l’autre (axiologiquement, logiquement, etc.), 
occupe la hauteur. Déconstruire l’opposition, c’est d’abord, à un moment donné, 
renverser la hiérarchie. Négliger cette phase de renversement, c’est oublier la 
structure conflictuelle et subordonnante de l’opposition.49  
 
Yet, the interminable work of deconstruction does not cease with an inversed 
Platonism that simply reverses a given traditional opposition at a given 
moment, all the while maintaining its hierarchical structure; rather, the other 
gesture of deconstruction performs a dismantling of the entire order of 
hierarchical binary structures. Accordingly, deconstruction does not rest at 
demonstrating how the primacy or superiority of one concept over another 
can be reversed; it also shows how the very structure upholding such an 
opposition fails to ground itself and is thus (dis)placed ‘en abyme’ where it 
“entame spontanément sa propre déconstruction.”50   
The insistence upon the necessity of such reversals and displacements in 
the hierarchically structured logic of oppositions is of course a heritage of 
Nietzsche’s venture towards a ‘revaluation of all values beyond good and 
evil.’ Yet, this Nietzschean heritage also brings with it an affirmative aspect 
of deconstruction, which overflows the critical–genealogical gesture of 
overturning. This is because in the dismantling of more or less rigid logics, 
                                           
49 POS, 57/41. 
50 PS, 88/82. 
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systems, or structures, deconstruction also releases the dissonant and 
disorganizing resources (dis)lodged in the fissures and hiatuses of their 
sediments that are excessive to and resist the rules and procedures of these 
logics, systems, or structures.  
At times, Derrida calls this other, affirmative gesture of deconstruction 
‘the invention of the other’ (l'invention de l'autre), because it entails the 
irruptive invention of the so-called infrastructural quasi-concepts that, to a 
certain extent, deconstruct the very concept of ‘concept,’ including their 
own, because in different ways they re-mark the otherness or heterogeneity 
always already at work in the act of conceiving or naming something as 
something. The quasi-concepts resist conceptualization by retaining a 
decisive undecidability that withholds them from becoming reinstalled in a 
hierarchical system structured by conceptual oppositions.51 This 
undecidability also entails that none of the quasi-concepts can occupy a 
superior or inferior position in relation to any of the others, nor function as a 
principle for the others; rather, one is substitutable by another even if none 
of them are synonymous. 
It is in light of this other ‘inventive’ or ‘affirmative’ deconstructive gesture 
that we must understand another negative statement regarding 
deconstruction that Derrida makes in his letter to a Japanese friend, namely 
that, in spite of appearances, “la deconstruction n’est ni une analyse ni une 
critique.”52 This hesitance towards identifying deconstruction with analysis 
leads us to our second methodological question regarding the reasons for 
bringing together deconstruction and psychoanalysis in this thesis—a 
complex question to which we shall attempt to respond only in brief. So, 
besides the palpable fact that Derrida’s engagement with psychoanalysis is 
long and persistent—spanning more than 35 years, during which Derrida 
engages, not only with the work of Freud and Lacan, but also with that of 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok53—why have we found it necessary to 
                                           
51 For instance, différance oscillates somewhere in between ‘difference or differentiation’ 
and ‘deferral or deferring’; the spacing in between ‘the timing of space’ and ‘the spacing 
of time’; the trace in between ‘a presence of absence’ and ‘an absence of presence’; the 
pharmakon in between ‘remedy’ and ‘poison’; the supplement in between ‘the additional’ 
and ‘the constitutive’; the parergon in between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’; et cetera—without, 
however, any of them being reducible to the determinations in between which they 
oscillate. 
52 PSY, 390/(II) 4. 
53 One of Derrida’s earliest texts from his engagement with psychoanalysis is “Freud et 
la scène de l’écriture” published in L’écriture et différence in 1967, while one of the last 
texts is États d’âmes de la psychanalyse: l’impossible au-delà d’une souveraine cruauté 
from 2000. In between, in 1976 Derrida’s text “Fors” was published as the foreword to 
Nicolas Abraham and Maria Torok’s Cryptonymie: le verbier de l’homme aux loups. 
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engage with both deconstruction and psychoanalysis in the course of this 
thesis? 
Heidegger had already emphasized a certain kinship between ‘analysis’ 
and what he called the ‘Destruktion’ or, echoing Husserl, the ‘Abbau’ of 
traditional metaphysics, which, as we have seen, Derrida translated into 
‘deconstruction.’ According to Heidegger, one of the oldest usages of the 
word analysis can be found in Homer’s Odyssey, where it is employed to 
describe the nocturnal occupation of Penelope whilst waiting for her 
husband’s return: “nämlich für ihr Auflösen des Gewebes, das sie tagsüber 
gewebt hatte.”54 As Heidegger further explains, the Greek άναλύειν refers to 
an unweaving of a weave, an unraveling of a knotted texture or a coming 
apart or dissolution of something into its elemental or component parts 
(Bestandteile).55  
Despite his refusal to reduce deconstruction to analysis, Derrida, in one of 
his most elaborate engagements with psychoanalysis entitled Résistances de 
la psychanalyse, nevertheless affirms that deconstruction “obéit 
indéniablement à une exigence analytique, à la fois critique et analytique. Il 
s’agit toujours de défaire, désédimenter, décomposer, déconstituer des 
sédiments, des artefacta, des présuppositions, des institutions.”56 However, 
as Derrida continues, deconstruction also takes its departure from a 
resistance against the two predominant motifs that orients analysis, that is, 
“le motif archéologique ou anagogique du retour vers l’ancien comme archi-
originaire et le motif philolytique de la déliaison dissociative.”57  
By calling the desire for the original and the belief in the elemental into 
question, deconstruction can, in a certain sense, be regarded as hyper-
analytic and hyper-critical insofar as it subjects analysis and criticism to a 
critical analysis, which results in their auto-deconstruction. However, the 
simultaneous insistence on and resistance to the analysis of deconstruction 
is not as paradoxical as it might seem, since, as Derrida argues, it is precisely 
“parce qu’il n’y a pas d’élément indivisible ou d’origine simple que l’analyse 
                                           
54 Zoll, 148. 
55 Derrida, to a certain extent, repeats this etymological interpretation of Heidegger, 
adding to it a Latin supplement: “Le mot grec analuein, c’est bien connu, signifie délier 
et donc aussi dissoudre le lien. Il se laisserait ainsi rigoureusement approcher, sinon 
traduire, par le solvere latin (détacher, délivrer, absoudre ou acquitter). La solutio et la 
resolutio ont à la fois le sens de la dissolution, du lien dissous, du dégagement, du 
désengagement ou de l’acquittement (par exemple de la dette) et de la solution du 
problème: explication ou dévoilement” (RES, 15/3). 
56 RES, 41/28. 
57 RES, 41/28. 
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est interminable.”58 This is a point where deconstruction comes into close, 
even if only tangential, contact with psychoanalysis, because psychoanalysis 
also contains hyper-analytic moments where analysis encounters its limit and 
a certain excessive and resistant remainder of analysis spurs on an 
interminable analysis.59  
These hyper-analytic moments, which at the same time resist and require 
analysis, take place at the uncircumventable place where Freud famously 
located the ‘knot,’ weave,’ ‘navel’ (Knäuel, Geflechts, Nabel), or the ‘netlike 
entanglement’ (netzartige Verstrickung) of the dream.60 However, these 
places of psychoanalysis, which to a certain extent are unanalyzable, do not 
call for a relinquishing of further analysis but solicits interminable analysis 
because they are abysmally unfathomable: “Jeder Traum hat mindestens eine 
Stelle, an welcher er unergründlich ist, gleichsam einen Nabel, durch den er 
mit dem Unerkannten zusammenhängt.”61  
Thus, psychoanalysis works not only with the premonition (Ahnung) of a 
‘hidden sense’ (Verborgne Sinn) to be deciphered by the analytic desire, but 
also with the omphalos of an absolute unknown, which remains absolved 
from analysis even while spurring it on, and which designates an 
impenetrable, inexhaustible, and irresolvable topos (Stelle) that the desiring 
analyst must therefore leave in the obscure (im Dunkel lassen).62 One can 
perhaps say that this tension in psychoanalysis between a resolving and 
terminable analysis aiming at a ‘cure’ or a ‘completed interpretational work’ 
(vollendeter Deutungsarbeit)63 and an interminable analysis confronted with 
the irresolvable that no longer belongs to the reserve of analysis but rather 
exceeds it, also makes psychoanalysis into something of a ‘double science.’  
As these considerations indicate, what is at issue concerning the ‘remains 
of a self’ with which this thesis is engaged is the shared resistance of 
psychoanalysis and deconstruction against that which, as Derrida writes in 
                                           
58 RES, 48/33–34. At times, Derrida even puts deconstruction and interminable analysis 
on the same footing. Cf. PdM, 23/51. 
59  Derrida also remarks on this proximity in distance, when he writes that deconstruction 
happens “en un coin, introuvable dans l’espace d’une topologie ou d’une géométrie 
objectives, là, entre la restance et la résistance: dans le re- d’une répétition qui, ne répétant 
ou ne représentant rien qui soit avant elle ou devant elle […] dans leur entre même, dans 
leur entrelacement, leur invagination chiasmatique, leur symplokè ou leur Geflecht; toutes 
ces figures apparaissaient en série à l’analyse, tout en y dérobant la présence pleine de 
leur comme tel, s’annonçant plutôt que se donnant à l’analyse” (RES, 44–45/30). 
60 GW II/III, 530. 
61 GW II/III, 116. 
62 GW II/III, 530. 
63 Cf. GW II/III, 126. See also Freud’s essay ‘Die endliche und die unendliche Analyse’ 
from 1937 (GW XVI, 57–99). 
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his essay “Moi—la psychanalyse,” “aura toujours lié le sens à la 
présentabilité.”64 In other words, both ‘double sciences’ are concerned with 
what essentially escapes (re)presentation—traces, resistances, repetitions, 
returns, specters, and hauntings, all of which signal towards an excess of 
analysis and of ‘proper’ knowledge—both in the sense of a property of 
ownership and a pure propriety, since, as Derrida writes, “plus tien n’est 
propre ici.”65 Accordingly, the question of both psychoanalysis and 
deconstruction is also “de part en part la question de la traduction,”66 since 
they are, each in different ways, confronted with the difficult task of 
translating the almost untranslatable—whether this is called the unconscious, 
the idiom, singularity, or otherwise. 
Deconstruction has to translate what essentially escapes translation 
because its meaning is already disseminated, already different from itself; 
psychoanalysis has to translate into the discourse of consciousness what 
essentially escapes it. One insight from Freudian psychoanalysis is that 
consciousness may not be the most general or prevalent character of the 
psychical processes (nicht der allgemeinste Charakter der seelischen 
Vorgänge) but only one particular function among others.67 To Derrida, this 
psychoanalytic insight that the subject is not just a unified and self-
transparent ego, but rather endlessly divided and multiplied in itself, obliges 
us to reconsider not only the concepts of ‘subject,’ ‘self,’ ‘(self-) 
consciousness,’ and ‘reason,’ but also those of ‘autonomy,’ ‘freedom,’ 
‘responsibility,’ and, I will argue, also ‘solitude.’ 
On a final note, I will say that the readings in this thesis, like any reading, 
will obey the unavoidable ‘law of selective economy,’68 seeing as the texts 
with which it engages far exceed its limits. This means there will be 
filterings, discriminations, calculated citation, omissions, and a whole series 
of mechanisms that—more or less abusively, more or less shamelessly—
make the texts accommodate the limited context and perspective of the 
thesis. Nevertheless, my intention has been to try to open the texts by 
drawing attention to their inexhaustible ambiguities, contradictions, and 
divergences, and thereby not to pretend to provide an exhaustive reading of 
                                           
64 PSY, 154/(I) 138. For instance, Derrida writes that the hiatus which separates the ‘I’ 
and the ‘me’ escapes phenomenological reflexivity and thereby “l’autorité de la présence 
à soi et à tout ce qu’elle commande. Ce hiatus de la non-présence à soi conditionne le 
sens dont la phénoménologie fait son thème mail il n’est lui-même ni un sens ni une 
présence” (PSY, 147–148/(I) 131–132). 
65 PSY, 153/(I) 137.  
66 PSY, 387/(II) 1. 
67 Cf. GW XIII, 23. 
68 PC, 397/372. 
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them, but instead trying to exempt them from “la requête de dernière 
instance, voire d’instance tout court.”69 Not least because it is my assumption 
that this thesis shares with both psychoanalysis and deconstruction the 
conjecture that, in the non-closing words of Derrida, “il reste toujours à 
analyser.”70 
  
                                           
69 PC, 279/261. 
70 RES, 49/34. 
  
I. THE SOLITUDE OF NOT BEING ABLE TO BE ALONE 
 
 
Dans le sommeil, on dort, il n’y a pas de moi et personne que du spectre, 
 arrachement du tétême de l’être, par d’autres êtres (à ce moment-là éveillés),  
de ce qui fait que l’on est un corps 
–  Antonin Artaud, Suppôts et Supplications 
 
 
J’ai toujours eu la sensation qu’il y avait en moi un être assassiné.  
Assassiné avant ma naissance. 
 Il me fallait retrouver cet être assassiné.  
Tenté de lui redonner vie. 
 – Samuel Beckett, Rencontres  
 
 
 
I.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to begin drawing up the contours of the strange sounding ‘solitude 
of not being able to be alone,’ perhaps it would be helpful to turn to the very 
place where it first made itself noticeable to me, namely, in the writings of 
Antonin Artaud. More specifically, my initial encounter with this sense of 
solitude took place when reading Artaud’s text Van Gogh le suicidé de la 
société published in 1947—just one year before his death. On my reading, 
this unique piece of writing offers an extraordinary reflection, or perhaps 
more of a resonance, both of and on this specific sense of solitude that stems 
from not being able to be alone. One paragraph in particular makes this 
apparent, which is why we will render it in its entirety. Here is Artaud:  
 
De plus, on ne se suicide pas tout seul.  
Nul n’a jamais été seul pour naître.  
Nul non plus n’est seul pour mourir. 
Mais, dans le cas de suicide, il faut une armée de mauvais êtres pour décider le 
corps au geste contre nature de se priver de sa propre vie. 
Et je crois qu’il y a toujours quelqu’un d’autre à la minute de la mort extrême pour 
nous dépouiller de notre propre vie71  
 
One of the striking features of this paragraph is that even though it laments 
the impossibility of ever being completely alone on one’s own, not even at 
the moment of death where no one can accompany another, it still exudes an 
immense sense of solitude. The question that therefore suggests itself is how 
                                           
71 OC XIII, 61/SW, 511. 
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to understand this sense of solitude that appears to be essentially bound up 
with the impossibility of being alone by and with oneself. Were we to suggest 
a first preliminary response to this question it might come in the form of an 
exclusion, since such a sense of solitude does not appear to be a serene 
solitude of voluntary and possibly self-authenticating seclusion, or a 
withdrawal into some individual, insular, or solipsistic solidity. Nor, 
however, does it appear to be a solitude of involuntary isolation, let alone a 
longing for the company of others. Instead, the voice that seems to speak in 
Artaud’s text, almost inaudibly, like a murmur, resembles an incessantly 
interrupted solitude. It resembles a solitude of profoundly superficial 
restlessness and unease, which seems to suffer from its inability to become 
properly solitary, as if from a distance within itself that keeps it from ever 
being completely alone with itself, almost to the point of being bereft of 
itself—that is, like a solitude without solitude.72 
Why, then, retain the word solitude? To this question, another tentative 
response could be that one bereft of his or her (as if there were only two 
genders) own solitude is also the only one left to answer for this theft, that 
is, the sole one responsible for the disrobement and dispropriation of his or 
her own solitude. Accordingly, there is still a relation to solitude even if such 
a relation is only sustained in the experience of its own impossibility; and 
yet the impossibility of relating to one’s own solitude may be the utmost 
solitary experience.  
Other aspects of the relation between responsibility and solitude will be 
developed in the concluding remarks. In the present chapter, however, my 
intention is to explore and expound upon the experience of a dispropriated 
solitude understood precisely as a solitude bereft of itself because of its 
inability to be alone with itself. In order to further sketch out such 
‘dispropriated solitude,’ we will proceed with our reading of Artaud’s texts, 
guided and inspired by the seminal readings provided and transmitted to us 
by Derrida over a course of more than three decades.73 In particular, 
Derrida’s 1965 essay on Artaud “La parole soufflée,” wherein he pursues 
what he calls the ‘structure of theft’ or the ‘structure of disrobement’ 
                                           
72 As Allen has put it, this solitude is “an imperfect solitude insofar as it is complex rather 
than simple, shared rather than unitary, and inescapable rather than isolated” (Allen 2015, 
69). 
73 As such, Derrida’s engagement with Artaud, his writings and drawings, has been 
persistent throughout most of his philosophical carrier. I shall mention four of Derrida’s 
most remarkable texts on Artaud here: “La parole soufflée” from 1965 (ED, 253–
292/169–195); “Le théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la representation” from 1966 (ED, 
341–368/232–250); “Forcener le subjectile” (AA, 55–105/61–148); Artaud le Moma—
Interjections d’appel from 2002. 
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(structure du vol ou dérobement), which he sees as permeating most of 
Artaud’s work, will be of utmost importance throughout this chapter. Before 
we go any further into the investigation of this structure, however, allow me 
first to make some brief remarks about certain difficulties in reading and 
writing on Artaud.  
 
 
I.2 A PRELIMINARY REMARK ON THE CRITICAL AND THE CLINICAL 
In “La parole soufflée,” Derrida suggests that a certain naïvité is 
indispensable for approaching the textual corpus of Artaud. Among other 
things, this suggestion concerns the way in which Artaud’s texts have been 
subjected to both critical and clinical exegesis, which, in Derrida’s view, 
share the tendency of making ‘examples’ or ‘cases’ out of their subject 
matters.74 In other words, both the clinical and the critical discourses risk 
constructing the texts with which they are engaged into examples of a more 
general essence or an underlying or overarching structure—whether this be 
the ‘essence of poetry’ or the ‘structure of schizophrenia’—thereby 
inevitably reducing that which in these texts singularly or idiosyncratically 
resists such reductions.75  
According to Derrida, the clinical and the critical discourses can only 
uphold their procedures by maintaining a reference to metaphysical dualities 
such as those between ‘mind’ and ‘body,’ ‘author’ and ‘text,’ ‘life’ and 
‘thought,’ ‘example’ and ‘exemplary,’ or ‘work’ and ‘madness’—even if the 
aim is to criticize them.76 For Derrida, the pressing problem with reading 
Artaud through such binary lens of either the critical or the clinical is that it 
is precisely the whole arsenal of such binary distinctions, which Artaud 
unrelentingly and persistently calls into question, or puts on trial, in order to 
make manifest the vacillating ground of their dissociation. Therefore, when 
confronted with the unruliness of a text whose madness is not distinct from 
its reason or whose ‘material body’ is not distinct from its ‘eidetic form,’ “la 
                                           
74 On Derrida’s critical deconstruction of the logic of the example and its political 
implications, see Michael Naas’ introduction to the English translation of L'autre cap. Cf. 
AC, vii–lix. 
75 We should note, however, that in one of his écrits Lacan also calls for the necessity of 
a certain ignorance in order to avoid violating and to open up a space for the unforeseen 
and undecidable singularity of the analysand when working within the clinical discourse. 
As a reminder of the analyst’s never omniscient point of view in the relation to the 
analysand, Lacan therefore emphasizes the necessity “de son ignorance toujours neuve à 
ce qu’aucun ne soit un cas” (Écrits, 824/699).  
76 Cf. ED, 260/174. 
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réduction psychologique et la réduction éidétique fonctionnent de la même 
manière, ont à leur insu la même fin.”77  
Derrida stresses the difficulty of reading Artaud even for an infinitely 
attentive and profound reader as Blanchot, who risks falling prey to the 
movement of exemplification when he presents Artaud as yet another poetic 
victim of and witness to the scandalous separation of thought from life, in 
line with other exemplary examples of poetic insight such as Hölderlin or 
Mallarmé.78 For Derrida, the main reason for Blanchot’s risk of succumbing 
to such exemplification is that, even though he recognizes that Artaud will 
never accept a separation between life and thought, he still leaves out 
“l’affirmation propre qui soutient la non-acceptation de ce scandale.”79 Yet, 
as Derrida stresses, it is precisely this idiosyncratic affirmation of non-
acceptance that produces the resistance of Artaud’s writing to 
exemplification thus reserving and retreating the secret of his texts from the 
judgments of clinical or critical exegesis. 
 Derrida’s insistence on displaying a certain naïveté in his writing on 
Artaud’s body of texts therefore has a double concern; it concerns an 
‘ignorance,’ or at any rate a suspension of judgment, as to whether this body 
belongs to either of these discourses—the clinical or the critical—but it also 
concerns the way in which this body to a certain extent deconstructs and 
thereby exceeds the very difference within which both of these discourses 
operate.80  
In questioning the shared tendency of the critical and clinical discourses—
notwithstanding their methodological and conceptual differences—towards 
exemplification in confrontation with what exceeds exemplification, that is, 
with the singular or the unique, Derrida argues that this tendency is so strong 
                                           
77 ED, 255/171. 
78 Cf. LV, 58/40. 
79 ED, 256/171. We shall return to Blanchot’s reading of Artaud in a later section of this 
chapter.  
80 According to Derrida, any diminishment of such naïveté would require that a genuine 
dialogue between the critical and the clinical discourses would finally be opened, and for 
that, Derrida says, “il eût fallu attendre longtemps” (ED, 253/169). Twenty-eight years 
after Derrida’s “La parole soufflée,” Deleuze published his Critique et clinique (1993), 
in which he reopens and reengages precisely with a discussion of the relation between a 
supposedly critical and a supposedly clinical discourse. More significantly, however, in 
these essays Deleuze also displaces the discussion of the critical and the clinical insofar 
as he writes ‘beyond’ their opposition in a zone of indiscernibility between these two 
regions of discourse. A zone that could perhaps be called ‘literature’ or ‘writing’ since, 
as Deleuze writes: “Ecrire est une affaire de devenir, toujours inachevé, toujours en train 
de se faire, et qui déborde toute matière vivable ou vécue. C’est un processus, c’est-à-dire 
un passage de Vie qui traverse le vivable et le vécu” (Deleuze 1993, 11/1).  
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because by definition “de l’unique il n’est rien dit.”81 In other words, it is 
precisely because there is nothing to say about the absolutely unique without, 
at the same time, reinscribing it in the general economy of what is sayable, 
that the question of the unique is inseparably bound up with the logic of the 
example—understood either as a sample of or as a model for something more 
general or universal, or both at the same time—wherefore the notion of a 
‘unique example’ or an ‘example of the unique’ must remain irreducibly 
paradoxical or even impossible.  
However, Derrida’s naïvité does not amount to a belief in the sanctity of 
the unique or the purity of the singular over against the reductive structures 
of generality or essentiality, and when he reproaches both the critical and the 
clinical discourses for their silent resignation in confrontation with the 
unique, it is not because he believes in the possibility, or even in the 
desirability, of recovering such singular uniqueness in an expression that 
would be uncontaminated by such structures. On the contrary, Derrida 
objects to this silent resignation before the unique precisely because, as he 
proclaims, “nous croyions à la nécessité de réduire l’unique, de l’analyser, 
de le decomposer en le brisant davantage.”82 In other words, Derrida’s 
reproach to both the critical and the clinical discourses concerns the 
circumventions that they make in order to avoid engaging with the 
unavoidability of the generality and iterability that makes the singular 
repeatable, and with impossibility of ever obtaining a discourse idiomatic 
enough to capture and express the unique in its pure difference—not least 
because, as Derrida puts it elsewhere: “Le désir de l’idiome, rien n’est moins 
idiomatique.”83 Despite the unavoidable necessity of analyzing the 
singularly unique, however, Derrida pays close attention to that which 
nevertheless continues to resist such analysis, thereby making it 
interminable. Hence, Derrida concludes his remarks on the yet-to-be-opened 
discussion between the clinical and the critical:   
 
Si Artaud résiste absolument—et, croyonsnous, comme on ne l’avait jamais fait 
auparavant—aux exégèses cliniques ou critiques—c’est parce qui dans son 
aventure (et par ce mot nous désignons une totalité antérieure à la séparation de la 
                                           
81 ED, 257/172. 
82 ED, 260/174. 
83 CP, 382/360. As Derrida remarks in a footnote to “La clôture de la représentation” the 
desire to reintroduce a purity into the concept of difference ends up returning it to non-
difference, because a pure difference would no longer be different from a pure identity. 
According to Derrida, one only escapes returning difference to non-difference is one 
attamps to think “la différence comme impureté d’origine, c’est-à-dire comme différance 
dans l’économie finie du même” (ED, 366/333). 
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vie et de l’oeuvre) est la protestation elle-même contre l’exemplification elle-
même.84   
 
Furthermore, if Artaud’s texts forcefully push us into thinking about 
singularity—even if this thought is nothing more than an interminable 
analysis of that which secretly resists analysis—then, as Derrida continues, 
“ce n’est plus comme l’exemple d’une structure puisqu’il s’agit de cela 
même—le vol—qui constitue la structure d’exemple comme telle.”85 If one 
therefore to some extent writes ‘on Artaud,’ as one says, one does so only as 
one writes on what Artaud calls a subjectile, that is, as a textual material that 
withdraws itself secretly in offering its surface as the support for ever 
renewed inscriptions.86 
In what follows, we will return to these themes of idiosyncratic resistance, 
secrecy, and singularity, as well as to their respective relations to solitude. 
First, however, we will have to attend in more detail to the above-mentioned 
structure of theft, brought to our attention by Derrida in the attempt to 
illustrate its permeation of Artaud’s work.  
 
 
I.3 ARTAUD AND THE STRUCTURE OF THEFT  
Resisting the temptation of making them into examples of a particular genre, 
experiences of deprivation, dispropriation, and theft are scattered throughout 
Artaud’s texts. Artaud writes repeatedly of experiences of having been stolen 
from himself, from his own birth, and from a death of his own. He writes of 
a sense of having his body, his breath, and his speech spirited away from 
him, and of being disrobed and vacated in and by his own thinking as well 
as in and by other modes of both impression and expression and inspiration 
and expiration.  
Indeed, for Artaud the very respirational condition of existing constitutes 
a symptom of the fundamental or, more precisely, the abyssal structure of 
theft, which makes him consider his whole existence as having been exiled 
or aborted from its origin (ab-oriri) and as being continuously carried away 
or miscarried by something elusive, stealthy, or furtive. The motifs of 
                                           
84 ED, 261/175. 
85 ED, 262/175. 
86 As Derrida explains, the notion of the subjectile “appartient au code de la peinture et 
désigne ce qui est en quelque sorte couché dessous (sub-jectum) comme une substance, 
un sujet ou un succube. Entre le dessous et le dessus, c’est à la fois un support et une 
surface, parfois aussi la matiére d’une peinture ou d’une sculpture, tout ce qui en ells se 
distinguerait de la forme, autant que du sens et de la représentation, ce qui n’est pas 
représentable. Sa profondeur ou son épaisseur présumées ne donnent à voir qu’une 
superficie […]. Une sorte de peau, trouée de pores” (AA, 56/64). 
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abortion and birth, as of aborted births, are recurrent throughout Artaud’s 
writings, as is the stealthy work of death and the waste products it perpetually 
leaves behind. Moreover, it is not only the respiratory but also the alimentary 
condition of existence that Artaud experiences as thieving, but also as 
intrusive and violating with regard to any sense of autonomy or 
independence of the one existing. 
It is not only that as existing one constantly and involuntarily has to take 
in something of the ‘outside’—inhale oxygen, uptake nutrition, et cetera—
in order to continue existing. It is also that once one has taken in this ‘outside’ 
one cannot even fully absorb, appropriate, or digest its otherness in order to 
make it into one’s own, even though one’s entire existence depends on it. 
Something or other will always remain inappropriable and indigestive, 
leaving one with no choice but to somehow abject or excrete these leftovers 
of otherness without these processes being able to entirely purge themselves 
of their traces of alienation—thus upsetting the very distinction between 
‘inside and outside’ or ‘other and own.’87 Perhaps one could say that Artaud 
experiences the movement of dialectics gone astray since there is no ‘own’ 
other to be reappropriated via negativa by someone who would then come to 
be confirmed retrospectively as the proper owner.   
Artaud’s conclusion therefore appears to be that there is nothing pure 
about existing. Rather, to exist means to have always already received the 
imprint of impropriety, always already to have been exiled from one’s own 
property—and no matter how fervently Artaud nevertheless continually 
attempt to extract a purity of ‘life’ from this exile the very fact of its 
originally contaminated existence cannot be undone.88 This originary 
impropriety of existing is also the reason why, with some precaution, we can 
make the prefatory suggestion here that Artaud’s writing bears testimony to 
the fact that a proper birth of one’s own will always have been aborted, just 
as a proper death of one’s own, as we glimpsed in the initial quote, will 
                                           
87 For instance, we read in Artaud le Mômo from 1947: “L’imposition du dehors qui dort 
/ comme un dedans, eclate des latrines / du canal où l’on chie la mort” (OC XII, 31/WRS, 
121). And further ahead, Artaud le mômo will write that the creation of the fact of being 
or existence that we call ‘reality,’ is nothing more than the outcome of a criminal 
fornication of non-being with the possibility of chance: “D’une préméditation de non-
être, d’une criminelle incitation de peut-etre est venue la réalité, comme du hasard qui la 
forniguait” (OC XII, 36/WRS, 125). 
88 Following a lecture by the psychiatrist José Solanes on the vicissitudes of exile, Artaud 
wrote him a letter in 1945 expressing his sympathy and understanding for what he had 
undergone in being expatriated from his native country. Artaud compares this state of 
political exile with the state of exile in which he finds his body and soul: “car le corps est 
comme une interne patrie dont aucun morceau ne doit être enlevé sans voir exiler chaque 
fois un peu d’âme” (OC XI, 161). 
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always remain in deferral, since—‘il y a toujours quelqu’un d’autre à la 
minute de la mort extrême pour nous dépouiller de notre propre vie.’ 
Throughout the years, especially at Rodez and afterwards,89 Artaud’s 
writings on the different aspects of the structure of theft—alimentational, 
respirational, or spiritual—become increasingly occupied with theological, 
scatological, and secretional vocabularies and focused on their essential 
interconnections. Texts such as the Cahiers de Rodez, Artaud le Mômo, and 
the late radio play Pour en finir avec le jugement de dieu (1947) are thus 
infused with images relating God and the genesis to the original and 
structural theft of any proper life. Accordingly, Artaud describes his 
improper life as being “emprunté, vole et violé de Dieu”90 and as existing 
only in terms of the “parasitisme de Dieu sur moi.”91 As such, ‘God’ will 
become the proper name, or the name par excellence, designating the furtive 
and thieving other who continually purloins my body from me by spiriting it 
away and separates me from myself by aborting my birth and suspending 
any relation to a death of my own.92  
In the French title of Derrida’s essay “La parole soufflée,” which is left 
untranslated in the English text, the verb souffler brings together a whole 
series of meanings significant to the structure of theft in Artaud’s text. These 
meanings all have something to do with respirational mechanisms, not only 
with breathing, inhaling, exhaling, losing one’s breath in astonishment, 
suffocating, and so forth, but also with the Latin spirare of spirituality, 
inspiration, and with being spirited away.93 Of particular importance in “La 
parole souflée,” however, is the fact that one has to draw in breath in order 
to be able to speak; and, in Derrida’s view, Artaud’s work comes to establish 
an essential yet furtive communication between “l’essence du vol et l’origine 
du discours en général.”94 This communication between theft and discourse 
will be a recurrent motif in Artaud’s work, from early till late, but it will 
                                           
89 From 1942–46 Artaud was a patient at the psychiatric hospital in Rodez. The Cahiers 
de Rodez constitutes volumes 15–21 of the OC and is a compilation of Artaud’s letters 
and other documents from these years of internment.  
90 OC XV, 147.  
91 OC XV, 304–5. 
92 Derrida even calls Artaud’s thinking and writing on the relation between the thieving 
god and the disrobement of man a ‘scato-theology.’ With reference to Freud, Derrida 
explains: “La défécation ‘séparation quotidienne d’avec les selles, parties précieuses du 
corps’ (Freud) est, comme une naissance, comme ma naissance, le premier vol qui à la 
fois me dé-précie et me souille. C’est pourquoi l’histoire de Dieu comme généalogie de 
la valeur dérobée se récite comme l’histoire de la défécation” (ED, 270–271/182). 
93 One of Artaud’s mantras, which he repeats in a manifold of ways, reads: “devenir corps 
en entier, dans la haine de la spiritualité” (OC XIV, 2; 48).  
94 ED, 262/175. 
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continually change its emphasis and operate at different levels: sometimes at 
the level of thinking; sometimes at the level of speaking; sometimes at the 
level of language or signification in general; and most often at several levels 
at once. We will therefore proceed by trying to unravel some of these levels 
through different down-strokes in Artaud’s text.  
In one of his letters to Jacques Rivière, the editorial director of La Nouvelle 
Revue Française,95 Artaud describes how ‘something furtive’ (quelque 
chose de furtif) continually steals away his thoughts and robs him of his 
words in order to leave his speech, his thinking, and his very existence in 
abeyance.96 In his ‘extraordinary precision’ of self-diagnosis, as Rivière calls 
it, Artaud observes the strange mechanism by which the closer and more 
meticulously he inspects his mental activities and movements of thinking, 
the more they seem to lose any supposed continuity, solidity, or 
substantiality. A couple of years following the correspondence with Rivière, 
in 1925, Artaud will name this highly refined ability of meticulous self-
scrutiny his ‘nerve meter’ (pèse-nerfs) with which, as he writes, “Je me 
considère dans ma minutie.”97  
The aim and desire of Artaud’s nerve metering is to reappropriate the 
perpetual dispropriation of his thoughts in order to become able: “Penser 
sans rupture minime, sans chausse-trape dans la pensée, sans l’un de ces 
escamotages subits dont mes moelles sont coutumières comme postes-
émetteurs de courants.”98 However, the more painstakingly sophisticated his 
methods of auto-inspection become, the clearer all the little gaps, faults, 
halts, unadmitted slips, and imperceptible lapses stand out and reveal the 
discontinuous and interrupted mesh-work of what is called thinking.99 It is 
                                           
95 In 1923 Artaud submitted some of his poetry for publication in La Nouvelle Revue 
Française. Rivière declined to publish the poems but in return expressed interest in the 
biography and pathology of their author. After some time of exchanging letters, Rivière 
finally suggested that he publish their correspondence instead, which Artaud agreed to on 
the condition that at least an excerpt of the poetry discussed in the letters were to be 
included. The correspondence ended up including just one poem, “Cri,” published in 
1927. 
96 Cf. Artaud, OC I, 36/SW, 35. In another of these letters, Artaud makes an explicit 
reference to his aborted existence, which he nonetheless still seeks to reappropriate: “Car 
je ne puis pas espérer que le temps ou le travail remédieront à ces obscurités ou à ces 
défaillances, voilà pourquoi je réclame avec tant d’insistance et d’inquiétude, cette 
existence même avortée” (OC I, 31/SW, 32). 
97 OC I, 119/SW, 85. 
98 OC I, 108/SW, 81. 
99 When Artaud discerns a “séparation anormale des éléments” in his thinking, along with 
“l’impulsion à penser, à chacune des stratifications terminales de la pensée, en passant 
par tous les états, toutes les bifurcations de la pensée et de la forme” (OC I, 36/SW, 35), 
his scrutinizing auto-inspections and his awareness of the paradoxes of reflexivity come 
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not that thought thereby loses all coherent sense, but rather that sense comes 
to disclose itself as being conditioned by intervals of nonsensical vacuity. 
Thus, in Fragments d’un journal d’enfer from 1925, Artaud will lament the 
discovery of his nerve meter: “Ni mon cri ni ma fièvre ne sont de moi. […] 
j’ai comme une conscience nouvelle de mon intime déperdition.”100  
This hyperawareness of unawareness, that is, the hyperawareness of all 
the leakages, holes, and gaping intervals, not only in the fabric of thinking 
but also of language and of bodily existence, along with the desire to mend 
them, is a recurrent subject in Artaud’s writings and drawings.101 
Undoubtedly, Artaud’s hyperawareness of instances of vacuity in awareness 
stems from tormenting experiences of self-abandonment or theft of self, but, 
as we shall come to see, they are also an effect of the very austere demand 
for thinking to which Artaud, at least in his earlier writings, complies. This 
demand for thinking stems from Artaud’s definition of what it means, not 
merely to think, but to have thought sensu stricto. 
In a lengthy footnote to the passage in L’ombilic des limbes entitled 
“Lettre a Monsieur le législateur de la loi sur les stupéfiants” also from 1925, 
Artaud concisely explains why he insists upon the thought that he has no 
                                           
very close to resembling the ‘hyperreflexivity’ that Louis A. Sass has found to be a 
movement of thought particularly prevalent in people who have been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia. Sass describes hyperreflexivity as an excessive alertness toward the very 
structure of thinking that continuously analyzes the thought processes while they proceed, 
breaking them up, and picking them apart into dismembered pieces separated by intervals 
of vacuity. This incessant decomposition of any composition of thought can lead to a 
radical detachment and “entrapment in a sort of morbid wakefulness or hyperawareness” 
(Sass 1992, 8). In a later article, Sass draws explicit attention to Artaud’s 
‘autobiographical’ writings as a first hand description of an ‘operative hyperreflexivity.’ 
See Sass 2003, 153–180. The question is, however, whether anyone, regardless of their 
diagnosis or lack of diagnosis, would experience such discontinuity, inconsistency, and 
obscurity if they subjected their thought processes to the same vigilant scrutiny as Artaud.  
100 OC I, 135–136/SW, 91. 
101 As Deleuze emphasizes in Logique du sens, this hyperawareness of holes and leakages 
pertains to the experience of the schizophrenic body, which Deleuze explains as follows: 
“Le premier aspect du corps schizophrénique, c’est une sorte de corps-passoire: Freud 
soulignait cette aptitude du schizophrène à saisir la surface et la peau comme percée d’une 
infinité de petits trous. La conséquence en est que le corps tout entier n’est plus que 
profondeur, et emporte, happe toutes choses dans cette profondeur béante qui représente 
une involution fondamentale. […] Comme il n’y a pas de surface, l’intérieur et l’extérieur, 
le contenant et le contenu n’ont plus de limite précise” (Deleuze 1969, 106–107/87). Yet 
the skin is in fact somewhat of a meshwork of little holes and the experience of a 
schizophrenic body as penetrated by the outside as its insides are exposed in and to the 
outside need not be limited to the clinical diagnosis of schizophrenia even if it might be 
more conspicuous and more intense within its domain.  
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thought, even if this odd claim makes his friends laugh (nervous laughs 
perhaps) and try to prove the opposite.  
To be sure, Artaud acknowledges that he cannot claim not to be thinking 
at all, since that would simply mean to be without any brain activity 
whatsoever, and yet he nevertheless maintains that there is a difference 
between merely thinking and having thought. The well-meaning attempts by 
his friends to prove to Artaud that he is in fact thinking, for instance by 
demonstrating his capacity to think something adequately or correctly with 
respect to ideas, norms, or objects on which they can agree, that is, in 
correspondence with some sensus communis, are not sufficient in convincing 
him of his having thought. This is so, Artaud explains, because “avoir de la 
pensée, pour moi, c’est maintenir sa pensée, être en état de se la manifester 
à soi-même et qu’elle puisse réprondre à toutes les circonstances du 
sentiment et de la vie. Mais principalement se réprondre à soi.”102 In other 
words, for Artaud having thought means that not only should one maintain 
or sustain one’s thought—by which he means that one should be constantly 
conscious of the movements and contents of one’s thought—, one should 
also be responsible for one’s thought by having it respond to oneself at all 
times.  
In order to legitimately testify to oneself, and others, that one is actually 
thinking or having thought, one should never, not even for the smallest lapse 
of time, be absent-minded or let the movements or the contents of one’s 
thoughts escape one’s hold on them (main-tenir). Not being entirely aware 
of every little intricacy in the workings of one’s thinking is, in Artaud’s view, 
the same as not actually thinking at all, that is, as not having thought due to 
letting it slip through one’s fingers. Artaud unfolds his strict demand for 
proper thinking as follows:  
 
[C]’est ne cesser à aucun moment de se sentir dans son être interne, dans la masse 
informulée de sa vie, dans la substance de sa réalité, c’est ne pas sentir en soi de 
trou capital, d’absence vitale, c’est sentir toujours sa pensée égale à sa pensée, 
quelles que soient par ailleurs les insuffisances de la forme qu’on est capable de lui 
donner.103 
 
From these requirements of sustainability and responsibility, we see that for 
Artaud having thought signifies nothing less than the absolute self-presence, 
self-sensing, and self-transparency of thinking by and to itself. That is to say, 
a thinking capable of hearing itself speak with full clarity and of responding 
to itself immediately with equal clarity and without intermediary or 
                                           
102 OC I, 82/SW, 69. 
103 OC I, 83/SW, 70. 
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interruption thereby eliminating the possibility of misunderstanding, 
uncertainty, doubt, conflict, or splitting.104  
At this crucial point, as with many other points, in Artaud’s writing we 
come to encounter a desire for what one—with Derrida in mind—could call 
a ‘pure auto-affection,’ that is, a desire for a complete  convergence between 
the affecting and the affected. Also remarkable about this desire as it is 
manifested in Artaud’s ideal demand for ‘having thought’ is its close 
proximity to the Aristotelian conception of the ‘thought thinking thought’ 
(νόησις νοήσεως νόησις), understood precisely as a thought that thinks itself 
immediately without any difference or distance, not even that of time, 
interrupting its relationship with itself—wherefore Aristotle conceives of it 
as eternal.105 Yet, as Derrida has shown in one of his elaborations of auto-
affection, the auto-affection of a finite existence will always turn out impure 
                                           
104 In this regard, it is of relevance to note that Melanie Klein, in her fine little text “On 
the Sense of Loneliness” from 1963, has suggested that the sense of what she calls 
loneliness (and not solitude), irrespective of any external circumstances, is “the result of 
an ubiquitous yearning for an unattainable perfect internal state.” Klein explains this 
yearning as emerging from the double bind of existence that “together with the urge to 
split there is from the beginning of life a drive towards integration”, the prime example 
being the necessity of the infant to split itself off from the symbiotic relationship with the 
mother in order to reconstruct an integrated ego-identity of its own. However, the 
splittings necessary for the constitution of an ego-identity leave traces of an irretrievable 
loss (of wordless understanding, of wholeness, of symbiosis) and no matter how strongly 
the integration process proceeds “it cannot do away with the feeling that certain 
component of the self are not available because they are split off and cannot be regained.” 
Furthermore, Klein remarks that in the schizophrenic condition these split-off parts of the 
self continues to haunt the self with such a force that “the schizophrenic feels that he is 
hopelessly in bits and that he will never be in possession of his self.” Finally, the excessive 
use of projective identification the schizophrenic therefore enacts causes him to 
experience himself “not only to be in bits, but to be mixed up with other people” (Klein 
2011, 303–313). We will return in more detail to the psychoanalytic understanding of an 
originary split or cut in the succeeding chapters on Freud and Lacan.  
105 In book 12 of the Metaphysics Aristotle writes of this idol of the eternal mind: 
“Therefore Mind thinks itself, if it is that which is best; and its thinking is a thinking of 
thinking” (Met. 1074b). The life of this self-thinking thought, Aristotle further says, is a 
supreme joy comparable only to what we might enjoy for a brief span of time (μικρὸν 
χρόνον) in our temporal lives, since it is both the object and the subject of its own desire 
and thus able to enjoy its own pleasure, or its pleasure of itself—immediately, that is, 
without distance, interval, or mediation and without the resistance of time. Thus Aristotle 
infers that self-thinking thought must be eternal, which leads to his influential corrective 
of Plato’s source of motion as ‘that which moves itself’ (τὸ αὐτὸ ἑαυτὸ κινοῦν). According 
to Aristotle, the principle of movement cannot itself have been moved, not even by itself, 
since that would already presuppose the time of movement; rather, “there is something 
which moves without being moved; something eternal which is both substance and 
actuality” (Met. 1072a). See also, Lawrence 1988, 155–174.  
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since it will always already have been haunted—“mais constitutivement 
hantée”106—by some infinitesimal hetero-affection related to the spacing of 
time, also famously called différance.107  
Derrida’s deconstructive engagements with the structure of auto-affection 
are manifold and the technicalities intricate and difficult. In order to offer a 
brief, and no doubt insufficient, clarification of the deconstruction of auto-
affectivity I will therefore restrict my focus to one such instance of 
engagement in an early text only recently published.108 In his 1964–1965 
seminar Heidegger: la question de l’Être et l’Histoire, Derrida reads 
Heidegger’s Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik of 1929, where 
Heidegger discusses the aporia of time as pure auto-affection (die Zeit als 
reine Selbstaffektion) as it is laid out in Kant’s first Critique. The aporia that 
Kant envisages in his transcendental aesthetics on time concerns the fact that 
the relation to oneself can never be immediate since it is always already 
affected by its own relating to itself. Kant explains:  
 
Wenn das Vermögen sich bewußt zu werden, das, was im Gemüte liegt, aufsuchen 
(apprehendieren) soll, so muß es dasselbe affizieren […] in der Vorstellung der Zeit 
bestimmt, da es denn sich selbst anschaut, nicht wie es sich unmittelbar selbsttätig 
vorstellen würde, sondern nach der Art, wie es von innen affiziert wird, folglich wie 
es sich erscheint, nicht wie es ist.109  
 
In other words, it is the temporal auto-affection ‘itself’ that prevents ‘itself’ 
from ever being pure because it always already dissimulates and alters itself 
in its own affecting of itself. Indeed, in his Kantbuch, Heidegger unfolds how 
Kant’s analysis discloses that time cannot simply be conceived as a pure 
form of intuition for a transcendental subject but that the pure auto-affection 
of time is what makes the very notion of a subject possible in the first place. 
According to Heidegger, the pure auto-affection of time is therefore not 
something that comes to affect a self already present-at-hand (vorhandenes 
                                           
106 T, 205/179.  
107 The term différance, deriving from the French verb différer, carries with it references 
both to the spacing of differing in the sense of separating, setting apart, making different, 
dissimilar, unlike, and to the temporalizing of deferring in the sense of putting off, 
delaying, or postponing. As Derrida clarifies in an interview with Antoine Spire, 
différance is “un mouvement dans lequel la distinction de l’espace et du temps n’est pas 
encore advenue: espacement, devenir-espace du temps et devenir-temps de l’espace, 
différenciation, processus de production des différences et expérience de l’altérité 
absolue” (PM, 384/150). 
108 Besides this early instance, some of Derrida’s most elaborate and seminal 
engagements with the structure of auto-affection can be found in the following places: 
VP, Ch. 6; T, §§ 2–3 and 8–13; ADS, Chs. 1–2.  
109 KW 3–4, A 49/B 69. My italics. 
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Selbst), since it constitutes the very concern of the relation to oneself (sich-
selbst-angehen). This circumstance further means that the self can no longer 
be perceived as existing in time because its very existence is constituted as 
the pure auto-affection of time, so that “das Ich so sehr ‘zeitlich’ ist, daß es 
die Zeit selbst ist.”110  
In his double reading of Heidegger and Kant,111 but also elsewhere, 
Derrida then comes to remark that the auto-affection of time cannot be 
conceived of without the intervallic spacing by which time affects itself, and 
therefore cannot be conceived of as pure. In other words, there is no pure 
‘living present,’ since every present can appear only as an interval 
constitutively marked by its own disappearance as having been and coming 
to be. As such, there is no present of self-presence without the supplementary 
gift of death insofar as “[l]’espace est ‘dans’ le temps il est la pure sortie hors 
de soi du temps, il est hors-de-soi comme rapport à soi du temps.”112 
Consequently, if the auto-affection of time always already dissimulates itself 
in and as spacing and the self is constituted as the auto-affectivity of time, 
then the auto-dissimulation of time as spacing is the primordial heterogeneity 
that always already makes the auto-affection of the self into a trace of its own 
hetero-affection.113  
The crux of Derrida’s deconstruction of auto-affection is not simply to 
show that it is impossible but that is possible only in terms of an auto-hetero-
affection, which further means that strictly speaking one can no longer speak 
of self-alienation in general since there no longer is or never was a self to be 
                                           
110 GA 3, 192. In his preface to the English translation of La philosophie critique de Kant, 
Deleuze suggests that Kant’s conception of the relation of the I (je) to itself (moi), 
constituted as the auto-affection of time whereby the I is separated from itself as “an Other 
which affects it” may be read the philosophical rendition of Rimbaud’s poetic formula ‘I 
is another.’ According to Deleuze, Kant in certain sense even goes further than Rimbaud 
insofar as Rimbaud “relates back strangely to an Aristotelian way of thinking” in keeping 
with the division of form and matter, whereby time would designate the changing form 
of the matter, which in this case would be the I becoming other. In contrast, Kant 
internalizes time as the exteriority that alters the I from within its very matter, that is, as 
“an infinite modulation, no longer a mould.” This further means that “not only that time 
is internal to us, but that our interiority constantly divides us from ourselves, splits us in 
two: a splitting in two which never runs its course, since time has no end. A giddiness, an 
oscillation which constitutes time” (Deleuze 1963, viii–ix).  
111 See especially HQE, 263–299. 
112 VP 96/86.  
113 This movement is also what Derrida in some contexts refers to as the ‘archi-trace’ or 
‘archi-writing,’ which are supplementary names, but not synonyms, for what he in other 
contexts calls différance and which constitutively haunts the present of self-presence 
whether this is sought in the presence of the silent voice of hearing oneself speak or 
elsewhere. Cf. M, 13/13. 
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alienated in the first place. Moreover, to speak of an original self-alienation 
of a self already subverts the very distinction between the presupposed self 
and its alienation. As Derrida explains: “L’auto-affection n’est pas une 
modalité d’expérience caractérisant un étant qui serait déjà lui-même (autos). 
Elle produit le même comme rapport à soi dans la différence d’avec soi, le 
même comme le non-identique.”114 In other words, the relation of a self to 
itself might be no-thing but the altering of itself, which cannot be determined 
by a definite article, yet this altering is not simply nothing.115 Despite its 
impossibility, however, a desire for a pure auto-affection may continue in 
spite of its phantasmatic nature; yet, as Derrida emphasizes: “On ne peut pas 
penser le fantasme sans cette dimension auto-hétéro-affective,” that is, 
without thinking “de l’imagination et de la sensibilité (espace et temps) 
comme auto-hétéro-affection.”116  
Returning to the writings of Artaud, they appear to be infused with 
experiences in which such a phantasmatic desire for a pure auto-affection 
continually suffers the hetero-affection that makes self-sensing possible in 
the first place, but in doing so also makes it impossible as anything other 
than an auto-hetero-affection. Hence, Artaud’s writings display experiences 
where the striving for a pure self-touching of thought is perpetually 
disappointed by the recurrence of its self-betrayal, self-dissimulation, and 
self-abandonment since, as Artaud writes: “Ma pensée m’abandonne à tout 
les degrés.”117 
Artaud therefore considers his thinking apostate because it does not live 
up to its own demands of responsibility and vigilance but proceeds instead 
to think at an ‘inferior rate’ to itself.118 At this stage, one cannot help but 
wonder if what Artaud refers to as an ‘inferior rate’ of vigilant thinking might 
not have something in common with what in psychoanalytic vocabulary is 
called the unconscious. Since, as Lacan clarifies it in his inventive return to 
Freud:  
 
[T]he unconscious has nothing to do with instinct or primitive knowledge or 
preparation of thought in some underground. It is a thinking with words, with 
                                           
114 VP, 92/82. 
115 In a Q and A session with children from 2002, Nancy unfolds this tension between the 
no-thing and nothing as follows: “Rien, c’est le quelque chose de ce qui n’est aucune 
chose. Donc ce n’est pas quelque chose. Et pourtant, ce n’est pas rien, c’est le fait qu’il y 
ait […]. S’il y avait eu quelque chose à la place du monde, on n’aurait pas pu y mettre le 
monde. Donc, justement, il y a le rien. Et le monde vient dans ce rien”  (CT, 54–55/92). 
116 BS II, 244/170. 
117 OC I, 30/31.  
118 Cf. OC I, 83/SW, 70. 
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thoughts that escape your vigilance, your state of watchfulness. The question of 
vigilance is important. It is as if a demon plays a game with your watchfulness.119  
 
We shall return in more detail to this demonic aspect of self-consciousness 
and vigilance in Chapter IV on Freud’s Das Unheimliche. For now, however, 
we will stay with Artaud and attempt to better understand the distance within 
thinking that keeps it from ever thinking at an equal rate to itself, but instead 
makes it abandon and betray itself. In order to do so, we will bring forth yet 
another aspect of the structure of theft having to with the vicissitudes of 
representational thought. 
 
 
I.4 THE STRUCTURE OF THEFT AS A PROBLEM OF REPRESENTATION 
In Artaud’s writings, the structure of theft does not appear solely as a 
personal matter pertaining to the author’s private life and register of 
experience; rather, the structure of theft comes into view as a metaphysical 
matter, pertaining to what Artaud sometimes simply calls ‘life’ and to all the 
mechanisms that continually purloin the living away from the forces of this 
life and thereby away from themselves.  
In this section, I shall try to show how one aspect of this metaphysical 
structure of theft is concerned with the representational logic that, according 
to Artaud, has played a significant and damaging role in the history of 
Western metaphysics, which Artaud opposes to what he refers to a 
‘metaphysics of life.’ Before proceeding to address the relation between the 
metaphysical structure of theft and the logic of representation some remarks 
concerning Artaud’s understanding of metaphysics are therefore required.  
Artaud’s notion of metaphysics, which is a word he excuses himself for 
using—“je regrette beaucoup de prononcer ce mot-là”120—seeing as he is 
                                           
119 SIO, 189. “Of Structure as an Inmixing of an Otherness Prerequisite to Any Subject 
Whatever” is the title of a speech delivered by Lacan at the Johns Hopkins symposium 
on “The Languages of Criticism and the Sciences of Man” in 1966 at which, among other 
great names, Derrida too attended. With his reference to a demon who plays tricks on 
one’s vigilance, Lacan is of course referring to Descartes’ cogito of radical doubt. Over 
the years, Lacan revised his earlier opposition to the Cartesian cogito in favor of the 
Freudian unconscious and in his later writings instead came to align the cogito with the 
subject of the unconscious. This alignment made sense since the certainty of the 
unconscious, like that of the cogito, stems precisely from the fact that “ça pense avant 
qu’il entre dans la certitude” (Sem XI, 37/37). Moreover, like the subject of the 
unconscious, it is only “de prendre sa place au niveau de l’énonciation qui donne sa 
certitude au cogito” (ibid. 128/140). In other words, the cogito reveals itself as the subject 
of the unconscious because it is constituted as such only belatedly and only in the field of 
the Other: “Le sujet ne voit pas où ça mène, il suit” (ibid. 72/75). 
120 OC IV, 44/TD, 25. 
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fully aware of its historical associations, differs significantly from the way 
in which this notion is frequently employed in philosophical contexts, 
including this one. I shall focus on two distinct but equally important aspects 
of Artaud’s ambiguous understanding of metaphysics. First, in Artaud’s 
view the term ‘metaphysics’ is restricted neither to philosophical thought nor 
to a monolithic Western tradition; on the contrary, it is Artaud’s impression 
that the East is “the only part of the world where Metaphysics is part of the 
daily practice of life.”121 
In contrast to Western metaphysics schematized by hierarchical 
dualities—such as ‘mind and body,’ ‘form and matter,’ ‘theory and praxis,’ 
‘thought and life,’ but very important in this context also between ‘presence 
and representation’—Artaud instead speaks of a “métaphysique en activité” 
or a “métaphysique de gestes,”122 which can be experienced in theatrical 
practices of the East—for instance in the Balinese theatre. Artaud therefore 
explicitly distinguishes between an Oriental theatre with metaphysical 
tendencies and an Occidental theatre with psychological tendencies, where 
the Oriental theatre breaks down the dual schemata of Western theatre, which 
is based on a metaphysics of representation, thereby coming into closer 
contact with the metaphysics of life—to which we shall return shortly. 
Second, ‘metaphysics,’ for Artaud, is essentially artistic and poetic, meaning 
that it creates and affirms life in all of its complexity and cruelty. According 
to Artaud, truly metaphysical theatre is cruel not because it is evil or vicious 
but because it pushes us to the limits of what it called ‘reality’ and exposes 
us to the anarchical, chaotic, and abyssal forces of life that remain 
inaccessible and de(con)structive in the face of such construction.123 In 
Artaud’s view, poetry is anarchic because it radically calls into question the 
ground of the dichotomous relations between a subject and an object as 
between a form and its meaning, furthermore, poetry “est anarchique aussi 
dans le mesure où son apparition est la conséquence d’un désordre qui nous 
rapproche du chaos.”124  
Accordingly, when Artaud refers to metaphysics in an affirmative tone it 
actually functions as a designation of that which destabilizes metaphysical 
dualities in a liberation of the anarchic surging-forth of life ‘before’ or 
                                           
121 SW, 191. I have not been able to locate the reference in OC.  
122 OC IV, 54; 67/TD, 31;40. 
123 Artaud further explains: “Et quelque aveugle rigueur qu’apportent avec elles toutes 
ces contingences, la vie ne peut manquer de s’exercer, sinon elle ne serait pas la vie; mais 
cette rigueur, et cette vie qui passe outre et s’exerce dans la torture et le piétinement de 
tout, ce sentiment implacable et pur, c’est cela qui est la cruauté. J’ai donc dit ‘cruauté,’ 
comme j’aurais dit ‘vie’ ou comme j’aurais dit ‘nécessité’” (OC IV, 137/TD, 82). 
124 OC IV, 52/TD, 30. 
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‘beyond’ its dichotomous separation from itself.125 Bearing these two 
remarks on Artaud’s notion of metaphysics in mind, let us return to the 
discussion of the relation between the metaphysical structure of theft and the 
logic of representation.  
By a ‘logic of representation,’ I refer to a logic or a structure of language 
and thought based on the presumption that there is something ‘behind’ the 
representation—something, namely, that would itself have been a 
presentation and of which the representation would form a substituting 
delegation.126 Representational language, thought, and, of great importance 
to Artaud, representational theatre come to represent something other than 
themselves in absentia; e.g. a script, a meaning, an intention, a feeling, an 
idea, etc., that would in its turn have been a presentation and not a 
representation. 
The logic of representation therefore works on the background of an 
absence, namely, the absence of the presentation that would have been 
present once but no longer is. Representational language consists of 
substituting signs that replace something else; signs replacing places that 
have been abandoned by something else, and that can only be represented on 
the condition of such abandonment. Thus, representation appears to be both 
too late and too early for the encounter with the presentation that it was meant 
to represent. Re-presentation is too late for encountering what it represents 
since it can only represent it in terms of its already absenting. Representation 
is too early because it always precedes itself by turning what it seeks to reach 
or achieve as a singular presentation into a generalized representation in and 
by this very reach, thus already finding what it seeks to represent to be 
unreachable.127 This is precisely the problem of representational language, 
                                           
125 In this respect, Artaud’s cruel metaphysics comes close to resembling the tragic or 
Dionysian ‘Metaphysik der Kunst’ with which Nietzsche was so occupied in the years 
surrounding his writing of Die Geburt der Tragödie published in 1872 and which he 
opposes to a ‘Metaphysik der Logik’ initiated by Socrates and Euripides and sees 
resulting in the suicide of the attic tragedy. Unfortunately, a discussion of the respective 
metaphysics of Artaud and the early Nietzsche is far too demanding a task to embark 
upon here, wherefore we will have to suffice with offering a reference to Nietzsche’s own 
remarks in his Nachgelassene Fragmente from 1869–1874 (KSA 7).  
126 Regarding the logic of representation, see Derrida’s “Envoi” (PSY, 109–144/(I) 94–
128). 
127 This aporetic movement is resonant of Hegel’s famous analysis of sense certainty and 
its dialectical reversal in Phänomenologie des Geistes. In brief, what Hegel demonstrates 
is that any supposed immediacy is always already mediated, and that any singular 
(Einzelne) hic et nun is always already mediated by the general (das Allgemeine), since 
the singular, as the “now,” can only ever appear as such through its dialectical relationship 
to other singulars or other nows, thus already negating itself as singular. As Hegel 
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entailing that one cannot articulate the singular inasmuch as the very 
articulation already negates or undermines that which it seeks to articulate. 
It is this inaccessible other of representation that Artaud calls ‘life’ and that 
Derrida translates as the “l’origine non représentable de la representation.”128  
Because of this untimeliness pertaining to the logic of representation, the 
encounter between the representation and the presentation it is supposed to 
represent will remain a missed or deferred encounter—or, as we shall come 
to see in Chapter V, what Lacan with reference to Aristotle calls a dystychia. 
Consequently, what we could identify as an aporia of representational logic 
concerns the problem of gaining access to an originary presentation without 
this access turning it into a representation and thereby making it inaccessible 
as such, that is, as a presentation. This aporia, however, is that which 
representation is prone to forget, and when it does it also forgets the life that 
it dissimulates.129 
Returning to Artaud’s texts, there are different levels upon which the 
metaphysical structure of theft operates and these correspond in turn to 
different levels of ‘representational dissimulation.’ At least three such levels 
may be discerned in Artaud’s work:  
1) The dissimulation of an immediate and singular self-sensing of thought 
into the mediate ‘mentalization’ or representation of that thought. Hence in 
a letter to George Soulié de Morant from 1932, Artaud complains about a 
perpetual ‘miscarrying’ of his thought that makes it impossible for him to 
“traduire les impressions les plus simple, de témoigner de ma fac̹on proper 
                                           
articulates it: “Sage ich: ein einzelnes Ding, so sage ich es vielmehr ebenso als ganz 
Allgemeines, denn alle sind ein einzelnes Ding” (HW 3, 92). This last part of the sentence, 
“alle sind ein einzelnes,” which is almost a contradictio in adjecto, nicely construes the 
aporia of representation since it expresses the very generality of singularity. This aporia 
of representation is also the reason why language, according to Hegel, kills what it names 
and why, as Kojève has remarked in his reading of Hegel, “all conceptual understanding 
(Begreifen) is equivalent to a murder” (Kojève 1969, 140). Indeed, as Hegel concludes 
his Enzyklopädie the very télos (Ziel) of nature is to commit suicide (sich selbst zu töten), 
or to sacrifice itself as a phoenix in order “als Geist hervorzutreten” (HW 9, 538). For a 
further discussion of the essential relation between language and death in Hegel and 
beyond, see also, Bataille 1955 and Agamben 1991.  
128 ED, 343/234. 
129 As Blanchot has shown in L’entretien infini from 1969 this logic tells us something 
not only about representation but also about presence, since “la présence immédiate est 
présence de ce qui ne saurait être présent, présence du non-accessible, présence excluant 
ou débordant tout présent. Cela revient à dire: l’immédiat, débordant infiniment toute 
possibilité présente de par sa présence même, est présence infinie de ce qui reste 
radicalement absent, présence toujours infiniment autre dans sa présence, présence de 
l’autre dans son altérité: non-présence” (EI, 54/38). 
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de réagir.”130 Accordingly, this first level of dissimulation concerns the 
transformation of presumed singular presentations into general 
representations.  
2) The dissimulation of an ‘internal’ mentalization or representation of a 
sensation, thought, or an idea into their ‘external’ articulation. Thus, for 
instance, in Le théâtre et son double from 1938, where Artaud writes that 
confusion is a sign of our epoch and that confusion emerges from “une 
rupture entre les choses, et les paroles, les idées, les signes qui en sont la 
representation.”131 Moreover, Artaud discerns that this confusion is fortified 
by the circumstance that: “Tout vrai sentiment est en réalité intraduisible. 
L’exprimer c’est le trahir. Mais le traduire c’est le dissimuler.”132 Thus, the 
second level concerns the impassable passage of the impression of a feeling, 
sensation, thought, or an idea to its expression and the confusion that arises 
when one tries to transport oneself through this passage via translation.  
3) The dissimulative survival of expressions and significations which 
continue to circulate after their time of articulation and thus independently 
of the one who expresses them. Here we can recall Artaud’s complaint to 
Rivière that “un quelque chose de furtif qui m’enlève les mots que j’ai 
trouvés.”133 Accordingly, we might say that this third level concerns a 
general dissimulation and dispropriation of signifying language as such, 
which is bound up with what Derrida has expounded as the irreducible 
dissemination and ‘iterability,’ belonging to and conditioning any signifying 
operation.134 As Derrida further explains: “Artaud savait que toute parole 
tombée du corps, s’offrant à être entendue ou reçue, s’offrant en spectacle, 
devient aussitôt parole volée. Signification dont je suis dépossédé parce 
qu’elle est signification.”135  
Undoubtedly, these three levels are neither exhaustive nor can they be 
clearly demarcated from one another in such a stratified fashion as is 
presented here. Rather, the levels are inseparably linked and continue to 
perforate their limits and overflow into each other’s domains, thereby 
producing more of the leakages that keep bursting open despite Artaud’s 
continuous mending. Nevertheless, the stratification of the different layers 
pertaining to the structure of theft might be helpful in trying to perceive how 
the dissimulation of thought and language is for Artaud essentially bound up 
with the problem of representation and the logic that governs it.   
                                           
130 OC I, 320/SW, 294. 
131 OC IV, 12/TD, 3. 
132 OC IV, 86/TD, 51.  
133 OC I, 36/SW 35. 
134 We shall return to the notion of iterability in Chapter IV.  
135 ED, 261/175. 
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The relation of Artaud’s writing to such representational logic remains 
irreducibly ambiguous. In one sense, Artaud is obeying this logic himself 
when he repeats a whole metaphysical chain of oppositional pairs such as 
‘thing and word,’ ‘signified and signifier,’ ‘body and spirit,’ ‘matter and 
form,’ et cetera—and when he complains about the dissimulation of a non-
representable life in the endless circulation of representations. Indeed, to 
Artaud, when representation forgets its untimeliness and thereby forgets its 
own forgetting of that which it represents, this is the time when ‘life’ is most 
in danger of complete extermination, that is, of erasing every singular trace 
of itself leaving nothing but cinders behind, which are traces of nothing. 
Artaud sees the signs of such an all-destructive forgetting—namely the 
forgetting of forgetting—in his time, providing him with the sense that in the 
absentminded yet prevalent logic of representation, “ce monde qui glisse, qui 
se suicide sans s’en apercevoir.”136  
In another sense, however, that which Artaud calls ‘life’ cannot be 
conceived of as an original yet forgotten presence underlying yet supporting 
its representational history, like an ancient presentation to be excavated from 
its many layers of representation, since such a notion of an original presence 
of life would itself be a myth fostered by the logic of representation. Rather, 
what Artaud calls ‘life’ resists and seeks to undo the very splitting up of life 
into an opposition between presentation and representation, along with all 
the other oppositional pairs that go with it. With the notion of ‘life,’ Artaud 
is signaling an opening, a surging forth of a spectacle that would no longer 
reflect or represent anything other than its taking place in time and space, or, 
as Derrida puts it, a spectacle that would be “l’archi-manifestation de la 
force, ou de la vie.”137  
The question remains, then, whether and how Artaud can somehow force 
‘life’—whether the life of thought, of language, of work, or of ‘Artaud’—to 
manifest itself despite the dissimulating and insufficient mechanisms of 
articulation and representation that continually break an entry into its process 
of archi-manifestation in order to steal life away from itself. We will return 
to this question in the last part of this chapter. First, however, we will take a 
closer look at the irreducible ambiguity or duplicity of Artaud’s work in 
relation to the logic of representation as an instance of the structure of theft.  
 
 
                                           
136 OC IV, 39/TD, 22. 
137 ED, 349/238.   
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I.5 PAINFUL REVERSALS IN ARTAUD’S TEXT 
In Le livre à venir from 1959, Blanchot has remarked that it is not difficult 
to observe how Artaud, in his desire for an absolute presence of life to itself, 
appears to be a “victime de l’illusion de l’immédiat.”138 Yet, according to 
Blanchot, what is more difficult to discern in reading Artaud is how 
 
tout commence avec la manière dont il est écarté de cet immédiat […], par une 
rupture si évidente qu’elle introduit au centre de lui-même l’affirmation d’un 
détournement perpétuel qui devient ce qu’il a de plus propre et comme la surprise 
atroce de sa véritable nature.139  
 
According to Blanchot, this perpetual turning-away gradually brings about a 
painful development in Artaud’s writing, beginning in the time following the 
Rivière correspondence and accelerating in the 1925 writings. This painful 
development, which is also a development of pain, is one by which Artaud 
“vient-il à renverser les termes du mouvement et à placer en premier lieu la 
dépossession, et non plus la ‘totalité immédiate’ dont cette dépossession 
apparaissait d’abord comme le simple manque.”140  
On this view, what is difficult to discern in Artaud’s writing is how a 
gradual reversal of the nostalgic and eschatological—since the télos is 
always the archē yet to come—longing for a restoration of original 
immediacy turn into an acceptance and perhaps even an affirmation of the 
fact “qu’il n’y a jamais eu d’origine.”141 Furthermore, the difficulty is to 
discern how such a reversal produces several other reversals such as a 
reversal of the desire for a pure auto-affection of a whole and hole-less body-
of-thought into a naked exposure to and of the condition of auto-hetero-
affection, according to which thinking is always already fractured and 
perpetually leaking from its several holes and openings.142 Thus, as Blanchot 
                                           
138 LV, 55/38. 
139 LV, 55/38. With this perpetual turning-away Blanchot is presumably paying tribute to 
Hölderlin who in his Anmerkungen zum Ödipus from 1803 writes about the ‘categorical 
turning about’ (kategorische Umkehr) whereby God as time turns away from the human 
being thus effecting a caesura in time by which beginning and end no longer rhyme 
(schlechterdings nicht reimen). Cf. HSW 10, 161. On the subject of Hölderlin’s 
‘categorical turning,’ see Lacoue-Labarthe 1998.  
140 LV, 55/38. 
141 This quotation is from Derrida’s epitaph to “Le théatre de la cruauté et la cloture de la 
représentation,” who attributes it to “Artaud, 6 June 1947,” but I have not been able to 
locate the reference in OC. The epitaph reads: “…quant à mes forces / elles ne sont qu’un 
supplement / le supplément à un état de fait /c’est qu’il n’y a jamais eu d’origine…” (ED, 
341/232). 
142 One such place of reversal could be in Artaud le Mômo where the holes or lack of 
being and the alienation appears to be ‘older’ than any fullness of being or self-presence: 
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continues, “que ce qui est à penser est dans la pensée ce qui se détourne d’elle 
et s’épuise inépuisablement en elle; que souffrir et penser sont liés d’une 
manière secrète.”143   
The only minor and supplementary notes that I would wish to add to 
Blanchot’s rendition of such painful reversal in Artaud’s writing would be, 
first, that the reversal must be rendered in the plural since, as I read it, there 
is not one single reversal gradually developing over the course of Artaud’s 
writing. Instead, it seems as if something like a perpetual shifting of reversals 
takes place, which is therefore not equivalent to a unidirectional 
development from original self-possession to original dispossession, let 
alone from original presence to original representation; rather Artaud’s 
writing shifts back and forth between these alternatives and in some passages 
even sustains both at the same time.144 Second, even if there is undoubtedly 
suffering in these painful reversals a certain affirmation nonetheless also 
appears to come about in them. We will come to this second supplement in 
the following section, but for now we will stay with the first supplementary 
note.  
Even if Artaud at certain times comes to recognize the lack of immediate 
origin as the very origin of origin, at other times he reverses this reversal 
back into thinking mediation or representation as a loss of original 
immediacy or presentation. Furthermore, this perpetual shifting back and 
forth of reversals is essential to the duplicity of Artaud’s work which, in 
Derrida’s view, makes him one of the most critical and radical challengers 
of metaphysical duality. This is because the radicality of Artaud’s critique of 
the oppositional logic of Western metaphysics results precisely from his 
strict fidelity to it.145 Derrida explains the duplicity as follows:  
                                           
“Lesquels, et de quoi ces trous? / D’âme, d’esprit, de moi, et d’être; mais à la place où 
l’on s’en fout, père, mère, Artaud et itou […] le membre coupé d’une âme (l’âme n’est 
plus qu’une vieux diction) mais l’atterrante suspension d’un soufflé d’aliénation” (OC 
XII, 15–17/SW, 524–526). 
143 LV, 58/40. 
144 For instance, it would appear that Artaud had already in the correspondence of 1923–
1924 acknowledged that the dissimulation and dispossession of thought in an essentially 
furtive way (essentielle à la fois et fugace) belong to the very movement of thinking as 
such, even if he still desires a thinking that would be in full possession of itself. Cf. OC 
I, 35/SW, 35. 
145 What Lacoue-Labarthe has shown in his reading of Die Geburt der Tragödie can, 
whilst remaining sensitive toward the significant differences between Nietzsche and 
Artaud and their respective quarrels with metaphysical duality, to a certain extent be 
shown in Artaud text as well. Namely, that the work of Nietzsche, and I would say Artaud 
alike, can be read “au moins deux langages: l’un où se confirme en effet la plus grand 
part de la métaphysique posthégélienne et de la métaphysique tout court; l’autre (mais 
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Artaud sollicite cette métaphysique, l’ébranle lorsqu’elle se ment et met pour 
condition au phénomène du propre qu’on se départisse proprement de son propre 
(c’est l’aliénation de l’aliénation); la requiert encore, puise encore à son fonds de 
valeurs, veut y être plus fidèle qu’elle-même en restaurant absolument le propre à 
la veille de toute discession.146 
 
Hence, in being rigorously faithful towards metaphysical oppositions such 
as those between the proper and the improper, or between presentation and 
representation, and in adhering stringently to metaphysical principles of the 
pure immediacy or pure presence to itself of self, of thought, or of life, 
Artaud causes the very architectonical foundations of this metaphysical 
building to vacillate.  
In order to come to a further understanding of the difficulty of discerning 
the reversals in Artaud’s text—from originary self-possession and self-
presence to originary dispossession and representation and back again—, let 
us turn for a moment toward a lengthy footnote in L’ombilic des limbes in 
which Artaud draws a distinction between two different forms of 
derangements, disorders, or disturbances (troubles) of what he calls 
‘personality.’  
According to Artaud, the first and most severe form is the disturbance of 
personality that may result in a total loss of any sense of self or of ‘ownness’ 
in regard to one’s ‘own’ experiences—like a self abandoned by itself, but 
with no remaing relation to this self-abandonment. In such a deserted state, 
Artaud writes, “la conscience demeure intacte mais ne se reconnaît plus 
comme s’appartenant (et ne se reconnaît plus à aucun degré).”147 The second, 
                                           
c’est très souvent le même en train de se défaire) où s’organise déjà la ‘déconstruction’” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 1979, 23/10).  
146 ED, 272/183. 
147 OC I, 81/SW, 69. My italics. Artaud does not develop this most severe form of 
disturbance any further thus leaving his readers to a mere guessing. One guess, however, 
could be that Artaud might be referring to certain states following severe brain lesions, 
brain damage, traumas, or other forms of cerebral pathologies such as Alzheimer’s 
disease, wherein all relation with the state prior to the catastrophic event appear to be 
completely broken resulting in a strange interruption of the relation to one’s own 
experience, which may manifest itself as an utter indifference to one’s ‘own’ suffering. 
In their ‘neurological novels,’ both Luria and Sacks portray conditions following different 
kinds of brain damage where an emotional, and perhaps even existential or ontological, 
indifference on the part of the person inflicted seems to occur both towards his or her 
surroundings but also towards his or her own condition. Cf. Luria 1987; Sacks 1998. In 
her philosophical work, Malabou has tried to give a voice to this traumatic indifference 
by calling it into question: “Could it be that the brain suffers? Could it be that this 
suffering manifests itself in the form of indifference to suffering? In the form of the 
inability to experience suffering as one’s own? Could it be that there is a type of suffering 
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less severe but in Artaud’s view more painful (douloureux) and potentially 
more ruinous (ruineux) disturbances of personality occurs when “la 
conscience s’approprie, reconnaît vraiment comme lui appartenant toute une 
série de phénomènes de dislocation et de dissolution de ses forces au milieu 
desquels sa matérialité se détruit.”148 
In the distinction between these two disturbances of personality, one can 
perhaps discern an instance of the reversal from the thought of originary self-
possession to originary dispossession, to which Blanchot has drawn our 
attention. In the first case, the disturbance results in an utter break or rupture 
of the self-relation of a self that was once said to belong to itself; there is still 
someone there who consciously registers the state of things but there is no 
longer anyone who in relating to the state of things also relates to him- or 
herself. Whereas in the second case we have a disturbance of personality that 
leaves a certain self-relation to remain albeit only as a relation in which a 
self recognizes an otherness, which belongs to it in such an intimate way that 
it subverts the very sense of belonging to itself of this self. 
Hence, what subtly comes to the fore in this second form of disturbance is 
that it brings the self to recognize instances of otherness or disturbing 
‘phenomena’ as belonging to its relation to itself such that they dislocate and 
dissolve this relation in its very relating to itself. Thus, the disturbances of 
dislocation and dissolution no longer appear to happen to a self that was 
already there, established in all its undisturbed presence to itself as a 
substance of its own experience. Instead, and here the reversal comes into 
view, these disturbances now appear as inherent to the very possibility of 
relating to oneself, dislocating and dissolving this relation from the very 
moment is begins to take place. In more Derridean words, the appropriation 
of which Artaud speaks in the second form of disturbance will only be 
possible as an exappropriation according to which its very taking place will 
already have become displaced. 
In light of this other form of disturbance, we come to see how Artaud, 
following his strict demands of thinking, can write: “moi, entre autres, que 
je n’ai pas de pensée.”149 With a slight interpretive twist of the sentence, we 
might read it as announcing something along the lines of: ‘I, among others, 
have no thought because there are always others between me and myself and 
                                           
that creates a new identity, the unknown identity of an unknown person who suffers?” 
(Malabou 2012, xii) Further on, Malabou raises the vertiginous questions of “the psyche’s 
survival of its own annihilation” and the “deserted identities of cerebrality, living figures 
of death” that such cerebral annihilation leaves behind (ibid. 56; 209), which are not 
unrelated to our questioning of the remains of a self.  
148 OC I, 81/SW, 69. My italics.  
149 OC I, 82/SW, 69. 
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I am nothing other than the in-between of these others, neither less nor more.’ 
In still other words, because of an original dispropriation the ‘in-between-
others’ is the only proper place of what I call ‘my’-self. Perhaps we can even 
allow ourselves to make the bold move of hyphenating the words of the 
sentence here in order to emphasize the continual displacement of an auto-
affection into an auto-hetero-affection: moi-entre-autres; I-between-others, 
or even better perhaps, between-others-me or others-between-me. Yet, as 
Artaud discerned as early as in his letters to Rivière: “Un homme se possède 
pas éclaircies, et même quand il se possède, il ne s’atteint pas tout à fait [...]. 
Cet homme cependant existe.”150 
Artaud’s early distinction from 1925 between two forms of disturbances 
of selfhood is particularly noteworthy with respect to a later letter to the 
psychiatrist Jacques Latrémolière of January 1945, in which Artaud 
compares his condition before and after undergoing multiple electric-shock 
treatments. More specifically, Artaud compares his experience of “ces 
abominables dédoublements de personnalité,”151 which he had already 
written about in the correspondence with Rivière, with the experiences of 
separation and doubling he is undergoing after the shock treatments two 
decades later. To Artaud, the fundamental difference setting these 
experiences apart is that in the twenties the redoublings, as abominable as 
they might be, were at least accessible to him as a ‘perceptual knowledge,’ 
whereas the treatments have transformed his very experience into nothing 
but ‘agony.’152 Electric shock, Artaud informs Latrémolière, has reduced his 
existence to utter despair by turning him into “un absent qui se connaît absent 
et se voit pendant des semaines à la poursuite de son être.”153 
If we are to try to understand the difference that Artaud is describing in 
this late letter, perhaps we could read it as a displacement of relating to 
separation. Before the treatments Artaud had at least been able to maintain 
a relation to the experiences of splitting and to the nothing separating him 
from his words and thoughts, and by virtue of such a relation to separation, 
he was also able to work on these experiences as material for writing and 
drawing. After the treatments, however, Artaud complains of being “détache 
de tout et de la vie,” and this absolute separation has made it impossible for 
him “de travailler, de penser et de me sentir être.”154 Consequently, the 
treatments have divested Artaud not only of his sense of being but also of his 
means of relating to such separation from himself through poetic writing 
                                           
150 OC I, 49–50/SW, 43. 
151 OC XI, 13/SW, 438.  
152 OC XI, 13/SW, 438. 
153 OC XI, 13/SW, 438. 
154 OC XI, 13/SW, 438.  
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and drawing. The transformation that the numerous electro shocks have 
induced appears, then, to concern different experiences of relation and 
separation, and of relating to the separation from oneself.  
In the letters to Rivière, Artaud is still able to uphold a poetic working 
relationship to the absences separating him from himself and keeping his life 
in suspense. By contrast, in his letter to Latrémolière, Artaud despairs not of 
these absences per se but rather of the fact that he himself has become absent 
“comme un mort à côté d’un vivant qui n’est plus lui.”155 Thus, another 
agonizing dimension of theft seems to be added here—namely, the theft of 
the ability to sense one’s sensations or to feel one’s feelings, as Artaud later 
writes: “souffrir c’est ne pas pouvoir vivre ses sensations.”156 Yet, someone 
who calls himself ‘Artaud,’ still remains to write about his experience of not 
being able to write and to write of this experience as the suffering of a living 
death, even if this name has become nothing but a memorial to him—in other 
words, there is still a relation to self even if this relation is only one of self-
abandonment.157 
As mentioned, Artaud’s writing appears to provide us with extremely 
meticulous descriptions of the experiences of undergoing auto-affection as 
hetero-affection. In the course of his hyperaware or hyperreflexive auto-
inspections, Artaud testifies to the incessant becoming other of self-
consciousness by virtue of which consciousness to a certain extent 
encounters its own unconscious as that which eludes and withdraws it in 
itself.158 As Derrida argues, such an encounter of consciousness with itself 
entails that “cette fois sera cruellement présente à elle-même et s’entendra 
parler.”159 Cruelly present to itself, because consciousness can only be 
                                           
155 OC XI, 13/SW, 438. 
156 OC XVI, 288.  
157 In his essay “La naissance est la mort” written in 1994, Lacoue-Labarthe suggests that 
Artaud’s experience of dying in electric-shock treatment and returning from the beyond 
to a life that is the living of death is nothing less than the experience, which constitutes 
the primal scene of literature recounted in the myth of Orpheus. As Lacoue-Labarthe 
writes: “L’origine de la littérature serait elle aussi immémoriale. À cette différence près, 
toutefois, qu’elle se soutiendrait d’un souvenir encore plus impossible, bien qu’il en soit 
le revers exact, que l’impossible souvenir de la naissance: le souvenir de la mort. C’est 
ce donc témoignerait—exemplairement, me semble-t-il—Artaud” (Lacoue-Labarthe 
2011, 120/63). 
158 The attempt to master this perpetual tension between consciousness of 
unconsciousness and the unconsciousness of consciousness is no doubt also a matter of 
control or lack of it. In an untranslated passage from 1945 in the Cahiers de Rodez, Artaud 
states: “L’inconsient est d’avoir perdu le contrôle de soi-même, et d’avoir été pris par le 
neant. Il faut regagner l’éternelle conscience” (OC XV, 160). 
159 ED, 263/176. 
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present to itself in the absence of its immediate self-presence, whereby 
consciousness will only be able to hear itself speak and to respond to itself 
in a voice that is never simply its own but is always already infiltrated with 
that of others.  
As Derrida further clarifies, the experience that Artaud undergoes is 
therefore not only one of self-alienation it is also an experience of 
“l’irresponsabilité radicale de la parole.”160 Irresponsible precisely because 
speech—like linguistic and signifying practices in general including the 
hearing-oneself-speak that is sometimes called thinking—is conditioned by 
that which Artaud considers to be an original theft that robs the speaker of 
the possibility of ever having complete authority or ownership of his or her 
own thoughts and words. Yet speaking of an original theft implies that there 
could not have been any property to be stolen in the first place, since 
whomever begins to speak was not there before speaking but only comes to 
be in and as speech. Language—and therefore also thought, since there is no 
thought, not even the unconscious, without language161—is never something 
one can own or appropriate, because one only comes into one’s own in and 
as language. If anything, the one who speaks is a property rather than a 
proprietor of the language spoken.  
As subject of thinking and speaking, I have no anterior authority in 
deciding the thoughts and words that make themselves available to me, and 
in doing so defines who I think I am; or rather, they are inherited from 
elsewhere. Likewise, I have no subsequent authority over the way in which 
these thoughts and words will be conceived and received by others in the 
aftermath of their articulation. As Derrida emphasizes, this irreducible 
irresponsibility even holds for the idea of a soliloquy, or a silent dialogue of 
the soul with itself, because from the moment that “je m’entends, le je qui 
s’entend, qui m’entend, devient le je qui parle et prend la parole, sans jamais 
la lui couper, à celui qui croit parler et être entendu en son nom. 
S’introduisant dans le nom de celui qui parle, cette différence n’est rien, elle 
est le furtif.”162  
At this point, another meaning of the verb souffler comes to the fore, 
which is that of its substantiation into souffleur, that is, into the prompter 
who dictates to me what to say as a whispering voice from ‘behind the 
scenes,’ or from a hidden center of the stage that comes to spirit away the 
possibility of speaking in a voice of one’s own. This radical irresponsibility 
of speech also speaks, of course, in the voice of inspiration—meaning, 
                                           
160 ED, 263/176. 
161 I am alluding here to Lacan’s frequently repeated statement that ”l’inconscient est 
structuré comme un langage” (Sem III, 187/167; Sem XX, 20/15; 25/21; 47/48; 49/51). 
162 ED, 265/177–178. 
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precisely, a voice from elsewhere163 that comes to speak in my voice in 
advance, thus making it into an always already borrowed voice, and causing 
Artaud to exclaim in capital letters filled with awe and terror alike: 
“CERTAINEMENT L’INSPIRATION EXISTE.”164  
Finally, if we return to the distinction in L’ombilic des limbes, in 
comparison to the first disturbance in which the relation of the disturbed one 
to him- or herself has evaporated, what makes the second form of 
disturbance, in which the self recognizes itself only as another, more painful 
is the circumstance that someone still remains to relate to the painful 
experience. If a total loss of self-relation had actually occurred then no one 
would be left to experience the pain of being separated from or abandoned 
by oneself. The difficulty here is precisely in trying to understand the pain 
that remains to be suffered by a self who experiences itself as dispossessed 
of itself, and to understand the painful suffering of remaining in abeyance of 
oneself. Who is the I or the me suffering such painful dispossession? Who is 
it that can say ‘I am dispossessed of myself and suffer my own abandonment 
or the abandonment of my own’? Who is the remainder of such a 
dispropriation and what sense of solitude remains in such an expression of 
self-abandonment? 
In a similar manner, the one whose voice is stolen is never entirely cut off 
from itself, as Derrida underlines, but remains as a sort of witness to its own 
dispropriation or perhaps rather to the dispropriation of its ‘own,’ a strange 
witness indeed, a witness of estrangement in the double genitive. The 
difficulty in this regard is trying to listen to this voice that speaks, almost in 
spite of itself (malgré moi), in a dispropriated voice, and to try to understand 
how someone is still left to respond to the irresponsibility of speech. We will 
return to these vertiginous questions more than once in the chapters to come. 
For now, however, we will turn to our second supplementary note on 
Blanchot’s discernment of a painful reversal in Artaud’s writing by taking a 
closer look at one of Artaud’s strategies for countering the structure of theft, 
which, as Derrida remarks, also implies a certain ‘idiosyncratic affirmation.’   
 
 
I.6 THE STRATEGY OF COUNTER-THEFT 
As both Blanchot and Derrida point out, Artaud will develop a strategy in 
order to steal life back for itself from its dispossessions in representative 
thought and language. As we have already glimpsed, Artaud’s exceptionally 
                                           
163 This italized sentence is a reference and reminder of Blanchot’s Une voix venue 
d’ailleurs (2002), which among other things in concerned with literature and the voice of 
inspiration.  
164 OC I, 112/SW, 82.  
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refined strategy against the structure of theft and its representational logic 
will paradoxically consist in employing language and thinking in order to 
enact a counter-theft towards the initial theft of language and thinking.165  
The strategy of counter-theft therefore has a double aim: one is critical and 
destructive; the other is affirmative and inventive. On the one hand, then, 
Artaud’s strategy aims at forcing representative thought and language to 
testify to their own insufficiencies in representing any form of ‘life’ or any 
living singularity by revealing themselves as dissimulative and thereby 
exposing their limits. On the other hand, Artaud’s strategy aims at inventing 
a poetic language that would counter the false premises of language that 
pretends to represent the unrepresentable by no longer performing a 
representation of anything but itself. This double aim of the strategy of 
counter-theft can be seen in the following paragraph from Le théâtre et son 
double where Artaud writes of forcing language to convey otherwise than 
usually by making a material metaphysics out of the spoken word: 
 
[C]’est s’en servir d’une façon nouvelle, exceptionelle et inaccoutumée, c’est lui 
rendre ses possibilités d’ébranlement physique, c’est le diviser et le répartir 
activement dans l’espace, c’est prendre les intonations d’une manière concrète 
absolue et leur restituer le pouvoir qu’elles auraient de déchirer et de manifester 
réellement quelque chose, c’est se retourner contre le langage et ses sources 
bassement utilitaires, on pourrait dire alimentaires, contre ses origins de bête 
traquée, c’est enfin considérer le langage sous la forme de l’Incantation.166  
   
Hence, the affirmative side of the double aim of Artaud’s counter-theft 
consists in rediscovering the ‘magical,’ ‘metaphysical,’ or ‘incantational’ 
forces of language and restoring to it its very flesh of sonority, inflection, 
color, materiality, texture, etc. In short, Artaud aims at restoring life to the 
expressions, ideas, thoughts, and words of language, which will now be 
                                           
165 As Lacoue-Labarthe has remarked, this counter-theft of especially Artaud’s late 
writings, could also be called, and not haphazardly so, Pour en finir avec le jugement de 
dieu. Yet, as Lacoue-Labarthe further remarks: “Comprenons bien: il y a jugement, mais 
pour en finir avec le jugement. Jugement dernier du ‘Jugement dernier,’ fin du ‘règne des 
Fins.’ Artaud proteste et demande, comme Achille (ou Job), réparation. C’est l’essai, dans 
la véhémence et la révolte—la ‘sainte colère’—d’achever la spoliation théologico-
métaphysique, le vol de l’âme. Une telle colère est comparable à celle de Nietzsche, aussi 
douloureuse, aussi pathétique. Mais peut-être en plus dur. Il est demandé que cesse—
enfin—la dépossession, la dépropriation. Nietzsche jubilait, Artaud souffre le martyre” 
(Lacoue-Labarthe 2011, 121–122/63). Undoubtedly, there is suffering and martyrdom in 
Artaud’s writing of protest and resistance, yet as we will come to see, there might also be 
some jubilation not least regarding a certain enjoyment (jouissance) of this very resistant 
writing.  
166 OC IV, 56/TD, 32–33. 
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powerful in itself and not merely by virtue of serving as an instrument for 
facilitating the representation of something else. This is to say, a useless 
language that strictly speaking means to say no-thing.167  
This restoration of life to the body of thought and language that means to 
say no-thing would, according to Artaud, be the invention of a concrete, 
material, and physical language, or a ‘poetry for the senses’ sieving through 
“la trame serrée et subtile de gestes.”168 That is, a poetic body-language 
whose gestures exceed and “échappent au langage articulé,”169 and 
moreover, an inventive language capable of conveying the “côté révélateur 
de la matière.”170 Thus, for Artaud poetic writing, drawing, and theatre will 
be the privileged means of warfare in trying to conquer back the life of 
language for itself, or, in trying to give birth once more to an originally 
aborted life. Yet this poetical rebirth, as it were, demands a violent self-
destruction of language in its instrumental and representative functions, a 
hunting itself down like a beast towards its own (stolen) origins in order to 
reinvent itself from these ruinous foundations. 
Hence, Artaud’s strategy is to fight thinking from within thinking and to 
wage war on language from within language in order to force it to convey 
what it usually hides, that is to say, to convey both itself as dissimulation and 
the life it dissimulates. To some extent, this double gesture brings Artaud’s 
strategy of counter-theft into proximity with what one could call an auto-
deconstruction, avant la lettre, of language. This is because one way of 
describing the movement of deconstruction is precisely that it consists in 
borrowing the means and mechanisms of whatever is being deconstructed in 
order to perform the deconstruction itself, which further means that 
deconstruction is always also an auto-deconstruction insofar as it is not 
applied to the deconstructed as if from the outside. If anything, 
deconstruction shows how the outside is already within the autos that 
deconstructs itself.  
In a similar manner, Artaud is battling the mechanisms of thought and 
speech by their own means, that is, through the mechanisms of thought and 
speech displacing themselves in order to make them testify to their own 
                                           
167 As Blanchot writes in La part du feu from 1949, this nothing is nothing short of the 
very imperative of literature: “ne rien dire, parler pour ne rien dire” (PF, 314/324)—an 
imperative that Blanchot sees well performed in the writing of Artaud, as he quotes from 
one of his letters: “Je n‘ai jamais écrit que pour dire que je n’avais jamais rien fait, ne 
pouvais rien faire et que faisant quelque chose en réalité je ne faisais rien. Toute mon 
oeuvre a été bâtie et ne pourra l’être que sur le néant…’” (LV, 54/37).  
168 OC IV, 69/TD, 41. 
169 OC IV, 45/TD, 26. 
170 OC IV, 72/TD, 42. 
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insufficiencies and forcing them to confront their uncertain foundations and 
anarchical origins in order to reinvent themselves. As Esther Rowlands 
points out, this turning of language against itself means that language 
becomes the witness of its own impossibility of bearing witness.171  
In his essay “Le théâtre de la cruauté et la clôture de la representation,” 
Derrida demonstrates how Artaud’s battle against the representational 
language and its logic in Le théâtre et son double goes hand in hand with his 
struggle to finally break away from the prevailing Western conception of art 
as merely representative or imitative of what is then in contrast called 
‘reality’ or ‘life.’172 Concerning theatre as a privileged scene for a creative 
auto-manifestation of life, Artaud writes: 
 
[L]e théâtre, qui ne se fixe pas dans le langage et dans les formes, détruit par le fait 
les fausses ombres, mais prépare la voie à une autre naissance d’ombres autour 
desquelles s’agrège le vrai spectacle de la vie. Briser le langage pour toucher la vie, 
c’est faire ou refaire le théâtre.173  
 
Furthermore, theatre has the potential to liberate what is called ‘man,’ the 
man of ‘humanity,’ from his ‘habitual limitations’ and thereby “rendre 
infinies les frontières de ce qu’on appelle la réalité.”174 Only by way of such 
                                           
171 Rowlands writes: “Acts of ‘parler’ and ‘témoigner’ are placed within an antithetical 
structure, as language becomes a ‘témoignage’ of its own incapacity to ‘témoigner’” 
(Rowlands 2004, 140). 
172 This Western conception of the imitative nature of art goes back to Plato and Aristotle, 
and to the latter’s theory of ‘mimesis’ (μίμησις), which is usually translated as ‘imitation’ 
or ‘representation’ of reality or life. The contextualized way in which Aristotle employs 
the term ‘mimesis’ and how it should be translated are widely disputed matters that 
require a study of their own. All that may be said in the brevity of a footnote is that in the 
Poetics the artist is described as ‘representing’ or ‘imitating’ the raw impressions 
presented by reality through his preferred artistic medium, be it music, poetry, or drama, 
thereby bringing to it a coherent meaning. Aristotle writes: “Epic poetry, then, and the 
poetry of tragic drama, and, moreover, comedy and dithyrambic poetry, and most flute-
playing and harp-playing, these, speaking generally, may all be said to be ‘representations 
[μιμήσεις] of life.’ But they differ one from another in three ways: either in using means 
generically different or in ‘representing’ [μιμεῖσθαι] different objects or in ‘representing’ 
[μιμοῦνταί] objects not in the same way but in a different manner” (Poet. 1447a). On the 
matter of Aristotle’s ‘mimetology’ and its history of reception, see also Lacoue-Labarthe 
1986. 
173 OC IV, 18/TD, 7. In reading this passage, one is struck by its resemblance to Beckett’s 
description in his famous ‘German letter’ of 1937 to Axel Kaun of his incentive for 
writing: “Ein Loch nach dem andern in ihr zu bohren, bis das Dahinterkauernde, sei es 
etwas oder nichts, durchzusickern anfängt—ich kann mir für den heutigen Schriftsteller 
kein hoheres Ziel vorstellen” (Beckett 1983, 52/172). 
174 OC IV, 18/TD, 7. 
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an infinite extension of the borders of reality will ‘man’ ever reach that 
shadowy part where he “impavidement se rend le maître de ce qui n’est pas 
encore, et le fait naître.”175 
Cruel theatre and material poetry will have the powers to turn language 
against its origins as a hunted beast, that is, to force language into a 
confrontation with its original abortion of life in order to remind it of its 
abyssal foundations and forgotten anarchic powers, which will now be 
employed in stealing life back to itself by reinventing its body, thus giving it 
another birth from the shadows of its stolen origin. It is in such a utopian 
place of anarchic shadow that “le théâtre loin de copier la vie se met en 
communication s’il le peut avec des forces pures.”176 I employ the word 
‘utopian’ not in a pejorative sense but in the sense of that which has not yet 
arrived at its proper place but remains yet to come since, as Artaud remarks, 
“ce noveau langage la grammaire est encore à trouver.”177  
Nonetheless, the continual attempt to invent another language—a purely 
inventive language that would no longer abide to the laws and logic of 
representation, a material language of gesture, a body-language that would 
represent and signify nothing other but the (re)invention of its own body—
is what Derrida is referring to when he speaks of the ‘idiosyncratic 
affirmation’ that accompanies Artaud’s resistant writing. As mentioned 
earlier, this idiosyncrasy affirms besides, despite, and in defiance of the 
scandalous separation of thought from life continually resisting its 
dispropriations by language from within language. As Rowlands concisely 
puts it, Artaud forces language “to create new meanings, through the violent 
destruction of its own structures,” a destruction and restructuration leading 
at times to an outright “abandonment of language, within language.”178  
                                           
175 OC IV, 18/TD, 7. 
176 OC IV, 98/TD, 58. Artaud gives the following illustration of a non-imitating theatrical 
gesture: “l’apparition d’un Etre inventé, fait de bois et d’étoffe, créé de toutes pièces, ne 
répondant à rien, et cependant inquiétant par nature, capable de réintroduire sur la scène 
un petit souffle de cette grande peur métaphysique qui est à la base de tout le théâtre 
ancient” (OC IV, 53/TD, 31).  
177 OC IV, 132/TD, 79. Again we find echoes of Nietzsche in Artaud, who in stating the 
necessity of reinventing grammar in order to be rid of the metaphysic-theological 
structure of theft and reconquer life to itself appears to share Nietzsche’s fear in Götzen-
Dämmerung that “wir werden Gott nicht los, weil wir noch an die Grammatik glauben…” 
(KSA 6, 78).  
178 Rowlands 2004, 151. This resistance of language within language comes very close to 
resembling the function of what Deleuze calls a ‘minor literature’ which installs itself 
within a major literature and there invents a sort of ‘foreign language’ (langue étrangère) 
bringing about both “une décomposition ou une destruction de la langue maternelle, mais 
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In the most palpable manner, we experience such abandonment of language 
within language in Artaud’s experiments of glossolalia or glossopoeia.179 
That is to say, experiments in a form of babbling that is not purely 
nonsensical, but rather produces a nonsense whose sense consists in breaking 
down grammatical and sentential structures and decomposing words into 
syllables so as to make manifest both the anarchic material forces of 
language and the nonsensical origin of sense.180  
In a letter to Henri Parisot from 1945, Artaud compares his own abyssal 
nonsense with the ‘anal infantilism’ of Lewis Carroll’s poem “Jabberwocky” 
from Through the Looking-Glass, and What Alice Found There (1871), 
which he finds to be superficial yet without the abyssal aspect of 
superficiality where the surface is penetrated by its bottomless depths.181 As 
Artaud explains: “On peut inventer sa langue et faire parler la langue pure 
avec un sens hors grammatical mais il faut que ce sens soit valuable en soi, 
c’est-à-dire qu’il vienne d’affre.”182 
Hence, the invention of another language within language must not be 
done for the sake of something else, harboring within it a hidden meaning to 
be revealed like in a riddle or in a game of hermeneutical crossword puzzle. 
                                           
aussi l’invention d’une nouvelle langue dans la langue, par création de syntaxe” (Deleuze 
1993, 16/5). 
179 As Derrida explains, this glossopoeia is “ni un langage imitatif ni une création de 
noms, nous reconduit au bord du moment où le mot n’est pas encore né, quand 
l’articulation n’est déjà plus le cri mais n’est pas encore le discours, quand la répétition 
est presque impossible, et avec elle la langue en général” (ED, 352/240).  
180 In this regard, Artaud’s poetic babbling, which he both ‘theorized’ and ‘practiced,’ has 
striking resemblances to what Lacan in his later writings calls lalangue, which is precisely 
the language that the unconscious is structured like because it is not yet a language 
understood as a dialogical means of communicating sense. Rather, lalangue is the 
rambling monologue of the unconscious, or the unconscious monologue of language, 
providing the reserves that conscious language and speech disciplined by the sensus 
communis draw upon. Lacan writes: “Le langage sans doute est fait de lalangue. C’est 
une élucubration de savoir sur lalangue. Mais l’inconscient est un savoir, un savoir-faire 
avec lalangue [...]. Lalangue nous affecte d’abord par tout ce qu’elle comporte comme 
effets qui sont affects. Si l’on peut dire que l’inconscient est structuré comme un langage, 
c’est en ceci que les effets de lalangue, déjà là comme savoir, vont bien au-delà de tout 
ce que l’être qui parle est susceptible d’énoncer” (Sem XX, 127/139).  
181 In the thirteenth series of Logique du sens “du schizophrène et de la petite fille,” 
Deleuze measures out the distance separating the superficial nonsense of Carroll from 
that of Artaud’s abyssal nonsense. Regarding Artaud’s relation to Carroll’s work, Deleuze 
writes: “Artaud dit: ce n’est que de la surface. La révélation qui va animer le génie 
d’Artaud, le moindre schizophrène la connaît, la vit à sa manière aussi: pour lui il n’y a 
pas, il n’y a plus de surface. Comment Carroll ne lui paraîtrait-il pas une petite fille 
maniérée, à l’abri de tous les problèmes de fond?” (Deleuze 1969, 106/86) 
182 OC IX, 185/SW, 449.  
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Rather, the invention of a body-language of extra-grammatical non-sense 
must come out of nothing but its own necessity without ulterior meaning or 
purpose. Hence, it is a language that no longer effects contents to be 
deciphered or meanings to be interpreted but instead affects bodies directly 
and which may produce anguish or anxiety in confrontation with its full 
sense of meaninglessness or with its sense of no-thingness. 
The double strategy of counter-theft is related to the irreducible duplicity 
of Artaud’s writing, which never leaves its reader certain whether the 
counter-theft strives for the re-creation of an original self-possession or self-
presence of life to itself lost through representational-theological 
dispossession, or whether the counter-theft strives for the creation or 
invention of a life that never came to be because of its originary 
dispropriation. Again, this alternative remains irreducibly undecidable in 
Artaud’s text, but it is precisely this undecidability that makes the 
foundations of metaphysical duality and representational language tremble. 
Indeed, the very fact that we are posing this question of an alternative 
between an ‘original’ presence and possession or an ‘originary’ absence 
(representation) and dispropriation shows how indebted and entrapped we 
still are by the very way of thinking that Artaud (and deconstruction) seeks 
to dismantle.183 Yet, as I shall attempt to show in what follows, this 
dismantling pertaining to Artaud’s double strategy also exposes itself and his 
text to the risk of autoimmunity inherent in the counter-theft.  
 
 
I.7 THE RISK OF AUTOIMMUNITY INHERENT TO THE COUNTER-THEFT 
In brief, autoimmune processes occur when mechanisms of self-defense, 
self-protection, and self-preservation turns harmful or even become fatal for 
the very ‘self’ which they were supposed to defend, protect, and preserve. In 
biological or physiological terms, autoimmune processes arise due to a 
failure or an inability on the part of an organism to recognize certain elements 
as constitutive of itself, treating them instead as though they were 
destructive. Such misrecognition therefore results in an autoimmune 
response on the part of the organism against a constitutive part of itself. Yet 
                                           
183 In order to liberate ourselves somewhat in (not from) this relation of indebtedness, the 
challenge is perhaps to inherit our debts in a different manner. The challenge is perhaps 
to alter our nostalgic thinking, to dislocate our ceaseless tarrying with origins whether 
these origins concern an originary presence (of self, of God, of the present) or an originary 
loss (of origin, of presence, of self, of God), in order to begin thinking more affirmatively 
in the Nietzschean sense about alteration and dislocation. To quote Lacoue-Labarthe 
paraphrasing Nietzsche, the question is if we can ‘cease to be pious’: “Sommes-nous 
capables d’athéisme?” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1979, 28/13)  
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a certain degree of autoimmune activity pertains to every living organism 
(every vertebrate organism at least), and the threshold at which benign 
autoimmunity turns into malign autoimmunity is difficult to delineate with 
precision. 
From a deconstructive perspective as well, autoimmunity “se trouve logée 
dans la structure même du present et de la vie”184 because the presence of 
life is inscribed in the spacing of temporalization. The temporal spacing of 
the very structure of life has the implication that the living must remain 
essentially open to an otherness that may come to alter them in some respect, 
that is, both to the promise of that which may come to strengthen them but 
also to the threat of that which may come to destroy them. 
Without this constitutive exposure to otherness, and thus to the possibility 
of surprise as well as corruption or violation, life ceases living. However, all 
living also has a tendency towards self-preservation and self-protection 
against what may come to mutilate it, which can result in more or less fatal 
attempts to close off its constitutive openness. In other words, processes of 
trying to protect and preserve life can become self-violating and self-
destructive as the result of not recognizing the constitutive ‘other’ of itself. 
In Voyous, Derrida calls this logic of constitutive autoimmunity an ‘illogical 
logic’ since it does not obey the principle of non-contradiction, and since it 
is a logic “par laquelle un vivant peut spontanément détruire, de façon 
autonome, cela même qui, en lui, se destine à le protéger contre l’autre, à 
l’immuniser contre l’intrusion aggressive de l’autre.”185  
In view of this illogical logic, then, Artaud’s endeavors to purge thought 
and language of every trace of heteronomy and to remake a body 
uncontaminated by foreign elements also risk eliminating the very life they 
are trying to (re)create. As we have seen, the aim was to invent a language 
that would be capable of bearing faithful testimony to the uniqueness of 
every singular impression, sensation, or thought without always already 
dissimulating it in generalizing representations—a singular language, then, 
inaccessible to hermeneutical endeavors of interpretation and translation, 
since such endeavors require the possibility of repetition wereas the purely 
singular can occur only once.186 
                                           
184 V, 179/127. 
185 V, 173/123. 
186As Artaud writes, “une expression ne vaut pas deux fois, ne vit pas deux fois; que toute 
parole prononcée est morte” (OC IV, 91/TD, 54). According to Artaud, the privilege of 
the art of theatre with regard to the invention of singular language is that “theater is the 
only place in the world where a gesture, once made, is never repeated in the same way” 
(ibid.). As Derrida has pointed out, Artaud’s attempt to save “la pureté d’une présence 
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The reinvention of material language must therefore be undecidable and 
undecodable because, as Rowland remarks, “uncoded sounds, they cannot 
be realised as ‘secret,’ because the language which follows no code, cannot 
be decoded.”187 Moreover, it is precisely because of the keeping secret of the 
secret that its singularity is kept safe, which is the reason why a “true secret 
cannot be stolen.”188  
However, Artaud is not content with inventing a language that would be 
secret and singular simply because it would be purely nonsensical; rather, he 
desires a language capable of giving truthful testimony of his singularity. 
Thus, Artaud dreams of “un mot-témoin, un mot précis, un mot subtil, un 
mot bien macéré dans mes moelles, sorti de moi, qui se tiendrait à l’extrême 
bout de mon être.”189 In order to obtain such absolute proximity in witnessing 
himself it is therefore not enough to exorcise the thieving others ‘inside’ of 
thinking and language, Artaud must also cleanse himself of the others ‘out 
there’ in the ‘world’ who in one way or another keep interrupting his solitary 
testimony: “J’ai pour me guérir du jugement des autres toute la distance qui 
me sépare de moi.”190 
In other words, Artaud wants to invent a language purified of any sort of 
heteronomy, in order to reach an absolute proximity to himself, absolved 
from others in a pristine solitude where he would finally become the 
sovereign witness of himself: “Je suis témoin, je suis le seul témoin de moi-
même.”191 The question, however, is how one bears witness to pure 
singularity. How can one recognize singularity as singularity, or even as 
such, without thereby also misrecognizing it? How can one bear witness to 
oneself in an absolute proximity without distance, that is, without 
introducing a gap of possible dissimulation, or without representing oneself 
to oneself? How does one bear witness to one’s solitude without stating to 
oneself,  ‘I am solitary,’ and by this very statement also bearing witness to 
the doubling which separates one from oneself as the one who is both the 
enunciating subject and the subject of enunciation?192 That is, how does one 
                                           
sans différence intérieure et sans repetition” paradoxically amounts to an attempt to save 
“une différence pure” (ED, 366/249). 
187 Rowlands 2004, 152. 
188 Rowlands 2004, 152.  
189 OC I, 108/SW, 81. Accordingly, in Le théâtre et son double Artaud writes that the aim 
of true theatrical language is not to “résoudre des conflits sociaux ou psychologiques, de 
servir de champ de bataille à des passions morales, mais d’exprimer objectivement des 
vérités secretes” (OC IV, 84/TD, 50). 
190 OC I, 34/SW, 34. 
191 OC I, 108/SW, 81. 
192 In his essay “Nous autres” from 2003, Nancy concisely describes the separation of 
enunciation, which does not take place secondarily in regard to some original unity of the 
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prevent this very testimonial from also bearing witness to the fact that the 
word ‘I,’ as well as the words ‘singular,’ or ‘solitary,’ are as “général que le 
mot pain,”193 and as such conditioned by the possibility of dissimulating 
dissemination, repetition, and representation. In short, how does one bear 
witness to a solitary singularity without at the same time erasing it?  
With a view to Artaud’s strict demand for a wholly unified body of 
thought and language—a thought-body and a body-language without organs, 
a body without parts or members, which for Artaud is always equivalent to 
a dismembering194—Artaud’s singularity repeatedly undergoes violation by 
the erosions and internal thefts of thinking. As we saw above, one aspect of 
the strategy of counter-theft that Artaud also employs against the incessant 
interruptions that deprive him of any sense of self-consistency and self-
possession is to intensify his auto-inspections. However, as we also saw, this 
was a double-edged strategy since the hyperreflexive auto-inspections tend 
to accentuate the gaping intervals they aim to close. Thus, the perpetual 
dissimulation of thought by itself brings it to the point where, in trying to 
coincide with itself, it “désespère maintenant de s’atteindre.”195 
The problem thus appears to be that in trying to close off his singularity 
from purloining and separating others, Artaud also risks effacing this very 
singularity by closing the constitutive openness to otherness along with it. In 
his attempt to get rid of the judgment of others, and especially of the 
judgment of God as the great thief of all singular life, Artaud might end up 
eliminating his own life along with it, which, as we saw earlier, only exists 
in a constitutive openness to otherness even when this openness is 
experienced as a non-mutual symbiotic relation of divine parasitism. This is 
the double bind of autoimmunity, which, as Derrida emphasizes in Le 
toucher, is always a “[q]uestion de cæur, et de corps étranger. 
                                           
one but as that by which the one separated from itself first comes into being as such: 
“Celui qui dit ‘je’ se distingue en le disant. Il ne fait même que cela: il se sépare, il 
s’écarte, voire il se retranche. Que je est un autre, comme le dit Rimbaud, c’est une 
évidence qui précède tout sentiment possible d’étrangeté à soi ou d’aliénation” (NA, 
4/100). 
193 FP, 9/1. 
194 For Artaud, the reconquering of life, and more specifically the life of the human being, 
to itself consists also in a remaking of its anatomy. As he writes in Pour en finir avec le 
jugement de dieu: “Lorsque vous lui aurez fait un corps sans organs, alors vous l’aurez 
délivré de tous ses automatismes et rendu à sa veritable liberté” (OC XIII, 104/SW, 571). 
Artaud’s phantasm of a body without organs is akin to the cosmic ‘body’ (σῶμα) of 
Plato’s Timaeus, which is described as a ‘blessed God’ (εὐδαίμονα θεὸν) that has no need 
of ‘organs’ (ὀργάνου) because it is wholly ‘self-sufficient’ (αὔταρκες) and designed to 
feed on its own ‘wastage’ (φθίσιν). See Tim, 33b–34b.  
195 OC I, 82/SW 69. 
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D’exappropriation du plus propre, comme désir, dirais-je, auto-immunitaire 
du propre.”196 
This autoimmunity of the life that Artaud so yearns to touch entails that 
the more he attempts to make his thought and language coincide by bearing 
witness to their singular unicity, the more the interval of separation and 
relation seems to expand, through a movement that defers the self-testimony 
of solitary existence endlessly. Paradoxically, Artaud’s strategy of trying to 
keep his singularity safe from theft, by preserving it as a non-translatable 
secret to which only he and his solitary word can bear witness, risks 
destroying what it aims to save. 
At this point, we seem to be approaching the end of this adventure with 
Artaud in the vicinity of the very place where we began, that is, at the 
‘extreme moment of death,’ where Artaud dreads that even if this death were 
to be a death caused by one’s own hand, it would still not be a death of one’s 
own. Are we now at a place where this fear might no longer appear so 
strange, no stranger at least than we remain to ourselves? If autoimmunity 
does indeed imply suicidal tendencies, it can only result in a suicide entirely 
devoid of any sense of authenticity, authority, or propriety, that is, in a 
suicide that, as a realization of Artaud’s fear, would be nothing but a death 
stolen away from the dying. In fact, as Derrida has shown in Voyous, the 
autoimmunity at the heart of the living consists “pas seulement à se suicider 
mais à compromettre la sui-référentialité, le soi du suicide même,” thus 
threatening “toujours de priver le suicide lui-même de son sens et son 
intégrité suppose.”197  
Certainly, Artaud suffered the aporia of solitary witnessing as the aporia 
of bearing witness to a secret. Yet, as Derrida has shown in Poétique et 
politique du témoignage, this aporia might be essentially linked to what he 
calls a poetic experience “au-delà ou en deçà de toutes les traductions 
possible.”198 In writing on Celan’s poem Aschenglorie, Derrida suggests that 
a poem retains its irreplaceable singularity precisely in bearing witness to the 
impossibility of bearing witness and to the solitary responsibility that comes 
with this impossibility, seeing that “Niemand / zeugt für den / Zeugen.”199 
This irreplaceability of the poem is, as Derrida writes: 
 
[L]à où il se tait, là où il garde son secret, tout en nous disant qu’il y a du secret, 
révélant le secret qu’il garde comme secret, ne le révélant pas, tandis qu’il témoigne 
                                           
196 T, 77/63. 
197 V, 71/45. 
198 PPT, 76/ 95.  
199 Celan 2000b, 72. We shall return to Celan in the closing remarks.  
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encore qu’on ne peut pas témoigner pour le témoin, qui finalement reste seul et sans 
témoin.200  
 
On this view, the essential solitude of the witness “n’est pas une solitude 
comme un autre—ni un secret comme un autre. C’est la solitude et la secret 
mêmes.”201 Artaud’s despairing attempt to find the proper word that would 
finally allow him to become the sole witness of himself and the secret of his 
own singularity might, in this respect, turn out to be a poetic 
accomplishment—a poetic accomplishment insofar as this ever-missing 
word, a hole-word in the sense of Duras,202 ends up bearing witness to a 
secret so secret that it is secreted away from any possible relation of 
witnessing. An ab-solute secret,203 at last, which preserves itself in a solitude 
that belongs to no one, not even to itself, and that therefore can never be 
stolen by anyone. 
 
                                           
200 PPT 77/96. 
201 PPT 77/96. 
202 In Le ravissement de Lol V. Stein, Duras lets Lol’s lover speculate in her silence is not 
due to her belief in the existence of a certain “mot-trou, creusé en son centre d’un trou, 
de ce trou où tous les autres mots auraient été enterrés” (Duras 1994, 54). Since she has 
not yet found this ever-missing word, Lol remains silent even when speaking.  
203 We should bear in mind here the many different connotations that the word ‘absolute’ 
composed of ab- (‘away from,’ ‘out of’) and solvere (‘loosen,’ ‘unbind,’ ‘release’) carries 
with it from its Latin heritage such as ‘completeness,’ ‘detachment,’ ‘exculpation,’ 
‘freedom,’ ‘perfection,’ and ‘unboundedness.’ The absolute is a paradoxical construction 
since it must both be complete in itself and detached from something else. Yet, as Nancy 
has emphasized in La communaute désoeuvrée, with this double-bound demand: “La 
logique de l’absolu fait violence à l’absolu. Elle l’implique dans un rapport qu’il refuse 
et exclut par essence” (CD, 18/4). Furthermore, as Nancy remarks in his L’expérience de 
la liberté, it is not enough that the absolute merely be separated from something, and 
thereby implicated in a relation of separation, because “Être absolu, c’est être détaché de 
tout lien et de toute présence, y compris à soir-même” (EL, 140/109). 
  
II. THE SOLITUDE OF DEPENDENCY 
 
 
La plus grande chose du monde c’est de savoir être à soi 
 – Michel de Montaigne, ‘De la Solitude’ 
 
Je sais bien, moi, à qui plus personne ne vient 
prêter un visage et des secrets—que je ne suis 
qu’un trou noir au milieu de Speranza, un point 
de vue sur Speranza—un point, c’est-à-dire rien 
– Michel Tournier, Vendredi ou les Limbes du Pacifique 
 
 
II.1 INTRODUCTION  
Let us now return to our point of departure for exploring the remains of 
solitude in the auto-deconstruction of the self, namely, to the so-called 
‘solitude of not being alone,’ which we encountered it in the initial passage 
from Artaud, in order to see what other aspects of solitude might still lie 
concealed behind this solitary figure of the first section.  
To begin again, then, perhaps we should be more emphatic, or more 
precise, in our pronunciation, when attempting to sketch out this figure of 
solitude that, as we have argued, holds Artaud under siege. More emphatic, 
that is, since what is at stake here concerns precisely a solitude of not being 
able to be alone, that is, of not being able to exist as oneself, or of not being 
able to sustain one’s being by oneself or on one’s own. The question to be 
pursued in the following chapter, therefore, is that of the specific nature of 
this inability. Can it be isolated to an emotional, a psychological, or perhaps 
even a pathological inability—or is there more to it than that? Does such a 
distinctive isolation appear unsatisfactory because the inability that we are 
trying to approach is much more general? Might the inability to exist as 
oneself by oneself perhaps be an effect of the very ontological structure of 
what we more or less readily call a ‘self’ due to the fact that ‘others,’ in 
whatever shape or form, condition both the possibility and the impossibility 
of the very sense of such a self?204 These are the questions that we will be 
                                           
204 In The Divided Self, Laing tells of a patient who begins her treatment because of what 
appears to be a severe agoraphobia. However, since Laing observes that she is not afraid 
to be outside in the streets when somebody that knows her is with her, it soon becomes 
evident that what frightens her is not the open streets as such but rather that she is afraid 
of disappearing in the anonymity of the streets. Laing therefore infers that the cause of 
her anxiety is her “lack of ontological autonomy” since, as he explains: “If she is not in 
the actual presence of another person who knows her, or if she cannot succeed in evoking 
this person’s presence in his absence, her sense of her own identity drains away from her. 
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posing again and again in the course of this chapter, perhaps without 
reaching any final responses.  
We deliberately say ‘others in whatever shape or form’ because, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, the otherness that prevents a self from being 
entirely on its own alone is not necessarily, or not only, restricted to the 
otherness of other people. Rather, we also saw that it is not only the 
alimentary and respiratory, but also the linguistic and representative 
conditions of existence that are experienced by Artaud as estranging him 
from his own proper solitude and as divesting him of his own proper life 
from its very beginning. In this respect, it is not difficult to imagine how such 
symptomatic conditions of existence may lead to fantasies or phantasms of 
an absolutely pure and sovereign solitude, hermetically self-enclosed and 
self-sufficient. Cast in one piece, without organs, and detached from any 
dependency upon others, such a sovereign solitude would be protected 
against all influences from the outside, never quavering in or doubting the 
stability of its inside. However, as we also came to witness in the previous 
section, and as we shall come to witness again in this and the following 
sections, the attempts to purge oneself of others also entail great risks: they 
can bring about autoimmune responses fatal to the very self that one wishes 
to purge of and preserve from all otherness.  
Leaving Artaud somewhat in the shadows but never entirely out of mind, 
the present section will further develop the risks associated with the desire 
for a sovereign solitude that are precipitated by the solitary experience of not 
being able to be alone in order to try to unfold the proposition that others 
constitute both a condition of possibility and of impossibility of the solitary 
self. We shall do so by concentrating on the solitary self’s dependence on 
different instances of otherness—although the otherness treated in the 
present section will mainly be the otherness of other selves, primarily in the 
sense of other human selves.205   
 
                                           
Her panic is at the fading away of her being. She is like Tinker Bell. In order to exist she 
needs someone else to believe in her existence” (Laing 1969, 56). The question we are 
raising in this chapter is, whether we are not all frangible tinker bells to some extent? Is 
anyone, inside or outside of treatment, capable of existing as someone without someone 
else believing in the unique existence of this someone? Otherwise put, without the 
sustaining belief of the other, would not anyone turn into no one?  
205 The intriguing and important question of whether or not what—in a problematic 
categorization—are frequently called ‘animals’ or ‘plants’ can be said to have or to be 
selves, and if so, whether or not any distinct borders may be drawn in order to delimit the 
animal or the vegetative from the human selves is a question that demands more attention 
than this thesis can afford it. For some of Derrida’s most elaborate discussions of the 
question of the animal and its difference to the human, see BS I–II and ADS. 
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II.2 SOLITUDE AND ORIGINARY BEING-WITH-OTHERS 
Perhaps it is no more than a triviality, or a mere statement of the obvious, to 
say that solitude—whether as a sense or as a notion—depends on a relation 
with others. Nevertheless, in this section we will investigate whether this 
apparent triviality might turn out to be more intricate than it appears. In order 
to launch this closer inspection, we will turn to Heidegger who, despite 
remaining a strong adherent of the proper Einsamkeit and Vereinzelung 
pertaining to every single Dasein, recognizes that such singular solitude is 
only possible because Dasein is always already a Mitsein or a 
Miteinandersein: in other words, that being-there always already means 
being-with-others.  
In his 1959 essay “Der Weg zur Sprache,” Heidegger explains the 
equiprimordial intrigue of singular solitude and being-with-others as 
follows: “Doch einsam kann nur sein, wer nicht allein ist; nicht allein, d. h. 
nicht abgesondert, vereinzelt, ohne jeden Bezug. Im Einsamen west dagegen 
gerade der Fehl des Gemeinsamen als der bindendste Bezug zu diesem.”206 
By way of translation, then, what Heidegger’s sense of solitude discerns is 
that only one who is not alone, secluded, or isolated without any relations or 
bonds to others can be said to be solitary. Moreover, in solitude it is precisely 
the absence or lack of a common ground of being that binds the solitary one 
most strongly or most forcefully to what we can call the being-in-common 
(Gemeinsamen) with other beings. 
Despite the originary being-with-others, however, there nevertheless 
remains an irreducible solitude (Einsamkeit) of each and every singular 
Dasein. We shall attempt to come to a better understanding of this irreducible 
solitude by reading Heidegger’s 1929–30 lecture course on Die 
Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Welt—Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit in tandem 
with Derrida’s last seminars on La bête et le souverain, given from 
December 2001 to March 2003 and dedicated, among other readings, to a 
double reading of none other than Heidegger’s 1929–30 lecture course 
together with Defoe’s 1718 novel Robinson Crusoe.  
To begin with Derrida: a recurrent refrain of his final seminars concerns 
the significant relation that he draws between a desire for solitude or for 
being all ‘alone’ (seul) with oneself, and a desire for sovereignty or for being 
‘the only one’ (le seul), that is, in more Heideggerian terms, between 
Einsamkeit and Einzigkeit. As Derrida demonstrates, this relation between a 
certain solitude and a desire for sovereignty can be detected not only in the 
works of Heidegger and Defoe, but throughout the abundant discourses—
whether philosophical, theological, fictional, or otherwise—where solitude 
                                           
206 GA 12, 254. 
88 
 
figures as something that is both longed for and shied away from, both 
desired and dreaded.  
We will return to this significant relation between solitude and sovereignty 
in more detail in the course of the following section. At this preliminary 
stage, however, we shall pause to ponder the strange circumstance that, in 
this context of drawing a connection between solitude and sovereignty, 
Derrida merely takes note of but does not expand on the fact that the word 
Einsamkeit—which figures as the last of the three fundamental concepts of 
metaphysics in the subtitle of Heidegger’s lecture course—more or less 
disappears from the course’s main text, where it is replaced by the word 
Vereinzelung.207 This circumstance becomes all the more strange given that 
one could in fact read Derrida’s entire seminar as devoting itself to, and 
unfolding in, precisely the trembling difference between these two German 
words, that is, between Einsamkeit and Vereinzelung, which Derrida more or 
less consistently translates into French as solitude and esseulement.208  
Throughout their respective texts, then, Heidegger will write more or less 
unsteadily of both Vereinzelung and Einsamkeit—although Vereinzelung 
definitely takes the more prominent role throughout the lecture course—
without clearly specifying when and why he uses one word instead of the 
other, much as Derrida will write in translation of both esseulement and 
solitude. But alas, the difficulties of translation between languages and texts, 
or within the same language and text, do not end here. Since we are currently 
reading and writing in English, a further complication attaches itself to this 
                                           
207 To my count, the word Einsamkeit only appears twice in the lecture course, apart from 
the subtitle (GA 29/30, 8; 19), whereas Vereinzelung appears more times than it would 
make sense to count. As one can discern from the editor’s epilogue, the substitution of 
words taking place in the lectures, on which Heidegger himself does not comment, was 
also a cause of doubt for the editors during their preparation of the German text for 
publication. Adding to their confusion, the editors report that two statements offered to 
them independently of each other by two participants of the lectures both affirm that 
Heidegger in his handwritten announcement of the lecture course on the blackboard had, 
in fact, assigned it the subtitle “Welt—Endlichkeit—Vereinzelung” instead of “Welt—
Endlichkeit—Einsamkeit” as was written in his manuscript. Because Heidegger did not 
decide to overwrite the word Einsamkeit with Vereinzelung in any of the manuscripts for 
the lecture course, however, the editors finally came to the decision to publish it without 
changes. 
208 Derrida himself emphasizes that the difference between the two terms marks an 
‘unstable differentiation’ (cf. BS II, 152/98) in Heidegger’s text as well as his own. That 
Derrida does not expand more on the substitution of words in Heidegger’s text could of 
course have something to do with the format of the text. Philological considerations are 
perhaps more accommodable to a text written mainly to be read and less so to a text that 
also serves as a manuscript for an oral presentation at a seminar where the listeners do 
not have the possibility of reading along to keep track of the complexities.   
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already complex matter, inasmuch as the English language offers (at least) 
two possible translations of the German Einsamkeit, namely, as loneliness or 
solitude; and when it comes to the English translation of Vereinzelung, 
matters become even more complicated, which is why we must briefly 
digress here in order to try to disentangle them a little.  
In McNeill’s English translation of Heidegger’s 1929/1930 lecture course, 
Vereinzelung is translated as individuation and Einsamkeit as solitude, 
whereas the word loneliness does not figure at all. In contrast, Bennington 
seems reluctant to use the word individuation in his English translation of 
Derrida’s seminar, and most frequently translates Derrida’s French 
translation of Heidegger’s Vereinzelung to esseulement as loneliness, 
sometimes inserting a note marking the difference from McNeill’s choice of 
words. However, in at least one quotation from Heidegger’s text in Derrida’s 
seminar, Bennington chooses to keep McNeill’s English translation of 
Vereinzelung as individuation, despite the fact that Derrida’s French 
translation still employs esseulement.209  
At this point, it seems unavoidable that we must address—albeit in a 
preliminary manner—the problematic issue of translating Heidegger’s 
Vereinzelung with the term individuation, whether in the 1929/1930 lecture 
course or elsewhere. What makes this translation problematic can be 
discerned by considering some of Heidegger’s more or less explicit, but most 
often quite critical or directly disapproving comments pertaining to the 
notion of the ‘individual,’ and all of its inflections, scattered across his 
writings.210 Overall, one can say that for Heidegger, concepts such as 
‘individuality,’ the ‘individuum,’ and the ‘individual,’ but also the ‘subject’ 
or the ‘person’ all presuppose what he seeks to designate in a more original 
manner with terms such as Dasein, Jeweiligkeit, or Jemeinigkeit. A more 
                                           
209 Cf. BS II, 163/108.   
210 This is already evident in one of Heidegger’s earliest texts Der Begriff der Zeit from 
1924, where time is rendered as the proper principium individuationis of Dasein, albeit a 
principle of individuation that only individuates inasmuch as it breaks down every 
possibility of standing out from others as someone uniquely outstanding (cf. GA 64, 82). 
Rather, time individuates in such a manner that it makes everyone equal inasmuch as it 
brings every single one before his or her death in exactly the same way. The way in which 
time serves as a principle of individuation without, however, producing outstanding 
individuals is precisely the movement that Heidegger sought to capture with his notion of 
an “each-time-ness that is mine” (Jeweiligkeit als meiniges) already in 1924, and which 
in Sein und Zeit and later became amalgamated in the notion of Jemeinigkeit (cf. GA 64, 
112). See also §31 of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger in a subsequently added comment 
explicitly distinguishes the self (selbst) that Dasein, as existing, already is but also always 
has to become, from the mode of the being of both the ‘subject,’ the ‘individuum’ and the 
‘person’ (cf. GA 2, 146).   
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original manner, because these terms indicate how the workings of both time 
(je, weil) and space (Da) precondition the constitution of any individual, or 
rather of any separated or singular human being as a being-with-others.  
In the 1929/1930 lectures specifically, Heidegger links the notion of the 
individual to the Apollonian in Nietzsche’s sense of this word, inasmuch as 
he detects in the individuum a need (Drang) for a complete being-for-itself 
(vollkommenen Für-sich-sein). For Heidegger, this need for being-for-
oneself connotes not only a representation of oneself before oneself 
(Vorstellung) as an object, but also the technical enframing (Gestell) of 
oneself as disposable to oneself. According to Heidegger, this need for 
representation pertains to all of the mechanisms that seek to simplify 
whatever is encountered in experience, making it clear and distinct only by 
abstracting it from any original ambiguity it might otherwise entail.211 
Further on in the lecture course, Heidegger also associates ‘the individual 
subject’ with the ‘everyday personality,’ which is obviously reminiscent of 
the notion of Das Man from Sein und Zeit, which, within the logic of 
fundamental ontology, is precisely the mode of being that every single 
Dasein must become dissociated from in order to experience its ownmost 
singularity.  
It is precisely these everyday (read: naïve or vulgar) concepts of 
‘individuality’ and ‘personality’ that encounter their porous limits and 
become insignificant in the fundamental moods, or the abyssal attunements, 
of ground (Grundstimmungen), i.e. both of anxiety, which exposes the 
anxious one to the original unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit) of its Dasein as a 
relation to being,212 and of a profound boredom, which discloses the essential 
                                           
211 As Heidegger explains: “Mit dem Wort ‘apollinisch’ ist ausgedrückt: der Drang zum 
vollkommenen Für-sich-sein, zum typischen ‘Individuum’, zu Allem was vereinfacht, 
heraushebt, stark, deutlich, unzweideutig, typisch macht: die Freiheit unter dem Gesetz” 
(GA 29/30, 109). With ‘the law,’ Heidegger is here referring to what Nietzsche calls ‘the 
aristocratic legislation’ (die aristokratische Gesetzgebung) according to which “so soll es 
immer sein!” which is the moral aestheticism of the Apollonian illusion of eternally 
beautiful forms and norms. In contrast, the Dionysian knows that existence can also 
appear cruel and hideous but it affirms these as aspects of the creatively destructive and 
destructively creative forces of the world as ‘continual creation’ (beständige Schöpfung). 
Cf. KSA 12, 113.   
212 Accordingly, in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger clearly distinguishes the Vereinzelung of the 
anxious one from the isolation of some kind of transcendental subject: “Die Angst 
vereinzelt und erschließt so das Dasein als ‘solus ipse.’ Dieser existenziale ‘Solipsismus’ 
versetzt aber so wenig ein isoliertes Subjektding in die harmlose Leere eines weltlosen 
Vorkommens, daß er das Dasein gerade in einem extremen Sinne vor seine Welt als Welt 
und damit es selbst vor sich selbst als In-der-Welt-sein bringt” (GA 2, 250).  
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emptiness and estrangedness of Dasein as a relation to time.213  
Hence, in the 1929/1930 lectures the category of the ‘individual’ is 
construed as part of that shining veil Schein, which in our everyday affairs 
we cast upon existence in order to make it a little less complicated, a little 
less nuanced, a little more simple than it might actually be. In other words, 
the ready-made notion of the ‘individual’ is one of the lies we need to tell 
ourselves lest we perish from the truth. Accordingly, for Heidegger, clinging 
on to the assumption of the ‘individual’ is precisely what keeps us from 
becoming properly singularized (vereinzelt) in becoming finite 
(Verendlichung).  
One must be careful, then, and attentive to Heidegger’s wording, which 
we know is never haphazard, and which distinguishes the proper 
(eigentliche) solitude of Dasein from an improper solitude of the individual, 
since, as Derrida emphasizes in “Il faut bien manger,” the concept of 
individuality “risque toujours de faire signe et vers l’ego et vers une 
indivisibilité.”214 The conception of such an indivisible kernel of 
subjectivity—constructed along the lines of a simple understanding of the 
Bohrian atomic model that disregards the divisibility of the kernel—solicits 
a thinking that begins with the principle of an isolated individual that exists 
in and for itself independently of others, in order to subsequently, and only 
in a secondary move, proceed to thinking of an ‘intersubjectivity’ that allows 
such atomic subjects to relate and engage with one another.  
In other words, the notion of ‘individuation’ bypasses, disregards, or 
overlooks the primordial link between, or the equiprimordiality 
(Gleichursprunglichkeit) of, solitude and being-with-others, which also 
implies the impossibility of being alone on one’s own, since ‘one’s own’ is 
always already infiltrated with an otherness that is also a condition of its 
possibility. As Nancy underlines, the question of singularity is always 
already plural and it always already lurks behind the conception of an atomic 
individual: “La singularité n’a pas lieu dans l’ordre des atomes, identités 
identifiables sinon identiques, mais elle lieu dans le plan du clinamen, 
inidentifiable.”215 
                                           
213 In the context of profound boredom, Heidegger writes: “Denn mit diesem ‘es ist einem 
langweilig’ sind wir nicht bloß der alltäglichen Personalität enthoben, ihr irgendwie fern 
und fremd, sondern in eins damit hinausgehoben auch über die jeweilige bestimmte 
Situation und das betreffende Seiende, das uns da umgibt. Die ganze Situation und wir 
selbst als dieses individuelle Subjekt sind dabei gleichgültig” (GA 29/30, 207). 
214 ASQV, 102/107.  
215 CD, 25–26/6–7. Lucretius employs the notion of the clinamen in reference to the 
unpredictable swerve of atoms whose ‘inclination’ remains undetectable, that is, when 
atoms for no predictable or deductible reason infinitesimally deviate “at scarce 
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As already mentioned, Heidegger, avoiding the term ‘individuation,’ refers 
at times, and especially during the period of Sein und Zeit, to the irreducibly 
singular solitude of being-with-others under the heading of Jemeinigkeit, an 
untranslatable word which nonetheless has the advantage of emphasizing the 
finitude of the time and the space distributed to each and every single Dasein. 
The ‘each time’ of the je- is a timing of space, or a spacing of time, according 
to which the ‘mineness’ of -meinigkeit can never be replaced by another, but 
also according to which this same ‘mineness’ can only take place because of 
the interval separating it from other instances of ‘mineness.’  
Therefore, the Jemeinigkeit or the ‘each-time-mineness’ of Dasein differs 
from the indivisibility of an individual inasmuch as it designates an 
intervallic structure according to which each and every Dasein is not only 
separated from each and every other Dasein, but also from itself in each and 
every time of another je-. Undoubtedly, then, there remains an irreducible 
singularity in this structure of Jemeinigkeit or Vereinzelung pertaining to 
Dasein, but this singularity is not that of the individual, which precisely 
denotes that which cannot be divided; whereas the singularity of the ‘each-
time-mineness’ is always already divided, always already multiplied, always 
already differing in itself.216 
As Nancy has concisely articulated the difference: “La singularité—pour 
cette raison distincte de l’individualité—a lieu selon cette double altérité de 
la ‘fois’, qui instaure le rapport comme retrait de l’identité.”217 We shall 
return to Nancy and his conception of a certain ‘inoperative’ community of 
solitary singularities who share nothing but their differing later in this 
                                           
determined times [incerto tempore], in scarce determined places [incertisque locis], from 
their course” (Re.Nat. II.218–219). According to Lucretius, if this principal deviation 
from principles had not occurred “then collisions never could be nor blows among the 
primal elements; and thus Nature would never have created aught [ita nihil umquam 
natura creasset]” (ibid. II.224–225). In other words, the beginning always begins with a 
deviation, which again implies that there is no simple origin of beginning. Moreover, for 
Lucretius the fact that the human mind has no prefixed internal necessity (necessum 
intestinum) comes from the very unfixable swerve of the principles (facit exiguum 
clinamen principiorum nec regione loci certa nec tempore certo) (ibid. II.289–293). With 
Heidegger and Nancy, one could say that this is why every beginning of a singular plural 
is linked to ecstasy understood precisely as an original dislocation from the stasis of a 
steady time and place. On the notion of the clinamen, see also Deleuze’s essay “Lucrèce 
et le simulacra” (Deleuze 1969, 307–324/269–270).  
216 We find the great fragment from Heraclitus referred to in Hölderlin’s Hyperion, both 
of which Heidegger had undoubtedly read: “Das große Wort, das εν διαφερον εαυτω (das 
Eine in sich selber unterschiedne) des Heraklit, das konnte nur ein Grieche finden, denn 
es ist das Wesen der Schönheit, und ehe es gefunden war, gabs keine Philosophie” (HSW 
5, 182).  
217 EL, 92/68.  
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chapter. For now, however, we will not dwell any longer on this intricate 
matter of wording. Instead, and as a way of closing this long meditation on 
individuation, we will simply note the curious proximity between the 
simplification of the individual, this Vereinfachung of which Heidegger 
speaks mostly pejoratively, and his advancement of the term Vereinzelung, 
which can also, as it were—according to the Deutsches Wörterbuch, that is 
to say, in ‘everyday’ German—signify simplification understood as the 
process of ‘dividing a whole into parts’ (ein ganzes in theile zertheilen).  
Coming to the end of this translational digression, then, the question 
remains whether Bennington’s loneliness, undoubtedly preferable to the 
term ‘individuation,’ is the most appropriate translation of Derrida’s 
esseulement, which again figures as a translation of Heidegger’s 
Vereinzelung. I am doubtful that this is appropriate, for several reasons. To 
mention just one reason, the noun loneliness does not carry with it the sense 
of movement or of becoming found in either Derrida’s esseulement or 
Heidegger’s Vereinzelung, both of which are words that can function as a 
noun or as a verb, depending on the context in which they occur. In this 
respect, it seems to me that a word such as ‘singularization,’ always preferred 
by someone like Nancy, would perhaps be more appropriate—even if it is 
still inappropriate—than both ‘individuation’ and ‘loneliness.’  
Yet one could also argue on behalf of retaining Bennington’s translation 
of esseulement as ‘loneliness’—first, because of the obvious reference to 
solitude that it bears, which makes the substitution of Einsamkeit for 
Vereinzelung in Heidegger’s text more marked. Second, and perhaps more 
far-fetched, because like both Vereinzelung and Einsamkeit, loneliness 
actually contains within it the one becoming singularized. In any case, to the 
question of whether the distinction between ‘Einsamkeit und Vereinzelung,’ 
‘solitude et esseulement,’ or ‘solitude and loneliness and/or singularization’ 
could or even should be drawn clearly or strictly, whether in Heidegger, in 
Derrida, or in the present text, I cannot speak with confidence, and so in what 
follows I will leave these distinctions to their unstable differentiations, even 
if for the above reasons I happen to prefer one term over another.218  
                                           
218 A couple of years following the seminar of La bête et le souverain, in L’animal que 
donc je suis from 2006, Derrida returns to this difficulty of translation when he cites one 
of the paragraph titles from chapter one of Heidegger’s lecture course, “Das Heimweh als 
die Grundstimmung des Philosophierens und die Fragen nach Welt, Endlichkeit, 
Vereinzelung.” Once again, Derrida translates Vereinzelung as esseulement but then adds 
a parenthesis noting his doubtful hesitation about this translation: “(Esseulement’ est-il la 
meilleure traduction pour Vereinzelung? Singularisation? Esseulement? Solitude? C’est 
très compliqué)” (ADS, 198/145). It is indeed very complicated; and we should not be so 
presumptuous as to think that we can resolve this complication any better than Derrida.   
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Returning to the texts of Heidegger and Derrida, it appears that Heidegger 
himself offers us a possible clarification of the substitution of Einsamkeit, or 
solitude, with Vereinzelung, or singularization, that takes place in his 
1929/1930 lecture course, inasmuch as he introduces the solitude with which 
he is concerned as a question of becoming singular: “Was ist diese 
Einsamkeit, wo der Mensch je wie ein Einziger sein wird?”219 From this 
question, which appears at the very outset of the lectures, we can at least 
sense an intimation of the reason why the term Einsamkeit came to be 
replaced by the term Vereinzelung, inasmuch as Heidegger’s main interest 
in solitude is precisely as a question of singuralization. Moreover, we might 
note that Vereinzelung, to a foreigner’s ear at least, sounds a lot like 
Verinselung, that is, insularization or islandization, which is of some 
importance in the context of Derrida’s double reading of Defoe and 
Heidegger. As it were, in La bête et le souverain, Derrida will come to show 
how the distance separating an eighteenth-century British novel about a man 
isolated for twenty-eight years on a desert island from the work of a 
twentieth-century German philosopher thinking about singularization might 
be slimmer than expected.  
Hence, Heidegger’s initial questioning of the solitary singularization 
already discloses that the underlying question linking the three fundamental 
questions of metaphysics—‘What is world (Welt)?’ ‘What is finitude 
(Endlichkeit)?’ ‘What is solitude (Einsamkeit)?’—is the question of the 
human being, which for Heidegger is always a question of the being whose 
being consists in being there (Dasein), which is also a question of grounds. 
Heidegger interlaces these four fundamental questions into one as follows: 
“Was ist das in Einem: Welt, Endlichkeit, Vereinzelung? Was geschieht da 
mit uns? Was ist der Mensch, daß mit ihm solches in seinem Grunde 
geschieht?”220 
What happens there that makes ‘us,’ the human beings, into the human 
beings that ‘we’ are? As Derrida affirms, this question of Dasein so 
significant to Heidegger’s thinking concerns precisely “la question de 
l’essence de l’homme dans l’expérience de ce Da.”221 Where is this there, 
then? Well, according to Heidegger, it takes place right there in the 
interrelation of the three fundamental questions of world, finitude, and 
solitary singularization. It is there in between the difference separating and 
relating beings from and to their being, which is the also the ‘in-between’ or 
                                           
219 GA 29/30, 8. 
220 GA 29/30, 8. Partly my italics. 
221 BS II, 161/106. 
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the interval that opens up the possibility of the apophantic, which again is 
the possibility for ‘having’ a world as such. 
However, the there as the condition of both having a world and becoming 
solitary is in return conditioned by the finitude of its time and space, that is, 
by its essential mortality. According to Heidegger, the human being is the 
only being capable of dying properly, and because of this distinguished 
capability of being mortal, it is also the only being capable of solitude and of 
relating to the world as such. Neither the animal, the plant, nor the stone can 
die, and for this reason they can neither be solitary nor have a relation to 
something like a world, since ultimately they are not even there, in the 
determinate, or rather terminal, sense of being Da.222 As such, the being 
called Dasein, which is human but also other than human, is the only being 
capable of both world, finitude, and solitude. It is also the only being capable 
of posing questions about these capabilities, and indeed of posing questions 
at all and about the all, that is, metaphysical questions (are there any other?)  
Accordingly, in a paragraph that transports the reader through the entire 
referential chain of finitude–solitude–singularity–man–world, Heidegger 
unfolds the interweaving, or the Verflechtung, of the three fundamental 
concepts of metaphysics—world, finitude, solitude—with that of the human 
being as follows: “Was sich in dieser Verendlichung vollzieht, ist eine letzte 
Vereinsamung des Menschen, in der jeder für sich wie ein Einziger vor dem 
Ganzen steht.”223  
It is in the confrontation with finitude in the guise of one’s ownmost death 
that the human being experiences the solitary singularization of its Da at the 
edges of the world. For Heidegger, this singularization of Dasein does not 
amount to the stifling of a petty little ego (ein schmächtiges und kleines Ich), 
abstracted from the world of others. On the contrary, the singularization of 
which Heidegger is speaking is rather like a becoming solitary or a 
solitarisation (Vereinsamung), in which each and every human being first 
enters into proximity with the essence of everything, that is to say, with the 
                                           
222 A small but significant correction must be inserted here, since according to Heidegger, 
animals do in fact have a relation to a world in a certain sense, namely, a relation of 
deprivation (Entbehrung) or poverty (Armut). Therefore the animal has a world in not 
having a world, or, as Heidegger puts it in his second thesis, ‘the animal is poor of world’ 
(das Tier ist Weltarm), the first thesis being ‘the stone is worldless’ (der Stein ist weltlos), 
and the third ‘the human being is worldbuilding’ (der Mensch is weltbildend). Obviously, 
the question of the animal world in distinction from the human world is important to 
Heidegger, and one might suspect also quite problematic, inasmuch as he spends no less 
than fourteen paragraphs and more than one hundred pages developing it. Cf. GA 29/30, 
§§ 45–63.  
223 GA 29/39, 12. In a preceding passage, Heidegger explained that in employing the 
notion of the ‘whole’ (Ganzen), he in fact means the ‘world’ (cf. GA 29/30, 8).  
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world.224 In light of what we have discussed so far, one must wonder why, if 
Vereinzelung is really more like a Vereinsamung, Heidegger does not stick 
to the word Einsamkeit in the main text? Einsamkeit, after all, contains 
precisely—according to the Heidegger of decades later, with whom we 
initiated this section—the sam that, in resonating with both the Gothic sama 
and the Greek ἅμα, articulates the belonging-together of the other or each 
other and the same in solitude: “Einsam besagt: das Selbe im Einigenden des 
Zueinandergehörenden.”225 
I cannot claim to be capable of resolving this problem, as though 
Heidegger’s text sheltered some final solution to be excavated in the use of 
the right interpretive key, but will make do with suggesting that his 
advancement of the word Vereinzelung in place of the word Einsamkeit may 
have something to do, as Derrida appears to suggest, with the relation 
between a desire for solitude and a desire for sovereignty. A relation that, 
moreover, is not unrelated to what we have been calling so far the solitude 
of not being able to be alone.  
We will engage in more detail with this relation between the desire for 
solitude and the desire for sovereignty in a later section of this chapter. 
Before we get that far, however, we shall have to dwell a bit longer on the 
strange community that initiated this discussion of solitude and 
singularization and which, according to Heidegger, is constituted only by its 
lack of communality.  
 
 
II.3 A COMMUNITY OF SOLITARIES 
To Heidegger’s question of what makes the human being singular in solitude, 
Derrida in turn poses a series of counter-questions: “Est-ce que la solitude 
éloigne des autres? Qu’est-ce que je dis quand je dis ‘je suis seul’? Est-ce 
que cela m‘éloigne ou me rapproche de l’autre ou des autres?”226 These 
questions refer us to the apparent paradox in Heidegger’s thinking of the 
equiprimordiality of solitude and being-with-others with which we began 
this chapter. Namely, the paradox that the lack of commonality or of 
something in common (Fehl des Gemeinsamen) serves as the most binding 
bond to being-in-common or to community (bindendste Bezug zu diesem).  
This paradoxical structure resembles that which, in a certain French 
tradition beginning with Bataille in the 1940s227 and prolonged by thinkers 
                                           
224 GA 29/30, 8. 
225 GA 12, 254. 
226 BS II, 103/62. 
227 In a post-script added ten years after the first publishing of L'expérience intérieure in 
1943, almost as if as a note too himself, Bataille in extension of what he had earlier called 
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such as Nancy, Blanchot, and Derrida, has been construed in the negative as 
a ‘community without community’ (communauté sans communauté),228 or as 
an ‘inoperative’ or ‘unavowable’ community understood precisely as a 
‘community of those who have nothing in common’—to quote some seminal 
titles by Nancy, Blanchot, and Lingis.229 This does not mean, however, that 
those who have nothing in common would then be self-sufficient or 
sovereign in their solitary existence. On the contrary, as is already made clear 
by the quote from Heidegger above, it is rather the other way around. It is 
only because I am always already bound to others in our lack of common 
ground that I can be solitary in the first place.  
According to Nancy, who has taken up and further elaborated Heidegger’s 
questioning of an originary being-with-others pertaining to singular solitude, 
the ‘community without community’ is the only community that remains 
when all poetico-political myths of commonalities have withdrawn—be they 
myths of gods, goods, labor, or Being.230 The conception of myth, in this 
context, designates the construction of everything that gathers or unites so 
called individuals into a community or a society—be it between human 
                                           
a ‘negative community’ writes explicitly of a ‘community of those who have no 
community’: “Revoir en particulier l’absence de communauté et insister sur l’idée de 
communauté négative; la communauté de ceux qui n’ont pas de communauté” (Bataille 
1973, 483). 
228 Cf. CD, 177/71. 
229 Besides Nancy’s Communauté désoeuvrée (1986) the other two titles referred to are 
Blanchot’s La communauté inavouable (1983), and Lingis’ The Community of Those who 
have Nothing in Common (1994), all of which in some way or other carry out a 
conversation with one another.  
230 However, saying that ‘being-with-others’ or the ‘community without community’ are 
originary for solitary and singular existence does not amount to positing the human being 
as a zoon politikon, nor being-with-others as the essence of the being we call human, nor 
sociality as the defining predicate of the human subject. First, because according to Nancy 
“il n’est pas certain que la communauté des singularités se limite à ‘l’homme’ et exclut, 
par exemple, ‘l’animal’” (CD, 71/28). Second, because it would be to misconstrue both 
the ‘being-with-others’ and the ‘community without community,’ neither of which can 
be conceived as an ‘essence,’ a ‘ground,’ or a ‘substance,’ which all the solitary 
singularities would have in common. Instead, Nancy emphasizes that being-in-common 
(l'être-en-commun) is not a common being (n’est pas un être commun) but rather “le fait 
constitutif d’une exposition au dehors qui définit la singularité” (CD, 74/29). In this 
respect, one might say that thinkers like Nancy, Bataille, Blanchot, and Derrida draw the 
consequences of Heidegger’s thinking of finitude more rigorously than Heidegger 
himself. For, if the ‘essence’ of the being we call human—and Dasein for Heidgger is as 
we know always and only human—is to exist, and if to exist is to stand out in the 
groundlessness of being as originally exposed to others, on which grounds then may we 
still discriminate essentially between the existence of human beings and that of other 
beings?   
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beings and nature, human beings and gods, or between human beings 
amongst themselves—which means that properly speaking there can be no 
community outside of myth and that the “l’interruption du mythe est donc 
aussi, nécessairement, l’interruption de la communauté.”231  
I say properly speaking, because a certain ‘bastard speech,’232 so to speak, 
still appears to resist such proper speaking by allowing one to speak within 
a certain ‘logic of the without,’ that is, to speak of elusive things such as a 
‘community without community,’ which is precisely the community that 
remains to resist its interruption by becoming, in turn, a community of 
interruption. It is a community of interruption, not only because it 
continually interrupts or disrupts the construction of myths, but also because 
it incessantly interrupts itself from becoming established as such. Instead, 
the community without community never closes in upon itself, never finishes 
itself off or completes itself, but keeps open a space for arriving at the 
absolutely unforeseeable, signaling a community that remains to come, 
remains in becoming.  
Of course, this is not to say that a reconstruction of gathering, unifying, or 
even totalitarian, myths could not begin to take place again at any time from 
within this interrupted space.233 Indeed, such risk is and must be inherent to 
                                           
231 CD, 145/57. 
232 I am referring here to the logismo notho of Plato’s Timaeus (52b) and Phaedrus (256a). 
In Timaeus, Plato discerns ‘bastard reasoning or reckoning’ (λογισμῷ τινι νόθῳ) as the 
only way of approaching the chora (χώρα), which is a third kind (γένος) of being 
distinguished from what can be approach by the intellectual knowledge of the mind 
(νοῦς), that is the ideas, and by the sense perception or persuasion of opinion (δόξα). The 
chora is nothing in itself or as such, and as such it is hardly trustworthy (μόγις πιστόν) as 
a being, but ‘is’ rather that which makes room or provides space for something else in 
giving way or withdrawing itself. Yet that which the chora lets appear in disappearing is 
that which does not have its substance in itself “but fleets ever as a phantom [φάντασμα] 
of something else” (Tim. 52c). Accordingly, one could, as Sallis has suggested in his 
brilliant study, call the chora “a ghost scene that, enshrouding precisely in letting appear, 
endows the fleeting specters with whatever trace of being they might enjoy” (Sallis 1999, 
122). 
233 Bataille had already called attention to the risk of the absence of myth reproducing 
itself as a myth and to a certain extent already saw it happening with perhaps the greatest 
myth of modern day societies, namely the myth of the individual—the individual being 
precisely the myth of a completed totality, closed off from other individuals yet 
indivisible in itself. Instead, Bataille in response to Nietzsche speaks of “une communauté 
noyant d'objet que l'expérience,” and by experience Bataille means very specifically a 
transport to the limit where “il n'est plus d'existence limitée” and where a person “ne s'y 
distingue en rien des autres: en lui se perd ce qui chez d'autres est torrential” which at 
the same time makes of man “une multitude, un désert” (Bataille 1973, 40/27). Hence, 
Bataille’s absent community is indeed very far from constituting a community of 
individuals. 
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the community of interruption, inasmuch as the exclusion of such a 
possibility would mean that its opening space was already in the process of 
closing itself off, and that the community without community would thereby 
already be in the business of constructing its own totality. Instead, then, and 
in the unending attempt to avoid the reconstruction of self-enclosing myths, 
the community of the interruption of myth must be incessantly exposed to its 
own limits, which therefore become undelimitable in principle since they are 
perpetually transgressed and redrawn. In this regard, Nancy, again with 
reference to Bataille, also speaks of an originary ‘ecstasy’ denoting the 
impossibility of either “d’une individualité au sens exact aussi bien que 
d’une pure totalité collective.”234 
Ecstasy is originary, however, only because it refers to the opening that is 
existence and that precludes the possibility of determining the origin of 
existence. As Nancy writes:  
 
Cela signifie que cette ‘origine’—l’origine de la communauté ou la communauté 
originaire—n’est pas autre chose que la limite: l’origine est le tracé des bords sur 
lesquels, ou le long desquels s’exposent les êtres singuliers.235  
 
The solitude stemming from such structural dependency is a solitude of not 
being able to exist sovereignly by oneself, precisely because to exist means 
always already being exposed to others, without the preexisting persistence 
of a substance or a firm ground of being, and as such to be dependent on 
others for one’s own existence, which is therefore not one’s own alone. 
Furthermore, in this existence of exposure to others we are also exposed to 
the exposure of each and every other to one another without common 
grounds of being and, as such, also to an exposedness of the fact that what 
we, the existing ones, do share is what divides us. As Nancy writes in 
L’expérience de la liberté: “Nous partageons ce qui nous partage.”236 The 
French verb employed by Nancy in this context, partager, has the double 
meaning of both ‘to share’ and ‘to divide,’ or ‘to part,’ and Nancy is fully 
engaged in the play of this meaningful duplicity. 
How are we to read this sentence that ‘we share that which divides us’? 
First of all, this apparently paradoxical formulation implies that that which 
we share is essentially unshareable because it is without referral to a unified 
essence or identity. That which we share is not some common substance that 
would be distributed and allotted to us in equal or unequal measures. Instead, 
we share the empty interval of the parting that opens up existence and relates 
                                           
234 CD, 22/6. 
235 CD, 83/33. 
236 EL, 123/95.  
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those who exist to one another only by separating them. That which we share 
is the unshareable and inappropriable strangeness between us. 
My singularity is only brought into existence at the limit that sets me apart 
from others but which I in turn therefore share with a plurality of other 
singular existences. Thus, singular existences are themselves constituted by 
sharing; they are distributed, and displaced, or rather spaced, by the sharing 
that divides them in making them others for one another. Again, then, we 
encounter the community of those who have ‘nothing’ in common. Or rather, 
nothing but the nothing of the time that spaces and the spacing of time that 
constitutes our finite existences, that is, the nothing of the interval that shares 
and divides us. Still, our finitude—the finitude we share as it divides us—
does not mean that we are not infinite. On the contrary, finitude means that 
we are infinitely finite because we are infinitely exposed to our not having 
an essence in ourselves, which means that each and every existent is exposed 
to “l’infinie inessentialité de son être-fini, qui le livre à la singularité où il 
est ‘soi.’”237 Infinitely finite, because our gaping existence exposes us to the 
infinite alterity of our ‘own’ birth and our ‘own’ death, which makes our 
‘own’ being infinitely inappropriable. In this respect, the passage from 
Artaud with which we began our first chapter, and in which he fears of ever 
attaining a birth or a death of his own, comes to take on yet another sense, 
namely, the sense according to which Nancy describes the mortal truth of 
community:  
 
Elle est la présentation de la finitude et de l’excès sans recours qui font l’être fini: 
sa mort, mais aussi bien sa naissance, seule la communauté me présente ma 
naissance, et avec elle l’impossibilité pour moi de retraverser celle-ci, aussi bien 
que de franchir ma mort.238  
 
In more simple words, I cannot give birth to myself any more than I can give 
myself my own death, even through suicide, and my finite existence ‘in-
between’ these two infinitely withdrawing limits that we call ‘birth’ and 
‘death’ is only given to me as ‘mine’ in the shared division from others. As 
Nancy puts it: “Le partage répond à ceci: ce que la communauté me révèle, 
en me présentant ma naissance et ma mort, c’est mon existence hors de 
moi.”239 Yet this sharing has no myth: you cannot tell a continuous narrative 
about it since the story of sharing neither has a simple origin nor ever reaches 
                                           
237 EL, 18/14. 
238 CD, 43/15. 
239 CD, 68/26. 
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a completion. Sharing is not myth but rather literature, since literature is 
precisely what interrupts myth insofar as it ‘never achieves an ending.’240 
Literature designates that which only has its being in being shared, since 
“jamais on n’opère seul, jamais on n’écrit seul, et l’‘être singulier’ n’est pas 
représenté, bien au contraire, par l’individu isolé.”241 There is no literature 
without the other and literature is what proliferates and exposes itself to this 
other instead of gathering and closing itself off. Yet what is being shared as 
literature is not some delimitable thing, feeling, or meaning, but rather the 
unsharable as such. Literature does not communicate something to someone, 
it communicates communication as the naked existence of being exposed to 
one another without refuge. Hence, for Bataille, Nancy, and Blanchot, the 
‘community without community’ is not so much a fictional as a 
fundamentally literary community ceaselessly writing “le mythe de la société 
sans mythes.”242 Abandoned to the absence of myth—or to the myth of myth 
revealing its abyssal origins of fabulous fiction—the ‘community without 
community’ finds its improper places in literature understood as “l’espace 
de l’inconvenance absolue.”243  
As such, the community without community is a community that does not 
gather around an inside constituted through the exclusion of an outside; it is 
rather a community of ex-perience, understood as a perpetual exposure to the 
intimate outside that is already opening it up from the inside and keeping it 
from completion; a community not of congregation but of separation or 
spreading—a disseminative community, if not a community of diaspora. 
Accordingly, the unavowable community, as Blanchot has designated this 
community without community, whose only myth is the absence of myth, is 
as the adjective makes clear a community that cannot be avowed, declared, 
or confessed to, inasmuch as it is a community that harbors no altars or other 
sacramentary places of communion in its midst. 
Divested of any common sacraments, the community without community 
also becomes a community of the secretive and of the cryptic, not in the sense 
that it treasures a hidden secret to be revealed by the adventurous and the 
persistent, but rather in the sense that it remains secret to itself, always 
secreted away, deferred, or displaced from its own space of revelation and 
always harboring a crypt of alterity that cannot be encrypted. As such, it 
remains a community of the incomplete or of incompletion, which for that 
very reason cannot be composed into an ensemble of indivisible individuals 
who all have their indivisibility in common, but only of plural singulars who 
                                           
240 Cf. CD, 161/64.   
241 CD, 182–183/73–74. 
242 CD, 157–158/63. 
243 CD, 158/63. 
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are exposed to one another without any possibility of common measure and 
who share nothing but this exposure that continually calls their position into 
question.  
Hence, the community without community is also a community of the 
solitary, who are solitary precisely because they remain incompatible with 
one another, solitary because they remain without common measure and 
without common places for communion. To quote from Nancy’s “Des lieux 
divins”:  
 
A la place de la communion, il n’y a pas de place, pas de lieu, pas de temple ou 
d’autel pour la communauté. L’exposition a lieu partout, en tous lieux, car elle est 
l’exposition de tous et de chacun, dans sa solitude, à ne pas être seul.244  
 
Such, then, would be the community that remains when all commonalities 
have withdrawn, a community without community of solitary existences that 
have nothing in common except having nothing in common. Solitary indeed, 
but not alone because their very solitude depends upon their exposure to 
other solitudes. Hence, the originary being-with-others of existence is also 
an originary being-delivered-over-to-one-another and one will only ever be 
solitary because one has never been and never will be alone in being alone.245 
Hence, depriving me of any independent, autonomous, self-sufficient sense 
of self, I am the other, as Rimbaud famously wrote, not because I am 
identical with the other—which would leave no solitude to remain—but 
rather because if I ever were to become absolutely alone, detached and 
isolated without any relation to the other, I would disappear, as it were.246  
 
 
II.4 ORIGINARY BEING-WITH-OTHERS AS THE (IM)POSSIBILITY OF ABSOLUTE 
SOLITUDE  
As mentioned above, one of Derrida’s main preoccupations in his seminars 
on the La bête et le souverain is that even though the expressions ‘being 
alone (seul)’ and ‘being the only one (le seul)’ does not amount to exactly 
the same, it is not a mere coincidence that the two expressions still “reçoivent 
                                           
244 LD, 579/143. 
245  For Kafka’s take on this being-delivered-over to others in solitude, see Excursus I. 
246 This is one reason why Nancy writes that “pour être absolument seul, il ne suffit pas 
que je le sois, il faut encore que je sois seul à être seul. Ce qui précisément est 
contradictoire” (CD, 18/4). As it were, one of the effective horrors of solitary confinement 
is that the isolated prisoner is not only pacified by his or her removal from others whom 
he or she might endanger, in the longer run, the prisoner is also pacified because he or 
she loses all sense of him- or herself and is no longer there, but has disappeared and 
dissolved into no one.  
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l’hospitalité d’un seul et même mot.”247 Rather, there seem to be a significant 
relation between these two apparently quite different expressions of being 
solitary.  
It follows from this not merely coincidental encounter of two meanings in 
one word that the French phrase ‘je suis seul’ can be perceived both as an 
expression of solitary despair due to a longing for others (I am alone, I am 
lonely) and as an expression of ‘narcissistic presumptuousness’ believing 
itself to be exceptionally, outstandingly, and perhaps even sovereignly 
independent of others (I am the only one). Moreover, as Derrida reads 
Heidegger’s text, “Vereinzelung marque plutôt l’esseulement en ce dernier 
sense, l’esseulement qui distingue, met à part, l’esseulement qui singularize 
et excepte, l’esseulement qui fait exception.”248 Accordingly, one of 
Derrida’s supplementary questions to Heidegger’s tripartite, or rather 
quadruple, metaphysical questioning is how the capabilities of having a 
world, being able to die, and being able to become singularly solitary are 
bound up not only with the question of the human being in distinction from 
all other living and nonliving beings but also with the question of 
sovereignty. 
Throughout at least one of the histories of Western philosophy, Derrida 
detects a desire for sovereignty which to a certain extent corresponds with 
this second sense of solitude, such that “‘Je suis seul(e)’ vaut d’ailleurs dire 
‘je suis’ absolu, c’est-à-dire absous, détaché, ou délivré de lien.”249 In order 
to demonstrate this tendency, Derrida draws upon numerous exemplary 
examples of philosophical ‘Robinsonades’ who long for the uninterrupted 
solitude necessary in order to make their thought as sovereignly independent 
as the quiet of a deserted island. Descartes would, and here one is tempted to 
say ‘of course,’ be one of the pioneers of philosophical solitude, in his 
intention to subvert the shaky foundations of everything that he had learned 
from external sources since childhood in order to reconstruct it all again, this 
time relying solely on his own strength of mind. Therefore, as we have 
already seen in the preceding section, Descartes tells his readers: “I have 
withdrawn into seclusion alone [solus secedo] and at last I will devote myself 
sincerely and without reservation to the general demolition of my opinions 
[mearum opinionum eversioni vacabo].”250  
For Derrida, this aspiration of destroying all opinions gained from the 
uncertain wellsprings of others in order to reconstruct an architecture on the 
grounds of an absolutely certain knowledge gained in complete solitude and 
                                           
247 BS II, 108/66. 
248 BS II, 152/99. 
249 BS II, 21/1. 
250 Descartes 1978, 17/12.  
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independence from others displays how “le cogito ergo sum est une 
robinsonade hyperbolique, en particulier dans le moment du doute 
hyperbolique qui insularise absolument la rapport à soi.”251 
As has become known through the readings of readers such as Derrida and 
Lévinas, however, Descartes will not succeed in his project of constructing 
an insular knowledge of certainty, since in the third meditation he finds it 
absolutely necessary to call upon the testimony of an Other, in this case God, 
in order to legitimate the knowledge he has gained in the cogito, which, by 
himself all alone, he cannot distinguish with certainty from the madness of 
the evil demon.252  
Another example of the philosophical desire for solitude would be Kant 
and in particular the Kant who in Was heißt: sich im Denken orientieren? 
from 1786 propounds the wishful intention of being able to orient himself by 
himself alone, that is, solely with regard to the subjective sense of left and 
right for which no objective criterion can account.253 According to Derrida, 
                                           
251 BS II, 64/33. 
252 This is so because, as Derrida writes in “Cogito et Histoire de la Folie” offering a 
certain counter-reading to Foucault’s reading of the Meditations: “Il y a une valeur et un 
sens du Cogito comme de l’existence qui échappent à l’alternative d’une folie et d’une 
raison déterminées [...]. La certitude ainsi atteinte n’est pas à l’abri d’une folie enfermée, 
elle est atteinte et assurée en la folie elle-même. Elle vaut même si je suis fou” (ED, 85–
86/55). See also Lévinas’ reading of the Descartes’ third meditation in Totalité et infini 
where he demonstrates how the idea of God anachronistically comes to provide the 
condition of possibility for the self-evidence of the Cogito in an analogous manner to how 
the subject called into responsibility becomes aware of how the preoriginary infinity of 
the other always already overflows any idea the subject might hold of the infinite. Cf. 
Lévinas, 1971, 46ff. 
253After noting that the word ‘orientation’ is derived from the name of one of the four 
world corners, namely, the East of the Orient, from which the other three can be 
determined, Kant nevertheless argues that even if the entire constellation of stars were to 
be reversed, so that east would become west and vice versa, the subject would still be able 
to orient itself by paying heed to its own feeling of left and right. Accordingly, Kant 
concludes: “Also orientiere ich mich geographisch bei allen objektiven Datis am Himmel 
doch nur durch einen subjektiven Unterscheidungsgrund” (KW 5, A 380). Similarly, in 
the famous §13 of his Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik (1783), Kant 
argues that even though there are no objective or exterior criteria for distinguishing the 
right hand from the left, it is nevertheless a fact that the right hand cannot be placed 
directly on top of the left without a change of position, just as “der Handschuh der einen 
Hand kann nicht auf der andern gebraucht werden” (KW 5, A 59), wherefore the two 
seemingly identical hands cannot be circumscribed by the same objective limits of space. 
Kant’s ‘solution’ (Auflösung) to this difficulty of incongruent counterparts is that the 
difference between left and right cannot be explained in terms of objective categories or 
concepts of understanding (Verstand) but only through our subjective sensibility 
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the wish to proceed from the absolute zero point of “le sens de l’orientation 
et l’orientation d’un sens qui ne se détermine qu’à s’orienter”254 reveals the 
desire for a sovereign subjectivity that would be able to preserve an 
Archimedean point of orientation within itself independently of any external 
situation—a desire resembling, perhaps, also the desire of philosophy 
‘überall zu Hause zu sein,’ written by Novalis in 1798 and quoted by 
Heidegger in the 1929/1930 lecture course and elsewhere.255 For is the desire 
to be at home everywhere not a desire to be able to orient oneself from out 
of oneself wherever one is and no matter the situation in which one finds 
oneself, carrying one’s home on one’s back like a snail always having the 
world at one’s disposal?  
Whether or not this desire in reality is achievable or not is not really the 
issue here, in fact, it is rather the very phantasmatic force of this desire for 
solitary sovereignty exceeding or defying any sensible corrections by a 
reality principle or by a sensus communis that is mainly of interest to Derrida 
and to us here too. A phantasmamic force that nevertheless touches reality 
in constitutin “cette zone où l’impossible est nommé, désiré, appréhendé. Où 
il nous affecte,”256 and to which also belongs the mode of the ‘as if’ (als ob), 
which Kant so appreciated and which can be at least as powerful as the 
phenomenal mode of the ‘as such’ (als solches).   
Returning to the solitude of not being able to be alone, or on one’s own, 
how may we further come to understand this phantasmatic desire of 
sovereign solitude? Why is it that this desire for absolute solitude, according 
to Derrida, remains phantasmatic? As I shall suggest in the following, the 
phantasmatic character of the desire for sovereign solitude depends precisely 
on the being-with-others, which, as we have already seen in Heidegger, is 
equiprimordial with solitary Dasein.  
Let us take a step back and consider a certain ‘everyday’ expression often 
employed when one stands before difficult matters in life, when one has to 
take responsibility, as one says, or to make important decisions, reconsider a 
supposedly ‘wrong’ decision, account for action, or acknowledge something 
                                           
(Sinnlichkeit) and its relations (Verhältnisse) to supposedly objective space (Raum), 
which “der äußern Anschauung” of this internal determination (cf. KW 5, A 59).  
254 BS II, 67/35.  
255 Cf. Novalis 1946a, 43. To Novalis’ claim that philosophy ultimately consists in a 
nostalgia (Heimweh) driven by the desire for being at home everywhere (überall zu Hause 
zu sein), Heidegger readily adds the precondition that philosophy can only be conceived 
as such a desire because the philosophers are precisely not at home anywhere—a 
precondition, moreover, that is conditioned from the very unhomeliness (Unheimlichkeit) 
of human existence. We shall return to this ontological unhomeliness in Chapter IV. 
256 BS II, 217/148. 
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of importance, namely, the expression ‘to look oneself in the eyes.’ 
Paradoxically, this expression bears witness to the very circumstance it 
wishes to ignore, which is the circumstance that I am the only one who I 
cannot look in the eyes, and here the only one (le seul) is no longer be a sign 
of some extraordinary uniqueness but rather of an inapproachability in 
relation to myself and an impossibility of ‘facing myself’—another 
expression commonly employed in decisive situations—which I share in my 
dividedness with everyone else. The whole difficulty of decision-making is 
precisely that I cannot face myself immediately, but only through the surface 
of a mirror257 or through the reflection of another gaze, which further means 
that I cannot look myself directly in the eyes in order to retrieve some sign 
of authenticity and some uncontaminated zero-point of orientation to lead 
me in the supposedly ‘right’ direction. I always only encounter myself 
through the detour of others or something other, which in a certain sense 
makes the other more intimate to me than I am to myself, to paraphrase a 
well-known phrase from the Confessions of Augustine.258  
In order to further unfold this structural dependency, according to which 
the other—whether you name this other the Other with a capital and 
sometimes divine O or in its plural form as ‘others,’ and whether you 
encounter this intimate otherness in the gaze of a cat or in the elusive gaze 
of your own mirror image—is a necessary condition for the very relation to 
one to oneself, we will attempt to clarify how this auto-heteronomous 
condition can be discerned both as condition of possibility and as a condition 
impossibility of solitary selfhood.  
On the one hand, others constitute a condition of possibility for my place 
in the world, for my abode in existence, for my possibility of inhabiting a 
space that would otherwise be nothing but the growing desert to which 
                                           
257 For Lacan, the very relation to myself as identical to myself emerges in the imaginary 
relation to my reflection in the mirror, however, as Lacan further points out, I cannot see 
my own gaze in the mirror even if the mirror helps me to see things I would not be able 
to perceive otherwise, which points to a certain limitedness of access to myself that can 
cause anxiety and which turns the gaze, which always falls out of the picture, into one of 
the desired objet petit a. As Lacan writes, “je ne me vois pas forcément moi-même, ou 
mon oeil dans le miroir, même si le miroir m’aide à apercevoir quelque chose que je ne 
verrais pas autrement” (Sem X, 89/73). We shall return to Lacan’s rendition both of the 
mirror stage and of anxiety in Chapters IV and V.   
258 Here Augustine writes of God as the other who is “more inward than the innermost of 
myself [interior intimo meo]” (Conf. III.6.11. My translation). We find a similar structure 
of the divine Other as being closer and more intimate to me than I myself can ever become 
in surah 50 verse 16 of the Quran, where the extreme and estranged intimacy of the divine 
to the human is bespoken: “We created man—We know what his soul whispers to him: 
We are closer to him than his jugular vein” (Quran, 340). 
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Zarathustra becomes exposed in his mountain solitude—“Die Wüste wächst: 
weh Dem, der Wüsten birgt!”259 As Deleuze points out in his essay “Michel 
Tournier et le monde sans autrui,” on Tournier’s 1967 rendition of Robinson 
Crusoe—but this time named after Friday as Vendredi ou les Limbes du 
Pacifique—it is ‘the structure-other’ (la structure Autrui) that provides me 
with horizons and possibilities, in short, with a world, and it is precisely this 
structure-other that Robinson gradually loses in his insular solitude before 
his dispersive transformation into an ‘elemental’ self.260 Thus, still mourning 
the gradual erosion or dissolution of his mundane self, Robinson writes the 
following entry in his journal:  
 
Autrui, pièce maîtresse de mon univers… Je mesure chaque jour ce que je lui devais 
en enregistrant de nouvelles fissures dans mon édifice personnel […]. Je sais 
maintenant que la terre sur laquelle mes deux pieds appuient aurait besoin pour ne 
pas vaciller que d’autres que moi la foulent.261  
 
On the other hand, but for the same reasons, others also constitute a 
condition of impossibility for making my abode, my habitation, my place in 
the world absolutely my own, seeing as the singular being never exists of, 
from or by itself. On the contrary, every singular being is conditioned 
precisely by not being its own condition, or, as Nancy alternatively 
formulates it, “l’ipséité de la singularité a pour essence le retrait de l’aséité 
de l’être.”262  
This doubly bound (im)possibility of a place of one’s own as conditioned 
by the other has the implication that, left to myself in a world without others, 
I little by little lose all stable relation with myself and with the world. 
Without others the world as a shared horizon disappears, leaving only a harsh 
and vast desert without possibilities, desires, or wishes, which is no habitat 
for a self. I can only occupy a place in the world because others made this 
place possible in the first place, and even if I wished to retreat from my place 
in the world by committing suicide, this possibility, as we read it in Artaud, 
would also only be given to me by others. This condition is also what Derrida 
at times calls exappropriation, designating precisely how a disownment is 
inscribed in every act of making something into one’s own—whether a 
                                           
259 Cf. KSA 4, 380.  
260 As Deleuze writes, “autrui assure les marges et transitions dans le monde. Il est la 
douceur des contiguïtés et des ressemblances,” so when the others disappear from the 
world, so does the world in a certain sense, and the abandoned one is left in a “[m]onde 
cru et noir, sans potentialités ni virtualités: c’est la catégorie du possible qui s’est 
écroulée” (Deleuze 1969, 355–356/305–306). 
261 Tournier 1967, 46–47/48–49. 
262 EL, 95/70. 
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name, a work, a body, a life, a language, a home, or other. I might think of 
myself as the proprietor of ‘my’ self, but this property has its proper place 
only in the dispropriation that makes it appropriable in the first place.   
Hence, the solitude of not being able to be alone with which we began has 
come to expose us to an essential dependency on others, which has the 
strange consequence that left to itself on its own what we call a self dissolves, 
precisely because its ‘own’ does not belong to it in the first place: I do not 
own my own ownness. Since the other is the possibility of myself, and since 
the attempt to eliminate this conditional alterity would eliminate myself 
along with it, my own being is shared from its very beginning and has no 
simple origin; the origins of my being are multiple and do not belong to me 
alone. 
In a certain sense, then, this exposure to others that is ‘my’ existence is 
also a pure expenditure of self, in the sense that the meshwork that I call 
‘myself’ is made up of nothing but my relations, is nothing but my being 
shared without reserve, which leaves nothing for me alone. Still, this 
existential dependency of myself upon others does not amount to a 
dialectical or an economical relationship in which I ‘invest’ myself in some 
relation, as if from the outside of this relation, and with the aim of gaining or 
the risk of lose something by it. Rather, I risk everything in each and every 
relation since I am not before I enter into relation and with the ending of 
relation cease to be me; the being of ‘my’ self is nothing more nor less than 
what remains in the interval between me and others and between me and 
myself where others are interposed. As Nancy puts it in “L’amour en éclats”: 
“C’est la question de ce qui reste ‘soi’ lorsque rien ne revient à soi.”263  
With Derrida and Lacoue-Labarthe in mind, one could speak of a certain 
‘desistance’ of the self.264 A desistance that consists precisely in the 
impossibility of consisting by oneself, which is not necessarily the same as 
a lack of consistency. Desistance names the fact that to exist means not to 
have a proper stasis,265 that is, not to have a proper stance, status, or standing 
place of one’s own in existence, since to exist means already to have exited, 
                                           
263 AE, 26/107. 
264 Cf. Derrida’s essay “Désistance” on the writing of Lacoue-Labarthe (PSY, 597–
638/(II) 196–230).   
265 Both the Greek στάσις and the Latin sistere derive from the Greek verb ἵστημι, which 
can mean ‘to make stand,’ ‘to set up,’ ‘to place,’ ‘to establish,’ ‘to bring to a standstill,’ 
‘to take up a position,’ ‘to take a stand,’ and ‘to stand up.’ As Comay emphasizes in her 
article “Resistance and Repetition: Freud and Hegel,” an ambiguity pertains to the word 
‘stasis,’ which hinges on the tension “between its stative and dynamic usage, between the 
condition of standing and the act of standing up, between situation and event—
steadfastness, constancy, and stability, on the one hand; interruption, instigation, 
initiation, on the other” (Comay 2015, 239). 
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to have been exiled or thrown from the anchorage and stability of a 
substance. To exist designates an impossibility of consisting, persisting, or 
subsisting by oneself once and for all; to exist designates an exposure to 
instability of each and every instant.  
This desistance of existence therefore rearranges the entire landscape 
surrounding the subjectivity emerging from the traditions of the ὑποκείμενον, 
substantia, or subiectum, that is, of the subjectivity of the subject understood 
as what persists or consists ‘underneath’ the many transformations a subject 
may otherwise undergo. The subject of desistance is no longer the supporting 
basis of its own imprints, impressions, or experiences; rather, it is prescribed 
by these, marked in advance by what happens to it and by its relation to 
others and by what befalls it, because of its constitutive openness to being 
exposed.  
With the word desistance we are thus attempting to name something of 
the self that resists self-possession or appropriation, but that nonetheless 
remains constitutive of it—something that the self is delivered over to and 
abandoned by in the same stroke. Something that destabilizes and 
expropriates the propriety of the self in advance, leaving it to take a stance 
in distance from itself, or to take up position in disposition. The desistance 
of the self means that the self has no proper place ascribed in advance, and 
that every place it would seek to make its own it only comes to after the fact 
(après coup), belatedly; and as such its place would already be marked by 
some impropriety, like stepping in the foreign footsteps of someone else even 
if that someone should turn out to have been myself.266 This is what the de- 
of the desistance remarks; that every possible ‘stance’ of the self will always 
already be marked by a distance, and that every possible autonomy, if 
autonomy signifies an ability of self-legislation, will always already be 
marked by a heteronomy—a distance and a heteronomy, however, that 
makes the relation of self possible in the first place in leaving it to a solitude 
of not being able to exist on its own.  
Yet, despite the fact that I am neither its principal of cause nor its principal 
of maintenance, I remain responsible for and to this irreplaceable dis-
position in which I am posed, and from which I must expose myself to others 
without ever being in possession of it. I am abandoned to this singular 
instability, this instance of space and time, which is the existence I call mine, 
                                           
266 In Defoe’s story, Robinson Crusoe discovers “the Print of a Man’s naked Foot on the 
Shore” of the island where he has been isolated for the last fifteen years. This discovery 
caused ‘many wild ideas’ and ‘strange unaccountable whimsies’ in Robinson’s mind, 
such as it might be a print of the Devil’s foot, and even makes him lose his belief in God, 
until one day he considers the possibility that is might be his own foot that had made the 
print at a previous occasion. Cf. Defoe 2007, 130ff. See also, BS II, 66–67/34–35. 
110 
 
because I am solely responsible for it even though it never belongs to me 
alone, or belongs to me only in belonging to others. No one can exist for me, 
no one can substitute for my existing; my existence is wholly non-
substitutable despite the fact that I can only exist by way of others.  
Here, then, we encounter the peculiar solitude whose interiority resides 
only and solely in its unremitting exposure to exteriority. This is not the 
solitude of an absolute and indivisible kernel of self; rather, it is the noisy 
and restless solitude of a self who is multiplied, divided, and interrupted from 
its very beginning. It is the solitude of not being able to exist by oneself, 
precisely because to exist means to be exposed to others and to depend on 
others for one’s very own existence. In a certain sense, then, it is a solitude 
of deprivation, or of theft as Artaud would say, deprived of  ‘having’ a self 
of one’s own—as though the self amounted to some self-disposable thing—
or of having a relation to oneself by oneself alone, without the interference 
of others. Yet, in regard to the originary being-with-others, which we are 
attempting to trace out here, such a deprivation or disrobement, or loss, of a 
being of one’s own independent of the other will always already have taken 
place and the desire to retrieve it will always be a retrospective desire for a 
time before the origin, or a desire for the ‘mythical’ as we shall see Lacan 
call it in Chapters IV and V. Deleuze has succinctly articulated this structural 
heteronomy in the relation of oneself to oneself as follows: “Il y a toujours 
un autre souffle dans le mien, une autre pensée dans la mienne, une autre 
possession dans ce que je possède, mille choses et mille êtres impliqués dans 
mes complications.”267  
Both Deleuze and Lacan take pains in their work to show how such 
structural heteronomy also permeates any desires, longings, or wishes that a 
self might consider to be its own inasmuch as they must always pass through 
others in order to become so. To quote Deleuze once more: “Je ne désire rien 
qui ne soit vu, pensé, possédé par un autrui possible. C’est là le fondement 
de mon désir. C’est toujours autrui qui rabat mon désir sur l’objet.”268 In fact, 
Deleuze argues that if desire did not somehow pass through others, we would 
be entering into the realm of perversion, which is a realm of unrestricted 
desire with no specific object and with no specific center of concentration or 
                                           
267 Deleuze 1969, 346/298. 
268 Deleuze 1969, 355/306. In his tenth seminar on anxiety, which we will engage with in 
more detail in Chapter V, Lacan also stresses how this dependency on the other in relating 
me to an object of desire has the implication of a certain inaccesibility to my own desire. 
As Lacan explains: “C’est pourquoi il n’y a pas pour moi, non seulement d’accès à mon 
désir, mais même de sustentation possible de mon désir qui ait référence à un objet quel 
qu’il soit, si ce n’est en le couplant, en le nouant avec ceci, le $, qui exprime la nécessaire 
dépendance du sujet par rapport à l’Autre comme tel” (Sem X, 33/23).   
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intensity, unfolding uninterruptedly in a world without others. According to 
Deleuze, then, this is precisely what becomes of Tournier’s Robinson after 
twenty-eight years of insular solitude: a pervert, for whom the structure-
others have vanished along with the world and whose desire, as well as his 
very self, has become entirely elemental, dispersed in all directions of the 
deserted environment of his habitat like ‘the rays of a star’ (ruisselle en 
étoile).269 Robinson has become nothing but an echo, or indeed as he himself 
says, an ‘excrement’ of the island of Speranza.270  
As Derrida pointedly exhibits the intrigue of solitary sovereignty, even the 
most coldblooded and powerful torturer imaginable also depends on victims 
to affirm not only his or her sovereignty but his or her very existence because 
“[o]n prie toujours l’autre d’être present à sa proper prèsence.”271 
Still, even if the solitary self has conceived of its ontological dependency 
upon others, it does not necessarily follow that this same self will not 
continue to desire and to phantasize about a solitude all of its own. In this 
regard, we should note that phantasy, whether sadistic or not, is not to be 
understood in strict opposition to that which we call reality. Instead, as both 
Freud and Lacan have shown us in their psychoanalytic works, phantasy in 
fact lends a very forceful hand in the structuring allowing us to refer to reality 
in the first place. In this way, phantasy is not simply opposed to ‘actual 
reality’ nor as something that prevents us from perceiving thing as they really 
are. Rather, as is shown in the algorithm of phantasy mentioned earlier, $ ◊ 
a, phantasy is both that which links the subject to its object of desire and that 
which defers its obtainment. Mediation in this context is then understood as 
a simultaneous movement relating and separating the desiring subject to and 
from the desired object.272 Thus, in his essay “La direction de la cure et les 
principes de son pouvoir,” Lacan writes that “le fantasme, dans son usage 
fondamental, est ce par quoi le sujet se soutient au niveau de son désir 
                                           
269 Tournier 1967, 99/98. 
270 In his journal, Robinson writes the following about his transformed desire and sense 
of self: “Le sujet est un objet disqualifié. Mon æil est le cadavre de la lumière, de la 
couleur. Mon nez est tout ce qui reste des odeurs quand leur irréalité a été démontrée- ma 
main refute la chose tenue […]. Robinson est l’excrément personnel de Speranza” 
(Tournier 1967, 84/82). 
271 BS II, 287/203. For a Sadean elaboration of this intrigue, see Excursus II. 
272 This means that, as the support of desire, phantasy is that by way of which the subject 
sustains itself in relation to what is called reality. See also: “Qu’une chose existe 
réellement ou pas, n’a que peu d’importance. Elle peut parfaitement exister au sens plein 
du terme, même si elle n’existe pas réellement. Toute existence a par définition quelque 
chose de tellement improbable qu’on est perpétuellement en effet à s’interroger sur sa 
réalité” (Sem II, 268/229). 
112 
 
évanouissant.”273 In this manner, phantasy has a mediating function in the 
subject’s relation to the reality of desire, which is always mediated by the 
presumed desire of the other. As Derrida articulates it in La carte postale, to 
which we will return in more detail later, “[l]e plaisir pur et la réalité pure 
sont des limites idéales, autant dire des fictions”274 and one is never given 
without the contagious withdrawal of the other, meaning that ‘reality,’ 
understood as what is “ordonnée à la valeur de présence”275 is always already 
compromised by the phantasy of that which remains absent.  
Think, for example, of the powerful force of traumas, phobias, obsessional 
or paranoid thoughts, and other more quotidian phantasmatic mechanisms of 
the mind. Then imagine telling someone suffering from repeated flashbacks 
of a traumatic scenario, or someone haunted by an obsessive-paranoid 
thought that if she does not wash her hands or switch the light off and on at 
least thirty nine times before leaving her home, someone (perhaps herself, 
perhaps her brother, perhaps a stranger) will inevitably be hurt or die: ‘Oh 
but you need not worry about it since it is not really real.’ Surely, with regard 
to this imagined example, we must concede that the argumentative powers 
of ‘actual reality’ as well as the referral to some sensus communis appear 
somewhat impotent and hollow.  
The question is then, whether the so-called phantastic, imagined, or virtual 
realities operating here are not equally as strong, and sometimes even 
stronger and more powerful than so-called reality proper? Would this not 
make the phantasmic, whether induced by traumas, desires, dreams, or 
memories more real still than the reality of reality proper? More real still 
than the actuality or the presence of what we call the real world? And, if this 
is the case, as is most often the case in psychoanalysis, how then to provide 
the criteria according to which one may clearly distinguish the real or proper 
reality—clung onto by common sense as though it were some sort of 
guarantee against the madness of the phantasmic or the spectral—from the 
improper realness of phantasy?  
Did not Freud himself suspect that there is something ‘beyond,’ not only 
the pleasure principle, since not all powerful phantasms are pleasurable,276 
                                           
273 Écrits, 637/532. 
274 CP, 304/284. 
275 CP, 304/284. 
276 In significant modification of his earlier work on the unequivocal hegemony of the 
pleasure principle in the psychic economy, “dem wir doch bisher die Heerschaft über den 
Ablauf der Erregungsvorgänge im Seelenleben zugetraut haben“ (GW XIII, 22), Freud in 
Jenseits des Lustprinzips from 1920 reaches the conclusion that “es sei eigentlich 
unrichtig, von einer Herrschaft des Lustprinzips über den Ablauf der seelischen Prozesse 
zu reden. Wenn eine bestände, müsste die übergroße Mehrheit unserer Seelenvorgänge 
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but also beyond the reality principle, which is but a modification of the 
pleasure principle and as such still working within its teleology even if it 
corrects, defers, and inhibits it?277 In fact, as Lacan suggests, it was Freud’s 
work, and especially his work on the Wolf Man, that indicated that there is 
something real, which is situated elsewhere than what is called reality 
proper, but that this real of the elsewhere nevertheless ‘frames’ our ‘present 
reality’ seeing as it is “par rapport au réel que fonctionne le plan du 
fantasme.”278 
Moreover, is the imaginative work of phantasy not also that which often 
keeps us from perishing from so-called ‘hard reality’?—a reality which 
might not be so hard after all, at least not if by hard one means solid or stabile. 
Yet we must also be careful not to turn the phantasmatic or the spectral into 
some other reality besides or beyond but of the same modality as ‘reality 
proper,’ that is, into another domain of reality or into another world beyond 
the world, since, as Nietzsche has demonstrated with his history of an error 
in Götzen-Dämmerung, the illusory world has disappeared along with the 
true one.279  
Accordingly, as Derrida says in La bête et le souverain one cannot respond 
properly or appropriately to the question if one believes in the impropriety 
of phantoms, revenants, or specter, since as soon as one answers either ‘yes’ 
or ‘no’ with certainty, one conjures away the very spectrality of that to which 
one is answering. Therefore, Derrida continues, “[l]e ‘je ne sais pas’ est donc 
la modalité même de l’expérience du spectral, de la trace survivante en 
général d’ailleurs.”280 In an earlier session of the seminar, Derrida in a similar 
manner plays on the expression je n’en sais trop rien, which can literally be 
translated as ‘I don’t know too much nothing about it,’ and which in 
‘everyday’ French is frequently rendered without the negation as j’en sais 
trop rien of which a literal translation could then be ‘I know too much 
nothing about it.’281 This non-knowing, which stems from knowing too much 
nothing, is according to Derrida the only proper response to the impropriety 
of the spectral or the phantasmatic which remains and survives in a very real 
                                           
von Lust begleitet sein oder zur Lust führen, während doch die allgemeinste Erfahrung 
dieser Folgerung energisch widerspricht” (GW XIII, 5). We shall return in more detail to 
this decisive text in Chapter III.   
277 Cf. GW XIII, 6.  
278 Sem XI, 41/41. 
279 KSA 6, 81.  
280 BS II, 202/137. 
281 Cf. BS II, 78/44. See also Bennington’s note to this question on the same page of his 
English translation. 
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manner despite the principles of common sense and in the intervals of actual 
reality. 
In order to come to a further understanding of a certain phantasmatic 
structure of solitude, let us try to delve a little deeper into the desire for a 
solitude that would be absolutely independent, and into what will turn out to 
be the autoimmune mechanisms inherent to such a desire. 
 
 
II.5 THE PHANTASTIC DESIRE OF SOVEREIGN SOLITUDE  
The ongoing phantasy of and desire for sovereign solitude, despite the reality 
principle of others, is precisely what the solitude of not being able to alone 
signals, that is, a solitude that phantasizes about being absolutely alone with 
itself, and moreover a solitude that desires this solitude as a place where it 
would be absolutely intimate with itself in a proximity undisturbed by others. 
However, the double bind of this desire is the circumstance that if it were 
ever to be realized then the very reality of the desiring one would have 
disappeared or dissolved into something else. This ‘if it ever were’ functions 
therefore not only as a future indicative but also as a conditional; or even 
better, it’s function is to indicate a point of interference where the difference 
between the indicative and the conditional becomes obfuscated or even 
collapses in the phantasmatic.282 
What does it mean, then, that the desired of absolute solitude must remain 
phantasmic, and how are we to understand its phantasmatic remainder? To 
begin responding to these questions, let us return for a moment to Derrida’s 
double reading of Heidegger and Crusoe, or to ‘Robinson Heidegger’ as 
Derrida sometimes writes in a conflation of their proper names. In La bête et 
le souverain, Derrida repeatedly remarks that a certain ambiguity or duplicity 
pertains to the phantasy of absolute solitude revealing itself in the fact that it 
may precipitate both desire and dread. On the one hand, absolute solitude 
can be desired as a state of complete independence resting sovereignly in 
itself without the interruption of others. On the other hand, however, absolute 
solitude can be dreaded as a state of desolation by others, eventually leading 
to a dissolution of the solitary one in utter otherness.283 This duplicity comes 
to the fore in Derrida’s expression of a desire for solitude despairing in the 
                                           
282 For Derrida’s remarks on the relation between the indicative and the conditional, see 
BS II, 190/128.  
283 We will return to this aspect of solitude, which one could also call ‘a solitude of 
dissolution,’ in our later chapters on ‘a solitude of dissolution’ and ‘a solitude of the 
impersonal.’   
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awareness of its double-bound entanglement with the other: “tant qu’à être 
seul, si du moins je pouvais être seul sans toi. Être seul(e) avec moi.”284 
In both Defoe’s and Tournier’s versions of the Crusoe story, the duplicity 
of the dreaded desire or the desired dread of absolute solitude also finds 
expression in Robinson’s phantasies of being ‘swallowed up alive’ or of 
becoming utterly absorbed in an otherness that leaves no room for 
differentiation or separation, whether such devouring otherness is 
represented by wild beasts, cannibals, or the earthen and oceanic elements. 
Hence, as Deleuze has emphasized, the desire to become absolutely alone 
with oneself without others risks delivering the solitary one over to an 
otherness other than that of other human beings: “Voilà la découverte de 
Robinson: découverte de la surface, de l’au-delà élémentaire, de l’Autre 
qu’Autrui”285 Yet, as both Deleuze and Derrida remark, this fearful phantasy 
of a living death in the belly of some all compassing otherness is not devoid 
of excitement; on the contrary, as Derrida writes about Robinson, “il ne 
pense qu’à être mange et bu par l’autre, il y pense comme à une menace, 
mais avec une telle compulsion qu’on se demande si la menace n’est pas 
aussi caressée comme une promessse, et donc un désir.”286 
Paradoxically then, the desire for absolute solitude that we are attempting 
to approach here comes close to resembling a desire to preserve oneself in 
losing oneself, that is, a desire for being present in the absence of oneself; a 
desire, perhaps, of experiencing and thus of surviving one’s own death. This 
would be the silent but insistent desire behind the desire of sovereign 
solitude, namely, the desire to become absolutely desireless. A desire, then, 
which may ultimately be given the name of the death drive, understood as 
the drive or longing for an uninterrupted state of being where no desires, 
always already mediated by others, would “venir limiter la souveraineté.”287 
Tournier’s Robinson comes fatally close to such a desireless and deathly 
state of absolute desire when he enters what he calls the ‘pink combe’—an 
entrance that almost becomes his final exit. 
                                           
284 BS II, 21/1. 
285 Deleuze 1969, 370/319. Robinson himself reports of his gradual deliverance over to 
an environment of otherness without the horizons provided by the structure-other: “Ma 
vision de l’île est réduite à elle-même. Ce que je n’en vois pas est un inconnu absolu. 
Partout où je ne sui pas actuellement règne une nuit insondable. Je constate d’ailleurs en 
écrivant ces lignes que l’expérience qu’elles tentent de restituer non seulement est sans 
precedent, mais contrarie dans leur essence même les mots que j’emploie. La langage 
relève en affet d’une façon fondamentale de cet univers peoplé” (Tournier 1987, 47/48). 
286 BS II, 122–123/77. 
287 BS II, 92/55. 
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The pink combe is a cavity lodged in the deepest crypt of a cave on the island 
of Speranza, which Robinson finds fits the contours of his body so perfectly 
that when he pulls up his knees to his chin like an embryo it feels almost as 
if this cavity had been his original mold. In this island womb, Robinson 
hangs suspended somewhere in between absolute desire and absolute 
desirelessness, uniting “miraculeusement la paix des douces ténèbres 
matricielles et la paix sépulcrale.”288 In this blissfully uninterrupted eternal 
moment, however, Robinson is nonetheless interrupted by his own dread of 
dissolving into nothingness and thus of no longer being able to experience 
from an ever more infinitesimal distance his desired proximity of non-
existence: “Pourqoui faut-il qu’au cæur de la nuit je me laisse de surcroît 
couler si loin, si profond dans le noir? Il se pourrait bien qu’un jour, je 
desparaisse sans trace, comme aspiré par le néant que j’aurais fait naître 
autour de moi.”289  
At this point, we are as readers reminded and referred back to the very 
beginning of Tournier’s story where, whilst still on the brig Virgina, the 
captain foretells Robinson’s imminent destiny with a deck of Egyptian tarot 
cards. Having initially implied that Robinson is somewhat of a demiurge 
reigning in his own land of illusion, the third card of the deck shows the 
hermit and impels the captain to warn Robinson of the fatal destiny awaiting 
one in search of sovereign solitude whom “[s]’il sort jamais de cette retraite, 
il s’apercevra que som âme monolithique a subi s’intimes fissures.”290 The 
captain then explicitly associates not only the demiurgic illusions with the 
desire for an absolute solitude, he also associates both of these with a third 
desire, namely, the desire for purity. In this tripartite linkage of demiurgic 
illusions, solitude, and purity we hear the phantasmatic desire for a sovereign 
solitude purged of all otherness that led Robinson to the pink combe resonate 
again, which allows us in a retrospective manner to grasp the meaning of 
captain’s final warning to Robinson: “gardez-vous de la pureté. C’est le 
vitriol de l’âme.”291 
Accordingly, when Robinson questions himself as to why he let himself 
‘stray so far,’ this question exposes the autoimmunity inherent to the 
phantasm of an absolutely independent solitude, due to the dependency of 
the phantasizing one upon others. Seeing as desire always comes from the 
desire of the other, the consequence of a desire to purge oneself of the other 
is that a dread of dissolution must always accompany the phantasy of 
absolute solitude. A phantasy that therefore represents both a sovereignty to 
                                           
288 Tournier 1987, 94/93. 
289 Tournier 1987, 72/71. 
290 Tournier 1987, 8/8. 
291 Tournier 1987, 12/13. 
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be desired and a dissolution to be dreaded. In this respect, Derrida poses the 
question whether there cannot be found in the same desire “une trouble 
concurrence et une étrange simultanéité, quant à l’insularité de l’île, entre 
l’attraction et l’aversion, entre ‘insularophilie et l’insularophobie.”292 
In a manner that almost appears to be a continuation of our previous 
discussions on the solitude of not being able to be alone, Derrida goes on to 
respond to his own question by conjecturing that this double movement of 
insular attraction and repulsion has something to do with “d’une certaine 
experience de la solitude.”293 Still, the ambiguous relation between 
insularphilia and insularphobia—or between the desire for sovereignty and 
the dread of dissolution—does not appear as the only ambiguity pertaining 
to such an experience of solitude. There also seems to be a dangerous 
similitude between the sovereign independence of autonomy and the lifeless 
repetition of an automaton, since, as Derrida points out: “La roue tourne toute 
seule. La machine. C’est ce qui marche toute seul en tournant sur soi.”294  
At the apex of autonomy, where the solitary one would have become 
absolutely independent of any sort of heterogeneity or heteronomy, there 
also seems to be a risk of slipping inconspicuously over into the empty 
automatism “d’être sa propre rotation sur soi”295—an automatism that, 
moreover, threatens to hollow out any sense of personal ‘autos’ or ‘self’ until 
collapsing in utter anonymity. This tipping point between autonomy and 
automatism brings us into proximity not only with the at times almost 
indistinguishable similitude between a solitary drive for life and a solitary 
drive for death. We have already discerned the presence of such a dangerous 
similitude in Robinson, since, as Derrida remarks: “Il y a là une force 
automatique qui est plus intime à lui que lui-même et qui agit de façon 
répétitive (à la mesure d’un destin) et de manière machinale. Seule, toute 
seule, d’elle-même.”296  
One can ask, then, whether the transformation of Tournier’s Robinson 
from a worldly self sustained by the structure-other to an elemental self 
where there are no longer others nor world but only an entirely unknowable 
otherness, which does not allow for the gathering of self but only for the 
dispersal of any such attempt, could not be read as analogous to what in 
                                           
292 BS II, 112/69. 
293 BS II, 112/69. 
294 BS II, 123/78. 
295 BS II, 120/75. 
296 BS II, 132/84. 
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psychoanalytic terms is called the passage—or rather the slippage—from 
desire to drive, or from the I to the It.297 
In the following chapters, we shall therefore look in more detail at the 
Freudian notion of ‘das Es’ and how, among other things, it manifests itself 
in relation to das Ich via duplicitous repetitions, by focusing on four seminal 
texts of specific importance with regard to our interest in the function of the 
impersonal pronoun.298 In chronological order, these texts are: Das 
Unheimliche from 1919, Jenseits des Lustprinzips from 1920, Das Es und 
das Ich from 1923, and Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zu Einführung in die 
Psychoanalyse from 1933. For now, however, we shall approach the end of 
this adventure with the solitude of dependency with yet another passage from 
La bête et le souverain, in which Derrida epitomizes how the solitude of not 
being able to be alone also refers to being solitary in a community without 
common grounds:  
 
Il faut donc, mais j’abandonne ici ces facilités, savoir que quiconque dit moi est 
Robinson, savoir que l’autos, l’ipse, l’autobiographie est robinsonnienne, et que 
chaque Robinson aménage l’économie de sa solitude en compagnie de ceux, les 
autres, qui, au plus près de lui, avec lui, voire en lui (Mitsein, alter ego, travail de 
deuil), ne l’accompagnent pas.299 
                                           
297 In a similar manner, Derrida speaks of  a double phantasm to: “être mange vivant par 
l’autre, mourir vivant, si on peut dire, disparaître, partir, décéder vivant dans l’élément 
illimité, dans le milieu de l’autre” (BS II, 146/94). 
298 For an analysis of the solitary impersonality of boredom and anxiety in Heidegger, see 
Excursus III. 
299 BS II, 281/199. The final sentence of this quote is a reference to Blanchot’s text Celui 
qui ne m'accompagnait pas from 1953, to which we shall return in Chapter V.  
  
III. THE SOLITUDE OF IMPERSONALITY 
 
                 Was den Aberglauben der Logiker betrifft: 
so will ich nicht müde werden,  
eine kleine kurze Thatsache immer wieder zu unterstreichen, 
welche von diesen Abergläubischen ungern zugestanden wird, 
— nämlich, dass ein Gedanke kommt, wenn ‘er’ will, und nicht wenn ‘ich’ will; 
so dass es eine Fälschung des Thatbestandes ist, zu sagen:  
das Subjekt ‘ich’ ist die Bedingung des Prädikats ‘denke.’ 
Es denkt: aber dass dies ‘es’ gerade jenes alte berühmte ‘Ich’ sei,  
ist, milde geredet, nur eine Annahme, eine Behauptung, 
 vor Allem keine ‘unmittelbare Gewissheit’  
– Friedrich Nietzsche, Jenseits von Gut und Böse 
 
 
III.1 FIGURATIONS OF THE IT IN FREUD  
Freud introduces a substantivization of the impersonal pronoun Es in his text 
Das Ich und das Es from 1923 as another denomination of the unconscious, 
or rather, as a further partitioning of the unconscious. This renaming serves 
both as a specification of the unconscious, which, in Freud’s view, had come 
to cover too broad a domain, and as a displacement of the unconscious within 
the eco-dynamic topography of the psychic apparatus, which comes to 
challenge its previous coordinates. 
As such, the unconscious (das Unbewusste) is no longer distinguished 
only from the conscious (das Bewusste) and the pre-conscious (das 
Vorbewusste), but also to some extent from itself. According to Freud, such 
a revised differentiation of the unconscious, as of the whole topographical 
model of the psyche, had become necessary because of the fairly 
‘uncomfortable discovery’ (unbequeme Entdeckung) that many of the 
functions and mechanisms pertaining to what he had hitherto designated as 
belonging to systems of the conscious and the preconscious could in fact be 
said to proceed unconsciously.300 Accordingly, from 1923 onwards the eco-
                                           
300 For an outline of what, in the scholarship on Freud, is usually referred to as the ‘first’ 
and the ‘second’ topography of the psyche, see Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 449ff. Freud 
himself warns us not to think too rigidly about the topographical domains of the psyche, 
since their limits are not delimitable from one another by sharply drawn borders. Rather: 
“Der Eigenart des Psychischen können wir nicht durch lineare Konturen gerecht werden 
wie in der Zeichnung oder in der primitive Malerei, eher durch verschwimmende 
Farbenfelder wie bei den modernen Malern” (GW XV, 85–86). Besides the 
topographical, Freud also considers what he calls the economic and dynamic perspectives 
of the psyche, dealing both with currents of energy and relations of power and exchange 
between the topographical ‘domains’ and their object cathexes. Taken together, these 
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dynamic topography of the psychic apparatus is no longer arranged 
predominantly on the basis of the unconscious–conscious division, but 
instead according to a tripartite differentiation between what Freud calls ‘the 
It’ (das Es), ‘the I’ (das Ich), and ‘the super-I’ (das Über-Ich), which 
nevertheless still operate across the line dividing the conscious from the 
unconscious. As instances of such unconscious processes of consciousness, 
Freud discerns not only the repressive mechanisms of the ego but also an 
unconscious feeling of guilt pertaining to the super-ego, which is why Freud 
states: “Nicht nur das Tiefste, auch das Höchste am Ich kann unbewusst 
sein.”301  
It therefore became necessary for Freud to further specify instances of the 
unconscious whose main characteristic was no longer simply that they 
proceed unconsciously, since we have now seen that many processes of 
consciousness do too, but more specifically that they remain absolutely alien 
to the I (Ichfremde). To emphasize the distance from the first-person 
singular, Freud therefore proposes the impersonal pronoun Es as the least 
improper denomination of the I-foreign parts of the psyche, thereby also 
suggesting that no proper name is really appropriate when it comes to these 
outskirts of the psyche.302  
In Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zu Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, 
Freud describes the It as the obscure (dunkle) and inaccessible 
(unzugängliche) part of the psyche, which makes us strangers to ourselves 
insofar as we can only have access to this ‘inner abroad’ (inneres Ausland) 
as we would to an ‘external’ other.303 That is to say, we can only approach 
these parts erringly and indirectly through detours following their traces 
disseminated throughout dreams, symptoms, or the occasional ruptures of 
                                           
perspectives what Freud calls ‘a metapsychological representation’ (Darstellung) of the 
psychic apparatus. Cf. GW X, 281.  
301 GW XIII, 255. See also Neue Folge in which Freud further explains that seeing as 
“auch Anteile des Ichs und Überichs im dynamischen Sinne unbewusst sind,” we must 
acknowledge that “wir haben kein Recht, das Ichfremde Seelengebiet das System Ubw 
zu nennen, da die Unbewusstheit nicht sein ausschließender Charakter ist” (GW XV, 78).  
302 According to Freud, it was the physician and ‘wild analyst’ Georg Groddeck who first 
gave him the idea of employing the impersonal pronoun Es for the unconscious, and who 
in his turn was indebted to Nietzsche for it. In Neue Folge Freud describes the genealogy 
as follows: “In Anlehnung an den Sprachgebrauch bei Nietzsche und infolge einer 
Anregung von G. Groddeck heißen wir es fortan das Es. Dies unpersönliche Fürwort 
scheint besonders geeignet, den Hauptcharakter dieser Seelenprovinz, ihre Ichfremdheit, 
auszudrücken” (GW XV, 79). See also, GW XIII, 251n2.  
303 Displacing the Husserlian approach to an alter-ego, Freud writes: “Wir haben dann zu 
ihm dieselbe Beziehung wie zu einem psychischen Vorgang bei einem anderen 
Menschen, nur dass er eben einer unseres eigenen ist” (GW XV, 77). 
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memory or slips of the tongue as leftovers for an interminable analysis: “Wir 
nähern uns dem Es mit Vergleichen, nennen es ein Chaos.”304  
The inaccessibility of this unknown and chaotic It is due not only to its 
resistance to the logical rules pertaining to the principle of non-contradiction 
as well as to chronological succession, but also to its organization into a 
consistent will or into an audible representation of a coherent voice; the It 
remains strangely and elusively dissonant as a cacophony of impersonal and 
murmuring voices.305 Despite its absolute alterity towards the ego, however, 
the It persistently affects the I, to such an extent that Freud even claims that: 
“Das Ich ist doch nur ein Stück vom Es.”306 Indeed, a piece of the It, which 
has been altered into an I only because of its exposure to certain stimuli—
whether these stimuli come from the ‘internal’ territories of the drives or 
from the ‘external’ world of so-called reality.307 That is, the I emerges as and 
in the organization of the chaotic disorganization of the It, wherefore the I is 
both different from and identical to It. Or, as Freud notes in his Hemmung, 
Symptom, Angst from 1926: “Das Ich ist eben der organisierte Anteil des 
Es.”308  
In reading this wondrous sentence ‘das Ich ist doch nur ein Stück vom Es,’ 
we come to ponder what it might mean for our overall questioning of the 
remains of a self. Where would we begin to trace such remains of a self in a 
relation of identity, in the difference between the I and the It? A certain 
ambiguity seems to emerge here (Freud speaks of a ‘tension’ (Spannung) or 
a ‘conflict’ (Konflikt)), since, on the one hand, the I is said to be nothing but 
a piece of the It, a sort of residue from the exposure of the It to the stimuli of 
others. On the other hand, however, the It appears to be an irreducible 
remainder that can never be appropriated by or assimilated into the 
organization of the I. In my view, this ambiguity in Freud’s text remains 
irresolvable and I believe it is important to insist on this irresolvability in 
order to try to avoid making any determinate decisions about what ultimately 
remains an indecisive relation between the I and the It, which does not allow 
for the reduction of subordination of one to the other. In the following 
                                           
304 GW XV, 80. 
305 Cf. GW XIII, 289. 
306 GW XV, 83. 
307 Cf. GW XV, 83. In Freud’s view, this goes anatomically as well since it is not the 
conscious I but the It that is lodged in the ‘innersten Innern’ of the psychic brain, whereas 
the I has its seat in the outer cortical layers. Cf. GW XIII, 23.  
308 GW XIV, 124. Freud explains the identity in difference as follows: “Die Scheidung 
des Ichs vom Es scheint gerechtfertigt, sie wird uns durch bestimmte Verhältnisse 
aufgedrängt. Aber anderseits ist das Ich mit dem Es identisch, nur ein besonders 
differenzierter Anteil desselben” (ibid. 124). 
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chapters, we shall return more than once to this psyche in pieces and to some 
further questions that it entails for the remains of a self. For now, however, 
we shall stay close to Freud’s text.  
The exposure to this unruly and inaccessible exteriority at the inmost 
interiority of the supposedly autonomous human being is one reason why 
Freud counts psychoanalysis as the third narcissistic wound inflected on the 
megalomaniac tendencies of humankind throughout its scientific history: not 
only has humankind been evacuated from the center of the universe by the 
discoveries of astrophysics, and dethroned from its distinguished birth into 
the common descent of animals by biology, now psychoanalysis comes 
along to inform the egocentric human being that it is not even master of its 
own house.309 Moreover, not only is the ego not master, it must also rely on 
the ‘sparse reports’ (kärgliche Nachrichten) it receives from an unknown and 
inaccessible occupant lodging in the midst of its household in order to try to 
accommodate itself to this economy of alterity.310 This topographical 
displacement of the psychic apparatus goes hand in hand with Freud’s 
reconstruction of his theory of drives.  
Already in 1916–17, Freud had encountered repetitive patterns of 
behavior and thought in his analysands, most prominently in those suffering 
from melancholia and obsessional neurosis, that appeared to generate such 
(self)destructive and unpleasurable effects that he could not align them with 
his previous theory of drives. The problem was that these symptoms of 
unpleasure did not cohere with Freud’s earlier theory according to which the 
drives were unilaterally, though not non-conflictually, oriented by the 
continual work of the pleasure principle (Lustprinzip), the aim of which was 
either an increase of pleasure or a decrease of unpleasure—or, more 
precisely, a decrease of an ‘unpleasurable tension’ (unlustvolle Spannung) in 
the psychic organism.311 Such inconsistency is what encouraged Freud in 
                                           
309 On the three traumatic blows to humanity, see Freud’s Vorlesungen zur Einführung in 
die Psychoanalyse from 1917 (GW XI, 294–295). 
310 In a similar manner, Groddeck in Das Buch vom Es, also published in 1923, designates 
the It as the insistence and res(is)tance of an impersonal force that ‘lives the human 
beings’ thus signaling towards a heteronomous dethroning and decentering of the 
consciously autonomous subject. Groddeck further explains his view as follows: “Ich bin 
der Ansicht, dass der Mensch vom Unbekannten belebt wird. In ihm ist ein Es, irgend ein 
Wunderbares, das Alles, was er tut und was mit ihn geschieht, regelt. Der Satz ‘ich lebe’ 
ist nur bedingt richtig, er drückt ein kleines Teilphänomen von der Grundwahrheit aus: 
Der Mensch wird von Es gelebt” (Groddeck 1923, 10; 281). 
311 These symptoms led Freud to the hypothesis of a ‘primary masochism’ inherent to the 
psychic apparatus. Freud calls it primary masochism in a revision of his previous 
explanation according to which masochism is derived from a ‘primary sadism’ 
(Ursadismus) by turning an aggression directed towards an external object inward. For 
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1920 to take up the question of a possible ‘beyond’ of the pleasure principle, 
which caused him to transform his fundamentally dualistic theory of drives 
from a clear distinction between the sexual drives (Sexualtriebe) and the self-
preservatory ego drives (Selbsterhaltungstriebe/Ich-triebe)—both governed 
by the pleasure principle—to a less rigid distinction between the 
assimilatory, constructive (aufbauend), and procreative (Fortpflanzung) life 
drive (Lebenstriebe) and the dissimilatory, de(con)structive (abbauend), and 
regressive death drive (Todestriebe), the latter of which Freud suspected to 
operate independently of the pleasure principle.  
Accordingly, it is no mere coincidence that Freud’s introduction of the It 
into the topography of the psyche in Das Ich und das Es takes place in the 
wake of two earlier, but just as seminal, texts, namely, Das Unheimliche 
from 1919 and Jenseits des Lustprinzips from 1920. For it is in these two 
texts that the economy of the psyche as governed by the pleasure principle 
markedly begins to tremble and vacillate. In order to learn more about how 
the It interferes with the authority of the I, we shall therefore take a closer 
look at these two texts and in doing so shall focus our reading chiefly on two 
notions significant to the disruption of the pleasure principle. One is the 
death drive, which Freud introduces as a perpetual force of disturbance in 
the physic economy whose main currency is said to be pleasure, and the 
other, whose importance to psychoanalysis can hardly be underestimated, is 
repetition. We will begin with the latter text.  
 
 
                                           
an early account of the counter-pleasurable symptoms related to masochism, see the essay 
“Trauer und Melancholie” from 1917, in which Freud tarries with the problem of 
explaining the apparently self-destructive drive of certain depressive conditions: “Wir 
haben als den Urzustand, von dem das Triebleben ausgeht, eine so großartige Selbstliebe 
des Ichs erkannt, wir sehen in der Angst, die bei Lebensbedrohung auftritt, einen so 
riesigen Betrag der narzißtischen Libido frei werden, daß wir es nicht erfassen, wie dies 
Ich seiner Selbstzerstörung zustimmen könne” (GW X, 438). See also Vorlesungen zur 
Einführung in die Psychoanalyse from 1916–17, where Freud raises the question of the 
apparent uselessness (Unzweckmäßigkeit), from the perspective of the pleasure principle, 
of an anxiety that paralyses the anxious person rather than making him or her capable of 
flight. Cf. GW XI, 445f. With the introduction of the revised psychic topography in 1923, 
Freud finally made the melancholic link between a primary masochism of the 
unconscious It and its manifestation in the punishing super-I explicit when he writes: 
“Was nun im Über-Ich herrscht, ist wie eine Reinkultur des Todestriebes, und wirklich 
gelingt es diesem oft genug, das Ich in den Tod zu treiben […] das Uber-Ich kann 
hypermoralisch und dann so grausam werden wie nur das Es” (GW XIII, 283–284). See 
also, “Das ökonomische Problem des Masochismus” (GW XIII, 369–383).  
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III.2 TO GO BEYOND OR NOT REPEATEDLY: READING THE JENSEITS.  
First, a preliminary note on this notorious Freudian text. In attempting to read 
Jenseits des Lustprinzips, one encounters an exceedingly complicated textual 
network, which even to a reader as experienced as Lacan is “incroyablement 
ambigu, voire confus.”312 The text is excessive, not only in terms of genre—
Freud himself calls it ‘speculation’ and often even ‘far-fetched speculation’ 
(weitausholende Spekulation) because it cannot unambiguously be said to 
belong either to scientific or philosophical discourse, but neither can it be 
discarded as ungrounded mysticism or fake profundity313—but also in terms 
of any consistent thesis or coherent theory. As Derrida has shown in his 
incomparable study “Spéculer—Sur ‘Freud’” from 1980, Jenseits des 
Lustprinzips is a text that proceeds a-thetically, that is, by repeatedly posing, 
disposing, and reposing different speculative hypotheses, almost to the point 
of paralysis.  
Derrida recapitulates the cadenced movements of the Jenseits as follows: 
“Il se construit-déconstruit selon un interminable détour (Umweg),”314 and 
as such ends up ex hypothesi positing a ‘beyond’ only accessible through 
these ‘(un)steps of writing’ (pas d’écriture). Accordingly, the text ends up 
abandoning not only its readers but even its author in a state of bewilderment, 
which can be discerned in Freud’s final hesitant declaration regarding the 
hypotheses wagered by the text: “Meine Antwort würde lauten, daß ich 
weder selbst überzeugt bin, noch bei anderen um Glauben für sie werbe. 
Richtiger: ich weiß nicht, wie weit ich an sie glaube.”315 Nevertheless, in 
what follows we shall try to make these little steps-not-beyond (pas au-
delà)316 in the attempt to retrace the exceedingly intricate and repetitive 
movements of Freud’s text—if this is indeed possible, for how can we begin 
                                           
312 Sem II, 51/37.  
313 Cf. GW XIII, 39.  
314 CP, 287/269. 
315 GW XIII, 64.  
316 As the Englsih translator of Blanchot’s La pas au-delà remarks in her introduction, 
the French phrase pas au-delà is impossible to translate in at least a quadruple sense: 
“since both pas and au-delà can be taken either as nouns or adverbs (pas is both a step 
and part of the negative adverb ne-pas; au-delà means ‘beyond,’ but also occurs as ‘l’au-
delà,’ the beyond) […]. However one chooses to translate pas, it is impossible to preserve 
to two meanings at once, although the simultaneity of meanings in the same word is 
important in preserving the sense of prohibition and transgression occurring at the same 
time” (PAD (1992), xvi). This simultaneity of prohibition and transgression, as of the 
possibility and impossibility both of going beyond and of not going beyond, is significant 
both regarding the textual movements of the Jenseits as its thematic thrust, wherefore we 
find the pas au-delà to be a fitting ‘(non-)procedure’ of reading the text.  
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reading a text so thoroughly driven by repetitions? Will a leap be necessary? 
Will it even be possible? We will give it a try.  
As mentioned, the problem that occupies the Jenseits from start to finish 
is that there are manifestations of the psyche that do not appear in accordance 
with Freud’s previous understanding of the psychic economy as governed by 
the principle of pleasure, and these seemingly aneconomic and unruly 
manifestations all seem to share a certain compulsive repetitiveness. Despite 
the fact that Freud begins the text by declaring that he has no hesitations or 
reservations in reassuming (nehmen wir unbedenklich an) his previous 
position, according to which, “daß der Ablauf der seelischen Vorgänge 
automatisch durch das Lustprinzip reguliert wird,”317 no sooner than page 
three of the first chapter he already corrects himself on this point. For, as 
Freud now argues, if pleasure is indeed the principal principle and sole aim 
of the psyche how, then, do experiences of unpleasure occur in the first 
place? Furthermore, even if unpleasure could arise in such an psychic 
archeo-teleology of pleasure, for example due to external factors beyond the 
control of the psyche, should we not still expect to find at least the majority 
of psychic processes to be advanced or assisted by the experience of 
pleasure?  
According to Freud, however, even the slightest experience with matters 
of the psyche—analytic or not—will leave such expectation disappointed, 
seeing as unpleasure is at least as common a psychic experience as that of 
pleasure. Therefore Freud finds it unavoidable to adjust his initial 
assumption by conceding that it is properly (eigentlich) incorrect to speak of 
an actual ‘dominion’ or a ‘lordship’ (Herrschaft) of the pleasure principle in 
the economy of the psyche. Instead, the initial declaration of dominance is 
modified into the articulation of a ‘strong tendency’318 in the psyche, either 
toward an achievement of pleasure (Lustgewinn) or toward a reduction of 
unpleasure. Notwithstanding this initial modification, however, Freud will 
make repeated attempts to reappoint the pleasure principle to the dominant 
position in the psychic economy throughout the Jenseits. As such, the 
movement of the text shifts back and forth between a dethroning and a re-
enthroning of the principality of pleasure, which gives it the appearance of a 
prosecution unfolding against its own initial hypothesis. A prosecution, 
moreover, in which Freud plays the self-proclaimed part of the advocatus 
diaboli acting as his own double and against himself.319  
                                           
317 GW XIII, 3. My italics.  
318 GW XIII, 5. 
319 Cf. GW XIII, 64.  
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Accordingly, in Chapters One and Two Freud presents his jury of readers 
with a first piece of evidence against the psychic authority of the pleasure 
principle by recounting three prevalent sources of unpleasure (Quellen der 
Unlust) drawn from his great range of analytic experience. The first cause of 
unpleasure concerns the inhibition of pleasure which occurs in the 
substitution (Ablösung) of the pleasure principle with that of the reality 
principle (Realitätsprinzip). However, as Freud points out, from the 
perspective of self-preservation, which is pleasurable to sustain, the reality 
principle is ‘a necessary evil’ in order to mitigate the worst blows from the 
surrounding world. The unleashing of an uninhibited and unrestricted 
pleasure principle in the world would be straight out dangerous and possibly 
fatal to the psychic organism, wherefore it must protect itself against itself 
by means of self-inhibitory regulations of adaptation to its surrounding 
world.320 
 In reality, then, the reality principle is nothing but an auto-modification 
of the pleasure principle, which does not cancel out the original tendency 
towards pleasure but actually serves to prolong it by deferring (Aufschub) 
the satisfaction of a possibly instantaneously fatal pleasure through lengthy 
detours (langen Umwege) in order to achieve a less violent, and perhaps less 
intense, but more economically tenable pleasure over time.321 Even if the 
postponement of pleasure necessitates a provisional endurance in the journey 
to its attainment, Freud ends up concluding that the reality principle by no 
means threatens the authority of the pleasure principle insofar as its 
inhibitions are enacted out of concern for the self-perseverance of the 
psychic organism and therefore serves the physic economy of pleasure in the 
long run. As Derrida renders the argument, the pleasure principle must make 
war on itself and according to such self-hostility, “[l]e principe même du 
plaisir se manifesterait comme une sorte de contre-plaisir, bande contre 
                                           
320 Again, for Freud, this self-inhibition arising from a demand for self-preservation has 
its anatomic analogue in the development of the brain, insofar as the outermost cortical 
layers must ‘sacrifice’ themselves (Absterben) by becoming a shield of almost inorganic 
matter (gewissermaßen anorganisch) capable of resisting the possibly lethal stimuli from 
the external world and thus protecting the more inward layers of the still living organic 
brain. Therefore, Freud writes: “Für den lebenden Organismus ist der Reizschutz eine 
beinahe wichtigere Aufgabe als die Reizaufnahme” (GW XIII, 27).  
321 This point is also emphasized by Lacan when, in his seminar from 1954–1955 
concerning the Le moi dans la théorie de Freud et dans la technique de la psychanalyse, 
he insists that the reality principle is not at all in opposition to the pleasure principle, but 
rather consists in “ce que le jeu dure, c’est-à-dire que le plaisir se renouvelle, que le 
combat ne finesse pas faute de combattants. Le principe de réalité consiste à nous ménager 
nos plaisirs, ces plaisirs don’t la tendance est précisément d’arriver à la cessation” (Sem 
II, 107/84). 
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bande qui vient limiter le plaisir pour le rendre possible.”322 Thus, the 
principle of pleasure operates in a double-bound logic of auto-immunity 
according to which its protective measures for surviving potentially run the 
risk of turning into a form of self-mutilation, such that its survival might end 
up having been nothing but a suicide. 
The second source of unpleasure that Freud presents as evidence against 
the authority of pleasure is related to the first inasmuch as the supplementary 
substitution of the pleasure principle with the reality principle may lead to a 
repression of initial pleasures, which, on account of an econo-dynamic 
deliberation, can transform even the mere possibility of certain pleasures (in 
one psychic system) into experiences of unpleasure (in another psychic 
system). Accordingly, these repressed pleasures are pleasures that can no 
longer be experienced as such and are, in Freud’s opinion, the mainspring of 
all neurotic experiences of unpleasure. Even so, Freud maintains that a 
certain amount of neurotic unpleasure can still be explained from an 
economic perspective insofar as it wards off the possibility of even greater 
unpleasures, such as a premature death caused by unrestricted desire, and 
therefore yields pleasure in the longer run. However, as Derrida remarks, 
there is no certainty that these postponements will ever reach their 
pleasurable ends since no one can guarantee that the long detours of 
inhibition, repression, and restriction will finally lead to an outlet of pleasure. 
The risk inherent to these detours is therefore that the psyche might lose track 
of its orientation and be led astray, since, as Derrida writes, “si la longueur 
du détour n’est plus maîtrisable, et plutôt que la longueur sa structure, alors 
le retour à soi n’est jamais assuré.”323  
The final source of unpleasure that Freud mentions here comes with 
exposure to a traumatic experience whose surprising and terrifying 
suddenness can prompt the traumatized psyche to repeat it over and over 
again in dreams, flashbacks, or compulsive motoric behavior that “immer 
wieder in die Situation seines Unfalles zurückführt.”324 Even though Freud 
                                           
322 CP, 426/399.  
323 CP, 302/282.  
324 GW XIII, 10. In his discussion of traumatic neurosis, Freud distinguishes between 
three modes of agitation: ‘anxiety’ (Angst), which is a state in which the psyche is 
expecting and as such is prepared for a still unknown but possibly dangerous or violent 
occurrence; ‘fear’ (Furcht), which is a state determined by its being related to a specific 
fearful object; and ‘fright’ (Schreck), which is the state of a psyche taken by complete 
surprise by a frightening occurrence. In Freud’s view, traumatic neurosis develops 
precisely when the psyche is completely overwhelmed by some unforeseen incident 
because not in a state of anxious alertness. According to Freud, the condition of trauma 
is therefore “das Fehlen der Angstbereitschaft” (GW XIII, 31). Six years after the 
Jenseits, however, Freud comes to revise this sharp distinction between traumatizing 
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does concede in Chapter Two that the unpleasurable repetitions pertaining to 
traumatic neurosis seem to challenge not only the authority of the pleasure 
principle but also his theory of dreams as essentially wish fulfilling,325 he 
cuts off any further elaboration at this point and instead leaves his readers 
with the following choice of explanation: either the unpleasurable repetitions 
in the wake of traumatization manifests the aftereffect of a disturbance of 
the ‘proper’ economy of drives, which causes a diversion from its original 
aim as regulated by the pleasure principle, or the unpleasurable repetitions 
bear testimony to “rätselhaften masochistischen Tendenzen”326 in the human 
psyche still in need of elucidation. 
 Following the first explicative alternative, the repetitions of trauma do not 
contradict, or even seriously challenge, the authority of the pleasure principle 
inasmuch as their unpleasurable effects are merely evidence of a diverting 
disturbance and as such actually confirm the original rule of pleasure by way 
of their unpleasurable exception. Following the second alternative, however, 
the difficulties following trauma proliferate and the possibility of providing 
an explanation for them within the already established theoretical framework 
of the psychic economy becomes ever more difficult.  
Despite this first retreat, the traumatic repetitions continue to haunt Freud 
so that in Chapter Four he returns to them once again in order to modify his 
initial statements. This time around Freud concedes that if the compulsive 
repetitiveness pertaining to trauma is in fact a trace of a ‘beyond’ or perhaps 
                                           
fright, determined fear, and prepared anxiety by further complicating his notion of 
anxiety. The revised, and in some respects contradictory notion of anxiety outlined in 
Hemmung, Symptom und Angst is now related to trauma insofar as it becomes a response 
to the belated (nachträgliche) temporality of trauma according to which a trauma can be 
said to come from the future as the return of a past that has never been present as such. 
Cf. GW XIV, 115; 157. I have engaged with this topic elsewhere, see Michaelsen 2016, 
48–77. 
325 In his work on Traumdeutung from 1900, Freud had already come across dreams 
whose contents and effects were experienced as so unpleasant that they appeared, if not 
to contradict, then at least to problematize his overall theory of dreams as wish fulfilling. 
However, no matter how anxiety-ridden, horrific, unpleasurable or even painful the 
dreams may be, Freud always manages to locate in them a ‘hidden’ wish, which the 
dreams are more or less secretly trying to fulfill, for example by interpreting them as 
‘counter wish dreams’ (Gegenwunschträume). In one instance, Freud even interprets the 
hidden wish of an unpleasant dream of one of his analysands to be to prove Freud wrong 
precisely by dreaming the most uninterpretable dream possible according to the theory of 
wish fulfillment (cf. GW II/III, 157). Ultimately, then, Freud ends up maintaining his 
initial thesis of wish fulfillment, modifying it only parenthetically, such that: “Der Traum 
ist die (verkleidete) Erfüllung eines (unterdrückten, verdrängten) Wunsches” (GW II/III, 
166).  
326 GW XIII, 11. 
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even a ‘before’ the pleasure principle, “so ist es folgerichtig, auch für die 
wunscherfüllende Tendenz des Traumes eine Vorzeit zuzulassen.”327 
Whether this past of a ‘time before’ which the function of wish fulfillment 
in dreams became operative might turn out to be somehow related to the 
immemorial past of the It in the place of which the I must come to be only 
belatedly we shall have to investigate in the following sections.328 For now, 
however, in the third chapter of the Jenseits, Freud leaves undecided which 
of the two alternative interpretations of traumatic repetition he prefers. 
Instead, he decides to interrupt the investigation into the “dunkle und düstere 
Thema der traumatischen Neurose”329 and its multiple affects of unpleasure 
in order to change direction and proceed along a seemingly very different 
path of more ‘normal activities’ (normalen Betätigungen) for the human 
psyche, namely, the path of children’s play. 
 
 
III.3 PLAYFUL REPETITIONS 
Freud’s analysis of the fort:da game performed by his one-and-a-half-year-
old grandson Ernst, is one of the most widely commented topoi in the 
Freudian oeuvre. In what follows, we will therefore not be so conceited as to 
think that we can do justice, let alone contribute something entirely ‘new’ or 
‘unthought,’ to its long itinerary of commentary of diverging quality. 
Instead, we will confine ourselves to providing a brief overview of Freud’s 
analysis, the crux of which is his observation of a tendency to repeat 
unpleasurable and even painful experiences in play, in order to bring it into 
conversation with our present discussion of a certain solitude of 
impersonality.  
In the aftermath of being abandoned by both of his parents—first by his 
mother leaving him in order to run an errand and later by his father going off 
to war330—Ernst develops a habit of throwing his toys away and out of sight 
whilst making an emphatic sound, which Freud and his mother unanimously 
                                           
327 GW XIII, 33. 
328 Another instance of the belatedness (Nachträglichkeit) following an immemorial past 
can be discerned in Freud’s neurological etiology of consciousness in Chapter Four of the 
Jenseits, according to which “das Bewußtsein entstehe an Stelle der Erinnerungsspur” 
(GW XIII, 25). In other words, consciousness arises as the substitute, not for a memory, 
but for the trace of a memory, which means that consciousness develops as the memory 
of something immemorial. For a discussion of the possible relation between a discourse 
of the immemorial and a discourse of the unconscious, see Chapter One in Lyotard 1988.  
329 GW XIII, 11. 
330 In a footnote, Freud laconically adds that later on in his life, when Ernst is five years 
of age, the mother (Freud’s daughter) will tragically die and thus abandon little Ernst 
permanently, “[j]etzt, da sie wirklich ‘fort’ (o—o—o) war” (GW XIII, 14n1). 
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interpret as meaning ‘gone’ or ‘away’ (fort). Initially, Freud takes this 
repeated act of making things disappear to be a game in itself, but at a later 
time when the child comes into possession of a wooden reel with a piece of 
string attached to it (Holzspule), the second act of the game reveals itself to 
Freud. Seeing that the child is now capable of making the disappeared toy 
return to sight by a pull of the string and accompanying its return with an 
enthusiastic ‘there!’ (da), Freud understands that the complete fort:da game 
has been invented.  
Freud interprets the two acts of the game as a mise-en-scène of the 
mother’s departure and return—since the father’s later departure had the 
benefit of leaving the child undisturbed in his sole possession (Alleinbesitz) 
of the mother (Oedipus is always lurking in the wings). However, Freud is 
puzzled at why the child would unrelentingly replay such an unpleasurable 
and painful separation over and over again. Briefly, he speculates upon the 
possibility that this earnest game, like the childish incentive to repeat in 
general,331 might in fact be an indication of something independent from and 
more original (ursprünglicher) than the pleasure principle—that is to say, 
something irreducible and heteronomous to the archeo-teleology of pleasure 
entailing its own energy, its own drive, and its own aneconomic agenda. 
More specifically, Freud entertains the notion of a compulsion to repeat 
working regardless of the concern for pleasure and even regardless of the 
care for one’s own being (Sorge). Yet, this first time around Freud once again 
retreats from his speculations and instead finishes his analysis in favor of 
another interpretation, which reinscribes the repetitive play of absencing and 
presencing, disappearance and reappearance (Verschwinden und 
Wiederkommen) back into the economy of pleasure.  
According to this alternative, and presumably less speculative, 
interpretation, the playful repetitions of the unpleasant departure and return 
of the mother represented by the wooden reel bound with string (Bindfaden) 
may actually be regarded as pleasurable from another perspective insofar as 
it manifests a drive to master (Bemächtigungstrieb) the anxious, painful, 
sorrowful, and possibly even traumatic separation from the mother. Even 
though Freud expresses some doubt as to whether this drive for 
empowerment in the face of something overpowering may originally operate 
independently from the pleasure principle, he is nevertheless quite clear that 
through the repetitions resulting from this drive the child is capable of 
                                           
331 In Chapter Five, Freud will return to the role of repetition in children’s play, noting 
that whereas children seem to take pleasure in repetition the adult demands renewal for 
his pleasure to be achieved or else he will get bored. According to Freud, the analysand 
who in adulthood repeats past experiences compulsively therefore behaves like a child 
(wie infantile) giving of the impression of being either boring or possessed. 
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transforming a passive situation of abandonment and desolation into an 
active staging of the same. This reenacting of the experience undergone 
allows the child to internalize and thus reappropriate the loss of the mother, 
thereby making an initial unpleasurable event seem almost pleasurable 
because of the gained mastery over it. As we shall come to see, this narrative 
of the fort:da game, is in Lacan’s view the very (hi)story of the subject’s 
traumatic inscription into the symbolic order—an inscription which is 
moreover prescribed precisely by the incision of a loss.332  
In an often overlooked footnote, Freud adds a subsequent observation of 
a further development of the fort:da game that, in his own view, confirms 
this interpretation of the game as one of mastery through which the return of 
the object yields greater pleasure than the unpleasure of its initial 
disappearance. Freud’s observation was made following a long period of 
solitude (langen Alleinseins) in which the child, in the absence of his mother, 
had found a way of making himself rather than an object disappear by 
crouching under the mirror so that his reflected image was gone.333 Since 
Freud does not explain why this observation entirely secures (völlig 
gesichert) his interpretation of a pleasurable drive for mastery, nor comments 
on what one would otherwise think was a quite significant substitution of the 
wooden reel representing his mother with Ernst himself, we are left 
guessing.334  
In light of what we saw in the previous chapter regarding the ‘solitude of 
dependency,’ however, what strikes us as remarkable in this supplementary 
footnote is the fact that Freud fails to tell his readers about the supposedly 
decisive second act of the fort:da game—that is, the act when, standing erect 
again, Ernst would have been able to see his image reappear there in the 
mirror. The default of this second act, entailing the re-presentation of the 
child to himself, may of course be nothing but a merely accidental omission 
or oversight on Freud’s part. Yet, is it not Freud himself who trained us to 
                                           
332 In this regard, Lacan writes: “L’ensemble de l’activité symbolise la répétition, mais 
non pas du tout celle d’un besoin qui en appellerait au retour de la mère, et qui se 
manifesterait tout simplement dans le cri. C’est la répétition du départ de la mère comme 
cause d’une Spaltung dans le sujet—surmontée par le jeu alternatif, fort-da, qui est un ici 
ou là, et qui ne vise, en son alternance, que d’être fort d’un da, et da d’un fort” (Sem XI, 
61/62–63). We shall return to this Lacanian drive of alternating repetition in a later section 
of this chapter. 
333 Cf. GW XIII, 13n.  
334 One tempting guess would be to discern a somewhat malfunctioning instance, or even 
a cancellation, of what Lacan designates as the mirror stage reenacted in this short 
footnote on an extension of the fort:da game. However, we will not give into this 
temptation at present but instead postpone our engagement with Lacan’s mirror stage to 
Chapter V. 
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be suspicious of merely ‘accidental’ omissions or oversights and to question 
whether they may signal something other than themselves? Hence, we might 
feel justified in speculating whether or not this default of little Ernst 
reappearing to himself in the mirror, might have something to do with his 
presentiment of his own disappearance or dissolution in the absence of the 
(m)other. In this regard, it is therefore tempting to read Ernst’s letting himself 
disappear (sich selbst verschwinden zu lassen) as the child’s solitary 
response to his exposure to the harsh conditions of the solitude of 
dependency. That is, as his childish soliloquy in confrontation with the fact 
that the very sense of himself does not come from himself alone, but from 
the (m)other, and when the (m)other is no longer there to induce his being 
with presence and his existence with personality he begins to sense himself 
disappearing into an anonymous absence.335  
We will leave this temptation aside for the moment in order to proceed 
with Freud, who brings his initial prosecution of the pleasure principle to an 
end by concluding that none of the hitherto exhibited evidence of 
unpleasure—that is, neither the restricting adjustments of the reality 
principle, the repetitions of traumatization, nor the repetitive play of 
fort:da—have testified to a need to go beyond the psychic economy 
regulated by the pleasure principle in order to retrieve an explanation (zeugen 
nicht für die Wirksamkeit von Tendenzen jenseits des Lustprinzips).336 
Consequently, none of the repetitive phenomena exhibited in the first and 
second chapter have presented a serious threat to the dominion of the 
pleasure principle, insofar as the unpleasure that these phenomena have 
undoubtedly caused in one system of the psyche at the same time yield 
pleasure in another system, thus leaving the authority and legitimacy of the 
pleasure principle intact. However, in Chapter Three, Freud turns towards 
more troublesome repetitions that will push the economy of pleasure to its 
limits and lead him into the ‘far-fetched’ speculations of Chapters Four to 
Seven regarding the manifestation of a certain death drive in the psyche. 
 
 
III.4 REPETITIONS BEYOND PLEASURE 
Freud begins the third chapter of the Jenseits by recounting an analytically 
significant experience, which he had elaborated as early as in his 1914 essay 
                                           
335 Laing appears to be indicating something similar when he writes the following about 
Freud’s footnote on Ernst: “[I]n overcoming or attempting to overcome the loss or 
absence of the real other person in whose eyes he lived and moved and had his being, he 
becomes another person to himself who could look at him in the mirror” (Laing 1969, 
117).   
336 Cf. GW XIII, 15. 
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on “Erinnern, Wiederholung und Durcharbeiten,” that is, the experience of a 
certain ‘repetition compulsion’ (Wiederholungszwang) manifested by many 
analysands during their analysis. However, it is not until 1920 that this 
compulsion manifestly points Freud in the direction of a possible ‘beyond’ 
of the pleasure principle. In the 1914 essay, the repetition compulsion mainly 
serves as a substitute for remembering with respect to the repressed 
(Verdrängte) that cannot be re-membered because of the resistance 
(Widerstand) of the I who “am Lustprinzip festhalten.”337 As such, the 
repetition compulsion appears useful to the analytic work insofar as it helps 
forward the working-through (Durcharbeiten) of transference 
(Überträgung) when memory fails to do so.338  
Yet, already in 1914 the compulsion to repeat had in some cases also 
shown itself to have an impeding effect on analysis, insofar as it could break 
free from the analytic process of working-through and, instead, proceed 
according to its own obscure and unbounded agenda.339 In such cases, the 
task of the analyst would be to try to redomesticate the repetition compulsion 
by binding it once again to the purposefulness of transference in analysis 
(den Wiederholungszwang des Patienten zu bändigen). According to Freud, 
in order for this analytic task to be successful the ‘common,’ ‘ordinary,’ or 
even ‘vulgar’ neurosis (gemeine Neurose) of the analysand has to be replaced 
by a ‘transference neurosis.’ If this replacement is followed through, the 
analyst will have succeeded in making the compulsion to repeat harmless 
(unschädlich), and even useful (nutzbar), to the analytic work insofar as its 
activity will have been restricted to a specific domain (einem bestimmten 
Gebiete). Freud writes: “Wir eröffnen ihm [den Wiederholungszwang] die 
Übertragung als den Tummelplatz.”340  
In other words, the analytic work consists in substituting a harmful and 
unhealthy form of repetition with a harmless and healing form of 
repetition.341 However, in the Jenseits Freud appears to have stumbled upon 
                                           
337 GW XIII, 22. 
338 Freud can therefore write that “die Übertragung ist selbst nur ein Stück Wiederholung 
und die Wiederholung ist die Übertragung der vergessenen Vergangenheit […] der 
Analysierte wiederholt anstatt zu erinnern, er wiederholt unter den Bedingungen des 
Widerstandes” (GW X, 130–131). 
339 Cf. GW X, 134. 
340 GW X, 134. 
341 In Différence et répétition, Deleuze also marks the duplicitous nature of repetition as 
follows: “Si la répétition nous rend malades, c’est elle aussi qui nous guérit; si elle nous 
enchaîne et nous détruit, c’est elle encore qui nous libère, témoignant dans les deux cas 
de sa puissance ‘démoniaque’” (Deleuze 1968, 30/19). This irreducible ambiguity 
undoubtedly gives the notion of repetition in psychoanalysis a structural similarity to that 
which Derrida with Plato calls a pharmakon, which can signify both a remedy and a 
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a repetition compulsion that will not let itself be restricted to the useful 
repetitions pertaining to the working though of transference, and in 1920 
such an unrestricted repetition therefore comes to entail a compulsion 
proceeding without and beyond a concern for pleasure.   
Returning to the third chapter of the Jenseits, then, Freud initially 
maintains that a great deal of the unpleasure resulting from compulsive 
repetitions can still be explained from an econo-dynamic perspective under 
the governance of the pleasure principle. However, the truly incriminating 
evidence against such economic calibration is still to come, in the guise of a 
compulsion to repeat that does not seem to allow even the slightest 
possibility of pleasure (die keine Lustmöglichkeit enthalten).342 Regarding 
these latter unpleasurable repetitions, Freud mentions at least three kinds. 
First, there is the inclination of certain analysands towards 
(self)destructive and (self-)abasing patterns of behavior and thought 
manifested symptomatically by their compulsive repetitions of previous 
experiences that never did nor will entail any prospect of pleasure 
whatsoever, thus giving the repetitions an impression of “eines dämonischen 
Zuges in ihrem Erleben.”343 Second, there are people who apparently have a 
tendency to repeat the same unpleasurable patterns in their relationships with 
others, of which Freud mentions the friend who is always betrayed or the 
lover whose love is always abused. Finally, there is the third and, in Freud’s 
view, the most enigmatic compulsive to repeat manifested by people who 
repeatedly, but by the look of it entirely coincidently and unwittingly, keep 
crossing paths with the same chain of events thus giving their lives an 
uncanny appearance of being haunted by ‘destinal’ or ‘fated’ repetitions 
(Wiederholung desselben Schicksals). With respect to this last form of 
repetition, Freud gives the example of a woman who three times in a row 
married men who died from illness shortly after the wedding. 
According to Freud, these unpleasurable and somewhat uncanny “eternal 
recurrences of the same”344 can only leave us to wonder in astonishment 
(verwundern). Yet, confronted with numerous observations of ‘neurotic,’ 
‘daemonic,’ and ‘fated’ repetitions in analysis and beyond, Freud 
                                           
poison. Cf. “La pharmacie de Platon” (D, 108–132/61–171). We shall return in more 
detail to the duplicity of repetition and its demonic power in the following sections and 
next chapter.  
342 GW XIII, 18.  
343 GW XIII, 20.  
344Cf. GW XIII, 21. Freud employs the expression “ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen” in 
inverted commas but does not bother to insert a reference to Nietzsche—perhaps because 
he finds this reference too obvious, even for his time; perhaps because he does not want 
it to be too obvious.  
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nevertheless finds the courage to ponder whether, deep in the psychic 
apparatus, there might be something like a compulsion to repeat that does 
not obey the principal commandment for pleasure, and, moreover, whether 
such compulsion could even be considered more originary (ursprünglicher) 
and more forcefully driven (triebhafter) than the pleasure principle itself. 
Hence, it is not until the end of the third chapter that an actual hypothesis of 
a ‘beyond the pleasure principle’ finally comes to inscribe itself. Here Freud 
writes:  
 
Angesichts solcher Beobachtungen aus dem Verhalten in der Übertragung und aus 
dem Schicksal der Menschen werden wir den Mut zur Annahme finden, daß es im 
Seelenleben wirklich einen Wiederholungszwang gibt, der sich über das 
Lustprinzip hinaussetzt.345  
 
It is only in retrospect that Freud will reconsider whether the motif of 
repetition, as it had already expressed itself in the context of traumatic 
neurosis and in the game of fort:da, might not after all be a sign of a 
compulsion to repeat beyond pleasure. Hence, in Chapter Four Freud returns 
once again to the problem of traumatic neurosis, but in contrast to Chapter 
Two, this time he reaches the decision that repetitive dreams in the wake of 
a trauma are decisively in contradiction with, and as such operating beyond, 
the command of the pleasure principle since—as he explains: 
 
Wenn die Träume der Unfallsneurotiker die Kranken so regelmäßig in die Situation 
des Unfalles zurückführen, so dienen sie damit allerdings nicht der 
Wunscherfüllung, deren halluzinatorische Herbeiführung ihnen unter der 
Herrschaft des Lustprinzips zur Funktion geworden ist.346 
 
Furthermore, what also shows itself in this traumatic return is that the 
pleasure principle is in effect a tendency that can operate only with the 
precondition of a certain function of ‘binding’ (Bindung). This precondition 
becomes evident because the traumatic events, which Freud defines as 
“solche Erregungen von außen, die stark genug sind, den Reizschutz zu 
durchbrechen,”347 momentarily put the pleasure principle out of action 
(außer Kraft gesetzt) because a more urgent task than the achievement of 
pleasure has been assigned to the physic apparatus, namely the task of “den 
Reiz zu bewältigen, die hereingebrochenen Reizmengen psychisch zu 
binden, um sie dann der Erledigung zuzuführen.”348  
                                           
345 GW XIII, 21. My emphasis.  
346 GW XIII, 32. 
347 GW XIII, 29. 
348 GW XIII, 29. 
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Accordingly, the function of binding has shown itself to be more originary 
than, and therefore independent from, the goal of achieving pleasure and 
avoiding unpleasure without, however, being in direct opposition to the 
pleasure principle since it functions precisely as its precondition; “erst nach 
erfolgter Bindung könnte sich die Herrschaft des Lustprinzips (und seiner 
Modifikation zum Realitätsprinzip) ungehemmt durchsetzen.”349  
As Derrida concisely renders the relation of the function of binding 
following an exceptional trauma to the rule of the pleasure, “l’exception ne 
parle pas contre elle: elle la précède. Il y a plus vieux que la loi dans la loi.”350 
Furthermore, this ‘older than’ the principle of pleasure—principle here 
designating both a commandment and a commencement351—becomes 
traceable only in the erasure of its own trace, thereby indicating that the 
archē is only constituted in the forgetting of its own archival history and vice 
versa.352 Staying with Freud, however, suffice it to say here that the 
repetitions of traumas in dreams—whether these traumas are from war, 
accidents, or infantile experiences—exceeds the demands of the pleasure 
principle in that it pertains rather to the compulsion to repeat (sie gehorchen 
vielmehr dem Wiederholungszwang).353   
As we are now approaching the end of Chapter Four in the Jenseits, I 
believe it is time to pause for a moment in the attempt to catch up with 
ourselves. Retracing our steps, we have come across three places in Freud 
where the hypothesis of a beyond of the pleasure principle is explicitly put 
forward. 
                                           
349 GW XIII, 36. On the relation between the function of binding and the tendency of 
pleasure see Deleuze 1968, 128ff.; 96ff. See also Derrida’s text on the “Parergon” where, 
in commenting on the peculiar pleasure of reading Kant’s third Critique, he writes of a 
“plaisir un peu strict mais on y apprend encore une fois qu’il n’est pas de plaisir sans 
stricture” (VEP 51/43). 
350 CP, 371/350. 
351 Like the Greek ἀρχή, the Latin principium can designate not only a beginning, a 
commencement, or an origin, but also a mastery, a commandment, or a dominion. Thus, 
a principle may be conceived as a first place of power or sovereignty. Cf. LSJ. 
352 Derrida therefore discerns a Mal d’archive encrypted in the name of the death drive 
since, as he writes, “[l]a pulsion de mort n’est pas un principe. Elle menace même toute 
principauté, toute primauté archontique, toute désir d’archive” (MA, 27/12). In other 
words, Freud may deem the repetition compulsion, also known as the death-drive, more 
originary than the pleasure principle, not in the sense that is would constitute a more 
original principle, but only in the sense that it undoes the very constitution of a principle 
in advance. This threat of principality of the death drive is perhaps one reason why, as 
Fletcher notes, there is a “conceptual instability that haunts the pleasure principle” 
(Fletcher 2013, 293). 
353 Cf. GW XIII, 33. 
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The first instance occurred in the second chapter, where Freud in his analysis 
of the child’s game called fort:da made reference to a certain ‘drive for 
mastery’ (Bemächtigungstrieb), which may or may not operate 
independently from the concern for pleasure. The second took place in the 
third chapter with Freud’s first mention of the ‘compulsion to repeat’ in the 
context of which the repetitions of traumatization seemingly exceed any 
possibility or purpose of pleasure. The third and final instance, which will 
not become entirely explicit until the fifth chapter of the Jenseits, concerns 
the ‘binding’ (Bindung), which is said to be the precondition that facilitates 
the very tendency of the pleasure principle in the first place.  
This retracing urges us to question whether these three instances of a 
possible beyond of the pleasure principle—Bemächtigungstrieb, 
Wiederholungszwang, and Bindung—stand in some relation to one another. 
The first thing to be noticed in this regard is that Freud at times appears to 
employ the notions of ‘binding’ and ‘mastering’ more or less synonymously, 
as for example when he writes that it is a task of the psychic apparatus to 
‘master or bind excitation’ (die Erregung zu bewältigen oder zu binden).354 
At other times, however, it appears as though the very possibility of 
mastery is conditioned by a successful process of binding, whereas an 
unsuccessful process of binding (Mißglücken dieser Bindung) has the 
potential of developing into a traumatic neurosis. With these few indications 
we can begin to discern a relation, since it appears that the binding of 
excitations, depending on the extent of their success or its failure, 
precipitates either a repetitive drive for pleasurable mastery or an unpleasant 
and overpowering compulsion to repeat.  
On this view, then, we might pose a series of questions: first, might not 
the common denominator of the three instances of a hypothetical beyond the 
pleasure principle be that they all share a certain repetitiveness? When we 
then distinguish between a drive for mastery, a compulsion to repeat, and a 
function of binding are we not in effect distinguishing between different 
modes, tempi, or rhythms of repetition? Some of these modes of repetition 
would strengthen the economy of pleasure and some would exceed or even 
overrule it, but all of them would repeat themselves independently of, but 
not necessarily in contradiction to, the pleasure principle. In other words, can 
that which is said to be ‘beyond’ and more originary than the pleasure 
principle in fact be designated by the notion of repetition? Not an 
unequivocal notion of repetition, however, insofar as it would not lead us 
back to an ‘original’ or ‘prototypical’ repetition but rather towards an 
originary ‘difference without concept’ which would expose us to the 
                                           
354 Cf. GW XIII, 36.  
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vertiginously proliferating movement of “formant une ‘autre’ répétition au 
coeur de la première.”355 Finally, what implications would the designation of 
such an originary, yet anarchic, repetition entail for the constitution of a 
principle and for the institution of an archeology?  
We will come back to these questions shortly, but first we will proceed 
with our reading of Chapters Five and Six of the Jenseits, in which Freud 
comes to consider the relation between the driven and the repetitive more 
explicitly and more vigorously when posing the question: “Auf welche Art 
hängt aber das Triebhafte mit dem Zwang zur Wiederholung zusammen?”356 
In trying to respond to this question, Freud makes recourse to his dualistic 
theory of drives, which, as mentioned in the above, undergoes some revision 
in the Jenseits, and to which we will therefore turn our attention in what 
follows.   
 
 
III.5 A DUALITY OF DRIVES  
Before embarking on a further exploration of Freud’s revision of his theory 
of drives in the Jenseits, let us first attempt a preliminary definition. Contrary 
to what one might usually associate with a drive (efficiency, progress, 
evolution, resourcefulness), and based on fairly elaborate cytological 
speculations, which we shall not go into detail about here, Freud ends up 
defining a drive as “dem belebten Organischen innewohnender Drang zur 
Wiederherstellung eines früheren Zustandes.”357  
Initially, then, all drives are conservatively inclined towards the 
restoration of an earlier state in order to maintain the highest degree of 
homeostasis in a living organism. In this regard, all organic development is 
to be considered merely a reaction to the unavoidable disturbance of external 
stimuli, diverting the drives from their original trajectory. If such disturbing 
influences had not continually interrupted the life of an organism and thereby 
forced it to react, the organism would never have undergone any 
transformation or development in the first place. Instead, the organism would 
have preserved its homeostasis by repeating the same course of life over and 
over again following only an ancient goal (altes Ziel) of organic life, namely, 
the aim of returning to the inorganic. It is against this speculative background 
                                           
355 Deleuze 1968, 38/25.  
356 GW XIII, 38. 
357 GW XIII, 38. See also “‘Psychoanalyse’ und ‘Libidotheorie’” from 1923, where Freud 
repeats this view of the conservatism of drives: “für die Triebe die Charakteristik geben, 
sie seien der lebenden Substanz innewohnende Tendenzen zur Wiederherstellung eines 
frühere Zustandes, also historisch bedingt, konservativer Natur, und gleichsam der 
Ausdruck einer Trägheit oder Elastizität des Organischen” (GW XIII, 233). 
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that Freud propounds his notorious conclusion: “Das Ziel alles Lebens ist 
der Tod, und zurückgreifend: Das Leblose war früher da als das 
Lebende.”358 
Accordingly, we seem to be provided with a Freudian variation on the 
story of genesis: in the beginning, or rather before the beginning, there was 
inanimate, inorganic, and unstimulated matter; then came some sort of 
disturbance, which divided and diverted this pre-originary matter into the 
different detours of life pertaining to different animate organisms. Ever since 
this original disturbance, it has become increasingly difficult for the 
organisms to die insofar as life throughout its organic history has been forced 
into taking ever more complicated detours (Umwegen) on its way to its 
deathly end goal (Todeszieles);359 whereas death would have been in closer 
proximity to itself in the olden days.360 In other words, it would seem that 
organic life is nothing but an ‘original trauma,’ which repeatedly forces its 
traumatized organisms to travel along ever longer and more circuitous paths 
until finally they can regain their rest.361  
To begin with, Freud acknowledges that there are also drives—such as the 
drives for self-preservation, empowerment, and validation 
                                           
358 GW XIII, 40. To his regret, Freud admits that he has unwittingly led himself into what 
looks like a Schopenhauerian philosophy of life according to which death would be the 
sole principal and purpose of life (cf. GW XIII, 53). Yet, one could broaden the scope of 
this admittance and say that Freud inscribes himself into an ancient Western tradition in 
which death is considered to be the most essential object of thought. Ever since Socrates 
defined the true philosophers as those who ‘practice and prepare themselves for dying’ 
(Phae. 67e), the threads of mortality and humanity have been so intimately interwoven 
that an ars moriendi appears to be the prerequisite of any ars viviendi. Accordingly, it 
would seem that death is not only the end-goal but also the proper beginning of 
philosophical thought. Hegel appears to be suggesting something similar when, in the 
second part if his Enzyklopädie (1830), he recounts the life of spirit as arising from the 
death cry of nature: “Über diesem Tode der Natur, aus dieser todten Hülle geht eine 
schönere Natur, geht der Geist hervor” (HW 9, §376, 537). Novalis thus hits the mark 
when in his Philosophische Studien from 1797 he declares that: “Der echte 
philosophische Akt ist Selbsttötung; dies ist der reale Anfang aller Philosophie” (Novalis 
1946b, 337).  
359 Cf. GW XIII, 40–41. 
360 Cf. GW XIII, 40. In this regard, we might also recall Nietzshe’s warning in Die 
Fröliche Wissenschaft: “Hüten wir uns, zu sagen, dass Tod dem Leben entgegengesetzt 
sei. Das Lebende ist nur eine Art des Todten, und eine sehr seltene Art” (KSA 3, 468). 
361 Influenced by the ‘Hamletlehre,’ Lacan resumes this Freudian genesis as follows: “La 
vie ne songe qu’à se reposer le plus possible en attendant la mort. C’est ce qui mange le 
temps du nourrisson au début de son existence, par secteurs horaires qui ne lui laissent 
ouvrir qu’un petit oeil de temps en temps […]. La vie ne songe qu’à mourir—Mourir, 
dormir, rêver peut-être—comme a dit un certain monsieur, au moment précisément où il 
s’agissait de ça—to be or not to be” (Sem II, 272/233). 
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(Selbsterhaltungs-, Macht- und Geltungstriebe)—that seemingly contradict 
this verdict of an overall conservatism of the drives striving towards the 
restoration of a previous inorganic state in the guise of death. Yet, upon 
closer inspection, Freud comes to the conclusion that such contradiction is 
deceptive insofar as the actual aim of these supposedly progressive drives 
consists in warding off any improper, premature, and merely external causes 
of death with the purpose of leading each and every life along the proper 
path to a death of its own (den eigenen Todesweg).362 
Therefore, Freud’s final judgment is that these apparent guardians of life 
turn out to have been the original satellites of death (diese Lebenswächter 
sind ursprünglich Trabanten des Todes gewesen) orbiting around the 
organisms only in order to divert them from improper, inauthentic, and 
artificial ways of dying; that is to say, ways of dying that Freud calls short-
circuits, or literally short-cuts (Kurzschluß), because they avoid the detours 
of life, which have become necessary in order for the organisms to reach 
their proper and, if not imminent, then at least immanent deaths.  
It appears, then, that organic life is caught in a somewhat paradoxical 
situation, insofar as it must perpetually obstruct itself from reaching its aim 
of returning to an inorganic state—a return that, after the traumatic accident 
of life, can only be obtained through death—only in order to get there at what 
would be its appropriate time of arrival. In other words, in order not to reach 
its proper destination in an untimely manner—neither too hastily nor too 
belatedly—the organism must drive itself off the straight and shortest path 
and instead undertake a journey of ever more prolonged detours. As Derrida 
points out, however, the risk inherent to such “théorie du suicide en 
différé”363 is that the detour unto death might turn out to have been nothing 
but an impasse or a dead-end ceaselessly missing the proper exit of dying 
and thus turning the final destiny of life into an infinite destinerrance.364  
                                           
362 One cannot help but think here of Heidegger’s Sein-zum-tode, which is indeed an 
extremely complex thought, to which Heidegger gives the following structural definition: 
“Der Tod als Ende des Daseins ist die eigenste, unbezügliche, gewisse und als solche 
unbestimmte, unüberholbare Möglichkeit des Daseins” (GA 2, 258–259). 
363 CP, 379/356. 
364 This inherent risk of missing out on one’s proper death on the way to dying is concisely 
rendered by Blanchot in L’espace littéraire by his notion of a ‘double death.’ According 
to this notion, there are, at least, two deaths, “dont l’une circule dans les mots de 
possibilité, de liberté, qui a comme extrême horizon la liberté de mourir et le pouvoir de 
se risquer mortellement—et dont l’autre est l’insaisissable, ce que je ne puis saisir, qui 
n’est liée à moi par aucune relation d’aucune sorte, qui ne vient jamais, vers laquelle je 
ne me dirige pas” (EL, 104/103).  
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However, Freud implores us to join him in coming to our senses for, as he 
exclaims, “dem kann nicht so sein!”365 What about the sexual drives, for 
example—do they also follow the oldest end-goal of life? The aim of these 
seemingly procreative drives does not appear to be the proper death of each 
and every organism but, on the contrary, a sort of organic ‘immortality’ 
obtained through the coalescence (Verschmelzung) of individual organisms. 
To a certain extent, then, such coalescence allows an organism to survive 
its own death by exceeding itself in another organism, and thereby it 
prolongs organic life indefinitely through reproduction. Still, Freud reveals 
to us that the sexual drives are in fact also conservative or regressive by 
nature and that their ‘apparent immortality’ (Schein der Unsterblichkeit) is 
only an illusion obtained through the constant restoration of an earlier state 
of organic life.366 Hence, even if Freud inaugurates Chapter Six by granting 
that it is indeed beginning to look as though all drives are a striving for 
death—even those that appear to be the most life-affirming ones—
nevertheless it is also in this chapter that Freud articulates his altered duality 
of drives. 
Instead of the previous distinction between ego- and sexual drives, Freud 
now distinguishes between the so-called death- and life drives, which he also 
labels with the Greek autonyms of Eros and Thanatos. Initially, Freud tries 
to carry out a one-to-one translation of what was formerly known as the ego 
drives (Ichtrieben) into the death drives and the sexual drives into the life 
drives. However, seeing as it was precisely the discovery that some of the 
(conscious) ego drives could also be libidinal that brought him to revise his 
theory of drives in the first place, Freud forgoes such straightforward 
translation and instead tends towards subsuming both the ego- and the sexual 
drives under the rubric of life drives, since the apparent aim of both is to 
sustain life—whether the life of the individual, of the species, or organic life 
in general. As for the elusive death drive—which essentially works 
inconspicuously in silence367 but nonetheless betrays itself in the repetition 
compulsion—it comes to name everything that remains inexplicable through 
the purposefulness of either self-preservation or of the reproduction of the 
species, thus lending it a somewhat excessive yet irreducible quality. Yet, as 
we have already glimpsed, the opposition between Eros and Thanatos is not 
as simple as it may appear, since, as Hurst notes: “These drives not only 
oppose each other, but each is internally aporetic.”368 
                                           
365 GW XIII, 41. 
366 Cf. GW XIII, 46.  
367 In “Das Ich und das Es,” Freud remarks “daß die Todestriebe im wesentlichen stumm 
sind und der Lärm des Lebens meist vom Eros ausgeht” (GW XIII, 275).  
368 Hurst 2008, 48.  
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This internal aporia pertaining to each of the two drives stems from the fact 
that Eros seems to be driven both in the direction of narcissistic self-
preservation aiming at maintaining the equilibrium of the individual 
organism and in the direction of procreative proliferation constantly 
upsetting this individual equilibrium with the purpose of prolonging the 
species. Whereas Thanatos, as Hurst further points out, seems to involve 
“both an inertial resistance to a change of state, which serves self-
preservation, but also an entropic moment of destructiveness or dissolution, 
which lies at the basis of aggressivity.”369 Despite its regressive striving 
against any progressive transformation, then, Thanatos also appears to have 
the potential to interrupt or disrupt a continuous evolution, thereby creating 
the space for possibly discontinuous ‘revolutions’ that may in turn generate 
even more far-reaching or radical transformation.   
This duality of internally aporetic drives inscribes the living organism in 
a ‘hesitating rhythm’ (ein Zauderrhythmus) that constantly interrupts, defers, 
and diverts itself from achieving its aim. As Freud explains, one group of 
drives ‘forges ahead’ (stürmt nach vorwärts) in order to reach the fatal end-
goal of life as quickly as possible, while another group of drives strives to 
prolong the way of life by repeatedly returning the organism to an earlier 
stage wherefrom it must reenact its course all over again, but with the aim of 
making this life reach a proper death of its own.  
Freud then interrupts himself in order to once again consider the 
possibility of whether there might be drives that are not conservatively 
inclined but rather strive for a new condition that might be better than the 
previous one, that is to say, drives that are inclined towards the 
unprecedented. Yet Freud’s response to such hopeful consideration is 
discouraging: “Ein allgemeiner Trieb zur Höherentwicklung in der Tier- und 
Pflanzenwelt läßt sich gewiß nicht feststellen.”370 And we recall that this 
world of flora and fauna does not exclude the human being who, as we saw 
above, has been divested of its exceptional birthright. Therefore, Freud finds 
it advisable to relinquish any belief that a drive towards perfection (Trieb zur 
Vervollkommnung) might be at work in the human being, even if this belief 
may serve as a benevolent illusion (wohltuende Illusion).371  
In this regard, Freud even goes so far as to raise doubts about his own 
argument concerning a naturally authentic death immanent to the living 
organism, suggesting instead that such a conception of death is a late cultural 
acquisition that may be nothing but a benevolent illusion helping us to carry 
                                           
369 Hurst 2008, 49.  
370 GW XIII, 43. 
371 GW XIII, 44. 
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the gravity of contingent existence less heavily (um die Schwere des Daseins 
zu ertragen)372—the gravity, that is, of a life that we have now come to know 
as nothing but an accident of death, which, in turn, no longer adheres to the 
inherent lawfulness of necessity (Ἀνάγκη) but has been delivered over to the 
necessity of contingency, divesting it of its possibilities of self-
authentication or self-appropriation.373  
In these pages of the Jenseits, an instance of what Žižek has termed the 
“anti-Darwinian lesson of psychoanalysis” comes to the fore, which displays 
“man’s radical and fundamental dis-adaption, mal-adaption, to his 
environs.”374 Žižek continues by saying that this anti-Darwinian tendency is 
fundamentally human because, “[a]t its most radical, ‘being-human’ consists 
in an ‘uncoupling’ from immersion in one’s environs, in following a certain 
automatism which ignores the demands of adaptation—this is what the 
‘death drive’ ultimately amounts to.”375 Nevertheless, as Žižek further 
emphasizes, this automatism of the death drive following its own agenda 
irrespective of biological or rational predispositions of purposefulness is also 
what affords human existence (but only human existence?) with a certain 
irruptive space of autonomy. Žižek explains: “The ‘death drive’ means that 
the organism is no longer fully determined by its environs, that is 
‘explodes/implodes’ into a cycle of autonomous behavior.”376  
                                           
372 As Freud writes: “Ursprünglich ist er sicherlich nicht, den primitiven Völkern ist die 
Idee eines ‘natürlichen Todes’ fremd; sie führen jedes Sterben unter ihnen auf den Einfluß 
eines Feindes oder eines bösen Geistes zurück” (GW XIII, 47). Nietzsche would probably 
agree that such benevolent beliefs are ‘beautiful illusions’ (schönen Scheines/herrliche 
Illusion) but would probably not, like Freud, advice us to get rid of them insofar as they 
are the very artifacts that keep us “an der Wahrheit zu Grunde gehn” (KSA 13, 500). 
373 To a certain extent, this growing doubt concerning a death proper to the living 
organism approximates the fundamental disbelief of the unconscious in its own death, 
which Freud refers to in several other places. One such place is in Zeitgemässes über 
Krieg und Tod from 1915, where Freud writes that “unser Unbewußtes glaubt nicht an 
den eigenen Tod, es gebärdet sich wie unsterblich” (GW X, 350). However, even if the 
unconscious does not believe in its own death, it certainly believes in the death of the 
other, and, as Freud further writes: “unser Unbewußtes mordet selbst für Kleinigkeiten” 
(GW X, 351). 
374 Žižek 2006, 231. 
375 Žižek 2006, 231. Lacan takes up this anti-evolutionary tendency in Freud in his second 
seminar, remarking that “la notion de la tendance à la répétition en tant que drive est très 
explicitement opposée à l’idée qu’il y ait quoi que ce soit dans la vie qui tende au progrès, 
contrairement à la perspective de l’optimisme traditionnel, de l’évolutionnisme, ce qui 
laisse la problématique de l’adaption—et j’irai même jusqu’à dire celle de la réalité—
entièrement ouverte” (Sem II, 35/24).  
376 Žižek 2006, 231. 
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In other words, in all of its deferring detours, displacing diversions, and 
disruptions of organic life, the death drive—or perhaps rather the originary 
conflict of the drives377—is in fact that which opens up existence to its 
abyssal freedom in that it creates a possible space for the irruption of the 
unforeseeable, for the surprising, for the other. One might call this a 
psychoanalytic notion of freedom, which distinguishes itself from any sort 
of decisionism or voluntarism, just as its notion of autonomy is irreducible 
to the conceptions of willful intentions or deliberate choices. Rather, 
psychoanalytic autonomy and freedom designate holes or gaps in the texture 
of being, which disrupts its supposed continuity and causality and prevents 
us from ever achieving complete certainty regarding our own wants, will, or 
wishes or total transparency regarding the inclinations, intentions, or 
motivations for that which we presumably want, will, or wish for. In this 
respect, one could almost be tempted to read the death drive as another name 
for a certain epigenetics of genetics designating an opening to ruptures and 
alterations inherent to the genetic code or, as Lacan formulates it: “Il y a déjà 
chez lui [i.e. l’homme] une fêlure, une perturbation profonde de la régulation 
vitale.”378  
Accordingly, psychoanalysis insists that there is something other to 
human existence that remains irreducible to the conatus379—understood both 
as a disposition for self-preservation and a teleological inclination towards 
reproduction—not least because such explanatory reduction is insufficient 
when it comes to understanding many of the symptoms with which 
psychoanalysis is confronted in clinical experience. The psychoanalytic 
subject is not restlessly reducible to her instincts, needs, or desires, and 
psychoanalysis is therefore obligated to look elsewhere in the attempt to 
understand, or at least to take its subject matter into account. Hence, it just 
so happens that the death drive, as well as the It, can be read as an indication 
of such irreducible remainders of the existence of the psychoanalytic subject. 
In Žižek’s view, the paradox of the Freudian death drive is therefore “that 
it is Freud’s name for its very opposite, for the way immortality appears 
                                           
377 In a footnote of the Jenseits, Freud, in what almost sounds like an echo of the 
Heraclitian polemos, bespeaks such originary conflict as the “von Uranfang an 
miteinander ringenden Triebe” (GW XIII, 66). I am here referring to fragment 53 by 
Heraclitus, which begins by stating that “Strife is the father of all [Πόλεμος πάντων μὲν 
πατήρ ἐστι].” For a reading of Heraclitus’ fragment, see Heidegger’s lectures on 
Hölderlin’s Hymnen (GA 39, 125ff.)   
378 Sem II, 50/37.  
379 I borrow the concept of conatus from Spinoza’s Ethics, who gives it an important role 
in his psychology. As Spinoza explains in proposition 7: “The conatus with which each 
thing endeavors to persist in its own being is nothing but the actual essence of the thing 
itself” (Eth. 283). 
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within psychoanalysis, for an uncanny excess of life, for an ‘undead’ urge 
which persists beyond the (biological) cycle of life and death.”380 This 
excessive urge can be said to be neither good nor evil per se; if anything it 
would rather designate an abyssal freedom for both good and evil, which 
itself would be beyond good or evil as it would be beyond the economy of 
pleasure and unpleasure.381 Žižek’s reading of the death drive as an immortal 
drive naming its own opposite is indebted to Lacan’s invigorating return to 
Freud and especially to his conceptual distinction between ‘desire’ (désir) 
and ‘drive’ (pulsion).382  
In my view, the Lacanian distinction by no means resolves the conflict of 
drives in Freud, but it does clarify this aporetic conflict in its irresolution—
or in its insolvency, as Derrida puts it. We shall therefore make a small 
digression here, in order to see whether and how Lacan’s displacement of 
this conflictual discussion—from a context of life and death drives striving 
within a dialectical economy of pleasure to one of what we might term 
aneconomic drives and economic desires—might help us to further unravel 
this knotted complex of internally aporetic drives which Freud appears to 
have left to his readers.383  
 
 
III.6 A LACANIAN DIGRESSION ON DESIRES AND DRIVES  
To put it as succinctly as possible, we can say that Lacan’s conceptual 
distinction between drives and desires concerns at least two interrelated 
differences: on the one hand, a difference regarding the object relation and, 
                                           
380 Žižek 2006, 62.  
381 Had this thesis been otherwise, it would have been compelling and, I think, proliferent 
to engage more thoroughly with a reading together/apart of both a Schellingian and a 
Nietzschean notion of freedom with this indication of a psychoanalytic notion of freedom, 
that is to say, a freedom that is neither strictly autonomous, in the usual sense of this term, 
nor strictly heteronomous, but which rather call their very oppositionality into question.  
382 In Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse from 1964 for instance, 
Lacan asserts that “C’est la libido, en tant que pur instinct de vie c’est-à-dire de vie 
immortelle, de vie irrépressible, de vie qui n’a besoin, elle, d’aucun organe, de vie 
simplifiée et indestructible” (Sem XI, 180/198). However, as Lacan further emphasizes, 
such pure life instinct is a myth akin to the myth of the cosmic ‘body without organs’ of 
the Timaeus. In turn, Lacan invents his own myth more fitting to his psychoanalytic 
context, which he calls ‘Le mythe de la lamelle,’ and which he offers as a sort of counter-
myth to Aristophanes’ myth of the complete human being prior to sexual differentiation. 
Cf. Sem XI, 197–199/179–181. 
383 According to Laplanche and Pontalis, the concept of the repetition compulsion 
“reflects all the hesitations, the dead ends and even the contradictions of Freud’s 
speculative hypotheses. This is one of the reasons why the discussion of the repetition 
compulsion is so confused” (Laplanche and Pontalis 1973, 78). 
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on the other hand, a difference of repetition. Whereas desire operates within 
a dialectical economy that reproduces lack and loss only in order to 
perpetually return to itself, drives operate in aneconomical movements of 
excess and expenditure without return that cannot be reintegrated into the 
economy of symbolic (un)pleasure but rather throw spanners into its works.  
According to Lacan, desire is constituted by a fundamental loss of object 
emerging as the inaccessible residue of an originary cut (coupure) that 
instigates the subject as always already divided in itself. We shall return to 
this originary cut in more detail in the next chapter, but for now our focus 
will be the status of this lost object—which Lacan names objet a and which 
“n’est en fait que la présence d’un creux, d’un vide, occupable, nous dit 
Freud, par n’importe quel objet”384—and its opaque function with respect to 
both desires and drives.  
 Desire sustains itself by continually trying to cover over the wound left 
behind by the originally lost object, which opens the subject to its ‘own’ 
desire, which, as we have seen, is always the desire of the other in the double 
genitive. As such desire continually ‘transport’ its imaginary objects into the 
symbolic order by metaphorically substituting one signifier with another in 
the place of the void left behind by this originary loss, which they will never 
succeed in filling, and metonymously displacing them in a signifying chain 
that never reaches closure.385 In Lacan’s view, then, “un fantasme qui est en 
réalité le soutien du désir, ou un leurre.”386 Consequently, desire always 
                                           
384 Sem XI, 164/180.  
385 It would be too demanding in terms of space and time to go into detail about Lacan’s 
psychoanalytic employment of the linguistic terms ‘metaphor’ and ‘metonomy.’ Suffice 
it to say here that Lacan transposes, while at the same time displacing, Freud’s laws of 
the primary processes of the unconscious, condensation (Verdichtung), and displacement 
(Verschiebung), to the unconscious laws of language fuelled by metaphor and metonomy. 
Hence, in L’éthique de la psychanalyse from 1959–60 Lacan writes: “L’inconscient, nous 
ne le saisissons en fin de compte que dans son explication, dans ce qui en est articulé de 
ce qui se passe en paroles. C’est de là que nous avons le droit—et ce, d’autant plus que la 
suite de la découverte freudienne nous le montre—de nous apercevoir que cet inconscient 
n’a lui-même pas d’autre structure au dernier terme qu’une structure de langage” (Sem 
VII, 42/32). See also, “L’instance de la lettre dans l’inconscient” from 1957, where Lacan 
explains that “le mot à mot de cette connexion que s’appuie la métonymie” whereas “la 
métaphore se place au point précis où le sens se produit dans le non-sens” (Écrits, 423; 
508/421; 506). 
386 Sem XI, 169/186. This symbolic production of meaning to a certain extent resembles 
Derrida’s notion of the supplement, which, as he explains in De la grammatologie, has a 
double signification: On the one hand, the supplement signifies merely an addendum or 
a surplus, which in principle should be dispensable and superfluous to the essence of 
whatever it serves as a supplement. On the other hand, however, the supplement also 
functions as a compensation or a replacement that marks a lack or an emptiness in 
147 
 
returns to the same empty place, which it tries to fill in with different 
surrogate objects that will never appear satisfying because they will never be 
able to undo the original lack for which they are always too late to 
compensate. As Lacan puts it, “les objets ne sont jamais ça”387—and here we 
should recall here that ça is Lacan’s translation of the Freudian Es. 
Passing over to the drives, then, no object will ever be satisfying for them 
either. Yet, the peculiar non-satisfaction of the drives does not arise because 
their object is fundamentally lacking, but rather because the drives actually 
attain their satisfaction in not attaining their object.388 Hence, whereas desire 
gets fixated on its different imaginary objects, unsatisfyingly substituting for 
a fundamental lack of object, for the drive it is the objects of fixation that are 
of significance but rather the fixation itself. Lacan therefore underlines that 
the aim and the goal of the drive do not coincide since the aim of drives is 
the unending metonymic displacement of objects as such and not its 
replaceable objects: “Pour ce qui est de l’objet dans la pulsion, qu’on sache 
bien qu’il n’a, à proprement parler, aucune importance. Il est totalement 
indifferent.”389  
Whereas desire experiences the metonymy of objects as perpetual failures, 
failures which nonetheless keep the engine of desire going, the drive can be 
successful for exactly the same reason that desire fails; the drive is the 
enjoyment (jouissance) of the failure of desire, which is why the Lacanian 
notion of enjoyment cannot be construed within the economy of the pleasure 
principle. Rather, jouissance exceeds not only the pleasure principle but also 
the very opposition between pleasure and unpleasure; it is an unpleasurable 
pleasure, or a pleasure of unpleasure.390 Lacan’s formula for the joyous 
                                           
whatever it serves to supplement, whereby it “intervient ou s’insinue à-la-place-de; s’il 
comble, c’est comme on comble un vide. S’il représente et fait image, c’est par le défaut 
antérieur d’une présence” (G, 208/145). In this sense, one could say that every imaginary 
object of desire, supposedly desired in, as, and for itself, also serves as a supplement 
marking that something is lacking in the symbolic order of desire.  
387 Sem II, 261/223.  
388 In the French text, Lacan writes that “la pulsion, d’atteindre sa satisfaction sans 
atteindre son but” (Sem XI, 163/179), and then remarks that the French but can be 
translated by both the English terms ‘goal’ and ‘aim’ (cf. Sem XI, 163/179). Lacan’s 
distinction between the goal and the aim, implied in the ambiguity of the but of the drive, 
to a certain extent reduplicates the Freudian distinction between the object (Objekt), 
which is partial, and the aim (Ziel), which is more general. Thus, In Triebe und 
Triebschicksale from 1925, Freud writes that: “Das Objekt des Triebes ist dasjenige, an 
welchem oder durch welches der Trieb sein Ziel erreichen kann. Es ist das variabelste am 
Triebenicht ursprünglich mit ihm verknüpft, sondern ihm nur infolge seiner Eignung zur 
Ermöglichung der Befriedigung zugeordnet” (GW X, 215). 
389 Sem XI, 153/168. 
390 On this point, see Buckner 2015, 1-16. 
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movement of the drive therefore becomes ‘la pulsion en fait le tour,’ which 
is tricky to translate since, as Miller explicates in a footnote to the English 
translation, it plays on the double meaning both of ‘the drive turns around 
the object’ and ‘the drive tricks the object’391—or, adding a third possibility, 
one might say that ‘the drive turns tricks on the object.’ In other words, for 
the drive the object-goal is nothing but a stalking-horse facilitating its aim, 
which is why the real reason for the apparent inhibition of the drives with 
regard to their aim (zielgehemmten) in Freud, according to Lacan, is that its 
actual aim consists precisely in the continual deferral of its object in order to 
repeat its perpetual detour around it indefinitely.392  
What drives the drives is therefore neither the goal of attaining some 
specific object nor the saturation of some specific need, but rather, as 
Lagache has suggested, a need of repetition.393 The Lacanian twist on the 
Freudian insight that the drive remains “ohne Aussicht, den Prozeß 
abschließen und das Ziel erreichen zu können”394 therefore appears to be that 
the unattainability of its goal is the very aim of the drive causing it to repeat 
itself compulsively.  
Hence, we can say that within the order of desire the object is experienced 
as originally lacking, wherefore satisfaction will never be attained but only 
                                           
391 Cf. Sem XI, 153/168. 
392 Cf. GW X, 215. 
393 In more than one place, Lagache suggests that a distinction between a repetition of 
needs (répétition des besoins) and a need of repetition (besoin de répétition) is implicitly 
at work in Freud’s writings. See, for instance, Lagache 1982, 266. Even if Lacan takes up 
Lagache’s ‘géniale’ distinction of repetitions (cf. Sem X, 110/93), which to a certain 
extent echoes his own distinction between desire and drive, he still insists on maintaining 
a distinction between need (besoin), which is related both to what Freud calls need (Not) 
and instinct (Instinkt), on the one hand, and drive (pulsion), which is related to Freud’s 
Trieb on the other. Most importantly, drive is associated with the death drive, which as 
we saw above, liberates psychoanalysis from a biologistic discourse of instinctual needs 
such as “la finalité de la reproduction” (Sem XI, 138/150), which is exactly why “c’est 
justement parce qu’aucun objet d’aucun Not, besoin, ne peut satisfaire la pulsion” (Sem 
XI, 153/167). Furthermore, for Lacan both desire and drive differ from need because of 
their structuration by an essential unsatisfaction through objects. A need such as thirst, 
for example, may be satisfied by a drink of water, whereas both desires and drives remain 
either perpetually unsatisfied by their object or utterly indifferent to it with respect to its 
satisfaction. Lacan is therefore critical of the English translation in the Standard Edition 
of Trieb as ‘instinct’ and Triebhafte as ‘instinctual’ (cf. Sem XI, 49/49). Nevertheless, as 
we have seen, Lacan at times employs the term ‘instinct’ himself, for instance in his 
L’ethique de la psychanalyse, where both l’instinct de mort and la pulsion de mort appear 
in reference to Freud’s Todestrieb, but I will not speculate upon Lacan’s criteria for 
employing one or the other term in different contexts here.  
394 GW XIII, 45. 
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postponed indefinitely, whereas within the order of the drive the object is 
nothing but the void around which it can turn and enjoy itself in its perpetual 
turning tricks.395 Contrary to desire, then, which is fuel by bereavement and 
loss, the drives have no concern for death, but rather testify to a certain 
excessive infinity of the finite, lending it, as Freud has it, a ‘Schein der 
Unsterblichkeit.’ Furthermore, the drives concern themselves neither with 
origins nor results; their only concern is the constancy or the ‘konstante 
Kraft’ of their repetition,396 which remains without beginning or end. Or, as 
Lacan explains it: “L’objet petit a n’est pas l’origine de la pulsion orale. Il 
n’est pas introduit au titre de la primitive nourriture, il est introduit de ce fait 
qu’aucune nourriture ne satisfera jamais la pulsion orale, si ce n’est à 
contourner l’objet éternellement manquant.”397  
Hence, whereas the originally lost object remains both the cause and the 
support of desire and its insatiable repetitions, the repetitive circuiting of the 
eternally lacking object remains the very enjoyment of the drives. We shall 
return to the question of such differential repetition shortly, but in view of 
the distinction between desires and drives with which we are presently 
engaged, allow me to end this Lacanian digression with a further digression 
concerning the critical and often conflictual relationship between followers 
of Deleuze and Guattari and ‘disciples’ of Lacan.  
 
 
III.7 DOES ONE EXCLUDE THE OTHER?  
Despite the fact that a prevalent tendency in the scholarly world of reading 
the Deleuzian-Guattarian experimentations of thinking against, in contrast, 
or even in opposition to Lacan’s psychoanalytic teachings, one must still 
wonder about the validity of such tendency even when reading the 
supposedly most ‘anti-psychoanalytic’ book of them all; L’anti-Œdipe from 
1972/1973. Referrals to Lacan and Lacanian subject matter in L’anti-Œdipe 
are abundant; however, we perhaps somewhat surprisingly find that the great 
majority of these referrals are explicitly affirmative towards Lacanian 
revisions of psychoanalysis. Moreover, when the comments are critical, or 
indeed repudiating, they appear to be directed at those whom the authors 
repeatedly refer to as ‘disciples’ of Lacan rather than at Lacan himself.398 In 
other words, even if there can be no priest without a band of disciples, and 
                                           
395 Cf. Žižek 1997, 84. 
396 Cf. GW X, 212. 
397 Sem XI, 164/180. 
398 Cf. Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1973, 62/53; 99/83; 110/92. 
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even if Lacan’s texts undoubtedly have a certain clerical style,399 when 
reading Deleuze and Guattari it would still appear that it is Lacan’s disciples 
that have made him into a psychoanalytic ‘priest of lack’ by re-oedipalizing 
the discourse of his texts, despite the fact that Lacan’s graphs rarely have a 
triangulate structure.400 
In view of what we have seen so far regarding the conceptual difference 
between desire and drive, however, it might be that, when read solely from 
the viewpoint of symbolic desire, Lacan may be regarded as an irredeemable 
priest who raises lack to the high place of sacrifice.401 Yet, once one makes 
an effort to hear what is being said when Lacan speaks about the real of the 
drives, such a reading begins to appear problematic, and one is urged to ask 
whether a lack is really all there is to say on the matter of the Lacanian 
discourse. This question becomes particularly acute when one considers the 
development of Lacan’s teachings from the late 1950s onwards, in the course 
of which the real of the drives in their repetitive resistance to desire appears 
to take on an ever more dominating role behind the scenes of the symbolic 
stage of psychoanalysis. If lack really does constitute the transcendental 
signifier directing the totality of Lacanian discourse from an irreplaceable 
position of presence elsewhere,402 what, then, are we to make of Lacan’s 
                                           
399 In “Le facteur de la vérité,” Derrida takes aim at this priestly tone of Lacan’s discourse 
by installing a pointedly ironic passage from Baudelaire as his motto for reading Lacan’s 
text on Poe’s The Purloined Letter, thus insinuating that Lacan presents himself as the 
truthsayer par excellence of the last truth that there is no truth. The passage reads: “Ils le 
remercient pour les grandes vérités qu’il vient de proclamer,—car ils ont découvert (ô 
vérificateurs de ce qui ne peut être vérifié!) que tout ce qu’il a énoncé est absolument 
vrai;—bien que d’abord, avouent ces braves gens, ils aient eu le soupçon que ce pouvait 
bien être une simple fiction. Poe répond que pour son compte, il n’en a jamais douté” 
(CP, 441/413). 
400 Deleuze and Guattari explain their understanding of the figure of the priest, of which 
the psychoanalyst is the most recent appearance: “Chaque fois que le désir est trahi, 
maudit, arraché à son champ d’immanence, il y a un prêtre là-dessous” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1980, 191/154). In this regard, one could undoubtedly argue that Deleuze and 
Guattari’s approach to Lacan is more critical of Lacan in 1980 than in 1972.  
401 Despite the fact that he recognizes the differing registers of desire and drive, Hägglund, 
for example, appears to be reading Lacan in this—in my view too one-sided—manner 
when in Radical Atheism he writes that in the Lacanian schema “the lack of fullness is 
not called into question but is located at the root of both desire and drive” (Hägglund 
2008, 193). 
402 On my reading, one of Derrida’s most crucial points in “Le Facteur de la vérité” is 
precisely that Lacan raises the Phallus, which is the lacking object par excellence, to a 
privileged ‘transcendental position’ from where it makes possible and organizes the entire 
series of Lacanian terms, of which it itself is a part, while also accounting for them. 
Derrida’s charge is therefore that Lacan hypostasizes lack as the truth of being, and 
absence as the truth of presence, and, as such, does not challenge the fundamental 
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statements concerning the ‘lack of lack’ in the real? If lack were really the 
final word on and in the corpus of Lacan, how then are we to read and try to 
understand the repeated “ça ne manque pas,”403 which clearly stands in some 
kind of relation with the ‘ne sont jamais ça’ of desire, and which, as we shall 
see in more detail in Chapter V, gives rise to anxiety in the desiring subject?  
Yet, stating that there is no lack in the real does not automatically turn it 
into a statement of pure presence. Instead, Lacan insists that the real is that 
which remains irreducible to the oppositional play of presence and absence 
according to which a presence can only arise as a supplement to an original 
lack. These games of fort:da are precisely what constitutes the order of the 
symbolic, which is where desire thrives in a “succession d’absences et de 
précences, ou plutôt de la présence sur fond d’absence, de l’absence 
constituée par le fait qu’une présence peut exister.” By contrast, however, 
Lacan continues, “[i]l n’y a pas d’absence dans le reel. Il n’y a pas d’absence 
que si vous suggérez qu’il peut y avoir une présence là où il n’y en a pas 
[…]. C’est la contradiction originelle du 0 et du 1.”404  
The question therefore remains whether or not Lacan’s discourse, which 
is indeed full of gaps, lacks, and holes, might also provide space for an 
opening toward a thinking of a pure excess and expenditure, which is neither 
present nor absent but which lacks nothing. A purity of expenditure, which, 
from the viewpoint of desire sustaining itself by lack and obsessed with its 
own bereavement, might look like nothing but suicide. From the non-fixated 
yet blindly fascinated gaze of the drives, however, which has regard for 
neither death nor lack because it has no regard for identity, the movement of 
excessive expenditure is nothing but an enjoyment that remains indifferent 
to its object as well as its subject.  
                                           
oppositional schema of metaphysics to which he claims to be in opposition. Cf. CP, 
505ff./477ff. 
403 Sem X, 67/54.  
404 Sem II, 359/313. Lacan’s discussion of this originary contradiction between 0 and 1 is 
strongly influenced by Frege’s number theory as developed in Die Grundlagen der 
Arithmetik from 1884. Here Frege employs zero to designate the concept, or rather the 
non- or limit-concept, of that which is not identical with itself (0 ist die Anzahl, welche 
dem Begriffe ‘sich selbst ungleich’ zukommt). Zero designates both the class under which 
nothing falls, that is, no elements, but also the concept under which nothing falls, and this 
non-identical nothing of the zero conditions the emergence of the units in the sequence 
of natural numbers. Yet, if the zero is the first class characterized by no elements, then 
the one actually comes to be second in the place of the zero, which therefore makes place 
for number two in the place of the third, etc. In other words, the meaningful unities of the 
natural numbers would not make sense without their implicit referral to the prior 
withdrawal of the non-identical and meaningless zero that they originally come to replace. 
Cf. Frege 1884, 86–91.   
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In the first line of the closing passage of his eleventh seminar, Lacan writes: 
“Le désir de l’analyse n’est pas un désir pur. C’est un désir d’obtenir la 
différence absolue.”405 This statement indicates that the psychoanalyst 
Lacan—notwithstanding the many differences setting them apart—might 
after all share at least one impure desire with the schizoanalysts Deleuze and 
Guattari. Namely, the desire to liberate desire from its fixation on imaginary 
objects, to free it towards the deterritorializing ‘lines of flight’ perpetually 
drawn by what Deleuze and Guattari refer to as desiring machines but which 
in Lacan would be more in line with the drives. In other words, Lacan, in 
some places at least, appears to share the desire of Deleuze and Guattari to 
liberate desire to a joy “qui n’implique aucun manque, aucune impossibilité, 
qui ne se mesure pas davantage au plaisir, puisque c’est cette joie qui 
distribuera les intensités de plaisir et les empêchera d’être pénétrées 
d’angoisse, de honte, de culpabilité.”406   
That Deleuze and Guattari are not blind to such a shared impure desire 
with Lacan can be seen from a significant footnote in L’anti-Œdipe inserted 
at the end of a critical passage contesting the tendency of psychoanalysis to 
reduce desire to lack. In spite of the possible confusion that might arise from 
the fact that Deleuze and Guattari maintain the notion of desire or desiring-
machine where Lacan would have probably employed the term drive, let us 
still read the passage in full:  
 
Le désir ne manque de rien, il ne manque pas de son objet. C’est plutôt le sujet qui 
manque au désir, ou le désir qui manque de sujet fixe; il n’y a de sujet fixe que par 
la répression. Le désir et son objet ne font qu’un, c’est la machine, en tant que 
machine de machine. Le désir est machine, l’objet du désir est encore machine 
connectée, si bien que le produit est prélevé sur du produire, et que quelque chose 
se détache du produire au produit, qui va donner un reste au sujet nomade et 
vagabond.407  
 
Following this corrective of what they take to be a prevalent tendency in 
psychoanalysis towards fixation on an object in avoidance of a fundamental 
lack, which has the consequence of reducing and restricting desire, Deleuze 
and Guattari insert a footnote indicating that Lacanian psychoanalysis might 
not succumb to such fixation—or at least not unequivocally so. Rather it 
                                           
405 Sem XI, 248/276.  
406 Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 192/155. As Deleuze and Guattari are keenly aware, this 
freeing of desire is never guaranteed a ‘happy ending.’ There is both creativity and 
destruction in freeing, and each line of flight implies possibilities of both joyous surprises 
as well as terrible risks, which can turn “qui fait de la ligne de fuite une ligne de mort.” 
(Deleuze and Guattari 1980, 280/229)  
407 Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1973, 34/26. 
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would seem that the authors see Lacan as a possible proponent of the free 
distribution of desiring machines when they note that: 
 
L’admirable théorie du désir chez Lacan nous semble avoir deux pôles: l’un par 
rapport à ‘l’objet petit-a’ comme machine désirante, qui définit le désir par une 
production réelle, dépassant toute idée de besoin et aussi de fantasme; l’autre par 
rapport au ‘grand Autre’ comme signifiant, qui réintroduit une certaine idée de 
manque.408  
 
To this remark by Deleuze and Guattari that Lacan’s text appears to oscillate 
between these two poles, which aligns well with the analysis proposed here, 
we would only add that this oscillation could be read as corresponding to 
another oscillation in Lacan’s text, which we have outlined above, that is, 
the oscillation between desire and drives. 
Viewed from the perspective of the Zauderrhythmus of the Freudian 
antagonism between life- and death drives, we might now say that for Lacan 
every drive is a death drive insofar as it designates the excessive expenditure 
of desire from which the subject of desire does not return to itself. Hence, 
whereas the satisfaction of desire would also mean its death, such satisfied 
death would leave the drive unsatisfied insofar as its enjoyment is the infinite 
repetition of difference. Paradoxically, then, one could say that desire faces 
its mortality in the immortality of the drive’s surviving all the many ‘little 
deaths’ of desire. Lacan explains: “Si la pulsion peut être satisfaite sans avoir 
atteint ce qui, au regard d’une totalisation biologique de la fonction, serait la 
satisfaction à sa fin de reproduction, c’est qu’elle est pulsion partielle, et que 
son but n’est point autre chose que ce retour en circuit.”409  
 
 
III.8 A Trembling of the Duality of Drives  
Returning to Freud after these Lacanian digressions, we begin to discern a 
certain ambiguity of automatism and autonomy pertaining to the notion of 
drive. On the one hand, we have seen that this ambiguity appears to threaten 
the autonomy of the I with collapsing into the automatism of the It. On the 
other hand, however, it was also indicated that the automatism might rather 
be on the side of the desiring I in its fixation on objects and obedience to the 
commandments of the pleasure principle, whereas the disruptive death drive 
seems to take on an autonomous force. We must therefore inquire further 
into the relation between the autonomous and the automatic not least in 
respect to the autos figuring in both.   
                                           
408Deleuze and Guattari 1972/1973, 34/27. 
409 Sem XI, 163/179.  
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In retrospect, then, the very first paragraph of the Jenseits, which 
unhesitatingly asserts the automatic regulation of all psychic processes by 
the pleasure principle,410 lets us suspect that Freud himself might already 
have suspected a more intimate—but for that reason also more estranged—
relation between the life drives and the death drives. On this view, it could 
therefore appear as though Freud was weaving together the life and the death 
drives from the very outset into an interlacing resembling the one Derrida in 
his reading of Freud and elsewhere calls “la vie la mort.”411 Nevertheless, 
Freud is determined to distinguish himself from Jung and other 
psychoanalyst working in accordance with a monistic conception of the 
psyche determined solely by libidinal or sexual drives by repeatedly 
emphasizing that his understanding of the psychic economy has been 
dualistic from the very beginning. Furthermore, the introduction of the life 
and death drives has only fortified this dualism, which is now “schärfer denn 
zuvor.”412  
Yet, one cannot help but wonder why Freud finds this emphatic insistence 
upon the rigid duality of drives necessary at a point where it seems to have 
become exceedingly difficult to disentangle Eros from Thanatos. Could it be 
that Freud’s writing is driven by the wishful dream that one of these dualistic 
drives is derivable from the other, or, perhaps even more wishful, the dream 
of an original duality pertaining to one and the same principle in their very 
opposition?413 Moreover, could this wishful dream perhaps be nurtured by 
the scientific desire of Freud the analyst, who wants to take everything apart 
in order to be able to identify its most simple components since, as Derrida 
                                           
410 Cf. GW XIII, 3. 
411 Cf. CP, 278/259; 280/262; 291/273.   
412 Cf. GW XIII, 57. 
413 We might note here that, in order to save Eros from total overshadowing by Thanatos, 
thereby also saving his duality of drives, Freud seeks refuge in a myth which, despite its 
phantastic and unscientific nature, may help him in his effort to solve his “Gleichung mit 
zwei Unbekannten” (GW XIII, 62). The myth recounted by the poet–philosopher 
Aristophanes in Plato’s Symposium traces the drive of Eros back, not to an inorganic 
death-like state, but to a far more romantic unity before humankind were split in two, 
which it ceaselessly tries to restore. As it turns out, however, even in this original unity 
“Alles an diesen Menschen war aber doppelt” (GW XIII, 62). In view of Aristophanes 
myth of Eros, Freud therefore asks whether we dare assume that all life is animated only 
in and by division (GW XIII, 63). Yet, once again Freud recoils from pursuing this 
venture with no explanation other than: “Ich glaube, es ist hier die Stelle, abzubrechen” 
(GW XIII, 63). We, however, shall return to the question of originary division more than 
once in the following chapters.  
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reminds us in Mal d’archive, “[t]out serait simple s’il y avait un principe ou 
deux principes.”414  
It would certainly appear that such a dream is at play when Freud 
wishfully exclaims: “Wenn es uns gelänge, diese beiden Polaritäten in 
Beziehung zu einander zu bringen, die eine auf die andere 
zurückzuführen!”415 Because being able to transfer both driving forces back 
to one original principle would actually mean that principally one drive 
would no longer be different from the other (prinzipiell nichts anderes),416 
and Freud could thereby have identified this unified origin with the pleasure 
principle. Yet, as the Jenseits testifies to, such an endeavor proves more 
difficult than Freud might have hoped, and no matter how far back Freud 
attempts to trace the purity of the pleasure principle (all the way back to 
unicellular organisms) as the supposedly primary and original principle 
(ἄρχων), it still seems to have been duplicitous from its very beginnings. 
Hence, whereas it was the compulsion to repeat that initially led Freud to 
the hypothesis of a beyond of the pleasure principle in Chapter Three, and 
thereafter to the tracing (Aufspürung) of a death drive impervious to the 
interdiction of pleasure in Chapters Five and Six, things begin to change 
towards the end of Chapter Six. For now, the death drive no longer appears 
to be simply impervious to the pleasure principle but rather begins to look 
like its precondition. This chance comes about because, as we saw, the 
pleasure principle is oriented either towards an increase of pleasure or a 
decrease of unpleasure, both attained by a lowering of tension in the 
organism; whereas the death drive is the urging forward towards a proper 
death with the purpose of restoring an earlier state of the organism. We also 
saw, however, that the pleasure principle in fact turned out to be a tendency 
operating in the service of an originary function of binding, the purpose of 
which is precisely to keep the level of excitation in the psychic apparatus as 
stable and as a low as possible—or even to entirely extinguish excitation 
(überhaupt erregungslos zu machen).417  
Furthermore, Freud acknowledges that the binding function served by the 
pleasure principle testifies to the most general striving of all living beings, 
namely, to return to the peace and quiet of an immemorial past ‘before’ the 
noisiness of life which, after its originary accident, can only be restored in 
death.418 Therefore, Freud is compelled to question, whether the absolute 
                                           
414 MA, 12/1. 
415 GW XIII, 57–58. 
416 Cf. GW XIII, 59. 
417 Cf. GW XIII, 68. 
418 Hence, Freud writes about “dem allgemeinsten Streben alles Lebenden, zur Ruhe der 
anorganischen Welt zurückzukehren” (GW XIII, 68). 
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lack of excitation and thus the ultimate decrease of tension in the living 
organism is not equal to death. Yet, if such were the case, would that not 
make death the greatest pleasure of life? It certainly does begin to look as if 
a pure and unrestricted pleasure may be experienced only when nobody is 
left to experience it.419  
In the very last chapter, then, the tables appear to have been overturned 
and the place of power to have been displaced seeing as, in strict contrast to 
his initial hypothesis of the authority of the pleasure principle in psychic life, 
Freud now writes: “Das Lustprinzip scheint geradezu im Dienste der 
Todestriebe zu stehen.”420 However, this overturning does not mean that the 
death drive has simply replaced the pleasure principle since, as indicated 
above, the death drive is a calling into question of the very place of 
principality. This means that the pleasure principle, which at the beginning 
of the text was said to automatically regulate all psychic processes, now 
appears to be preconditioned by that which exceeds all principles from the 
very outset, that is to say, by the anarchic.421 Hence, as Derrida suggests, we 
seem to have ended up “dans un domaine sans domaine où la recherche du 
propre, loi des lois et loi sans loi, excède toutes les oppositions et par 
excellence celle de la vie et de la mort.”422 In other words, one thing is to say 
that the death drive is that which is beyond the regulation of law, but another 
thing is to say that the law regulates in service of that which exceeds it. 
At this point, it is difficult to avoid a certain sense of vertigo and perhaps 
a certain desire to set the tables straight as we are approaching the end of the 
                                           
419 Freud himself remarks on the affinity between the achievement of sexual pleasure and 
the extinction of excitation: “Wir haben alle erfahren, daß die größte uns erreichbare Lust, 
die des Sexualaktes, mit dem momentanen Erlöschen einer hochgesteigerten Erregung 
verbunden ist” (GW XIII, 68). Three years later, in “Das Ich und das Es,” Freud renders 
the affinity between sexual satisfaction and death even more explicitly when he writes: 
“Daher die Ähnlichkeit des Zustandes nach der vollen Sexualbefriedigung mit dem 
Sterben, bei niederen Tieren das Zusammenfallen des Todes mit dem Zeugungsakt” (GW 
XIII, 276). It is probably not haphazardly, then, that Bataille in Les larmes d’Éros 
employs the notion of ‘la petite mort’ to emphasize the resemblance of the orgasm of a 
living organism to its death. Cf. Bataille 1987, 590–598. 
420 GW XIII, 69. 
421 Regarding the ‘anarchic,’ I am more or less following Schürmann’s understanding of 
this term when, in Des hégémonies brisées, he writes: “L’arché n’est pas tout à elle-
même. Elle est anarchique, par un acte d’altérité qui la trouble. L’anarchisme 
phénoménologique résulte toujours d’un différend originaire entre conditions” 
(Schürmann 1996, 210/164). 
422 CP, 419/393. In L’éthique de la psychanalyse, Lacan points to a similar anarchy of the 
death drive when he poses the question: “Qu’est que l’instinct de mort? Qu’est-ce que 
cette sorte de loi au-delà de toute loi, qui ne peut se poser que comme d’une structure 
dernière, d’un point de fuite de toute réalité possible à atteindre?” (Sem VII, 29/21) 
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text. Unfortunately, however, Freud provides us no such relief, and the end 
of the Jenseits will not bring closure to itself—as Freud himself remarks, it 
will bring only an “im Grunde nicht einfachen Ergebnis.”423 Finally, then, 
this not uncomplicated outcome will leave the problem of determining the 
relation between the pleasure principle and the repetition compulsion 
unresolved (noch ungelöst).424 
 
 
III.9 A (COUNTER-)RHYTHMICAL NACHSPIEL  
Four years after the publication of the Jenseits, in “Das ökonomische 
Problem des Masochismus,” Freud once again returns to the unresolved 
economic problem of pleasure and unpleasure in relation to the erotic and 
thanatic drives. In 1924, Freud discerns that the economic problem cannot 
be resolved with reference to mere quantity, that is, by referring pleasure and 
unpleasure respectively to a decrease and an increase of tension, insofar as 
both pleasurable excitations of tension and unpleasurable relaxations of 
tension occur in the psychic apparatus. Accordingly, the key to 
understanding the economic relation between pleasure and unpleasure in 
relation to the life and death drives must be sought elsewhere than in their 
quantitative features, wherefore Freud reasons that there must also be some 
qualitative distinction involved in these movements of decrease and increase 
that decide whether the tensions are experienced as pleasurable or 
unpleasurable.  
Even though Freud still claims that his view on the psychic drives is 
fundamentally dualistic, this dualism has now become even more 
indistinguishable than it already was in 1920 and the drives only seem to 
come about in a more or less confused mixture (Triebvermischung). Since 
the solution to the problematic economy of drives can no longer be found 
through mere quantitative measurements of their level of tension, Freud goes 
on to ponder whether the missing distinction might have something to do 
with their temporality: “Vielleicht ist es der Rhythmus, der zeitliche Ablauf 
in den Veränderungen, Steigerungen und Senkungen der Reizquantität wir 
wissen es nicht.”425  
This reference to rhythm refers us back to the Zauderrhythmus of the 
Jenseits, and to what Derrida with great clarity demonstrates in his reading 
of this text. That is, it brings us back to how repetition operates in the 
Jenseits, not only as an explicit topic of various forms—playful, traumatic, 
                                           
423 GW XIII, 68. 
424 Cf. GW XIII, 67. 
425 GW XIII, 372. 
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compulsive, dreamy, daemonic, fated, empowering repetitions—but also, 
almost as if behind its back, as the very movement of the text. In this way, it 
is repetition that infinitely complicates and upsets not only the opposition 
between ‘content’ and ‘form’ but also the movement between the beginning 
of a pleasure principle (archē) and the end of a death drive (télos) thereby 
deferring the closure of the text indefinitely. Derrida clarifies:  
 
La valeur de répétition ‘en abyme’ de l’écriture de Freud a un rapport de mimesis 
structurelle avec le rapport entre le PP [the pleasure principle] et ‘sa’ pulsion de 
mort. Celle-ci, une fois de plus, ne s’oppose pas à celui-là mais le creuse d’écriture 
testamentaire ‘en abyme,’ originairement, à l’origine de l’origine.426 
 
To a certain extent, the repetitive moving back and forth of the Jenseits 
therefore demonstrates its hypotheses, and the impossibility of their 
postulation as theses, before (dis)posing them, advancing only in a 
stammering manner and repeatedly interrupting itself, sometimes to the point 
of paralysis, starting off again, staggering along somewhat uncannily, but 
also comically, like a ‘ limping devil.’427  
Approaching the end of this chapter, we can say that Freud ends his 
prosecutorial investigations into the authority of the pleasure principle by 
concluding that nothing can be concluded with certainty as to a possible 
‘beyond,’ but that the pleasure principle certainly seems (scheint) to serve 
such a ‘beyond’ in the guise of the death drive. What Derrida then comes to 
show in “Spéculer—sur ‘Freud’” is how the authority of the pleasure 
principle is dependent upon the repetition of itself as authoritative and hence 
upon how the repetitive structure serves as a condition of its identification. 
In such service, then, the compulsion to repeat becomes more ‘originary’ 
than any principal origin, which, in turn, becomes the result of an originary 
repetition—or, as Derrida would have it; the principle becomes “l’a priori 
d’un après-coup.”428 Perhaps, then, the difficulties of finally resolving the 
relation between the repetition compulsion and the pleasure principle have 
to do with the fact that it cannot be resolved by an original duality of drives 
(psychic Manichaeism) nor by a single principle of origins (psychic 
monotheism). Rather, Freud appears to repeatedly get caught up in an 
originary rhythm of drives differing in themselves, and this leads him into 
                                           
426 CP, 325/304. 
427 Cf. CP, 287/269. Freud’s last words in the Jenseits take the form of a quote from the 
poet Rückert who tells us that according to scripture “es ist keine Sünde zu hinken” (GW 
XIII, 69). In turn, Derrida sketches a link from this apology for limping both to the club-
footed Oedipus and to the limping devil who can grant pleasure at the incurring of a debt.   
428 CP, 342/321. 
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those hesitatingly cadenced movements of the Jenseits allowing no closure 
to the text since, as Derrida reminds us in “Désistance”: “Il n’y a pas de 
rythme sans césure.”429  
One could ask then, if the death drive in Freud is a designation of that 
which remains counter-rhythmic to the rhythm of ‘life’ as automatically 
regulated by the pleasure principle—without which, however, there would 
be no life in the first place. Because to state that repetition or rhythm is 
‘originary’ is in a certain way to undermine the very statement in its 
pronunciation, inasmuch as what this statement performs, all the while 
stating something as originary, is an auto-deconstruction of the very logic of 
the original. In Derrida’s words, stating that rhythm is originary is also a way 
“de marquer qu’il n’y a pas de commencement simple”430 insofar as it 
remarks that the ‘origin’ is always already doubled, always already the 
product of a repetition that turns the origin into the aftereffect of what 
originates from it.431 Yet, this rhythmic movement of remarking is not 
equivalent to a simple refutation of originality; rather, as Derrida writes in 
“Violence et Métaphysique,” it traces the sense of an origin “qui n’a aucun 
sens avant le de, qui ne peut être séparée de la génitivité et de l’espace qu’elle 
engendre et oriente: origine inscrite.”432  
As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have rendered it in their reading of Lacan, 
this aporetic logic, or this aporetology, of an inscribed origin only traceable 
by and in its after-effects, necessarily entails that repetition “se produit dès 
le début ou même, si l’on peut le concevoir, avant que le texte ne 
commence,—comme sa prescription la plus rigoureuse.”433 Such 
prescriptive repetition rendering the origin as always already inscribed, is 
what Derrida designates with the quasi-transcendental notion of archi-
writing already at work at the very origin of sense, which entails that the 
                                           
429 PSY, 637/(II) 229–230. According to Hölderlin’s Anmerkungen zum Ödipus, a caesura 
allows no closure since it is the empty (leer) interval of the ‘counter-rhythmic 
interruption’ (gegenrhytmishe Unterbrechung) of rhythmical, successively alternating, or 
chronological time entailing a discordant spacing of time whereby before and after, 
beginning and end have been displaced and thus deferred. Cf. HSW 10, 155ff. See also 
Lacoue-Labarthes’ essay “La césure du spéculatif” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1986, 39–69/208–
235). 
430 PSY, 626/(II) 222.   
431 In L’écriture du désastre, Blanchot therefore writes that the origin is always already 
marked by its own inoriginality: “Il n’y a pas d’origine, si origine suppose une présence 
originelle. Toujours passé, d’ores et déjà passé, quelque chose qui s’est passé sans être 
présent, voilà l’immémorial que nous donne l’oubli, disant: tout commencement est 
recommencement” (EdD, 180/117). 
432 ED, 169/115. 
433 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1973, 96/94. 
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origin can only present itself as originary by relating to whatever it 
supposedly originates. As such, the very presentation of something as 
originary already marks a synthesis of traces and, as Derrida writes in 
“Différance,” it is therefore “irréductiblement non-simple, donc, stricto 
sensu, non-originaire.”434 This is also why, as Derrida’s notorious dictum has 
it, “il n’y a pas de hors-texte”435 since, as always already prescribed by 
repetition and inscribed as a trace of something other than itself, the origin 
no longer functions as a transcendental signifier orienting the meaning of the 
text from the outside. Instead, it has become a written origin, “tracée et dès 
lors inscrite dans un système, dans une figure qu’elle ne commande plus.”436 
Returning to the Jenseits, then, and to the pleasure principle inscribed 
within this text, we see that Freud struggles to retain a distinction between 
different kinds of repetition in his questioning of the relationship between 
the repetitive and the driven. On the one hand, we have the repetitions 
propelled by the life drives in service of the pleasure principle, and, on the 
other hand, we have the repetitions compelled by the death drive working 
beyond and without regard for the pleasure principle. However, as becomes 
clear during the hesitating rhythm beyond and behind the Jenseits, such a 
distinction between what we could call the erotic and the thanatic kind of 
repetition becomes ever more intricate, and Freud must concede that the 
effects of the repetition compulsion are seldom, if ever, encountered in their 
purity.437  
Consequently, we seem to become increasingly entangled in what Derrida 
calls a “stricture différantielle du la répétition,”438 causing the duality of the 
drives to oscillate indeterminably in a duplicity of repetition.439 This is why 
it must be emphasized that the death drive is always the death drive of the 
pleasure principle, transgressing it without going anywhere else, beyond 
within it, proceeding with all these steps-not-beyond that make up the 
Jenseits. As such, there is not really a pure beyond of the pleasure principle 
but rather an ‘interior exteriority’ or an ‘extimacy’ of the death drive, which 
causes the pleasure principle to react to itself as though it were another. Once 
again, then, we return to the psychoanalytic leitmotif of the “wo Es war soll 
Ich werden,” according to which, Freud tells us, the psyche will always have 
                                           
434 M, 14/13.  
435 G, 227/158. 
436  ED, 169/115. 
437 Already at the end of the third chapter, Freud acknowledges “daß wir die Wirkungen 
des Wiederholungszwanges nur in seltenen Fällen rein, ohne Mithilfe anderer Motive, 
erfassen können” (GW XIII, 21).  
438 CP, 373/353. 
439 We will return to this ‘duplicity of repetition’ in more detail in the next chapter.  
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the inclination (Neigung) to treat what comes from itself “als ob sie nicht von 
innen, sondern von außen her einwirkten.”440  
So the compulsive repetition stemming from the drivenness of the It and 
causing unpleasure for the I is treated as if it comes from ‘beyond,’ when in 
fact it comes from the innermost inward (innersten Innern), which, as we 
recall from the above, is nevertheless nothing but an inneres Ausland. That 
is why the text cannot reach a pure ‘beyond,’ because there is no pure 
‘within’ to go beyond, just as there is no pure ‘there’ from which to be ‘gone.’ 
There is only the rhythmical fort:da of the life:death limping 
beyond:within—compulsively, discontinuously, inconclusively. 
Again, we enter the home of the psyche, whose economy seems to have 
become interminably differentiated and whose regulating master no longer 
seems identifiable as the pleasure principle, which, as it turns out, was 
working in the service of a compulsion to repeat all along. As mentioned, the 
compulsion to repeat not only has something transgressive or excessive 
about it but also a certain diabolical draw, which Freud indicates with his 
evocation of Mephisto, thereby also signaling back towards another text 
from the previous year, that is, towards Das Unheimliche from 1919. What 
is significant not only in the Jenseits but also in Das Unheimliche is the 
uncanny link between the compulsion to repeat and those impersonal parts 
of the unconscious that Freud calls ‘the It.’  
Hence, we must trace this indication one year backward and attend to 
Freud’s text on the uncanny, where we will continue to unfold the duplicity 
of repetition and its haunting effects on the home of the psyche, a home in 
which, as Derrida writes, “tout change de signe à chaque instant.”441 
 
                                           
440 GW XIII, 29.  
441 CP, 384/361. 
  
IV. THE SOLITUDE OF UNHOMELINESS 
  
 
April is the cruellest month, breeding 
Lilacs out of the dead land, mixing 
Memory and desire, stirring 
Dull roots with spring rain […] 
 I will show you fear in a handful of dust 
 – T.S. Eliot, “The Burial of the Dead,” The Wasteland 
 
 
IV.1 THE DUPLICITY OF REPETITION REVISITED 
Before turning to what Cixous in her “Fiction and its Phantoms” aptly calls 
Freud’s “strange theoretical novel”442 on Das Unheimliche, and following up 
on our reading of the Jenseits, the time has come for a further questioning 
into the duplicity of repetition. This questioning seems to be a prerequisite, 
not only because of the significance that the notion of repetition has with 
respect to the psychoanalytic understanding of the ‘unhomely’ or the 
‘uncanny,’ but also because it is Derrida’s suggestion that the only chance 
we have of reading Freud’s illegible text is if one ‘takes into account’ “cette 
incalculable double bande de la répétition”443—which we shall attempt to do 
in what follows.  
To recapitulate some of the findings from the previous chapter, we seem 
to have come across at least two series of repetition in Freud’s text. 1) The 
first series—which became manifest in the analytic working-through of 
transference, in the binding of unbounded excitations, and in the 
Bemächtigung of children’s play—appears to be masterfully empowering 
and has to do with the pleasurable appropriation, habituation, identification, 
and preservation of the psychic apparatus in relation to its surrounding 
reality. 2) The other series—which became manifest in the compulsive 
repetition of trauma in dreams, in the non-transferable resistance to analysis, 
and in neurotic obsessions—appears hauntingly daemonic and has to do with 
the unpleasurable disempowerment, dispropriation, and estrangement of the 
very same psychic apparatus in relation to its surrounding reality. The first 
series of repetitions seems to proceed in the service of the pleasure principle, 
whereas the latter series seems to work compulsively beyond it, and it is 
precisely this strange ‘beyond’ which, in Freud’s view, gives it its daemonic 
allure: 
                                           
442 Cixous 1976, 525. 
443 CP, 374/352. 
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Die Äußerungen eines Wiederholungszwanges, die wir an den frühen Tätigkeiten 
des kindlichen Seelenlebens wie an den Erlebnissen der psychoanalytischen Kur 
beschrieben haben, zeigen im hohen Grade den triebhaften, und wo sie sich im 
Gegensatz zum Lustprinzip befinden, den dämonischen Charakter.444  
 
Nevertheless, we also saw that Freud begins to have doubts as to whether the 
distinction between a life drive that would repeat itself within the constraints 
of the pleasure principle and a death drive that would repeat itself beyond 
these constrains can indeed be sustained. For how does one distinguish 
between what is repeated automatically by the regulation of the pleasure 
principle and what is repeated compulsively, yet with a strange sense of 
autonomy, by what is beyond such regulation? Put differently, how does one 
distinguish between a repetitive need for pleasure and an unpleasurable 
compulsion to repeat? 
The duplicity of repetition in question here is, as Derrida has pointed out, 
not restricted to the Freudian (con)text.445 On the contrary, it would appear 
that two logics of repetition—pertaining to the economic and aneconomic 
aspects of repetition, respectively—tend to be at work in most of the thinkers 
who have given persistent thought to the notion of repetition.446 According 
to Derrida, the first of these two logics of repetition is the classical one 
operating with a stable relation between the repeated and the repetition, 
according to which a repetition always follows what it repeats, which is more 
original and which the repetition repeats in a fashion that clearly 
distinguishes it from what is repeated. In contrast and as already indicated in 
the previous chapter, the second logic designates “une logique autre et non 
classique de la répétition, celle-ci est ‘originaire.’”447 In the concise words 
of Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy, this is to say that the ‘other’ logic of 
repetition is one according to which “la répétition n’est pas la reduplication 
                                           
444 GW XIII, 37. 
445 Cf. CP, 374/352. 
446 In Zupančič’s view, it is even so that “[o]ne of the conceptual events that distinguish 
the contemporary, post-Hegelian philosophy is the emergence of the concept of repetition 
as an independent and crucial concept” (Zupančič 2007, 27). Besides Kierkegaard, 
Nietzsche, Freud, and later Deleuze, Lacan, and Derrida, Zupančič also places Marx on 
the list of prominent thinkers to have considered repetition a critical and significant 
subject for thought. Despite crucial differences in their respective projects, Zupančič 
argues that one of the key features shared by all these thinkers of repetition is that 
“repetition is viewed, posited, and elaborated as fundamentally different from the logic 
of representation” (ibid. 28) and sometimes even, as in Deleuze, in strict opposition to it. 
447 CP, 373/351.  
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de l’identitique.”448 Let us now attend to these two logics in a little more 
detail.  
In the first logic, the derivative notion of repetition remains confirmative 
of the narratives of originals and principles, as of archeological beginnings, 
which always already inscribe teleological endings. In the second logic, by 
contrast, the notion of ‘original repetition’ effects an auto-deconstruction of 
such archeo-teleological narratives reminiscent of the Abbau pertaining to 
the death drive, which, as we saw in the Jenseits, leaves the origin of the 
pleasure principle in abeyance. Yet the duplicity of repetition becomes 
conspicuous only once it is noticed how the two logics of repetition with an 
incalculable effect “ne s’opposent pas plus qu’elles ne se reprodusient 
identiquement.”449 This is because the very duplicity of repetition, as the 
genitive construction suggests, pertains to the notion of repetition itself in 
such a way that “il n’y a jamais la répétition.”450 If only in terms of its 
temporalization and spacing, every singular repetition produces a minimum 
of excess that makes it different from what it repeats as well as from any 
previous or succeeding repetitions and hence irreducible to the mechanism 
of identification. For this reason, the only thing that strictly speaking repeats 
itself in repetition is difference, or, as Zupančič puts it with reference to 
Deleuze, “what is repeated is the very impossibility of repetition.”451   
According to this differential stricture of repetition, it is therefore 
necessary to think the notion of repetition doubly as both “la forme typique 
ou récurrente et la singularisation inépuisable,”452 without, however, 
thinking along the necessity that these features should be clearly 
distinguishable or separable from one another—for, indeed, what makes 
repetition ‘essentially’ duplicitous is that it “installe la hantise de l’une dans 
l’autre.”453 As such, the differential stricture of repetition entailing that 
repetition is never simply itself but always also other than itself, is intimately 
related to another quasi-concept found in Derrida’s writing, namely that of 
‘iterability,’ which indissolubly links repetition to alterity—seeing as “itara, 
dont vient le mot, dit à la fois la répétition du même et l’altération.”454  
                                           
448 Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1973, 96/93. 
449 CP, 374/352. 
450 CP, 373/351.   
451 Zupančič 2007, 32. See also, Dolar 2013, 228.  
452 AC, 78/80. 
453 AP, 44/20. 
454 RES, 46/31. In “Signature Evenement Contexte,” Derrida explains that the itara of 
iterability means ‘other’ in Sanskrit and that “tout ce qui suit peut être lu comme 
l’exploitation de cette logique qui lie la répétition à l’altérité”  (M, 375/315). 
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With the quasi-concept of iterability, Derrida articulates the duplicity of 
repetition insofar as it exposes how repetition serves both as the condition of 
possibility and as the condition of impossibility for the constitution of 
identical unities, conceptual or otherwise. Serving as a condition of 
possibility, iterability is identificatory inasmuch as it allows something to be 
constituted as something by the possibility of its being repeated in different 
and potentially unlimited contexts. Serving as a condition of impossibility, 
however, but for the very same reason, iterability also effects the perpetual 
alienation of identity insofar as it “répète le même en le déplaçant ou en 
l’altérant.”455 Hence, seeing that iterability is conditional for something to be 
constituted as identical to itself in its possibility of being repeated otherwise 
and elsewhere, this also means that in its very constitution identity is already 
contaminated by its becoming different to itself.  
To be sure, that which is not repeatable is not, and that which is repeated 
was not there before its repetition, which means that any singular being or 
event is “en elle-même divisée, ou multipliée d’avance par sa structure de 
répétabilité.”456 An absolute unrepeatable ‘only once’ of singularity can 
never be recognized as such since as soon as it is recognized it is already 
repeatable. The identity, the ‘whatness,’ or the recognizability of anything 
whatsoever depends on its possibility of archivization, that is, of its 
becoming inscribed, traceable, memorable, representable, reproducible—in 
short, it depends on its becoming repeatable even in the absence of itself 
when it is no longer there ‘in person.’ This means that the very possibility of 
identity depends on its structural separability from itself, that is, on its 
possibility of becoming displaced from its ‘own’ presence and disseminated 
from its ‘original’ context inscribed in its very constitution. Paradoxically, 
then, the archivization that saves identity for future repetition and thus for 
the possibility of remembrance also implies an originary forgetting of the 
very thing it seeks to save, namely, a forgetting of the ‘first impression’ or 
of the singularity of whatever is being archived.457 As such, the two series of 
repetitions mentioned above have become constrained in a double bind, 
insofar as what makes repetition possible, that is, its difference from what it 
repeats, is also what makes it impossible as a repetition of the identical.  
                                           
455 BS II, 120/75. 
456 LI, 97/48.  
457 This is precisely the sickness of the archive (mal d’archive), which Derrida 
circumscribes in his reading of ‘the Freudian impression’ and which he associates both 
with the traumatic structure of experience in general and with the death drive. Derrida 
explains: “A inscrire ainsi la répétition au cæur de l´à-venir, il faut bien y importer du 
même coup la pulsion de mort, la violence de l’oubli” (MA, 126/79). 
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Drawing this revisiting to a close, let us resume the duplicity of repetition. 
On the one hand, repetition is a mechanism of identification and recognition 
enabling us to make a home in the world insofar as it allows us to form and 
maintain codes, customs, habits, and patterns that help make ourselves, 
others, things, and situations familiar and habitual. In this way, repetition 
endows existence with a certain sense of predictability and stability that 
makes us feel more or less safe in our homes. On the other hand, however, 
but for the same reasons, repetition can also come to threaten everything that 
makes us feel homely by letting us suspect that the predictability and stability 
of our homes is supported by nothing but these fundamentally ungrounded 
repetitions, underneath which there is only ever another repetition. In other 
words, repetition may endow our existence with a certain sense of stability 
and things with a certain sense of identity but, at the same time, it also 
indicates the unstable foundations of such stability and exposes the 
(un)conditional iterability at the heart of identity. And, in yet other words, it 
is precisely because repetition plays such a decisive role in the formation and 
safeguarding of the homely that it can also betray this role and make the well-
known and familiar appear to us in a strangely distorted way; in short, it 
indicates to us “unter welchen Bedingungen das Vertraute unheimlich, 
schreckhaft werden kann.”458  
Accordingly, the duplicity of repetition may conjure up the uncanny 
insofar it throws a shadow of doubt upon the mechanisms that would allow 
us to sustain clear distinctions between the original and its reduplications or 
between the one and its doubles. Instead, the duplicity of repetition lets the 
original appear as neither more nor less than it has become in its potentially 
infinite regress of repetitions, and, in the concise word of Derrida: 
 
Une telle apparition dérange sans doute l’ordre apaisant de la représentation. Mais 
elle ne le fait pas en réduisant les effects de double, elle les multiplie au contraire, 
et la duplicité sans original en quoi consiste peut-être la diabolicité, son 
inconsistance même.459 
 
In what follows, our aim will not therefore be to investigate the uncanny as 
a determinable concept or phenomenon with a unified meaning because, as 
Royle emphasizes in his study on The Uncanny: “The uncanny is (the) 
unsettling (of itself).”460 Instead, we will suggests that the uncanny, in Freud 
and beyond, may only appear in a sort of unstable interchange between the 
two faces of duplicitous repetition always already dividing it from within. 
                                           
458 GW XII, 231. 
459 CP, 288/270. 
460 Royle 2003, 5. 
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Before engaging in a closer reading of Freud’s Das Unheimliche, however, 
we will begin our venture into the uncanny by inquiring about the title of this 
text. 
 
 
IV.2 READING THE UNHOMELY  
The German Unheimlich is a word that in all its semantic ambiguity has 
fascinated not only Freud but also an entire tradition from Schelling to 
Heidegegr, Lacan, and Derrida. In this section, howeve, we will look mainly 
at how Freud reads this word.   
In his comment on the Sander’s dictionary entry on the word heimlich, 
Freud notes that it appears to be ascribed two meanings that are, if not in 
opposition, then at least ‘alien’ (fremd) to one another.461 These are, on the 
one hand, the meaning of the familiar or the well-known (Vertrauten), and 
of the comfortable (Behaglichen), which pertain to the economy of the home 
or to what is homely, and, on the other hand, the meaning of the concealed, 
the hidden, or the secretive (Versteckten; Verborgengehaltenen), which 
introduces a strangeness to the otherwise homely. In light of such ambiguity, 
Freud further notices that the negation of the ‘Unheimliche’ actually only 
negates one of these meanings, namely that of the familiar and comfortable, 
but not, so it would seem, that of the concealed or the secretive. This 
asymmetrical negatory function brings Freud to draw a connection between 
the Unheimliche and the ‘other’ meaning of the homely, namely, the ‘hidden’ 
(geheime) or the ‘secret’ (Geheimnis). Inspired by a passage from 
Schelling’s Philosophie der Mythologie, Freud therefore offers the following 
definition of the uncanny: “Unheimlich sei alles, was ein Geheimnis, im 
Verborgenen bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist.”462 
                                           
461 Cf. GW XII, 235. As Comay has remarked, one might think that such inherent 
ambiguity would qualify the heimlich for Freud’s list of so-called ‘primordial words’ 
(Urworte). Dating back as far as the Ancient Egyptian language, the primordial words 
contain two apparently opposite meanings within them without contradiction, which 
renders them impervious to the law of non-contradiction and this imperviousness makes 
them relevant for the study of the unconscious. Cf. Comay 2015, 237–266. See also, GW 
VIII, 213–221. 
462 GW XII, 236. This slightly altered quote from Philosophie der Mythologie is given by 
Schelling in a parenthesis that reads as follows: “Unheimlich nennt man alles, was im 
Geheimniß, im Verborgnen, in der Latenz bleiben sollte und hervorgetreten ist” (SW XII, 
649). A few pages later, Schelling describes how, in the facial features of certain 
sculptures from the Greek island of Aegina, one can see the ideals (Vorbilder) of a more 
ancient art form, which did not seek to portray the divine openly (nicht es offen zu zeigen) 
but only through distorted and misconstrued human features (entstellte undverdrehte 
menschliche Züge). Thereby, Schelling continues, this ancient art sought to let the over-
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Accordingly, the prefix of the Un-heimliche is not simply a negation of the 
Heimliche but also strangely redundant, insofar the Heimliche already 
contains within it the Geheime, just as the homely economy of the psyche 
already harbors the I-foreign territories of the It and other uncanny guests. 
As such, the word of the Heim itself becomes somewhat uncanny insofar as 
it can revert itself into its opposite and hence transform the homely and the 
familiar into the unhomely and the unfamiliar. Following the historical 
linguistic development of the homely as rendered by the Grimm dictionary, 
Freud therefore concludes that “heimlich ist ein Wort, das seine Bedeutung 
nach einer Ambivalenz hin entwickelt, bis es endlich mit seinem Gegensatz 
unheimlich zusammenfallt.”463  
In view of this ambiguity of the word Heimlich, we begin to discern why 
Heidegger ascribe such significance to its negation. Because if das 
Heimliche can signify both the homely, the habitual, and the familiar, as well 
as the concealed, the secretive, and the strange, then das Un-heimliche may 
in turn signify both the unhomely or unfamiliar, but also the unconcealment 
of the concealed or hidden pertaining to the homely. In other words, the 
‘unhomely’ indicates a disclosure of that which remains closeted or secreted 
away in the homely, or in more Heideggerian terms, it indicates the 
unconcealment of concealment (Unverborgenheit der Verborgenheit) as 
such.464 When Heidegger therefore affirms the Sophoclean designation of the 
human being as ‘the most unhomely of all beings,’ which is Heidegger’s 
idiosyncratic but nonetheless excellent translation of Sophocles’ 
δεινότερον,465 he also emphasizes this being’s privileged relation to the truth 
of being, understood in the Greek sense precisely as ‘unconcealedness’ 
                                           
human or non-human of the divine show itself in the human only “durch etwas Fremdes—
noch zu verhüllen, mit einer gewissen Unheimlichkeit zu umgeben” (ibid. 658).  
463 GW XII, 237. 
464 Cf. GA 9, 416.  
465 Cf. ANT, 340-341. This designation figures in a choral song from the first stasimon 
(vv. 332–375) of the tragedy, which reads: “πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν ἀνθρώπου δεινότερον 
πέλει.” Storr translates it as “Many wonders there be, but naught more wondrous than 
man.” Heidegger, in turn, translates it as: “Vielfältig das Unheimliche, nichts doch über 
den Menschen hinaus Unheimlicheres ragend sich regt” (GA 40, 155; GA 53, 73). 
According to Heidegger, τὸ δεινόν involves a tripartite signification each of which in turn 
implies a double signification: 1) the terrible (das Fürchterliche), signifying both the 
horrifying or terrifying and the glorious or the venerable (das Ehrwüdige); 2) the powerful 
(das Gewaltige), signifying both the violent (das Gewalttätige) and the overpowering 
(das Überragende/Über-wältigende); 3) the unusual or extraordinary (das 
Un/Außergewöhnliche), signifying both the monstrous or the tremendous (das 
Ungeheure) and the ‘in-all-skillful’ (das in allem Geschickte). To some extent, then, 
Hölderlin’s translation of τὸ δεινόν with das Ungeheure is preserved and reaffirmed in 
Heidegger’s translation of the same with das Unheimliche.  
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(Ἀλήϑεια).466 Hence, in its unhomeliness the human being already responds 
to the truth of being as the internal counterturning (inwendigen 
Gegenwendigkeit)467 of itself, that is,  as the ‘event’ (Ereignis) of being in its 
originary yet conflictual belonging together of concealing and unconcealing, 
forgetting and unforgetting, closure and disclosure, absencing and 
presencing, giving and withdrawing, and so on. As some of Heidegger’s 
most elaborate inquiries into the essential unhomeliness of human existence 
are found precisely in his 1930s readings of Sophocles’ tragedy Antigone 
carried out in his Einführung in die Metaphysik from 1935, and later in his 
Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister” from 1942 to which we shall therefore attend 
briefly in what follows.  
According to Heidegger, the unhomeliness of human existence is brought 
to the fore in Antigone with the oxymoronic concatenation παντοπόρος-
ἄπορος, which Heidegger translates as a being ‘everywhere underway-
without way,’ by which the truth of the human being shines forth as a 
‘catastrophe’ (καταστροφή) in the literal sense of the word, namely, as “eine 
Umkehrung, die ihn vom eigenen Wesen abkehrt.”468 Accordingly, human 
beings only ever become homely through an unhomeliness, which drives 
(trieb) them away from their homes and out on perpetual detours or restless 
straying. Therefore, the unhomeliness of human existence is not to be 
considered a negative deviation from some original being at home, which 
would only turn the becoming homely in unhomeliness into a nostalgic 
odyssey of return. Instead, as McNeill underlines, “this extreme possibility 
of unhomeliness does not simply belong to Dasein’s ownmost being: it is 
rather the opening up of the very possibility of ownness, of selfhood, of 
mineness.”469  
In this light, it is tempting to regard Heidegger’s prescript that the human 
being must become poetically homely in unhomeliness as a sort of existential 
variation of the Freudian dictum according to which the I should come to be 
                                           
466 Ἀ-λήϑεια is derived from the Greek verb λανθάνω, which can be translated as ‘to 
escape notice,’ ‘to be unknown, unseen, unnoticed,’ ‘to let a thing escape one,’ ‘to forget’ 
(cf. LSJ). Accordingly, the alpha-privativum Ἀ-λήϑεια can designate the becoming 
noticeable of the unnoticed, the unseen, the forgotten etc.  
467 Cf. GA 53, 96. Regarding the uncanny response of the unhomely being to the truth of 
being, Heidegger writes: “Das Gegenspiel spielt zwischen dem Unheimischsein im Sinne 
des ausweglosen Umtriebes im Seienden und dem Unheimischsein als dem 
Heimischwerden aus Zugehörigkeit zum Sein” (GA 53, 147). 
468 GA 53, 94 
469 McNeill 1999b, 321. 
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where It was.470 Giving in to this temptation, and taking a step back in 
chronological time, another Heideggerian variation of Freud’s 
psychoanalytic dictum of human unhomeliness might be extracted from the 
renowned analysis of the ‘call of conscience’ (Ruf des Gewissens) in §§56–
58 of Sein und Zeit. Here Heidegger writes: 
 
Unheimlichkeit ist die obzwar alltäglich verdeckte Grundart des In-der-Welt-seins. 
Das Dasein selbst ruft als Gewissen aus dem Grunde dieses Seins. Das ‘es ruft 
mich’ ist eine ausgezeichnete Rede des Daseins. Der durch die Angst gestimmte 
Ruf ermöglicht dem Dasein allererst den Entwurf seiner selbst auf sein eigenstes 
Seinkönnen.471  
 
Curiously, the most intimate of calls, namely, the call that is supposed to call 
Dasein to its ownmost self (auf das eigene Selbst) comes from an impersonal 
it residing in the most foreign (unvertraut) outskirts of the familiar far-off 
nowhere (Nirgends)—“so etwas wie eine fremde Stimme.”472 Moreover, not 
only does the call come from no one (Niemand) who is nowhere, it also 
comes in order to say nothing (nichts). Finally, this call from nowhere about 
nothing from no one calls Dasein to gather itself together not in some original 
authenticity of a home but instead in the originary unhomeliness of 
existence: “In der Unheimlichkeit steht das Dasein ursprünglich mit sich 
selbst zusammen.”473 In other words, the human Dasein is only ever ‘at 
home’ in its originary not-being-at-home (Unzuhausesein), and is only ever 
‘itself’ in the exteriority of its intimacy and in proximity to the remoteness 
of its being there.  
However, in the attempt to avoid ‘opportunistic assimilations,’474 we 
should of course be attentive towards the differences setting Freud and 
Heidegger apart both with respect to the impersonal Es and to the 
experiences of unhomeliness. An obvious yet significant difference between 
the two understandings of unhomeliness—in themselves not unequivocal—
is that for Freud the notion of das Unheimliche constitutes a psychodynamic 
and an aesthetic designation of a particular series of experiences bound up 
with the return of the repressed. Whereas, for Heidegger, the notion of 
Unheimlichkeit is an existential or ontological designation of the human way 
                                           
470 Regarding the poetic becoming homely, Heidegger writes: “Das griechisch erfahrene 
Wesen des δεινόν steht im dichterischen Blick dieser Dichtung, aber so, daß das 
Heimischwerden im Unheimischsein gedichtet ist” (GA 53, 147). 
471 GA 2, 277. My italics. 
472 GA 2, 277. 
473 GA 2, 287. 
474 Cf. CP, 380/357. 
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of being-in-the-world, which is characterized by an originary not-being-at-
home and therefore by a perpetual ‘becoming homely in unhomeliness’ 
(Heimischwerden im Unheimischsein).475  
Despite their differences, however, one thing that Freud and Heidegger do 
seem to share in their respective takes on the uncanniness of the unhomely 
is that it is not, as the psychiatrist Ernst Jentsch thought, the indicator of some 
unknown novelty, which awakens fright and anguish because of the 
‘intellectual incertitude’ (intellektuelle Unsicherheit) induced by its 
unprecedented appearance.476 On the contrary, the uncanny unhomeliness 
pertains to that which is most ancient, familiar, and intimate to human 
existence, but which also remains the most concealed, elusive, and secretive 
to it. The uncanniness of the unhomely is that it remains secretly familiar, or, 
as Freud formulates it: “das Unheimliche sei jene Art des Schreckhaften, 
welche auf das Altbekannte, Längstvertraute zurückgeht.”477 
Hence, seeing how Heimliche is a word that exposes how the unfamiliar 
and estranging is inherent or belongs to the familiar and intimate—in such a 
way that it calls the supposed opposition between these notions into 
question—one could suggest that the word Unheimlich therefore comes to 
perform a negation not only of the familiar and intimate, as Freud argues, but 
also of the unfamiliar and estranging. Furthermore, we might suggest that 
such a double negation, or de-negation, points toward that which, according 
to Heidegger, Sophocles already knew. Namely, that what is most intimately 
close and familiar to the being we call human is also what is most strange 
and inaccessibly distant to it, wherefore the human being can come to be at 
home only in the most uncanny of ways.  
In line with these suggestions, we begin to see why Dolar has proposed 
Lacan’s neologism of extimité478 as a translation of Freud’s Unheimliche 
insofar as it undoes any strict opposition between the interior and the 
exterior. Lacan performs this deconstruction of interiority and exteriority by 
demonstrating that the subject, even in the most intimate corners of its most 
hidden desires, is predisposed by something that remains outside of its 
                                           
475 Cf. GA 53, §20, 143–152. Freud initiates his text on Das Unheimliche with some 
reflections about the uncanny as a somewhat neglected aesthetic category. Usually, Freud 
notes, aesthetics are not of much interest to psychoanalysis, but the case of the uncanny 
constitutes an exception to this norm. Cf. GW XII, 229.  
476 Cf. GW XII, 231; 242. 
477 GW XII, 231. 
478 Cf. Dolar 1991, 6. According to my findings, Lacan introduces the neologism of 
extimité in his seventh seminar on L'éthique de la psychanalyse from 1959–1960. Even if 
the notion of extimité approaches a hapax legomenon in Lacan’s seminars, Miller argues 
it is nonetheless an important rarity. Cf. Miller 1994, 74–87.  
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authority. Hence, almost in a dislocated echo of Augustine’s interior intimo 
meo, Lacan’s notion of extimité exposes how the other is “quelque chose qui 
est entfremdet, étranger à moi tout en étant au coeur de ce moi.479 We shall 
return to this estranging intrigue more elaborately in the next chapter, but for 
now, we shall proceed with a closer reading of Freud’s 1919 text on Das 
Unheimliche.  
 
 
IV.3 DISTURBANCES OF THE HOME: READING DAS UNHEIMLICHE 
Returning now to Das Unheimliche, Cixous has demonstrated how a 
‘hesitating shadow’ lingers over Freud’s text causing it to mimic the essential 
instability of the concept with which it is engaged and thus to continually 
destabilize its procession as it goes along—or, as Cixous describes it: “Just 
as the reader thinks he is following some demonstration, he senses that the 
surface is cracking: the text slides a few roots under the ground while it 
allows others to be lofted in the air.”480  
We may now read this hesitating shadow as being cast over the supposedly 
closed and familiar economy of a household, disclosing or unveiling that 
which remains undisclosed or veiled as the ‘outside’ within it. Accordingly, 
such disclosed undisclosedness belongs to the veiled or disguised character 
of the unhomely (den verhüllten Charakter des Unheimlichen),481 insofar as 
it exposes the secrets (Geheimnisse) of the homely as such. That is to say, 
the unhomely does not excavate the ‘content’ of some particular secret of the 
home but rather exposes the secret that there is no secret to be exposed—and 
yet that the secretive remains.482 Freud then proceeds to explicate the 
ambiguity of the homely by further exhibiting its secret relationship with the 
unhomely since, as it turns out, the unhomely itself emerges from something 
that was once homely and familiar, which has been long repressed 
(altvertrautes Verdrängtes) in a time before time (Vorzeit) only to return 
home as untimely estranged and uncannily foreign. So Freud writes: “dies 
Unheimliche ist wirklich nichts Neues oder Fremdes, sondern etwas dem 
Seelenleben von alters her Vertrautes, das ihm nur durch den Prozeß der 
Verdrängung entfremdet worden ist.”483  
                                           
479 Sem VII, 87/71. 
480 Cixous 1976, 525–526. 
481 Cf. GW XII, 231. 
482 Cixous aptly underlines this ‘secret without secret’ of the uncanny when she remarks 
that “the Unheimliche refers to no more profound secret than itself: every pursuit 
produces its own cancellation and every text dealing is a text which returns” (Cixous 
1976, 547). 
483 GW XII, 254. 
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Thus, even while the Grimm Dictionary lists one meaning of the ‘homely’ 
as “der von gespensterhaften freie ort,”484 Freud would probably add to this 
that such definition would only hold true on the condition that repression 
works without remainder. Yet, given that repression only rarely, if ever, 
works without a remainder, one of the significant discoveries of 
psychoanalysis is that the home of the human psyche is “ein Haus, in dem es 
spukt.”485 Freud therefore concludes his etymological investigations into the 
unhomely by stating that the negative prefix of the Un-heimliche in effect 
functions as “die Marke der Verdrängung,”486 and that the home of the 
psyche continues to be haunted by the “disquieting return of the long-ago 
repressed.”487  
However, since not every repression necessarily returns in an uncanny 
manner, Freud goes on to emphasize that the mere material (stofflichen) 
condition of the unhomely, which is the return of the once familiar and long 
repressed as strange and foreign, does not suffice to explain the peculiar and 
remarkable uncanniness pertaining to some but not all returning 
repressions.488 Moreover, Freud notes that almost every example, fictive or 
not, of uncanny unhomeliness that he provides in the text can be countered 
by another example where a similar experience or incidence would not 
appear uncanny in the slightest.489  
Hence, Freud proceeds to inquire about the particular circumstances 
wherein some repressed returns appear in an accentuated uncanny way, or in 
other words, he inquires about “der Momente, die das Ängstliche zum 
Unheimlichen machen.”490 Based on his psychoanalytic experience, Freud 
suggests that the uncanniness pertaining solely to certain returns of the 
repressed stems from the fact they are returns of ancient anxieties and old 
beliefs, which civilization may have succeeded in repressing, but which it 
still cannot rid itself of entirely. This is so, Freud explains, because the 
                                           
484 Cf. GW XII, 236. 
485 Cf. GW XII, 255.  
486 GW XII, 259. 
487 Rand and Torok 1994, 187. 
488 Cf. GW XII, 259. 
489 Freud gives the examples of animated furniture or toys, speaking animals or trees, 
dismembered limbs acting on their own, or the coming back to life of the dead in various 
fairytales and myths where such fantastic occurrences are not necessarily experienced as 
uncanny but rather as wondrous or even comical. Whether the comical might not also 
expose us to a sort of uncanniness is a question we will leave open. In this regard, see 
Zupančič 2008, 111ff.  
490 GW XII, 256.  
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civilized psyche is still not completely convinced by its newfound beliefs 
and convictions and therefore “die alten leben noch in uns fort.”491  
In this regard, Freud focuses on two different kinds of ‘returning 
repressions.’ One kind is ontogenetic and pertains to infantile castration 
anxieties of emasculation, loss of power or virility, of being insignificant to 
the (m)other, of separation, and so forth, in the history of the individual 
psyche. The other kind is phylogenetic and pertains to supposedly outmoded 
and superseded beliefs belonging to the primitive stages of development of 
the human psyche, such as various figures of afterlife or of a ‘beyond’ life 
and death (ghosts, demons, phantoms, specters), magical powers of thought, 
animistic representations, the evil eye, etc. One reason why doubles, 
reduplications, and repetitions can appear so uncannily haunting is due to the 
fact, Freud argues, that our unconscious still does not believe in or is not 
convinced either that birth marks an absolute beginning or that death marks 
a final end. Rather, something other seems to precipitate our birth and 
something other remains to return after our death, thus giving rise to the 
phantasies of phantoms, vampires, zombies, and other figures of the undead. 
Still, as Freud notes with reference to Otto Rank, the figure of the 
Doppelgänger may once have been a sign of the belief in a life after death, 
but to us ‘moderns’ it has become a token of our inexorable mortality of 
which we are certain even if unconsciously we cannot bring ourselves to 
believe it wholeheartedly.492  
As Rand and Torok suggest in their reading of Das Unheimliche, what 
these two kinds of returning repressions have in common is precisely their 
exposure of “the unexpected return of something that should have been 
overcome, by repression or civilization, but has not been.”493 Freud therefore 
raises doubt whether we can ever reach certainty about the questions to 
which these repressed anxieties and beliefs give rise. For example, can we 
ever be certain that there is not some sort of survival after death? Can we 
ever be certain where we should draw the line between the living and the 
non-living, between the dead and the non-dead, or between factual reality 
and fictional phantasy, for that matter? The uncanniness pertaining to certain 
returning repressions concerns precisely the borders of reality and the limits 
of the existence that I call my own as they begin to quiver and vacillate—
since, as Freud writes, it is often an uncanny experience “wenn die Grenze 
                                           
491 GW XII, 262.  
492In 1914 Freud published Rank’s study on Der Doppelgänger in the third volume of the 
journal for applied psychoanalysis Imago, which was later to be published in an expanded 
edition. Cf. Rank 1925; GW XII, 47.  
493 Rand and Torok 1994, 187. 
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zwischen Phantasie und Wirklichkeit verwischt wird.”494 Again, Freud’s text 
seems to mimic this ‘blurring’ or ‘effacing’ of boundaries of which it speaks 
insofar as it oscillates indeterminably between literary fascination, 
psychoanalytic theorizing, and autobiographical experience. With Royle, we 
can therefore say that “the uncanny has to do with a strangeness of framing 
and borders, an experience of liminality.”495  
Fables and fairytales may present us with images that are scary, strange, 
or mysterious, but as long as they are clearly distinguishable from our so-
called daily life they are not uncanny because they do not seriously challenge 
the borders of our ‘reality,’ but rather confirm them by their marked 
difference. Such fables and fairytales therefore allow us to surrender to the 
free play of phantasy without the imminent threat of a perforation or 
penetration of ‘reality.’ Experiences of the uncanny, however, often occur in 
almost identical resemblance to what we take to be reality, indicating with 
minor and almost indistinguishable displacements of the familiar that 
something is slightly ‘un-hinged’ or ‘out of joint,’ without, however, being 
able to point out exactly what or why. Again, these experiences of the 
uncanny are not restricted merely to an ‘intellectual incertitude’ but rather 
signal a fundamental ‘existential’ or ‘ontological’ insecurity, making the 
foundations of the familiar tremble.496 Still, this fundamental insecurity 
emerges with an anxious yet strong certitude that, according to Freud, leads 
back to an unconscious persuasion “welches das sonst Harmlose unheimlich 
macht.”497  
This is why, in Freud’s interpretation, the uncanny sense of E.T.A. 
Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann pertains not so much to the animated puppet 
                                           
494 GW XII, 258.  
495 Royle 2003, 2. This uncertain oscillation is one reason why Derrida often experiences 
himself as closer to Freud than to Lacan who, in Derrida’s view, reduces ‘fictions’ to 
mere illustrations of the demonstrations made by psychoanalysis. As Derrida writes in 
“Le facteur de la vérité,” for Lacan “[i]l s’agit donc de fonder la fiction en vérité, de l’y 
garantir dans ses conditions de possibilité, et cela sans même marquer, comme le fait Das 
Unheimliche, cette résistance toujours relancée de la fiction littéraire à la loi générale du 
savoir psychanalytique. De plus, Lacan ne se demande jamais ce qui distingue und fiction 
littéraire d’une autre” (CP, 454/426–427). Whether this characterization of Lacan might 
be in need of some qualification will be discussed in the next chapter when we return to 
the question of ‘framing’ in Lacan’s seminar on anxiety.  
496 In The Divided Self, Laing coins the term ‘ontological insecurity,’ which has to do 
precisely with an insecurity of borders. Among others, Laing gives an example of 
ontological insecurity of particular relevance to the uncanny questions with which we are 
engaged in these chapters, namely, the dread “of turning, or being turned, from a live 
person into a dead thing, into a stone, into a robot, an automaton, without personal 
autonomy of action, an it without subjectivity” (Laing 1969, 46).  
497 GW XII, 250. We shall return to this anxious certitude in Chapter V.  
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Olimpia in itself, but rather to the exposure to the indeterminable oscillations 
between the animate and inanimate, between the autonomous and the 
automatic, between the living and the dead, and between reality and 
phantasy. Therefore, Freud to a greater extent relates the uncanny of 
Hoffmann’s story with the recurring figure of the Sandman and the 
concurrent threat of having one’s eyes stolen that his appearance indicates, 
that is, with the threat of being blinded and abandoned to powerless 
confusion and lack of orientation.  
We will not go into further detail with Freud’s renowned analysis of Der 
Sandmann, which has been subjected to critical inquiry elsewhere;498 instead, 
we will proceed with an inquiry into the two intertwined motifs that Freud 
identifies as the dominant ones in Hoffmann’s uncanny writings. These are 
the motif of ‘redoubling’ (das Doppelgängertum) and the motif of the 
‘perpetual recurrence of the same’ (beständige Wiederkehr des Gleichen), or 
of the ‘repetition of the resembling’ (Wiederholung des Gleichartigen).499 
This choice of procedure it due to the assumption that with this uncanny 
intertwining of redoubling and repetition we might have encountered one of 
the first conspicuous incentives of Das Unheimliche that will eventually lead 
Freud towards the writing of the Jenseits. In what follows, we will pursue 
this assumption of textual interrelation.  
 
 
IV.4 DAEMONIC REDOUBLINGS AND REPETITIONS  
According to Freud, the uncanny can be experienced in situations where 
one’s sense of self is so radically put in question that 
 
man an seinem Ich irre wird oder das fremde Ich an die Stelle des eigenen versetzt, 
also Ich-Verdopplung, Ich-Teilung, Ich-Vertauschung—und endlich die beständige 
Wiederkehr des Gleichen, die Wiederholung der nämlichen Gesichtszüge, 
Charaktere, Schicksale, verbrecherischen Taten, ja der Namen durch mehrere 
aufeinanderfolgende Generationen.500  
 
Writing in the first person singular, Freud then proceeds to recount two 
autobiographical experiences with the uncanny related to the motifs of 
redoubling and repetition. One thing that these uncanny experiences make 
manifest to the reader is how the ‘other’ or the ‘double’ is always already 
implicated in our relation to ourselves, all the way into our innermost 
                                           
498 Cf. Rand and Torok 1994; Falkenberg 2005; Royle 2003, 38-50. 
499 Cf. GW XII, 246; 249. 
500 Cf. GW XII, 246. 
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intimacies of auto-affection, and how it is therefore not always possible to 
clearly distinguish between these others and ourselves.  
The first autobiographical experience with the uncanny concerns Freud 
getting lost in the labyrinthine streets of some unnamed Italian town. After a 
period of seemingly directionless or driverless wandering about (führerlos 
herumgewandert) in the small alleyways, which all resemble each other and 
which all seem to lead back to the same place, Freud begins to get the 
uncanny sense that his wandering might not be so driverless after all. Rather, 
his drifting around now strikes Freud as directed, almost as if behind his back 
and yet ahead of him, by some elusive and unknown automatism proceeding 
autonomously yet anonymously outside or beyond his authoritative 
jurisdiction. These unintentional returns (unbeabsichtigte Wiederkehr) to the 
same place bestow upon Freud an uncanny sense of helplessness and of being 
delivered over to some fateful and possibly disastrous (Verhängnisvolle) 
chain of events, which under other circumstances might have been 
experienced as nothing but a harmless coincidence (Zufall).501  
Retracing the steps of some anonymously autonomous automatism, it 
would seem that Freud was in 1919 already on the trail of his own words to 
come, as if they were already resounding in his ear: Wo Es war soll Ich 
werden—the same words that have been a refrain throughout our 
engagement with this solitude of the impersonal. In fact, Freud had already, 
earlier in the text, mentioned the fact that a presentiment of the uncanny may 
be conjured forth when the distinction between the automatic and the 
autonomous is obfuscated and begins to dissolve. For instance, when behind 
the presumable autonomy of oneself or a fellow human being “Ahnungen 
von automatischen—mechanischen—Prozessen geweckt werden,” such as 
in obsessive or traumatic neurosis, epileptic seizures, or, as Freud writes, in 
“der Äußerungen des Wahnsinnes.”502 Yet, with this first autobiographical 
story of the uncanny, it would seem that Freud is beginning to sense that the 
blurring of the borders between the automatic and the autonomous might be 
even more habitual to the human psyche than he may have initially thought, 
and may not be restricted solely to certain pathologies. Thus, in the wake of 
his first self-experienced example of the uncanny Freud reaches the first 
mention of the repetition compulsion in Das Unheimliche, anticipating what 
will become the fulcrum of the Jenseits when he writes: 
                                           
501 Cf. GW XII, 259–250. Interestingly, even if it is a mere coincidence, one of the very 
few times that Heidegger employs the word ‘unheimlich’ in the 1929/30 lecture course 
(three times to my count), which we engaged with in Chapter II, is precisely with 
reference to a seemingly aimless, repetitive, and vertiginous circling movement, not of 
the unconscious per se but of philosophy. Cf. GA 29/30, 266–267.  
502 GW XII, 237. 
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Im seelisch Unbewußten läßt sich nämlich die Herrschaft eines von den 
Triebregungen ausgehenden Wiederholungszwanges erkennen, der wahrscheinlich 
von der innersten Natur der Triebe selbst abhängt, stark genug ist, sich Seiten des 
Seelenlebens den dämonischen Charakter verleiht.503 
 
Freud may no longer believe in neither gods nor ghosts, but he certainly 
seems still to believe in daemons, and since this is not the first time that the 
daemonic is referred to in relation to the repetition compulsion, we shall have 
to make some further inquiries into the sense of the daemonic in the Freudian 
corpus.  
The word ‘daemon’ is of Greek origin and one way to approach the 
daemonic in Freud’s text might be to consider it in the light of one of 
Heidegger’s most appreciated dictums of philosophy, namely, the one 
contributed to Heraclitus’ saying that “the human ethos is its daemon [ἦθος 
ἀνθρώπῳ δαίμων].”504 One of the etymological roots of δαίμων can be traced 
back to the verb δαίоμαι or δαίω, which can mean both ‘to divide,’ ‘to 
lacerate,’ or ‘to cleave asunder’—as when for example Athena empathically 
laments Odysseus by saying that her “heart is torn [δαίεται ἦτορ]”505 in 
thinking of him—and ‘to assign’ or ‘to distribute.’ According to Agamben, 
this ambiguity means that: “Only insofar as it is what divides can the daimōn 
also be what assigns a fate and what destines,”506 which further means that 
Heraclitus’ fragment may be read in the following way: “‘For man, ēthos, 
the dwelling in the ‘self’ that is what is most proper and habitual for him, is 
what lacerates and divides, the principle and place of a fracture.’”507 In other 
words, the human being dwells only in an originary parting from itself and 
this arche-division constitutes its daemonic ethos. 
Readers of Freud may at times feel inclined to think of the unconscious It 
as though it were some psychic domain or entity subsisting in clear 
demarcation from the conscious I, and to think of the daemonic as pertaining 
solely to this entity and its occasional possession of the I. Yet, as we saw in 
the previous chapter, such a reading would be, if not straight forwardly 
misconstrued, then at least overly simplistic. Taking Agamben’s 
etymological indications and translation of Heraclitus’ fragment into 
consideration, I would instead suggest a reading of the Freudian daemonic 
                                           
503 GW XII, 251. 
504 DK 119. 
505 OD, v. 1.48, 7.  
506 Agamben 1999, 118.  
507 Agamben 1999, 118. Presumably, Agamben is following Heidegger’s translation of 
ἦθος with ‘abode’ (Aufenthalt) or ‘dwelling place’ (Ort des Wohnens) here. In Brief über 
den Humanismus, Heidegger’s suggestion for a translation of Heraclitus’ fragment reads: 
“der Mensch wohnt, insofern er Mensch ist, in der Nähe Gottes” (GA 9, 185ff.)  
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as pertaining to an originary separation of the psyche from itself. Just as the 
unconscious would not come to be without repression, and the repressive 
consciousness would not come to be without the repressed, so the It and the 
I are constituted only in their relation of separation before which there was 
no unity other than an unknown X to be named only retrospectively.508 This 
equiprimordial constitution of the repressed and the repressive in separation 
also entails, that what was ‘before’ the repression of the repressed withdraws 
into an ‘immemorial past,’ which cannot be remembered or represented 
because it has never been present as such. As Malabou formulates it in The 
New Wounded: “Originary separation takes place without actually 
happening”509 insofar as it constitutes the very horizon upon which anything 
can come to be, including the separation itself.  
Hence, we might say that for Freud the uncanny leads back to something 
old and long familiar, which has long been repressed and forgotten but which 
nevertheless still returns to haunt the representations of consciousness with 
its original absence. The experience of the uncanny may then take on a 
similar structure as that of a déjà vu,510 that is, as the return of something that 
has never taken place but that is nevertheless experienced as something 
elusively recognizable and strangely familiar even if its presence remains in 
abeyance—almost like a remembrance of that which remains forgotten. An 
uncanny experience—almost like a repetition of the immemorial where that 
which continues to repeat itself nevertheless retains the secret of itself. An 
uncanny experience—almost like someone returning to haunt itself 
incognito through compulsive repetitions commanded as if from 
‘elsewhere.’   
                                           
508 The movement I point to here is somewhat similar to Schellings rendering in 
Grundlegung der positiven Philosophie (1832–33) of an equiprimodiality of the 
withdrawal of ground and the emergence of existence in their originary separation 
(Entscheidung), “sodass eodemque actu Vergangenheit und Zukunft zugleich entstanden” 
(GP, 447). In the various fragments of his unfinished Weltalter project, Schelling 
perpetually circles around the problem of this primordial decision of separation as the 
anarchic origin of origin, since “eben daß eines anfange, eines das Erste sey, muß eine 
Entscheidung erfolgen” (WA, 220). In other words, a beginning is never pure since it 
must always stand in realtion to something else, which however becomes immemorial 
with the decision of beginning wherefor the past cannot be remembered but only 
recounted as a myth or a fable.  
509 Malabou 2012, 130. 
510 According to the OED, a similar ambiguity as that of the Heimliche pertains to the 
notion of déjà vu, which according to the OED can designate both “[a]n illusory feeling 
of having previously experienced a present situation; a form of paramnesia” and “[t]he 
correct impression that something has been previously experienced; tedious familiarity.” 
For a further elaboration of the specific uncanniness of déjà vu, see Royle 2003, 172–
186.  
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In other words, our suggestion would be to read the Freudian daemonic as 
pertaining to an originary scission, which allows the psychic apparatus to 
relate to itself only as separated from itself. Inherent to this constitutive 
relation of separation, however, is also the possibility of the psyche 
appearing to itself as other, and even as hostile, to itself, and therefore also 
the risk of the daemonic split becoming diabolical. Freud associates the 
originary scission constituting the daemonic ethos of the human being with 
‘conscience’ (Freud puts “Gewissen” in inverted commas as if to mark his 
critical distance from or skepticism towards this word) and with the ability 
for (critical) self-observation, which is always at risk of turning into a 
pathological or hyperbolical self-monitoring (Beachtungswahnes). Thus, the 
cut relating the psyche to itself in separation from itself can also come to cut 
off (abgespalten) the psyche from itself to such an extent that it appears to 
itself as a wholly other. So Freud writes: “der Mensch der Selbstbeobachtung 
fähig ist, macht es möglich, die alte Doppelgängervorstellung mit neuem 
Inhalt zu erfüllen.”511  
This structural risk inherent to the arche-division of the psyche, linking 
the possibility of self-relation and self-observation with the possibility of 
self-alienation and self-doubling, leads us to the second of Freud’s 
autobiographical experiences with the uncanny. Freud renders this 
experience in a footnote, thereby presenting it as more of an anecdotal 
parergon than as something of importance to the main text and proper corpus 
of the work. However, we shall not let ourselves be duped by such 
arrangements, but instead remind ourselves of what Derrida writes about 
such an apparent ‘ornamental feature’ in La vérité en peinture, namely that, 
“un parergon vient contre, à côte et en plus de l’ergon, du traveil fait, du fait, 
de l’æuvre mais il ne tombe pas à côte, il touche et coopère, depuis un certain 
dehors au-dedans de l’opération.”512 Accordingly, we shall concern 
ourselves with Freud’s ornamental footnote as though it were neither entirely 
accessory nor entirely essential to the work itself, but nonetheless somehow 
operative within its margins.  
Freud’s other ‘adventure’ (Abenteure) with the uncanny begins with him 
sitting alone in the wagon-lit of a train, getting ready for the night. Suddenly, 
the door of the adjoining bathroom swings open due to a violent jolt of the 
train and an elderly gentleman wearing a dressing gown and a travelers cap 
enters Freud’s compartment. Startled by this sudden intrusion, Freud jumps 
up in order to politely inform the elderly gentleman of his honest mistake in 
confusing the direction of compartments only to realize that the intruder is 
                                           
511 GW XII, 248. 
512 VEP, 63/54.  
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none other than his own image reflected by the mirror on the inside of the 
bathroom door. Despite the fact that Freud did not experience the incident as 
immediately uncanny, he still recalls the displeasing impression that the 
apparition of the elderly gentleman left on him. And despite the fact that 
Freud, “qui ne veut pas parler aux phantoms,”513 refutes any superstitious 
beliefs, he nevertheless ends his autobiographical tale by pondering whether 
the displeasure caused by the intruder in the mirror might be an indication of 
something ancient and long repressed that should have been surmounted by 
his civilized way of thinking, but that still remains as a secret to return. In 
other words, Freud wonders whether the incident, and the discomfort it 
caused, might have been an uncanny reminder of something long and 
perhaps even originally forgotten returning in the ancient figure of the 
Doppelgänger.514  
Yet, Freud withholds from venturing into a further discussion of why this 
apparently harmless, and even quite comical, encounter with his 
unrecognized self should have had such a displeasing and upsetting effect. 
In view of what we have now seen of the daemonic, however, we might 
consider whether Freud’s encounter with himself as another might have been 
such an uncomfortable experience because it calls into question his very 
sense of self by indicating the elusive conditions of its constitution and the 
fragility of its borders. This reading appears to be strengthened by a remark 
Freud makes just a few pages before recounting this uncanny encounter with 
his unrecognized self, where he writes that the motif of the double concerns, 
“ein Rückgreifen auf einzelne Phasen in der Entwicklungsgeschichte des 
Ich-Gefühls, um eine Regression in Zeiten, da das Ich sich noch nicht scharf 
von der Außenwelt und vom Anderem abgegrenzt hatte.”515 In this respect, 
we are therefore in alignment with Royle when he asserts that: “The uncanny 
is a crisis of the proper: it entails a critical disturbance of what is proper (from 
the Latin proprius, ‘own’).”516  
                                           
513 MA, 146/94.  
514 GW XII, 262–263 n1.  
515 GW XII, 249. 
516 Royle 2003, 1. One could think here of the renowned story of The Double by 
Dostoyevsky where the protagonist Mr. Golyadkin constantly tries to reassure himself of 
the borders and propriety of his own being but never succeeds in doing so. Thus he 
repeatedly tells himself that he is a man for himself, that he is his own person, and that 
others cannot threaten this security in himself: “I keep myself to myself and so far as I 
can see am not dependent on any one” (Dostoyevsky 1997, 8). However, despite these 
repeated attempts at self-assurance, Mr. Golyadkin can no longer avoid the exposure of 
his fragile existence once his double suddenly appears and gradually infiltrates his most 
personal habitats until “nobody, absolutely nobody, could have undertaken to distinguish 
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Still, we should not think of this uncanny crisis of the proper as designating 
an experience of something alien or foreign coming to disturb the already 
constituted property of a self. Instead, we must recall the Greek inheritance 
of κρίσις, entailing, as it were, not only an event of scission as of decision 
but also that of a turning point or a sudden change. Accordingly, we must try 
to relate our thinking of the uncanny understood as a crisis of the proper with 
what we saw above concerning the originary scission constituting the 
daemonic ethos of the human psyche. Moreover, we must try to think this 
originary scission as allowing not only the proper possibility of relating to 
oneself through critical judgment but also the improper possibility of a crisis 
separating oneself from oneself to the point where the double suddenly 
emerges in place of oneself.  
With this recurrent mention of ‘the sudden’ in relation to the daemonic, 
we might have a look at The Concept of Anxiety in which Kierkegaard states 
not only that “the daemonic is the sudden [Det Dæmoniske er det 
Pludselige]”,517 that is, the unpredictable, the unforeseeable, and the leaping, 
but also that “the daemonic is the contentless, the boring [Det Dæmoniske er 
det Indholdsløse, det Keedsommelige].”518 This ambiguity is particularly 
interesting in the present context, insofar as Kierkegaard by conferring both 
‘the boring’ and ‘the sudden’ as predicates of the daemonic thereby brings 
into relation the notion of a duplicitous repetition. On the one hand, 
Kierkegaard renders the demonic as the machine-like, monotonous 
movement of the ‘undead’ (Udøetheden); the form of nothing (Intets Form) 
ceaselessly repeating itself in a pseudo-continuity (Skin-Continuitet)—“like 
the elf maid who is hollow when seen from the back.”519 On the other hand, 
however, the daemonic is also characterized as the interruption of such 
monotonous continuity, thereby making its fraudulence manifest. 
Kierkegaard recalls an instance of such a daemonic apparition that seized 
him with horror during a ballet by Bournonville when suddenly the figure of 
Mephistopheles jumped through a window only to remain standing its frame 
petrified in the position of a leap. As Kierkegaard explains, what is daemonic 
                                           
which was the real Golyadkin and which was the counterfeit, which was the old and which 
was the new one, which was the original and which was the copy” (ibid. 42). 
517 SKS 4, 430/129. 
518 SKS 4, 433/132. We should note here, that in terms of Kierkegaard’s categories we 
are only considering the daemonic from an ‘aesthetic’ and not from an ‘ethical’ or a 
‘religious’ perspective. All too briefly, the daemonic in terms of the ethical designates an 
anxiety for the good, i.e. communication, resulting in an inclosing reserve 
(Indesluttethed) revolving endlessly around itself; whereas in terms of the religious the 
daemonic designates an anxiety for the eternal. Yet, as Kierkegaard notes, “eternity is the 
true repetition [Evigheden er den sande Gjentagelse]” (SKS 4, 324/18).  
519 SKS 4, 435/134. 
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about the figure of Mephistopheles is the fact that there is no continuous 
passage (Overgang) in his movements, which would allow one to anticipate 
his next step. Instead, his movements are discontinuous, jerking, ruptured, 
or, with Freud in mind, limping, going from complete standstill (fuldkommen 
Stillestaaen) to an sudden leap resembling those of a raptor surprising its 
prey.   
Now, what does this daemonic figure—both boring in its vacuity and 
sudden in its unavoidable return—represent if not the death that the 
unconscious does not believe and that consciousness can only represent to 
itself through the proxy of a double? As Derrida has emphasized, the 
possibility of relating to oneself is inextricably bound up with the possibility 
of becoming severed from oneself. Moreover, the bond between these two 
possibilities is constitutive of both, wherefore one can no longer speak of a 
self who is present to itself before being exposed to the possibility of its own 
disappearance. Rather, as Derrida writes in La voix et le phénomène: 
“L’apparaître du je à lui-même dans le je suis est donc originairement rapport 
à sa propre disparition possible. Je suis veut donc dire originairement je suis 
mortel.”520 Still, despite the fact that I can only appear to myself on the 
horizon of mortality, my own death nevertheless exceeds my horizon of 
experience—withdrawing from it yet all the while delimiting it—and this 
delimiting excess is precisely what marks the infinite finitude of existence.521 
In light of this ‘mortiferous separation,’ as Malabou calls it, one may view 
all the images of separation that arise in psychoanalysis—some of the most 
significant ones being birth, weaning, and castration—as manifestations of 
the fact that “[f]undamentally it is the cut—the fantasy or anticipation 
thereof—that opens the psyche to the horizon of its own relation to itself, to 
the way in which it can see itself die by doubling itself.”522  
                                           
520 VP, 60–61/54. 
521 Derrida employs the apparently paradoxical syntagma ‘infinite finitude’ in many 
different contexts. For instance, in the dialogue between Derrida, Nancy, and Lacoue-
Labarthe taking place in Strasbourg in 2004, the latter mentions an ‘infinite finitude’ as 
an interest shared by both Derrida and Nancy, whereupon Nancy suggests that Lacoue-
Labarthe would perhaps be more interested in a tragic ‘finite infinitude.’ Cf. Dia, 88f./18f. 
Another instance, is Derrida’s seminal statement in La voix et le phènomène that “La 
différance infinite est finie” (VP, 114/102). 
522 Malabou 2012, 130. However, as Malabou continues, under certain traumatic 
conditions the threat of one’s own disappearance constituting one’s horizon can turn into 
“the threat that the horizon itself might be destroyed” (ibid. 133). Such destruction would 
no longer allow the psyche to maintain a relation to the possibility of its own 
disappearance, which is also the condition of its self-relation. According to Malabou, 
neither Freud nor Lacan pursue this possibility of radical destruction, but rather shy away 
from it by maintaining a possible relation in separation to the destruction of relation in 
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In order to come to a further understanding of the various scenes of cutting 
so significant to psychoanalysis but also of the intercrossing between 
originary separation and repetition that we have come across in our 
engagement with the daemonic, we will once again turn to Lacan for 
assistance. Hence, in the following sections, we will first pursue the link 
between an originary separation and repetition and then turn to different 
scenes of cutting in order to explore how this linkage may manifest itself.   
 
 
IV.5 APRES COUP(URE)—REPETITION IN LACAN 
In Les quatre concepts fondamentaux de la psychanalyse from 1964, Lacan 
appoints ‘repetition’ as one of the four fundamental concepts of 
psychoanalysis—the others being ‘the unconscious,’ ‘transference,’ ‘the 
drive,’ and, as a fifth addendum, ‘the object a.’ Following the trail of Freud, 
Lacan once again raises the question of why repetition first makes its 
appearance as a crux for psychoanalysis in the context of traumatic neurosis. 
Like Freud, Lacan considers the possibility that repetition may be understood 
as a strategy of mastering a traumatic event, but insofar as “précisément nous 
ne savons où situer l’instance qui se livrerait à cette opération de maîtrise,”523 
Lacan warns against too hastily affirming such an interpretation.  
What is incumbent for Lacan to underline concerning repetition—both 
when it pertains to the drive for mastery (Bemächtigungstrieb) and to the 
death drive (Todestrieb)—is that the ‘agency’ of repetition was not there 
before the repetition ‘began.’ Instead, the agency of repetition is itself a 
product of repetition originating in the originary cut that constitutes the 
psychoanalytic subject as always already divided from itself—après 
coup(ure), so to speak.524 Therefore, Lacan insists that we must “fonder 
                                           
such a way that “separation signifies its own effacement—which is to say that it is never 
effaced” (ibid. 139). As I read it, this is where Malabou’s concept of destructive plasticity 
sets in in order to think a complete destruction of any relation in separation without trace, 
which can occur in the wake of severe trauma interrupting any relation between a before 
and an after the trauma. According to Malabou, the traumatized psyches that she calls 
‘the new wounded’ are not even able to relate to themselves (as traumatized) since “when 
the damage occurs, it is another self who is affected, a new self, unrecognizable” (ibid. 
141). 
523 Sem XI, 50/51. 
524 According to Lacoue-Labarthe, the story of an originary division or cut can be read as 
a repetition of  the very history of metaphysics, which, in turn, can be conceived as a 
succession of commentaries on the Parmenidian desire for an identity between being and 
thinking (τò γὰρ αὐτò νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι). Or, as Lacoue-Labarthe recounts the fable 
of identity: “à ‘l’origine,’ il y a la faille, l’écart, la différance qui inquiète l’Identité. 
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d’abord cette répétition dans la schize même qui se produit dans le sujet à 
l’endroit de la rencontre” because, as he continues, it is the exposure to this 
schism “qui nous fait appréhender le réel, dans son incidence dialectique, 
comme originellement malvenu.”525  
As I read Lacan, saying that we have to ground repetition in the split 
occurring in the originally inappropriate or ‘ill-come’ (mal-venu) encounter 
with the real is also a way of saying that the subject is always already split 
because it is originally cut off from its own origin. It is because of this 
original cessation that the primal scene, as Lacan articulates it, will always 
be ‘too early or too late’526 and thus remain a dystychia, that is, an encounter 
that will always already have been missed because of the originally 
discordant timing of the subject. Much like the originary accident of life in 
the Freudian rendition of the Genesis, the subject in Lacan begins, as 
Hyldgaard renders it, with an “ill-timed accident”:  
 
The foundation of the subject is a trauma, an accidental event, a mishap, even 
dystychia […]. No immediate and evident reason or cause for the subject can be 
pinpointed. A trauma is understood as an event without necessity; a cause for the 
subject as an accidental, contingent event; an event without immediate purpose; an 
event that does not make sense, or rather a senseless event that has to be made sense 
of, an event that hereafter will be the foundation of sense.527  
 
To conceive of the subject as a fundamentally traumatic—understood as a 
foundationless and contingent event that may only receive meaning after its 
own meaningless fact, and whose originary meaninglessness continues to 
haunt its subsequently appropriated meanings—also entails that the only 
‘proper’ origin of the subject is repetition—since, as seen in the previous 
chapter, the immemorial past of a trauma belatedly comes to assert itself 
through repetition and not remembrance. 
 Accordingly, just as the repetition compulsion—as a representative of the 
death drive—came to interrupt Freud’s conception of the psychic economy 
as regulated by the pleasure principle, so Lacan confirms and emphasizes 
this disruption by stating that it is upon the function of repetition “qu’y périt 
toute conception de l’unité du psychisme, du prétendu psychisme totalisant, 
synthétisant, ascendant vers la conscience.”528 
                                           
L’histoire est donc l’histoire du Même, qui n’est pas l’identique: l’histoire du manque, du 
retrait, de la répétition de l’altérité” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1979, 3). 
525 Sem XI, 67/69.  
526 Cf. Sem XI, 67/69.  
527 Hyldgaard 2003, 235. 
528 Sem XI, 51/51. 
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On Lacan’s reading, this originary trauma of repetition is precisely that to 
which Freud’s rendering of little Ernst playing the fort:da game testifies. 
After the immemorial trauma of being ‘cut off’ from his (m)other, the infant 
is left with the remainder of his abjected being to play around with only 
symbolically. Originally abandoned with a hole in its being, the infant 
becoming subject is delivered over to the infinite task of trying to cover up 
its constitutive gap with substitutive signifiers over and over again. Here 
again, the repetition constitutive of identity comes very close to a machine-
like repeatability, which threatens to undo the very same identity from 
within. As Lacan explains this perpetual threat in reference to the fort:da 
game:  
 
La fonction de l’exercice avec cet objet se réfère à une aliénation, et non pas à une 
quelconque et supposée maîtrise, dont on voit mal ce qui l’augmenterait dans une 
répétition indéfinie, alors que la répétition indéfinie dont il s’agit manifeste au jour 
la vacillation radicale du sujet.529   
 
In this respect, we may ask whether the infantile compulsion to repeat the 
same thing over and over again might be preoccupied not with repeating the 
selfsame or the identical, as Freud in part suspected,530 but rather with the 
impossibility of repeating the selfsame or the identical due to the originary 
duplicity of repetition, which we outlined in the above. Could it be, then, that 
the component of repetition in children’s play may in fact be a mise en scène, 
or rather a mise en abyme, of one of the oldest aporias of philosophy? 
Namely, the aporia of how to speak of something as identical to itself without 
repeating it and how then to avoid this repetition turning the selfsame into 
another. In other words, might the childish demand to repeat a game or a 
story in exactly the same way—with the same intonations, emphases, and 
impressions—be driven not only by a nostalgic desire for returning to the 
selfsame but also by a preoccupation with the impossibility of such a return, 
and perhaps even by a fascination with the production of difference within 
the repetition? Indeed, this appears to be what Lacan is suggesting when he 
says that “le vrai secret du ludique” is to be found in “la diversité plus 
radicale que constitue la répétition en elle-même.”531  
For Lacan, as for Derrida, the notion of repetition in Freud is not an 
unequivocal term but rather fundamentally ambiguous and bound up in the 
indissolubility of a double bind entailing “deux registres qui s’entremêlent, 
                                           
529 Sem XI, 216/239. 
530 Cf. GW XIII, 36. 
531 Sem XI, 60/61. 
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s’entrelacent.”532 To emphasize these two registers of repetition in relation 
to the traumatic constitution of the subject, Lacan takes up two Aristotelian 
terms—the automaton and the tyché—and transposes them to a 
psychoanalytic context. The two terms are not given very elaborate 
definitions by either Aristotle or Lacan, but in what follows we will attempt, 
as clearly as possible, to explicate how we understand Lacan’s adaption of 
the Aristotelian terms without, however, adapting ourselves entirely to the 
Lacanian discourse. 
In the second book of the Physics, Aristotle employs the notions of 
αὐτόματον and τύχη in order to distinguish between two types of chance or 
accidental events. The automaton, commonly translated into English as ‘the 
automatic’ or ‘the spontaneous,’ designates that which happens by itself, 
automatically, and without inferring to any cause other than itself. As such, 
the automaton also designates an accident in the sense of an event that cannot 
be anticipated, calculated, or programmed as part of a causal chain, but that 
nevertheless takes place with a sort of automatic necessity of its own. Tyché, 
on the other hand, designates that which happens by chance, whether this 
chance event is of a good or ill fortune, that is, an event that cannot be 
assigned a determinable cause or that can only be assigned to unknown 
causes such as fate or divine providence.533  
Turning to Lacan, the automaton comes to designate the way in which 
accidental and arbitrary events are automatically assimilated by the 
mechanisms of the symbolic in its production of reality, whereas the tychic 
designates events that resist such assimilation or appropriation and therefore 
cannot really be experienced as events at all. As Malabou puts it, the non-
events of the tychic are “other events that are like holes within the symbolic 
fabric.”534 In more Lacanian terms, we might say that the tychic designates 
                                           
532 Sem II, 85/65–66. 
533 As for instance in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, when Neoptolemus teaches Philoctetes that 
it is good for men to endure the fortunes alloted to them by the gods (ἐκ θεῶν τύχας) but 
not to wallow persistently in pain (Phil. 1318). According to Aristotle, the automaton is 
the more general term pertaining to everything that happens unexpectedly and without 
determinable cause in nature, whereas tyché is a narrower term restricted to that which 
happens unexpectedly to beings endowed with reason and self-direction: “For tyche itself, 
as a cause, and the results that accrue by the action of tyche, are only spoken of in 
connexion with beings capable of enjoying good fortune, or more generally of ‘doing 
well’ or ‘doing ill’’” (Phys. 197b). Common to both ‘accidental’ and ‘chance’ events, 
however, is that they interrupt the notion of continuous causality, which makes them 
insubsumable under Aristotle’s general theory of the four causes (efficiens, formalis, 
materialis and finalis). As Dolar puts it: “Both tyche and automaton figure like leftovers 
of causality” (Dolar 2013, 225). 
534 Malabou 2012, 134. 
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experiences of the ‘real’ understood as the event of the impossible and that 
the term dystychia signifies the unsuccessful or unfortunate encounter with 
the evasive ‘real’ to which the symbolic subject is perpetually called but 
which retreats from it indefinitely.  
In a prolongation of Freud’s assertion that the pleasure principle regulates 
the processes of the psyche automatically, whith the term automaton Lacan 
is designating precisely “du retour, de la revenue, de l’insistance des signes 
à quoi nous nous voyons commandés par le principe du plaisir.”535 On this 
view, the automaton designates the signifying machine of desire, which, 
fueled by metonymic displacements and metaphoric replacements, 
constitutes the subject as ‘a signifier for another signifier’ and sustains the 
symbolic network of signifiers constituting what we call ‘reality.’ Thus, the 
automaton bears a resemblance to what Derrida, as we saw above, calls the 
economic aspect of repetition, which is associated with conservation, 
remembrance, and the return of the same. In the automaton, everything runs 
according to the laws of ‘symbolic determination,’536 which automatically 
turn all chance, contingency, and surprise into a semantically coded meaning 
pertaining to a structural necessity.  
Yet, something other, indeed another repetition, continually obstructs the 
automatic repetition of the selfsame; but, as Lacan insists, this altering 
belongs to the true nature of repetition, which “est toujours voilé dans 
l’analyse.”537 How so? The alterity of repetition remains veiled in analysis—
though we could expand this rule to every praxis determined by the 
symbolic—because that which repetition repeats can only reveal itself 
through prosthetic substitutes, that is, “in effigie, in absentia.”538 This 
structural secrecy of repetition becomes obvious in the case of transference, 
where repetition precisely functions in relation to the analyst substituting as 
a representative for the absence of the ‘original’ cause of the traumatized 
compulsion to repeat. This is because that which repetition repeats, in 
analysis and beyond, is nothing other than the resistance of the 
unrepresentable, and as such repetition functions in lieu of a representation 
or as ‘le tenant-lieu de la representation,’ which is one of Lacan’s translations 
of Freud’s at-first-glance redundant term Vorstellungsrepräsentanz.539 
                                           
535 Sem XI, 54/53–54. 
536 Cf. Écrits, 60/45. 
537 Sem XI, 54/54. 
538 Sem XI, 54/54. 
539 Cf. Sem XI, 58/60. Lacan’s appropriation of Freud’s Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in his 
own chain of signifiers as the  has been an issue of much debate. In my view, one 
circumstance that makes the notion of the Vorstellungsrepräsentanz in Freud so 
significant to Lacan is the way in which it underlines that the unconscious is not some 
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Hence, the unrepresentable and entirely arbitrary cause of the repetitive 
automatism would be the tychic, which, in Lacan’s view, is therefore the 
name for repetition strictly speaking insofar as that which repetition really 
repeats is precisely the real that remains irreducible to the symbolic and 
irrepresentable to the imaginary.540  
At times, these ‘impossible’ or ‘missed’ events of the tychic can elusively 
manifest themselves as unintentional interruptions of our intentions or as the 
unpredictable that comes to disrupt the chains of meaning and 
purposefulness, such as in lapsus linguae, absentmindedness, forgetfulness, 
mistakes, mishaps, or presumable coincidences. As such, these non-events 
can be conceived as repetitions of the other that come to interrupt, defer, or 
displace the automatic repetitions of the same. At other times, however, the 
tychic designates encounters with that which cannot be encountered because 
of their unfathomable horror, humiliation, shame, or terror and which 
therefore turn into the missed encounters—also called dystychias or traumas. 
Let us therefore turn to one such missed encounter in the psychoanalytic 
archive. 
As I read Lacan’s take on Freud’s famous rendition of the dream of the 
burning child, it stages not only the irruption of the real in the symbolic, as 
a tyché that interrupts and disrupts the automaton, but also the effect of an 
inassimilable trauma encrypted at the heart of mourning. After the event of 
a child’s death, which must always appear accidental since no meaningful 
cause could possibly make sense of it, all the operations that belong to what 
Freud calls the work of mourning set in; grieving, funeral preparations, the 
washing of the body, burying or burning the body, singing psalms, and so 
                                           
realm of ‘raw’ immediate presence in contrast to a representational consciousness. 
Rather, the drive, as Freud writes in Das Unbewußte, “kann aber auch im Unbewußten 
nicht anders als durch die Vorstellung repräsentiert sein” (GW X, 275–276). This 
unavoidability of representation underpins the many expressions of Lacan’s well-known 
dictum: “L’inconscient est dans son fond structuré, tramé, chaîné de langage” (Sem III, 
135/119). For a more thorough discussion of Lacan’s appropriation of the Freudian 
Vorstellungsrepräsentanz, see Johnston and Malabou 2013, 125–137. 
540 This is why Lacan, drawing on the difference in Freud between Wiederkehr and 
Wiederholung, calls the repetitions of the automaton ‘recurrences’ (retours) or ‘returns’ 
(revenue) over and against the ‘repetitions’ (répétitions) of the tyché. One reason for this 
is that while the returns of the automaton pertain to the reappearance of the barred subject 
in the signifying chain, the tychic repetitions of the real pertain to the resistance of the 
always disappearing subject in between these chains. In view of the duplicity pertaining 
to the notion of repetition, which we are investigating here, and bearing in mind Derrida’s 
reminder that there is no repetition itself, we should however exercise great suspicion and 
hold ourselves in suspense with regard to Lacan’s designation of a repetition par 
excellence, which would be the repetition of the real.  
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forth. Yet, do all these gestures of mourning ever encounter the event that 
caused them, or must the death of a child to some extent remain 
unencounterable and inappropriable? Like the knotted navel of a dream that 
resists unraveling by any interpretive strategies, is there not a trauma 
encrypted in every work of mourning that escapes encounter and thereby 
makes the work of mourning as impossible and interminable as analysis? As 
Lacan articulates it:  
 
C’est dans le rêve seulement que peut se faire cette rencontre vraiment unique. Seul 
un rite, un acte toujours répété, peut commémorer cette rencontre immémorable—
puisque personne ne peut dire ce que c’est que la mort d’un enfant—sinon le père 
en tant que père—c’est-à-dire nul être conscient.541  
 
On Lacan’s reading, then, the dream of the Father indirectly and discordantly 
testifies to an irruption of the real in the symbolic precisely by way of its 
evasion or withdrawal from symbolic representation. In the dream, the 
deceased child is brought back to life and to symbolic reality, endowed once 
again with the ability to speak; yet, what the child is telling the sleeping 
father is the unspeakable: that his speechless body is burning. Thus, Lacan 
asks if this delivery of the unspeakable in a dream is not somehow more real 
than what is really happening in the room next to where the father is sleeping, 
and furthermore, whether the dream is not “essentiellement, si je puis dire, 
l’hommage à la réalité manquée?—la réalité qui ne peut plus se faire qu’à se 
répéter indéfiniment, en un indéfiniment jamais atteint réveil.”542 
According to Lacan, it is therefore no coincidence (but perchance the 
accident of a missed encounter) that the compulsion to repeat, and thereby 
the significance of repetition, first appeared on the psychoanalytic stage in 
the context of traumatic neurosis. This is because, as emphasized by Freud, 
a trauma only becomes a trauma in a constitutive ‘belatedness’ 
(Nachträglichkeit), ‘retardation,’ or ‘deferral’ (Verspätung),543 whereby the 
‘original’ experience or event has always already withdrawn from its own 
presence. For this reason, the traumatic event, which comes to be traumatic 
only after the fact—or après coup,544 which is one translation of Freud’s 
                                           
541 Sem XI, 58/59. 
542 Sem XI, 57/58. 
543 Cf. “Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose” (1918), GW XII, 64–75; 77–109; 
128–147.  
544 Cf. Écrits, 256/213. Lacan’s translation is particularly appropriate in the context of 
trauma since the French coup concsisely captures the multiple meanings of the Greek root 
of τραῦμα signifying both ‘a wound,’ ‘a hurt,’ ‘an injury,’ as well as ‘a hard blow’ (cf. 
LSJ). The significance of this hard blow is crucial for Freud’s definition of trauma as an 
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Nachträglichkeit that Lacan employs—cannot be re-presented by memory 
and hence integrated as a once-present member of a narrative whole, but can 
only be repeated once more as another experience or event. Therefore, the 
constitutive belatedness belonging to the temporality of trauma also entails 
a certain futurity that comes along with the other repetition, which carries 
with it a threat so forceful that the traumatic trace seems to come, in fact, 
from the future. For Lacan, the compulsion to repeat becomes a symptom 
precisely of this strange futurity of a past that has never been present.545  
By extension, Lacan defines the tyché as a repeatedly missed encounter 
with the real, which can only return to haunt the symbolic repetitions of the 
automaton belatedly, as that which remains inappropriable by experience, 
and thus by memory, precisely because it ruptures the continuity between 
perception and consciousness. Accordingly, the real becomes available to 
experience only as the experience of a rupture or caesura that remains 
resistant to experience and to re-membering, and can only be encountered 
through repetitions without determinable origins. As Lacan therefore 
emphasizes, the insistence of this other repetition or the repetition of the 
other also shows that, “[t]he key to this insistence in repetition is that in its 
essence repetition as repetition of the symbolical sameness is impossible.”546  
Once again, then, the subject was not there before its repetition because 
repetition is what constitutes the subject belatedly as always already divided 
and doubled in itself. This originary repetition leads Lacan to pose the 
perhaps rhetorical but not self-evident question: “Est-ce que le un est 
antérieur à la discontinuité? Je ne le pense pas […] le un qui est introduit par 
l’expérience de l’inconscient, c’est le un de la fente, du trait, de la rupture.”547 
Lacan enforces this point by once again turning to Frege’s number theory 
in order to show that not only does the one come second in order to replace 
the zero, the one will also not be confirmed in its existence as one until the 
two appears. Yet, as Lacan underlines, what psychoanalytic experience adds 
to this mathematical insight is that “the two does not complete the one to 
make two, but must repeat the one to permit the one to exist.”548  
                                           
event of stimulation or excitation strong enough to break through the protective shield of 
the psychic brain. Cf. GW XIII, 29.  
545 As Derrida clarifies in Voyous: “Le traumatisme a lieu là où l’on est blessé par une 
blessure qui n’a pas encore eu lieu, de façon effective et autrement que par le signal de 
son annonce. Sa temporalisation procède de l’à-venir” (V, 148/104–105). 
546 SIO, 192.  
547 Sem XI, 28/26. Here Lacan plays on the indistinguishability in writing between the 
German ‘Unbewusste’ and the French ‘un’ in order to show how any ‘one’ is always the 
product of a ‘split’ connected to primal repression.  
548 SIO, 191. As Lacan explains: “L’important, pour nous, est que nous voyons ici le 
niveau où—avant toute formation du sujet, d’un sujet qui pense, qui s’y situe—ça compte, 
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Let us back up a bit in the attempt to unfold the untimely relation between 
the originary cut and duplicitous repetition a bit further, without, however 
going into close detail with Lacanian algebra but impiously selecting what 
appears to be of relevance to our specific context from the wealth of his 
textual corpus. 
 
 
IV.6 SCENES OF CUTTING  
As Malabou has pointed out “for Lacan, originary separation—characterized 
as separation of the ego and the subject—is interpreted as the inscription of 
alterity, or lack,”549 and this inscription of alterity is the primordial trauma 
that instigates the history of the subject as always already split. There are 
several other cuts in the path of the subject, in fact the cuts continue to repeat 
themselves, but in what follows we will attempt to approach this originary 
inscription of alterity, which is also a separation of the subject from itself, by 
narrowing our focus to a few crucial cuts for psychoanalysis.  
For Lacan, as for Freud, the earliest cut in the history of the subject is 
birth. Yet for Lacan the crux of the trauma of birth does not pertain to the 
separation of the infant from the mother, as Freud would have it, but rather 
to the separation of the infant from itself in the inscription of alterity. This is 
so because in its embryonic form the subject lives as a parasitical part of the 
mother’s body so that once it is born and the umbilical cord is cut the infant 
subject is not only separated from the body of the mother but also from part 
of its own body. There are therefore, as Taylor has articulated it, “at least 
two dimensions of separation that contribute to desire: the separation of the 
subject from others, and the separation of the self from itself.”550 Yet, 
separation is only one element constitutive of the birth trauma, another, and 
for Lacan perhaps even more crucial, is the intrusive or invasive inscription 
of alterity. As Lacan explains:  
 
[Q]u’en émergeant à ce monde où il [i.e. l’être vivant humain] doit respirer, il est 
d’abord littéralement étouffé, suffoqué. C’est ce que l’on a appelé le trauma—il n’y 
en a pas d’autre—, le trauma de la naissance, qui n’est pas séparation d’avec la 
mère, mais aspiration en soi d’un milieu foncièrement Autre.551  
                                           
c’est compté, et dans ce compté, le comptant, déjà, y est. C’est ensuite seulement que le 
sujet a à s’y reconnaître, à s’y reconnaître comme comptant” (Sem XI, 24/20). In other 
words, the subject is structurally determined as a ‘one’ in the field of the other before it 
is able to recognize itself as such, that is, also before it is able to speak in the place of its 
prescribed oneness and to say I.  
549 Malabou 2012, 133. 
550 Taylor 1987, 100–101. 
551 Sem X, 378/327.  
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In other words, the human being is invaded by the other before it even has a 
chance to establish itself, which is why Lacan takes the “prématuration 
spécifique de la naissance”552 pertaining to the human infant to be of great 
importance to understanding the psychoanalytic subject. The human infant 
is born prematurely insofar as it is born too early to care for itself and 
therefore as wholly dependent on the (m)other’s care to sustain its immature 
being; yet such immaturity presumably goes for most other mammals as 
well. The specific prematurity of the human infant, however, becomes 
obvious in the way in which this prematurity also entails a constitutive 
belatedness in the relation of the subject to itself. This belatedness is testified 
by what Lacan calls the mirror stage, which is yet another cut in the history 
of the psychoanalytic subject.  
According to Lacan, the human infant’s initial identification of itself with 
its specular image introduces an irreducible and irreversible gap (beance) 
between the infant’s polymorphous body “encore plongé dans l’impuissance 
motrice et la dépendance du nourrissage”553 and its imaginary ego projection 
or Imago represented to it in the mirror as a coherent, homeomorphic, and 
unified Gestalt. One could perhaps say that the infant goes from ‘being a 
body’ to ‘having a body’ as an ideal object, which, however, is misleading 
insofar as “la seule vue de la forme totale du corps humain donne au sujet 
une maîtrise imaginaire de son corps, prématurée par rapport à la maîtrise 
réelle.”554  
From its earliest beginnings, then, the subject is constituted in ‘a 
primordial discord’—both chronologically and ontologically, we might 
add—by which it precipitates itself in such a way that it lags behind itself, 
and by which it becomes initially inscribed in “une ligne de fiction.”555 It is 
constituted in a fictional direction, because this primordial ‘line of flight’ of 
the idealized ego, as one might be tempted to call it, will remain irreducibly 
discrepant from the later social determinations to which the subject will 
become subjected, wherefore it will continually displace the subject in a 
“discordance d’avec sa propre réalité.”556  
Hence, from the very outset of self-recognition the subject’s relation to itself 
is marked by a ‘misrecognition’ (méconnaissance).557 Not because such 
                                           
552 Ècrits, 96/78. 
553 Écrits, 94/76. 
554 Sem I, 93/79. 
555 Écrits, 94/76; 96/78. 
556 Écrits, 94/76. 
557 It is difficult to reproduce the same reduplication in English as in French when Lacan 
speaks of “un méconnaître essential au me connaître,” that is, of ‘a misrecognition 
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misrecognition could have been avoided in favor of a more appropriate or 
correct recognition, but because it belongs to the very structure of self-
recognition that misrecognition is inscribed in it as an essential possibility.558 
Without the possibility of misrecognition, miscomprehension, or 
misunderstanding there would be no recognition, comprehension, or 
understanding in the first place—there would only be immediate givens with 
neither the need nor the space for such procedures. As Lacan explains:  
 
L’analyse considère la conscience comme bornée irrémédiablement, et l’institue 
comme principe, non seulement d’idéalisation, mais de méconnaissance, comme—
ainsi qu’on l’a dit, en un terme qui prend valeur nouvelle de se référer au domaine 
visuel—comme scotome.559 
 
In other words, Lacan’s optical depictions of the subject emphasize how 
every auto-inspection is conditioned by an area of partial alteration 
belonging to the field of vision, which means that the idealized self-image 
can only be construed against the dark background of blind spots. 
Accordingly, the Imago of the infant’s body as a whole both symbolizes the 
subject’s first identification of itself as a relatively stable entity, and, at the 
same time, also “préfigure sa destination aliénante.”560  
As Lacan underlines, this cutting instance of the mirror stage is 
constitutive of the me, le moi, in separating the (real) subject from the 
(imaginary) ego. However, this first identificatory dyad of the real and the 
imaginary can only acquire a meaningful reality in its legitimation by the 
Other, that is, by its inscription into the intersubjective register of signifying 
language, which passes us on to the symbolic register.561 This necessity of 
                                           
essential to recognizing myself,’ or, as Fink translates it, “a misrecognizing that is 
essential to knowing myself” (Écrits, 684/808).  
558 The term ‘essential possibility’ is borrowed from Derrida who, in his discussion with 
Searle, emphasizes how any concept or theory of a structure said to be ‘normal,’ ‘general,’ 
or ‘standard’ must be able to account for “la possibilité essentielle des cas dits marginaux, 
des accidents, anomalies, contaminations, parasitages” (LI, 215/118) affecting its 
construction from the very outset. Accordingly, if one had the intention of developing a 
‘standard’ theory or concept of self-recognition, self-understanding, or self-consciousness 
it would also be necessary to take into account the essential possibilities of 
misrecognitions, misunderstandings, and unconscious divergences always already 
inscribed in such ‘standard,’ which, one could argue, is precisely what Freudian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis attempt to do.  
559 Sem XI, 78/82. 
560 Écrits, 95/76. 
561 We will not go into a detailed discussion of Lacan’s three registers ‘the imaginary,’ 
‘the real,’ and ‘the symbolic,’ here; however, as will hopefully become clearer as we 
proceed, we will merely note that these registers are interdependently and non-
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bringing the imaginary fictional line into relation with the corrective reality 
of the symbolic, can be observed in the very first gesture of the infant, 
following its surprised jubilation in recognizing itself in the mirror, which is 
to turn towards the (m)other holding the child, or standing behind, it for some 
sign of confirmation of its own experience. The m(other) will often provide 
a confirmative response to the infant’s experience of self-recognition by 
pointing to the mirror reflection and calling it by the infant’s proper name, 
thus enforcing the sense of a unified identity.  
It is first by mirroring itself in others and their employment of language 
that the infant subject acquires the ability to speak in the first person singular, 
that is, the function of the I, le je. As with every word, the subject becomes 
capable of saying I only via imitation, repeating the ways in which ‘I’ is 
employed by others in order eventually to make of this general shifter an 
expression of what the child will by then have become accustomed to as its 
own particular I. This is why the first language is also called the mother 
tongue; the infant literally borrows the tongue of the (m)other in order to 
speak for itself. Initially, then, my ‘I’ is borrowed from and only receives a 
meaning from another. Lacan therefore discerns the passage from the 
imaginary to the symbolic register as proceeding “de l’image spéculaire va 
à la constitution du moi sur le chemin de la subjectivation par le 
significant”562—a passage that also corresponds to “le glissement par quoi le 
Bewusstsein sert à couvrir la confusion du Selbst.”563  
At the symbolic level, then, the cut of alienation is linked to the incision 
of the signifying mark, which bars the subject from its acephalic or 
polycephalic unorganized being by turning it into an one-headed organism 
defined as a signifier for another signifier, and which Lacan associates with 
the traumatic, hence immemorial, event of a primary repression 
(Urverdrängung) in Freud.564 This primary repression gives rise to the initial 
                                           
hierarchically structured, as illustrated by one of Lacan’s later topologies of the subject 
called the Borromean knot. Accordingly, one register cannot serve as the principle of the 
others, and when one of the registers is somehow changed, distorted, or interrupted it will 
affect all of the other registers of subject as well. See, for instance, Sem XX, 107–
123/118–136. 
562 Écrits, 809/685. 
563 Écrits, 809/685.  
564 As Lacan has it: “Le sujet transformé dans cette image polycéphale semble tenir de 
l’acéphale. S’il ya une image qui pourrait nous représenter la notion freudienne de 
l’inconscient, c’est bien celle d’un sujet acéphale, d’un sujet qui n’a plus d’ego, qui est 
extrême à l’ego, décentré par rapport à l’ego, qui n’est pas de l’ego. Et pourtant il est le 
sujet qui parle, car c’est lui qui, à tous les personnages qui sont dans le rêve, fait tenir ces 
discours insensés—qui justement prennent de leur caractère insensé leur sens” (Sem II, 
200/167). 
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‘metaphor,’ which transports the subject (S) to the place of the unary trait of 
the first signifier (S1)565 in replacing and representing the non-identical with 
the identical in its difference from others.  
Accordingly, the unifying mark of the signifier is also a mark of 
differentiation in more than one sense. First, because it functions only on the 
basis of a separation of the subject from itself by introducing a gap between 
‘being and meaning,’ ‘signified and signifier,’ ‘thing and word’ or ‘concept,’ 
‘immediacy and mediation,’ etc. Second, strongly influenced by Saussure’s 
linguistic dictum that “dans la langue il n’y a que des differences,”566 
Lacan’s defines the signifier as constituted solely by its difference to other 
signifiers within an open network of differential relations.  
This implies that the subject’s definition as a signifier for another signifier 
necessarily proceeds ad infinitum insofar as ‘il n’y a pas d’Autre de 
l’Autre.’567 That is to say, there is no absolute signifier that would be able to 
provide closure to a signifying chain, just as there is no Other who would 
have the infinite knowledge capable of comprehending all the different 
relations of signifying language in order finally to determine the infinite 
finitude of subjectification in some sort of metalanguage. This interminable 
termination, which, as we have seen, is simply a sign of mortality, is, Lacan 
proclaims, ‘le grand secret’ of interminable psychoanalysis at whose 
termination only ‘une vérité sans vérité’ is revealed.568 As such, the subject 
of signification remains “un étant dont l’être est toujours ailleurs”569 and who 
can therefore never become identical to itself. Or, as Soler has put it, the 
subject determined by the signifier is “one without identity.”570  
                                           
565 Put briefly, Lacan’s le trait unaire is an adaptation of Freud’s term ein einzigen Zug 
from the chapter on identification in his Massenpsychologie und Ich-Analyse. Cf. GW 
XIII, 117. According to Lacan, the unary trait denotes that through which every being can 
be said to be a one, a monas, that is, that which makes the subject countable only on the 
condition of a reduction of difference. See, Sem IX, Chs. 4–5. 
566 Saussure 1995, 166/120  
567 Lacan first expressed this notorious sentence in session XVI of his sixth seminar on 
Le désir et son interprétation from 1958–59. In all fairness, it should be noted that Lacan’s 
denial of the Other for the Other could also, to a certain extent, be regarded as a 
denegation of his own earlier position regarding the Name-of-the-Father as the master 
signifier guaranteeing the symbolic order as “le signifiant de l’Autre en tant que lieu de 
la loi” (Écrits, 583/485). As Miller underlines, a turn seems to takes place in Lacan’s 
teaching from 1958 to 1959 entailing, among other displacements of his earlier discourse, 
a pluralization of the Names-of-the-Father, which necessitated that “Lacan had to think 
against himself in order to formulate: ‘there is no Other of the Other’” (Miller 2013, 15–
29). 
568 Cf. Sem VI, 353-354.  
569 Sem XX, 180/142. 
570 Soler 2014, 108. 
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Hence, if the Lacanian subject on the one hand becomes determinable in and 
as language, this determinability comes with a price on the other, the costs 
of which are accounted for in the operation of alienation entailing what 
Lacan calls an ‘aphanisis’ or a ‘fading’ of the subject.571 Rendered in a 
somewhat simplistic manner, the operation of alienation occurs when the 
subject, which is not yet determined as such, in its constitution is confronted 
by a disjunctive vel (˅) forcing it to choose between its indeterminate, open, 
and semantically vacuous being and its delimited and determined meaning. 
However, as Lacan underlines, this choice is not an actual choice but a forced 
choice because you cannot choose not to choose between the two options 
and, moreover, because each option implies an unavoidable loss on the other 
side. We will let Lacan explain the aporetic operation himself:  
 
Nous choisissions l’être, le sujet disparaît, il nous échappe, il tombe dans le non-
sens—nous choisissons le sens, et le sens ne subsiste qu’écorné de cette partie de 
non-sens qui est, à proprement parler, ce qui constitue, dans la réalisation du sujet, 
l’inconscient.572 
 
Of course this situation is a retrospective abstraction, since one could ask 
who exactly it is that chooses, seeing as the subject only comes to be in this 
choice. But this is precisely Lacan’s point: the subject has no choice—which 
is therefore not a choice—than to come into its being as already lost. In other 
words, once the subject appears as meaning in one place (in the register of 
the symbolic) it disappears as being in another (in the register of the real), 
which Lacan in his ‘Subversion du sujet et dialectique du désir dans 
l’inconscient freudien’ refers to as the ‘lethal factor’ of language. Thus Lacan 
writes: “Être de non-étant, c’est ainsi qu’advient Je comme sujet qui se 
conjugue de la double aporie d’une subsistance véritable qui s’abolit de son 
savoir et d’un discours où c’est la mort qui soutient l’existence.”573  
                                           
571 Cf. Sem XI, 198f./207f. Lacan employs the term ‘fading’ in English insofar as he 
borrows it from the British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones. See also, Sem VI, 361. 
572 Sem XI, 192/211. 
573 Écrits, 802/679. Noticeably, this movement of meaningful, identifying, signifying 
existence sustaining itself through the death of non-sensical, non-identical, singular being 
is strongly influenced by Hegel and in particular by Kojève’s reading of Hegel. As 
previously noted, Hegel renders the life of spirit not only as arising from the death of 
nature but, as he states in the Phänomenologie, also as ‘carrying’ (ertragen) and 
‘upholding’ (erhalten) death in itself (cf. HW 3, 36). The abortive birth of spirit is also 
indicated in the description of the signifying perception (Warhnehmung) of things, which, 
precisely because it perceives the perceived in its thingness (Dingheit), implies that “das 
Ding geht vielmehr durch seine wesentliche Eigenschaft zu Grunde” (ibid. 103). In other 
words, signifying perception, as well as the meaningful language, kills the singularity of 
whatever it perceives or articulates in raising it to the sur-vival of spirit. On this, see also 
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There is no retreating of what retreats with the incision of signifying 
language and, bearing in mind its Latin etymology, the infant who is born 
without speech574 will only ever come to itself as a subject of speech when it 
is too late to save the speechlessness of its bare being already obliterated in 
the garments of meaning. Lacan therefore also refers the symbolic cut to the 
parting of the lips, which, once they have let go of the breast (sein), open the 
void of the mouth that allows the subject first to cry and then to fill out this 
hollow cry with speech.575 The language of consciousness would thus live 
off a forgotten death, which it cannot remember because it was not yet there 
to experience it and when it arrived there it had already killed that which it 
henceforth seeks to revive with its words, since “the loss does not exist 
before this symbolization indicates its place.”576  
Lacan’s suggestion that it is the very incision of the symbolic cut that 
inscribes a loss in the real is important in order to avoid a naïve ‘realist’ 
misunderstanding of the real that would have Lacan proclaim the existence 
of some pure, immediate, pre-linguistic, and pre-symbolic being prior to the 
arrival of symbolic language. Rather, it is the inscription of symbolic 
language as such that retroactively gives rise to the ‘myth’ of such pure 
primordial being, which would have been originally lost, meaning that this 
‘lost origin’ is only constituted retrospectively after the fact of cutting (après 
coup(ure)). This, again, is why traumatic repetition is the only thing that can 
(im)properly be said to be ‘originary,’ since the primal repression of the 
subject is the cut that originally marks the unmarked in such a way that it can 
only ever be re-marked.577 Or, as Lacan formulates it in 1956: “De cette 
                                           
Agamben 1991, 41–48. However, as we shall see in what follows there is an important 
difference between Hegel and Lacan regarding this deathly language, which has do with 
a certain obstruction of the dialectic.  
574 Infant is derived from the Latin in-fans, where fans is the present participle of fari, 
meaning ‘to speak,’ wherefore the infant is ‘without speech.’  
575 Lacan, knowing Heidegger very well, often plays on the fact that the French word for 
breast, sein, which can also mean ‘womb,’ ‘midpoint,’ and ‘heart,’ is also the German 
word for being, Sein, which is precisely what the subject loses once it lets go of the breast 
in order to speak. 
576 SIO, 191.  
577 As such, one could suggest that Lacan’s ‘law of language’ to some extent resembles 
what Derrida, in his readings of Nancy, calls the ‘law of tact.’ According to Derrida, the 
‘law of tact’ at the same time demands and forbids touching, so that “[E]n touchant, il est 
interdit de toucher” (T, 81/66). According to this law, one must therefore “savoir toucher 
sans toucher, sans trop toucher, là où toucher, c’est déjà trop” (T, 82/67). In a similar 
way, Lacan’s ‘law of language’ both makes the enjoyment of the Thing possible and 
impossible. This can be illustrated by Lacan’s portmanteau word l’interdit, which 
designates both an ‘interdict’ and a ‘saying of the in-between’ thus showing how “la 
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hétéronomie du symbolique, nulle préhistoire ne nous permet d’effacer la 
coupure”578 This is undoubtedly true, yet, as Blanchot reminds us in 
L’écriture du désastre, this prehistory that forbids us to efface the 
heteronomous cut of language because it is itself constituted as effaced by it 
nonetheless remains elsewhere as the ‘immemorabilia’ of a forgotten 
memory in whose unending obliteration we come to speak:  
 
[L]a possibilité de parole et de vie dépendrait, par la mort et le meurtre, de la relation 
de singularité qui s’établirait fictivement avec un passé muet, en deçà de l’histoire, 
hors passé par conséquent, dont l’infans éternel se fait figure, en même temps qu’il 
s’y dérobe.579   
 
In a more Lacanian vocabulary, this mute past of an eternal infancy 
continually effaced by the non-effaceable cut of signifying language belongs 
precisely to the inaccessibility of the real, which nevertheless bears a trace 
of “cet Autre préhistorique impossible à oublier.”580 Impossible to forget, 
indeed, but also impossible to remember insofar as it remains inappropriable 
to any proper remembrance as “quelque chose qu’au niveau de l’inconscient, 
seule représente une representation.”581 Furthermore, this impossibility of 
forgetting what one cannot remember, namely, the effaced real of the 
ineffaceable cut of signifying language, exposes that the fact that “[c]ette 
extériorité du symbolique par rapport à l’homme est la notion même de 
l’inconscient.”582  
                                           
jouissance est interdite à qui parle comme tel, ou encore qu’elle ne puisse être dite 
qu’entre les lignes” (Écrits, 821/696). 
578 Écrits, 468/392. 
579 EdD, 116/71. 
580 Sem VII, 87/71. 
581 Sem VII, 87/71. 
582 Écrits, 469/392. Here we should underline that Lacan, in a certain displaced 
appropriation of Saussurean linguistics, operates with a distinction between parole, which 
is usually translated as either ‘speech’ or ‘discourse,’ but which can also mean ‘word,’ 
and langage, usually translated as ‘language,’ which, in opposition to a particular 
language (langue), designates any signifying structure constituted by differential 
relations. When Lacan says that the unconscious is structured like (comme) a language he 
is therefore not saying that the unconscious is a discourse of meaningful propositions that 
can be identified as a particular language with a particular grammatical structure as in the 
register of the symbolic. Rather: “L’inconscient, à partir de Freud, est une chaîne de 
signifiants qui quelque part (sur une autre scène, écrit-il) se répète et insiste pour interférer 
dans les coupures que lui offre le discours effectif et la cogitation qu’il informe” (Écrits, 
799/676). Hence, in a somewhat crude assimilation of two different (con)texts, one could 
say that Lacan’s language would belong to what Benveniste calls the ‘semiotic,’ whereas 
speech or discourse would be of the order of the ‘semantic.’ According to both Lacan and 
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In other words, just as there was no repressed before repression, and vice 
versa, insofar as the Urverdrängung names the immemorial instigation of 
both at the same, yet anachronic, time, so there was no ‘authentic’ real before 
the ‘alienating’ reality of the signifier, since neither emerges before the cut 
that separates them. The point for Lacan is therefore not whether such a pure 
state of being can be said to have ever really existed or not, but rather that 
existence as such, which for Lacan is the existence of desire, needs this 
lacking ground in order to ex-ist in the first place. If the (m)other did not 
show signs of lacking something and therefore also of desiring something, 
the infant would never let go of the breast (sein) in its desire to become the 
object of that unknown desire.   
In order to regain a little freedom from its traumatic alienation by the 
initial signifier and from the fixation of the (m)other’s desire, the subject 
must separate itself ‘actively,’ although not necessarily intentionally, in 
order to defend itself against the originary separation it suffered ‘passively’ 
by liberating itself from the initially repressive metaphor to the metonymy 
of substituting signifiers.583 This second operation of separation, however, 
cannot be performed without a certain degree of deception insofar as a proper 
return to a ‘time before’ the originary separation is no longer possible (if it 
ever was). Instead, the subject must repeat the act of separation in order to 
make its engendered loss work as the productive force of the dialectics of 
desire: “Le fantasme de sa mort, de sa disparition, est le premier objet que le 
sujet a à mettre en jeu dans cette dialectique, et il le met en effet.”584 Hence, 
the repeated separation is an operation by which the subject regains some 
‘freedom’ through the very circumstance that it was trying to avoid, that is, 
in the non-meaning of its vanishing being. This vanishing being reveals the 
irreducible holes in the supposedly determining meaning of the signifiers and 
thereby allows the subject to play more ‘freely’ with the remainder of his 
being, which is nothing but these leftover holes in the nets of symbolization, 
by replacing one signifier with another, whereby “[u]n manque recouvre 
l’autre.”585  
Accordingly, the two operations of alienation and separation manifested 
both in the imaginary alienation of the mirror stage and in alienation of 
                                           
Benveniste these different registers constituting the ambiguity of language are separated 
by a hiatus. Cf. Benveniste 1981, 5–23.  
583 Lacan is here playing on all the fluctuating significations that separare has in French 
since, as Lacan writes in signifies “aussi bien s’habiller, que se défendre, se fournir de ce 
qu’il faut pour vous mettre en garde, et j’irai plus loin encore, ce à quoi m’autorisent les 
latinistes, au se parere, au s’engendrer dont il s’agit dans l’occasion” (Sem XI, 194/214). 
584 Sem XI, 195/214. 
585 Sem XI, 195/215.  
202 
 
symbolic language are constitutive of one of Lacan’s most basic algorithms 
of the subjective structure—namely, the algorithm of phantasy—showing 
how the support of desire is conditioned by a lack: $ ◊ a. What this algorithm 
denotes is the situating of two ‘lacks’ (manques) on either side of a 
‘functioning rim’ (bord fonctionnant) ◊: on the one side, the barred subject 
$ (sujet barré), understood as the empty interval between signifiers in a 
signifying chain; on the other side, the small object a (objet petit a), 
understood as the ever-evasive real of signification. The functioning rim thus 
symbolizes the two operations at work in the constitution of the symbolic 
subject in relation to its impossible encounter with the real. These are the 
disjunctive alienation represented by the lower part of the lozenge (˅: either 
being or meaning), and the conjunctive separation represented by the upper 
part of the lozenge allowing for the metonymic relation of desire to its 
always-lacking object (˄: and, and, and, etc.).586   
Originally displaced in the gap between the imaginary ego and the 
abjected real of the subject instigated by the symbolic cut, the subject is 
therefore assigned the interminable task of negotiating between these orders, 
a negotiation that is strictly unnegotiable and, as such, interminable but 
nevertheless unavoidable. Lacan can therefore say that “le chemin du sujet 
passe entre deux murailles de l’impossible.”587  
 
 
IV.7 RESUMING: THE SAME IN THE OTHER IS THE OTHER IN THE SAME.  
To sum up, with these scenes of cutting I believe Lacan is trying to underpin 
his view that fundamentally “le sujet n’est sujet que d’être assujettissement 
au champ de l’Autre.”588 This sentence, so significant to understanding 
Lacan, could in fact be read as a retranslation of Freud’s equally significant 
sentence Wo Es war soll Ich werden. All too simply, we read both these 
psychoanalytic crescendos as emphasizing that the subject can neither be 
defined, determined, nor acquire any meaning by ‘itself’ alone but only in 
and through its relation to the other—whether ‘inside’ or ‘outside.’  
The subject can never be instigated as its own master, because it is always 
already born into, constituted and predetermined by that which is outside of 
its authority. Put simply, we are all born (which no one chooses to be) into a 
                                           
586 Cf. Sem XI, Chs. 16–17.  
587 Sem XI, 152/167.  
588 Sem XI, 172/188. The subjection of the subject concerns precisely the unconscious 
emergence of consciousness and meaning in this field of the Other. Wherefore, Lacan 
explains: “L’Autre est le lieu où se situe la chaîne du signifiant qui commande tout ce qui 
va pouvoir se présentifier du sujet, c’est le champ de ce vivant où le sujet a à apparaître” 
(Sem XI, 185/203).  
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language, an environment, a family, and other institutions that provide us 
with the words, the values, the sensations, the meanings, and the relations by 
which we come to define ourselves but which we have had no authority in 
forming. This is not to say that every single human being is preprogrammed 
all the way from its beginning to its end with no space for accidents, 
divergences, or surprises. Rather, it is to say that I cannot have a relation to 
myself that is not somehow already induced and infiltrated by all of these 
instances of otherness, which I never had a chance to choose before they 
intimately influenced every single choice that I will ever come to make in 
the exposure to such accidents, divergences, and surprises.  
For Lacan, then, there can be no talk of a subject in and for itself (an und 
für sich); there is only a subject in and for the other, which is why, despite 
his great admiration for Hegel, Lacan the psychoanalyst nevertheless 
dissociates himself from Hegel the philosopher. Even if the Hegelian 
dialectics of recognition to a certain extent displays how the desire of the 
subject is always the desire of the other, this dialectic remains a violent 
struggle between two self-consciousnesses where “l’Autre est celui qui me 
voit, et c’est ce qui, à soi tout seul, engage la lutte.” By contrast, “[p]our 
Lacan, parce que Lacan est analyste, l’Autre est là comme inconscience 
constituée comme telle.”589 That is to say that the Other concerns my desire 
in the most intimately estranging of ways insofar as every possibility of my 
object of desire is given by the lack of an Other, who does not know what it 
lacks, and by the phantasies I then produce about this lack of the Other. As 
Lacan further explains:  
 
C’est pourquoi il n’y a pas pour moi, non seulement d’accès à mon désir, mais 
même de sustentation possible de mon désir qui ait référence à un objet quel qu’il 
soit, si ce n’est en le couplant, en le nouant avec ceci, le $, qui exprime la nécessaire 
dépendance du sujet par rapport à l’Autre comme tel.590 
 
Without claiming the plausibility of any one-to-one translation or 
transposition of terms, we might still risk the suggestion that Lacan’s 
algebraic notations, S (the subject of the unconscious who is not yet existing 
as an I) and $ (the subject existing by the alienating separation of the signifier 
allowing it to speak in the first-person singular), could be read as displaced 
reflections of the Es and the Ich in Freud. The barred subject designates the 
subject inscribed in the signifying chains of symbolic language, whose ex-
istence is made up of signifiers representing themselves for another signifier. 
The subject of the real designates that which is originally lost to the symbolic 
                                           
589 Sem X, 33/23. 
590 Sem X, 33/23. 
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inscription but that somehow remains or returns in the holes and hiatuses of 
the signifying chains as traces of the unspeakable silence that belongs to 
language as the intimate exteriority of its infancy.  
The real of the subject must therefore remain mythical insofar as it is the 
always not yet or already no longer existing subject that eludes the logos of 
signification; as soon as it is articulated it has already escaped or been missed 
by its articulation and turned into what it is not. This also implies that the 
object a of desire is really the inaccessible yet irreducible remainder of the 
subject ‘itself,’ originally lost in its subjection to speech, signifying 
language, and meaning: “Where is the subject? It is necessary to find the 
subject as a lost object. More precisely this lost object is the support of the 
subject and in many cases is a more abject thing than you may care to 
consider.”591 
The subjection of the subject to signification happens unconsciously; the 
subject is a space of inscription—a ‘mystic writing pad’ (Wunderblock) we 
might say with Freud, or a subjectile in the non-sense of Artaud592—and as 
such the history of a subject might be considered as a palimpsest text in the 
process of continually being written, read, and erased by multiple others.593 
Yet the subject is also the continual exscription of inscription insofar as there 
remains an irreducible inconsistency between the unconscious inscriptions 
and what is given to consciousness to read. The exscription of inscription is 
precisely what makes the subject of a text inexhaustible; it is that which in 
every text resists being read exhaustively, thus making analysis interminable. 
In the words of Nancy: “L’âge de l’imprimerie est bien l’âge du sujet—il 
n’est de livre que d’un je, et je se répète, c’est à cela qu’il se reconnaît.”594  
It is in this light that we should read Lacan’s preface to the English 
translation of the eleventh Seminar, where he writes: “A certificate tells me 
that I was born. I repudiate this certificate: I am not a poet, but a poem. A 
poem that is being written, even if it looks like a subject.”595 In other words, 
the subject is too late to have been born and is therefore in some sense still 
unborn—always yet to be born. This means that I can only ever repeat myself 
in the attempt to catch up with my own being, which was never simply there 
                                           
591 SIO, 189.  
592 Cf. “Notiz über den ‘Wunderblock’” (GW XIV, 3–8). See also, ED, 293-340/196–
231. 
593 Lacan refers to the so-called ‘interior eight’ topology of the Möbius strip to illustrate 
how the structural heteronomy of language functions as an “essential inscription at the 
origin, in the knot which constitutes the subject” (SIO, 192). 
594 RE, 89/325–326. 
595 Sem XI, viii. 
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but is being continually written by another—even if this attempt will remain 
an ever-missed encounter.596  
Accordingly, there remains an irreducible ambiguity in the way in which 
Lacan defines the subject, which makes it impossible to reduce it to what is 
said or written about it, that is, to ‘language,’ ‘meaning,’ or other ‘concepts.’ 
On the one hand, then, the Lacanian subject is neither more nor less than a 
signifier for another signifier and as such is caught in the nets of signifying 
language. On the other hand, however, the subject is that which always fades 
‘behind,’ ‘underneath,’ or ‘in between’ the signifying chains and thus 
perpetually resists signification by withdrawing from its grasp. This 
withdrawing subject is to be read neither as the stabile stance of the 
ὑποκείμενον nor as the perpetual presence of the subiectum, but rather as the 
ever fading conception of such concepts. However, as Lacan emphasizes, 
this “sliding and the difficulty of seizing, the never-here (it is here when I 
search there; it is there when I am here) is not nothing.”597 
In order to express this ambiguity, Lacan in his return to Freud introduces 
alternative, more dynamic, and vacillating topologies of the subject as 
substitutions for Freud’s topologies of the psyche, which are misleadingly 
static. Whereas the topologies of Freud, both before and after Das Ich und 
Das Es, still somehow seek to outline an internal psychic apparatus exposed 
to and confronted by an external environment—even if this apparatus does 
harbor an inner foreignness that seems to come from the outside—Lacan 
proposes various topologies of the subject that subvert any clear distinction 
between the internal and the external as well as between the subject and the 
object.598 
In other words, object a is the remainder of an intimate exteriority from 
which the subject is cut off as a part of itself remains inaccessible to it as 
other than a lack—albeit a lack that is constitutive of the upholding of its 
subjective reality. In the words of Lacan:  
 
C’est donc en tant que représentant de la représentation dans le fantasme, c’est-à-
dire comme sujet originairement refoulé que le $, S barré du désir, supporte ici le 
                                           
596 Or, as Lacan formulates it, “the subject is the effect of this repetition in as much as it 
necessitates the ‘fading,’ the obliteration, of the first foundation of the subject, which is 
why the subject, by status, is always presented as a divided essence” (SIO, 192).  
597 SIO, 196.  
598 Very roughly, Lacan’s topologies can be divided into topologies of surfaces, which 
have fluid and porous boundaries such as the torus, the Klein bottle, the Möbius strip, and 
the cross-cap, and topologies of knotted complexes showing how different registers are 
in inextricably interrelated with others, such as the Borromean knot mentioned above. 
See, for instance: Sem X, Ch. 7; Sem XX, Ch.10; Sem XXIII, Chs. 1–3.  
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champ de la réalité, et celui-ci ne se soutient que de l’extraction de l’objet a qui 
pourtant lui donne son cadre.” 599  
 
What therefore happens when this constitutive lack comes to be lacking is 
that the very frame of the subject’s reality begins to dissolve, which causes 
great anxiety to the subject that says I. 
Here we begin to discern a certain relation between the uncanny and 
anxiety, which both somehow concern borders, thresholds, frames, and other 
phenomena of the liminal and which both somehow concern the difficult and 
slippery notion of ‘the real’ in Lacan, which cannot be understood simply as 
an unreality in opposition to reality. Rather, the real designates the originally 
unrealized of what was aborted and repressed in the anarchical 
Urverdrängung, and which afterwards returns to appear only elusively to the 
ontic optics of consciousness “comme quelque chose qui se tient en attente 
dans l’aire, dirai-je, du non-né.”600 On Lacan’s reading, it is precisely these 
experiences of a caesural suspense of experience that, as he says, “contraint 
à poser ce que Freud appelle, en en faisant l’hommage à Fechner, die Idee 
einer anderer Lokalität—une autre localité, un autre espace, une autre scène, 
l’entre perception et conscience.”601  
For Freud, this ‘andere Schauplatz,’ designating the scene of the 
unconscious primary processes that remain inaccessible and inappropriable 
to the secondary processes of consciousness, reveals itself mainly in the 
dream work.602 For Lacan, by extension, the ‘other scene’ designates the 
space of the real, stretching from trauma to phantasy, that is extracted in the 
staging of a common ‘reality,’ but which continues to haunt the constitution 
of this stage of reality from behind the scenes. The other scene is an 
otherwise than reality that nevertheless has very real effects on reality 
insofar as it “se répète et insiste pour interférer dans les coupures que lui 
offre le discours effectif et la cogitation qu’il informe.”603 With this 
indication of another scene, or the scene of the other, behind or beyond the 
stage of reality, we finally seem ready, even if not prepared, to engage with 
the uncanny in relation to anxiety. 
 
                                           
599 Écrits, 554/487.  
600 Sem XI, 25/23. 
601 Sem XI, 55/56. 
602 Cf. GW II/III, 51; 541. 
603 Écrits, 799/676. 
  
V. THE SOLITUDE OF DISSOLUTION 
Lacan and Blanchot on Seeing Oneself Disappear 
 
The bell then beating one—Enter Ghost  
– William Shakespeare, Hamlet 
 
Il était aux prises avec quelque chose d’inaccessible, d’étranger,  
quelque chose dont il pouvait dire:  
cela n’existe pas, et qui sentait errer dans l’aire de sa solitude 
– Maurice Blanchot, Thomas l’Obscur 
 
 
V.1 INTRODUCTION: THE RELATION OF ANXIETY TO THE UNCANNY 
Even if Freud does not explicitly unfold the uncanny in its relation to anxiety, 
there are nevertheless several indications of such a relation to be found in his 
writings, for instance, in his insistence on distinguishing specifically 
uncanny experiences within various other forms of anxious experiences 
(innerhalb des Ängstlichen ein ‘Unheimliches’ zu unterscheiden), these 
being precisely experiences that evoke a specific kind of anxiety going back 
to the old and long familiar secrets of the home.604  
In his tenth seminar on anxiety held in 1962–63, it would seem that Lacan 
has taken up the challenge of making the relation of the uncanny and anxiety 
more emphatic and more prominent, to the point where Freud’s text on Das 
Unheimliche even becomes “la cheville indispensable pour aborder la 
question de l’angoisse.”605 The notion of anxiety drawn out in the tenth 
seminar is so tortuously manifold that the task of unfolding even a few of its 
aspects would merit an entire study for itself. In what follows, I shall 
therefore restrict myself to a reading of the seminar that follows a very 
stringent and narrow thread, tracing the relation between the uncanny and 
anxiety. This means that we will continue to read along the thread delineated 
throughout the preceding chapters—all the way from the impossibility of 
being alone, through the dependency of personal solitude on others, to the 
impersonality of the Es and the uncanny unhomeliness in Freud. It is my 
hope that this thread has now led us to a pivotal point, where we can attempt 
to approach the almost unapproachable experience of a certain anxious, 
solitary, and uncanny experience of disappearance and dissolution—of the 
anxious subject itself and of its reality, which are two inseparable 
experiences. To begin this approach, we shall mainly look at Lacan’s 
                                           
604 Cf. GW XII, 230. 
605 Sem X, 53/41.  
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seminar on anxiety, but as we go along we shall also encounter other texts 
by Lacan until, in the last section, we engage in a certain reading 
together/apart of Lacan and Blanchot.  
Yet, the relation between anxiety and the uncanny is not the only challenge 
taken up by Lacan in the tenth seminar, which also appears to be responding 
more or less implicitly to a more or less rhetorical question posed by 
Heidegger in his introduction to Was ist Metaphysik? After suggesting that 
anxiety might be one way for the contemporary human being to become 
attuned to the destinal forgetting that belongs to the truth of being, and 
thereby once again alluding to the relation between ‘unconcealedness’ 
(Unverborgenheit) and ‘unhomeliness’ (Unheimlichkeit), Heidegger asks: 
“Was hat das Seinsgeschick dieser Angst mit Psychologie und 
Psychoanalyse zu tun?”606 As is quite clear from the fact that he does not 
even bother to unfold, let alone answer, this question (as though the answer 
were self-evident), Heidegger is convinced that neither psychology nor 
psychoanalysis have anything to offer regarding the human being in its 
anxious relation to destinal being. Lacan, however, seems to be less 
convinced regarding this matter and even less so by Heidegger’s conviction.  
Accordingly, one might read Lacan’s seminar as a conflictual reading-
together, or Auseinandersetzung, of Freud’s psycho-aesthetic analysis of the 
uncanny and Heidegger’s existential-ontological account of the 
unhomeliness of Dasein. This is not to say, however, that Lacan is putting 
forth an ontology, let alone a metaphysics or a philosophy (putting aside the 
question of a possible synonymy between these disciplinary terms) of the 
uncanny in his seminar on anxiety. Rather, in Lacan’s own words, the 
seminar resembles “plutôt un lavage de cerveau”607 than a metaphysics, and 
perhaps even a washing that tries to scrub the metaphysical clots and 
coagulated scraps of ontology from the minds of his listeners and readers. In 
fact, the reason for Lacan’s hesitance, reluctance, and even suspicion 
towards ontology, becomes all the more obvious and insistent when dealing 
with experiences of the uncanny and other recurring traces of the 
unconscious insofar as they concern “c’est que ce n’est ni être, ni non-être, 
c’est du non-réalisé.”608  
Yet, as we shall come to see, this unrealized, which remains inaccessible 
to any ontological project, still effects the domain of ontology insofar as 
everything that comes to be does so against the background of that which 
does not come to be. To be sure, even if the traces of an immemorial 
                                           
606 GA 9, 371. 
607 Sem X, 85/69. 
608 Sem XI, 32/33. 
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unconscious never present themselves to an ontology, or any other logic 
concerned with presence, even in its negative form, they nevertheless retain 
an ontological function, which Lacan underpins when he writes: “La béance 
de l’inconscient, nous pourrions la dire pré-ontologique”609 Moreover, this 
ontological function of the pre-ontological is all too often forgotten by the 
ontology to which it does not lend itself, and this forgetting itself occurs 
“d’une façon qui n’est pas sans signification.”610  
Another way of envisaging the ontological function of the pre-ontological 
comes from Lacan’s discourse of framings, borders, thresholds, and other 
liminalities that play a significant role in articulating the anxiety of the 
uncanny, which we shall examine further on in this chapter.  Becoming 
anxiously aware of the borders of reality is connected to the return of such 
pre-ontological yet irreducible remainders and residues that remain outside 
of any ontology of reality—albeit an ‘outside’ that may turn out already to 
be working on its insides, fracturing, and puncturing ontology from within. 
As Lacan writes in L’envers de la psychanalyse, psychoanalysis reveals 
that the truth of ontology is nothing but a veiling of its own truth insofar as 
it continually seeks to cover up “le trou d’où jaillit le significant-maître.”611 
In other words, just as one can be ashamed of a hole in ones socks, the veiled 
truth of ontology would be a ‘hontology,’612 and the revelation of this veiled 
                                           
609 Sem XI, 31/29. As Butler has it: “Lacan disputes the primacy given to ontology within 
the terms of Western metaphysics and insists upon the subordination of the question 
‘What is/has being?’ to the prior question ‘How is ‘being’ instituted and allocated through 
the signifying practices of the paternal economy?’” (Butler 1999, 55–56). Even though I 
agree with Butler on the matter of Lacan’s displacement of the ontological question to the 
question of the conditions of posing this question in the first place, that is, to its linguistic 
and structural conditions, I nevertheless do not think that we should reduce Lacan’s 
discourse to a discourse of ‘structuralism,’ but remind ourselves that it is also a discourse 
about that which eludes the structures of the language of being, i.e. of onto-logy. This, of 
course, is not the same as proclaiming the possibility of a ‘meta-language’ in which we 
could speak about the language of being from its outside, an endeavor which Lacan 
repeatedly claims is impossible. Instead, it is a matter, in the very accountancy of the 
structural conditions of ontology, of becoming attuned to all the gaps, slides, and slips of 
such accountancy and thereby of taking account of that which resists being taken into 
account.  
610 Sem XI, 31/29. 
611 Sem XVII, 219/189. Freud appears to make a similar point when, in Neue Folge der 
Vorlesungen zu Einführung in die Psychoanalyse, he quotes Heinrich Heine’s satirical 
verse about the cosmological or ontological philosopher who in wearing “seinen 
Nachtmützen und Schlafrockfetzen Stopft […] die Lücken des Weltenbaus” (GW XV, 
173). 
612 Sem XVII, 209/180. 
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truth would reveal the truth of being as being shameful.613 To 
psychoanalysis, shame and being are thus indissoluble, and the hontology 
that Lacan pursues and rigorously questions is just as ethical as it is 
ontological. Moreover, this ethical questioning takes its dictate precisely 
from the Freudian imperative of the ‘Wo Es war soll Ich werden.’614 
One cannot but remark here that Lacan’s suturing of ontology and shame 
in his (h)ontology bears a certain resemblance to Derrida’s suturing of 
haunting and ontology into what he, with a certain serious humor, calls 
‘hauntology.’615 Even though Derrida would inarguably object to my all too 
inconsiderate and violent drawing of resemblances, I will risk the suggestion 
that both Lacan’s hontology and Derrida’s hauntology have to do precisely 
with that which slips away, escapes, or eludes any attempt at ontic or 
ontological categorization, but whose traces and aftereffects may 
nevertheless not be entirely exorcized from these categorizations insofar as 
they conjure them up, even if ontology would like to conjure them away.616 
Perhaps my suggestion will become more palatable when we consider just 
two of the common reference points of Lacan’s hontology and Derrida’s 
hauntology: first, their shared reference to Freud’s Das Unheimliche and its 
preoccupation with what returns to haunt the house of being, as it were, even 
if it should have remained hidden; and second, their shared reference to 
                                           
613 In this respect, Lacan comes into relation with Lévinas, especially the Lévinas of De 
l’évasion from 1935. However, as Copjec points out in her essay on “May’68, The 
Emotional Month” Lacan’s take on the relation between shame and being is different 
from that of Lévinas insofar as, “[s]hame is not a failed flight from being, but a flight into 
being, where being—the being of surfaces, of social existence—is viewed as that which 
protects us from the ravages of anxiety, which risk drowning us in its borderless enigma” 
(Copjec 2006, 111). See also, Lévinas 1982.  
614 Cf. Sem VII, 7/16.  
615 As Derrida explains the term ‘hauntology’: “Cette logique de la hantise ne serait pas 
seulement plus ample et plus puissante qu’une ontologie ou qu’une pensée de l’être […]. 
Elle abriterait en elle, mais comme des lieux circonscrits ou des effects particuliers, 
l’eschatologie et la téléologie mêmes” (SM, 31/10). 
616 Despite the fact that Derrida offers a harsh critique of Lacan’s phallo-phono-
logocentric ‘masterspeech’—many points of which I agree with but others I find (more 
or less deliberately) miss or ignore other tendencies of Lacan’s discourse that perhaps 
undermines such a masterspeech—in an interview from 1971 he does seem to admit a 
certain proximity of his own writing to that of Lacan. After commenting on the tense 
relationship between Lacan and himself, and after listing several critical points in regard 
to Lacan’s discourse, Derrida concludes with the following statement regarding his prior 
silence on Lacan: “j’ai jugé que la meilleure contribution ou ‘explication’ théorique 
consistait à poursuivre mon travail, selon ses voies et ses exigencies spécifique, que ce 
travail doive ou non, selon certains axes, se rapprocher de celui de Lacan et même, je ne 
l’exclus nullement, plus que de tout autre aujourd’ui” (POS, 117/111). 
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Heidegger’s phenomenological and ontological, or existential-
hermeneutical, endeavors, which may be said to be occupied just as much, if 
not more, with what does not show itself and with what withdraws and veils 
itself as with what does show itself, that is, with the difference between being 
and beings rather than with the being of beings as such. In other words, both 
hauntology and hontology are concerned with the spectrality of reality, and 
the phantomality of phenomenology, just as they are concerned with the 
unhomely secrets of the home. 
After this brief traversing of disciplines, let us turn in more detail to 
Lacan’s seminar on anxiety. To make this turn, however, we must first cast 
yet another short glance at Freud’s essay on Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, 
which serves as a key text for Lacan’s tenth seminar. 
 
 
V.2 THE OBJECT OF ANXIETY 
For Freud, at least the Freud of 1926, anxiety always occurs in the 
presentiment of a certain danger, namely, the kind of danger that somehow 
threatens the I, which, according to Freud, is “die eigentliche Angststätte.”617 
Seeing, as in the previous section, that the I only emerges in and as the 
organization of the disorganized It, anxiety can therefore be conceived as a 
signal indicating the limits of such an organizing I in the encounter with a 
task that might be too excessive for it to undertake. As Marder has pointed 
out, it is precisely this conception of anxiety that leads to “one of the most 
fundamental paradoxes in Freud’s text,” and, as she further explains, this 
paradox emerges “[t]o the extent that anxiety is located in the ego, that it 
inhabits the ego, anxiety is the ego’s absolute other, its demonic 
doppelganger, as well as its raison d’être.”618  
                                           
617 GW XIV, 171. It should be noted here that Freud comes to locate the I or the ego as 
the proper site of anxiety only through a revision of his earlier view on anxiety as an after-
affect resulting from the repression of the libido withheld from discharge, whereas in 
1926 anxiety is rather regarded as what causes repression. Freud explains his 
displacement in regard to anxiety as follows: “Das Problem, wie bei der Verdrängung die 
Angst entsteht, mag kein einfaches sein; immerhin hat man das Recht, an der Idee 
festzuhalten, daß das Ich die eigentliche Angststätte ist, und die frühere Auffassung 
zurückzuweisen, die Besetzungsenergie der verdrängten Regung werde automatisch in 
Angst verwandelt. Wenn ich mich früher einmal so geäußert habe, so gab ich eine 
phänomenologische Beschreibung, nicht eine metapsychologische Darstellung” (GW 
XIV, 120). Some pages later, Freud therefore sets things straight: “Immer ist dabei die 
Angsteinstellung des Ichs das Primäre und der Antrieb zur Verdrängung. Niemals geht 
die Angst aus der verdrängten Libido hervor” (ibid. 138).  
618 Marder 2012, 85. 
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We encounter this paradox, which is perhaps rather a double-bind, once we 
perceive that the I only functions as the organizing response to a 
disorganization that therefore sustains it while perpetually threatening to 
undo it. As a consequence of this double-bind constitutive of the I, there is 
always a degree of auto-immunity related to the affective response of anxiety 
insofar as it is an attempt to protect the psyche against that which also 
sustains it. In short, anxiety is an attempt to protect the psyche against the 
forces of life, which can potentially be dangerous, destructive, and disruptive 
and which ultimately, as we all know even if we unconsciously do not 
believe it, bring death.619 Keeping these preliminary remarks on anxiety in 
Freud’s oeuvre in mind, let us now proceed with care and caution to Lacan’s 
tenth seminar as it lays out his most elaborate analysis of the affect of 
anxiety.  
According to a certain trajectory of thought, anxiety and fear can be 
distinguished on account of their differing object relations such that, to put 
it briefly, fear is referred to in relation to a more or less determinable object, 
whereas anxiety is referred to as objectless. Lacan clearly interrupts this 
traditional distinction with one of the key statements of his tenth seminar: 
“L’angoisse n’est pas sans objet.”620 However, in the seminar, Lacan not 
                                           
619 Weber indirectly notices this structure of auto-immunity when he remarks on the 
ambiguity of the notion of anxiety in Freud causing him to pose the following still 
unresolved questions: “Is anxiety a constitutive process by which the psyche maintains 
its coherence and identity, or does it ultimately entail their dissolution?,” and “Is anxiety 
functional or dysfunctional? Is the danger to which it responds essentially external or 
internal?” (Weber 1991, 154; 156) One response to Weber’s questions might be, that these 
questions are still unresolved because of an inherent irresolvability of anxiety, which as 
the protective mean aiming at maintaining the coherence and stability of the organizing I 
is perpetually at risk of dissolving this very organization by closing it off from the 
disorganization that keeps it goin. Weber appears to offer a similar response when he 
affirms a double-bind of the psyche, according to which “the functioning of the psyche 
is, intrinsically, as it were, bound up with an irreducible exteriority, with an alterity that 
it simultaneously denies and affirms” (ibid. 156). 
620 See, for instance, Sem X, 85ff./69ff.; 105/89; 119/100. As noted previously, Freud to 
a certain extent contributes to this trajectory with the distinction in Jenseits between 
anxiety, fear, and horror or terror. Freud even sharpens this distinction between anxiety 
and fear and their respective object relations in Hemmung, Symptom und Angst when he 
writes: “Die Angst hat eine unverkennbare Beziehung zur Erwartung; sie ist Angst vor 
etwas. Es haftet ihr ein Charakter von Unbestimmtheit und Objektlosigkeit an; der 
korrekte Sprachgebrauch ändert selbst ihren Namen, wenn sie ein Objekt gefunden hat, 
und ersetzt ihn dann durch Furcht” (GW XIV, 197–198). According to Lacan, 
Kierkegaard is an important exception to this trajectory of objectless anxiety, since in The 
Concept of Anxiety he conceives that anxiety does in fact have an object even if this object 
is properly speaking: “the object of anxiety is a nothing [Angestens Gjenstand er et Intet]” 
(SKS 4, 380/77). See also Sem X, 35/25. 
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only challenges the objectlessness of anxiety but also the idea that fear arises 
from the presence of a determinable object perceived to be somehow 
endangering or threatening in itself. Commenting on Chekhov’s fearful 
encounter with a pedigree dog at an odd hour in a forest, Lacan argues that, 
insofar as the dog would probably not have been frightening at an other 
time—in broad daylight, for example—what causes Chekhov’s fear is not 
the dog as such, but rather “d’autre chose, quelque chose en arrière.”621 
Therefore, Lacan suggests that the objects of fear and anxiety might not be 
so different after all, and that the distinction between anxiety and fear should 
be sought elsewhere.622  
Keeping our focus on anxiety, however, Lacan’s claim that anxiety is not 
without an object is not the same as claiming that anxiety positively has or 
is in the possession an object, because the double negation of ‘not without’—
which in French is actually a triple negation ‘n’est pas sans’—does not 
automatically turn into an affirmation, but rather holds the relation between 
anxiety and its object in a sort of suspense.623 
This suspension is necessary insofar as the object of anxiety is neither an 
object that can be properly grasped or comprehended by an intentional 
subject—which, according to Lacan, is the sole object permitted by modern 
subjectivist philosophy taken to its extreme by Husserl—nor is it an object 
that can be metaphorically and metonymously symbolized in its originary 
loss by desire.624 Instead, the object of anxiety concerns a much more 
improbable object or, more specifically, it concerns the very object of 
impropriety, that is, of everything that makes any recourse to propriety, 
ownness, authenticity, or identity doubtful. This is because anxiety signals a 
relation with the irreducibility of the real and of its opaque function in the 
symbolic reality, which, as we recall from previous chapters, is sustained 
phantasmatically. It is in this sense that Lacan can say that anxiety is the only 
affect that does not deceive, because it concerns a relation to that which is 
                                           
621 Sem X, 187/159.  
622 We should note, however, that there appears to be a shift in Lacan’s thinking around 
1960 in regard to the object relation of anxiety. Before this time, Lacan seems to be 
following Freud more closely, or more literally at least, when in his fourth seminar La 
relation d’objet from 1956–1957 he distinguishes between anxiety, which is said to be 
“quelque chose de sans objet,” and phobia or fear, which is said always to concern 
“quelque chose d’articulable, de nommable, de reel” (Sem IV, 244–245/284), and which 
even serve as a protection against the objectlessness of anxiety. However, instead of a 
shift in Lacan’s thinking one should perhaps rather call it a refinement of his thought on 
the object of psychoanalysis that, after the accentuation of the objet petit a, reaches 
another level of complexity. 
623 Cf. Sem X, 105/89.  
624 Cf. Sem X, 119-120/101. 
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‘beyond or outside doubt’ (le hors de doute) even if it is the very ‘cause of 
doubt’ (la cause du doute).625 Indeed, doubt only arises as an attempt to 
defend oneself against the appalling certainty of anxiety. 
This is because anxiety is a presentiment of that for which we can never 
be prepared but which is nevertheless expected inasmuch as it is always 
already there in the secret places we call home, and as such it exposes the 
always unprepared, always surprised response of an existence that can never 
get behind itself because it arrives too late. Anxiety is the cause of doubt 
because it makes the limits of our reality tremble with the threating 
presentiment that the unrepresentable, the unthinkable, in short ‘the real,’ 
might come to perforate and penetrate our horizons of possibility and let the 
impossible happen. Doubt is a mechanism succeeding anxiety insofar as it is 
an attempt to restore the limits of what can reasonably be expected by 
discriminating between the certain and the uncertain, the known and the 
unknown. Yet, anxiety exposes the blindness of wanting to know, which 
causes Oedipus to tear out his eyes and then become a seer with the certainty 
that only anxiety can obtain. 
However, as Lacan remarks, anxiety is not for the possibility of tearing 
out one’s eyes, but for “l’impossible vue qui vous menace, de vos propres 
yeux par terre”626 An impossible sight, a blind sight of one’s own eyes on the 
ground, which, however, is not without seeing. Anxiety is a witnessing of the 
impossibility of witnessing, of the impossibility of seeing oneself seeing, 
whereby—anticipating our engagement with Blanchot—“l’aveuglement est 
vision encore, vision qui n’est plus possibilité de voir, mais impossibilité de 
ne pas voir.”627 We shall return to Blanchot in more detail in the last section 
of this chapter, but suffice it here to say that the certitude of anxiety is other 
than, and belongs to the shadow side, of any ‘objective’ or ‘fundamental’ 
certitude precisely because it is a radical calling into question of every 
foundation and security of knowledge. Anxiety is rather a certitude of 
incertitude and of the blinding inability to gain insight, leading back to 
Freud’s intimate association of the fear of castration with the fear of losing 
one’s eyes in Das Unheimliche. This is one reason why for Lacan, the eye 
                                           
625 As Lacan explains, “la véritable substance de l’angoisse, c’est le ce qui ne trompe pas, 
le hors de doute […]. L’angoisse n’est pas le doute, l’angoisse est la cause du doute […]. 
C’est qu’il s’agit d’éviter ce qui, dans l’angoisse, se tient d’affreuse certitude” (Sem X, 
92/76). 
626 Sem X, 191/161. Lacan is here alluding to the place in Das Unheimliche, where Freud 
interprets “die auf dem Boden liegenden blutigen Augen Olimpias” (GW XII, 240) in 
Hoffmann’s Der Sandmann as a sign of the castration anxiety leading back to the tragic 
self-mutilation of Oedipus.  
627 EL, 23/32. 
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even becomes the object of anxiety par excellence, because it is the very 
object “sans lequel il n’est pas d’angoisse.”628 
Despite this certainty of anxiety, however, Lacan underlines that the 
structure of desire as supported by phantasy ($ ◊ a) and the structure of 
anxiety resemble each other insofar as they are both structured as a relation 
between the barred or symbolic subject and the impossibility of the real.629 
On my reading, what takes place in Lacan’s account of anxiety can therefore 
be read as a sort of reversal of the phantasmatic structure of desire by which 
the relation of the desiring subject to its object, always already lost in the 
originary cut but supported by phantasy, becomes distorted to the point of 
obstruction. On this reading, phantastic desire keeps the certainty of anxiety 
at a distance while, inversely, anxiety signals towards an imminence that 
threatens to eliminate desire. We will pursue this suggestion in what follows. 
Recalling Lacan’s distinction between desire and drive as outlined in 
Chapter III, we saw that the essential function assigned to the object of desire 
was its incessant displacement (Verschiebung). In fact, desire is dependent 
on this perpetual default of its object and the ensuing deferral of enjoyment, 
whereas the drive enjoys these very failures as its success. The anxiety of 
desire is therefore bound up with the possibility that it might actually achieve 
its object, which would then result in a ‘default of default’ or a ‘lack of 
lack’—or, as Lacan places the emphasis: “C’est toujours le ça ne manque 
pas.”630 Recalling that ça is Lacan’s translation of the Freudian Es, we should 
pay attention to the double emphasis of this italicized part of the sentence ‘ça 
ne manque pas,’ which can say both that ‘there is no lack’ and that ‘it is not 
lacking,’ meaning that as soon as the desired object is no longer lacking the 
uncanny imminence of the It is there. 
In his tenth seminar, Lacan therefore adds two points to the distinction 
between desire and drive: first, the object of desire perpetually escapes, slips, 
or turns away from the intentional gaze or grasp of the subject because it 
actually concerns something that goes on somewhere else—behind its back, 
as it were, rather than before its eyes. Second, anxiety is introduced as the 
signaling affect that separates desire from jouissance and, as such, keeps 
desire at a safe distance from going under in an excessive expenditure of 
drives that would destroy the economic organization of the I.  
Regarding the first supplement, Lacan repeatedly emphasizes that the 
object of desire is behind it and not in front of it.631 This is because the lost 
object of desire is actually its cause, albeit a cause that desire cannot turn 
                                           
628 Sem X, 125/106. 
629 Cf. Sem X, 11/3. 
630 Sem X, 67/54.  
631 Cf. Sem X, 120/101. 
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around to face without the risk of fatal consequences.632 Hence, the subject 
of desire is no longer the subject of Vorstellungen—already subjected to the 
auto-deconstruction in Nietzsche and Heidegger—representing itself to itself 
by projecting itself in front of itself as an object. Rather, the subject of desire 
is always too late to commit itself to such projects in advance and is instead 
delivered over to repeating itself from an immemorial past, which has never 
been present and from which it has been cut off and abjected, thus leaving 
its object cause behind it. This object cause is, among other things, what 
Lacan denotes objet petit a insofar as “[l]e a est ce qui reste d’irréductible 
dans l’opération totale d’avènement du sujet au lieu de l’Autre.”633  
This lends a certain duplicity to the objet petit a: On the one hand, it is the 
notation for the ‘lost object’634 of which the desiring subject is itself a 
function; on the other hand, it is a remainder of the ‘mythical’ subject who 
lacked nothing until after the fact of the originary alienating separation called 
birth. This duplicity emerges because the object a is the result, or rather the 
waste product, of an originary division: “Il y a, au sens de la division, un 
reste, un résidu.”635 Moreover, this residue of the subject lost to itself is a 
trace of the other’s otherness (de l'altérité de l'Autre) that constitutes the 
subject as unconscious, that is, the trace of “l’Autre en tant que je ne l’atteins 
pas.”636 Lacan points to this duplicity, when he tells us that right there where 
our habits of ‘conscious’ thinking tells us to look for ‘ourselves’—as the 
deliberate cause of an action, some conduct, or a desire, or as a responsible 
subject who ‘takes’ responsibility for such actions, conduct, and desires—
that is where we should look, despite ourselves, for the thing that always 
eludes us: “là où vous dites je, c’est là, à proprement parler, que, au niveau 
de l’inconscient, se situe a.”637  
In other words, the a in the algorithm of phantasy is a notation, not only 
of the originally lost object, but also of the remainder of the subject that must 
fade and be cast off in order for the subject of desire to come, or rather to be 
cut or carved, into existence. Hence, this remainder called objet petit a is 
neither an object nor a subject in the proper sense of these words, but rather 
the impropriety of that which remains irreducible after the fact of the cut 
(après coup(ure)) between subject and object. Lacan sometimes calls this 
irreducible remainder resisting the opposition between subject and object the 
                                           
632 Lacan writes: “a n’est pas l’objet du désir que nous cherchons à révéler dans l’analyse, 
il en est la cause” (Sem X, 323/279). 
633 Sem X, 189/161. 
634 Cf. Sem X, 189/161. 
635 Sem X, 37/27. 
636 Sem X, 37/27. 
637 Sem X, 122/103. 
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Thing, and this Thing concerns precisely the It of the unconscious subject 
(S), where the I of the desiring subject ($) can come to be only belatedly.638  
This duplicity of the notation a entails that the lost object, which the 
subject desires to recuperate, is ultimately nothing other than the remainder 
of itself cut off in the original cut which constituted it as a subject. Yet 
because its alienating separation from itself is originary and constitutive, the 
subject can only desire to receive itself through the desire of another and by 
becoming the object of the other’s desire that remains unknown, not only to 
the subject but also to the other itself.639 In other words, the subject is 
delivered over to the unconscious desires of the other, or constituted in the 
‘field of the Other,’ who knows neither what is lacking nor what is wanted. 
Hence, the notation a ultimately designates the inroad to the other (l’abord 
de l’Autre), which the subject can neither anticipate nor prepare for since its 
very existence is already a response to it.640  
Turning now from desire to anxiety, what occurs in this turning is that the 
lost object, which is behind desire as its very cause, somehow comes to the 
fore in order to appear there as the return of something that has never been 
present as such. Lacan therefore concedes with Freud that, in contrast to 
desire, anxiety is always before or in front of something (vor etwas). 
According to Lacan, what Freud nevertheless misses in his account of 
anxiety, despite his engagement with the uncanny and although it remains 
readable in the interstices of his text, is that what anxiety is anxious before 
is precisely what is behind desire. This is because anxiety is an affect that 
goes back or returns to the very cut that—in its separation of the imaginary 
from the real—allows not only for the construction of symbolic subject, its 
desires, and its reality—which resides precisely in the gap between these two 
impossibilities—but also for the possible return of the impossible that was 
cut off and repressed in this initial incision. In other words, the proper object 
of anxiety is what Lacan denotes objet petit a, which is the notation of 
everything that remains inappropriable yet irreducible to symbolization or 
signification. Lacan explains:  
                                           
638 In this respect, Lacan makes use of the ‘coincidence’ that the German Es and the 
French S are homophones. When we hear Es spoken we cannot distinguish it from S, 
which, according to Lacanian algebra, signifies the mythical and uncastrated subject 
‘before’ the originary cut, and which can only return as the originally repressed remainder 
of the I.  
639 According to Lacan, this is the reason why the masochist, perhaps better than anyone, 
has understood the structure of desire as the desire of the other, when in “de se poser dans 
la fonction de la loque humaine, de ce pauvre déchet de corps […]. Ce qui est cherché, 
c’est chez l’Autre, la réponse à cette chute essentielle du sujet dans sa misère dernière, et 
cette réponse est l’angoisse” (Sem X, 192/163). 
640 Cf. Sem X, 190/161. 
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L’angoisse a une autre sorte d’objet que l’objet dont l’appréhension est préparée et 
structurée par la grille de la coupure, du sillon, du trait unaire, du c’est ça […]. 
L’angoisse, c’est cette coupure—cette coupure nette sans laquelle la présence du 
signifiant, son fonctionnement, son sillon dans le réel, est impensable—, c’est cette 
coupure s’ouvrant, et laissant apparaître ce que maintenant vous entendrez mieux, 
l’inattendu, la visite, la nouvelle, ce que si bien exprime le terme de pressentiment 
qui n’est pas simplement à entendre comme le pressentiment de quelque chose, 
mais aussi comme le pré-sentiment, ce qui est avant la naissance d’un sentiment.641 
 
Hence, anxiety belongs to a moment which structurally, though not 
necessarily chronologically, precedes desire insofar as it belongs to the very 
cut that opens the desiring subject to a horizon of expectation, allowing both 
for the presentiment of the unknown, whether promising or threatening, and 
for the eerie premonition of the return of something inescapable. As we saw 
in the previous chapter, the anxious cut is what establishes a relation of the 
subject to itself as such, that is, as subjected to the desire of the other, which 
remains an unknown secret even though it precipitates the desire of the 
subject and structures its horizon of expectation while all the time 
withdrawing from it. However, this establishment of the subject’s self-
relation is at the same time also a relation of the subject to its own 
disappearance, that is, ultimately, to the always secretly approaching other 
that we call death, which seems to demand, we know not what from the 
living.  
In Lacan’s view, then, anxiety does not arise in the incertitude of coming 
face to face with some unprecedented novelty, but rather in confrontation 
with the certainty of something very old and strangely familiar that 
nevertheless makes its return so unexpectedly that it punctures the horizon 
of expectation established by the cut. Again, we can think of Dostoevsky’s 
The Double, where, upon the anxious shock caused by the unexpected 
appearance of his double, Mr. Goljadkin nevertheless keeps repeating to 
himself that he “knew it all beforehand, and had had a presentiment of 
something of the sort for a long time.”642 Freud already discerns this 
ambiguity of anticipant expectation and uncanny return pertaining to anxiety 
when, in Hemmung, Symptom und Angst, he writes that in anxiety: “Die 
Gefahrsituation ist die erkannte, erinnerte, erwartete Situation der 
Hilflosigkeit.”643  
The object that anxiety is not without therefore has something to do with 
the uninvited guest (hôte), who has always already secretly arrived, not only 
at the door, but in the house, and who, as Lacan says, “c’est déjà ce qui était 
                                           
641 Sem X, 91–92/76. 
642 Dostoevsky 1997, 133. 
643 GW XIV, 199. 
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passé dans l’hostile.”644 Nietzsche associated this uncanny guest with a 
certain nihil, as did Heidegger with the nothingness of being; Dostoevsky 
associated it with the doppelgänger and Kierkegaard with a daemonic 
Mephistopheles. Finally, Freud associated the uncanny guest who is always 
already there, albeit a ‘there’ without presence, with the It in the place of 
which the I must come to be and with the deadly compulsion to repeat. That 
is, with the uninvited visit of the repressed, which only arrives in the form of 
a return to the household of hospitality (or of ‘hostipitality’ as Derrida would 
have it) that the I does not govern.645 Even if both Freud and Heidegger speak 
of a certain ‘readiness’ or a ‘preparedness’ for anxiety,646 Lacan will 
maintain that the uncanny guest always already enters suddenly. In this 
respect, we are reminded again of Mephistopheles suddenly yet stagnantly 
leaping in of a window in Kierkegaard’s Concept of Anxiety when Lacan 
writes that “le magistral unheimlich de l’allemand, se présente par des 
lucarnes […]. Soudain, tout d’un coup, toujours vous trouverez ce terme au 
moment de l’entrée du phénomène de l’unheimlich.”647  
With these associations, we have begun to discern why the unhomely, 
understood as the return of something once homely but long repressed 
without ever having been present, is in Lacan’s view indispensable for 
approaching anxiety. Let us try to make this indispensable relation more 
approachable. 
 
 
V.3 A REVERSAL OF THE MIRROR STAGE 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the subject of desire cannot come into 
symbolic existence without at the same time fading somewhere else beneath 
the alienating cuts of the signifier and “sans voir, de ce fait même, l’objet lui 
échapper, dans une série de déplacements infinis.”648 Inversely, in anxiety it 
is the very identity or personal existence of the desiring subject that becomes 
threatened with dissolution in the anonymous or impersonal existence of the 
unconscious. Seeing that desire is actually a defense against anxiety 
                                           
644 Sem X, 91/75.  
645 Cf. H, 358–420. 
646 See for example in Jenseits, where Freud speaks of an ‘Angstbereitschaft’ the default 
of which may cause such a terrible shock (Schreck) that the protective shield (Reizschutz) 
of the terrified one may suffer a puncture that could develop into a recurring trauma (cf. 
GW XIII, 31–32). See also Heidegger’s post-script to Was ist Metaphysik?, where he 
speaks of a necessary “Bereitschaft zur Angst,” which consists in the enduring insistence 
(Inständigkeit) of listening to the voice of being, which calls the human being to “das 
Wunder aller Wunder: daß Seiendes ist” (GA 9, 307).  
647 Sem X, 90/75. 
648 Sem II, 210/177. 
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therefore also allows anxiety to reveal something about desire that desire 
itself tries to veil, namely that all the objects are in fact desired “d’un sujet 
primitivement désaccordé, fondamentalement morcelé par cet ego.”649 
This sentence can be read as saying several things; it says both that the 
ego is a fragmentation of the subject (S) before the cut of signification, but 
it also says that the ego is a fragment of this same subject, which is of course 
reminiscent of Freud’s definition of the I as a piece of the It (ein Stück vom 
Es). Yet these two sayings in fact say ‘the same’ as it differs from itself, 
namely, that the desiring ego constitutes itself as a unity or a ‘oneness’ only 
in severing itself from the driven S, but it thereby also makes itself into an 
organized fragment of the disorganizing Es, and this is what somehow comes 
to the fore in anxiety. Accordingly, we can say that that which had to 
disappear in order for desire to appear on the stage is that which reappears in 
anxiety, which also means that anxiety has an effect on the function of the 
mirror stage, which is one of the fabulous cuts precipitating the history of the 
symbolic subject as identical to itself. This is because in anxiety the specular 
function becomes disturbed—it no longer functions as it should, that is, as a 
mechanism of identification via alienating separation, but instead becomes a 
mechanism of auto-dissimulation that may lead to an utter dissolution of self. 
In anxiety, the mirror stage is reversed whereby “ce rapport imaginaire 
atteint lui-même sa propre limite, et l’ego s’évanouit, se dissipe, se 
désorganise, se dissout.”650 As a reversal of the mirror stage, anxiety is a 
signal of an imminence that threatens the organization of the imaginary I 
with fragmentation, dismemberment, and disorganization, or rather it makes 
                                           
649 Sem II, 210/177. 
650 Sem II, 210/178. In this respect, we might ask how Lacan’s conception of anxiety as 
dissipating and dissolving of identity might relate to Heidegger’s conception of anxiety 
as a precondition for an ‘authentic,’ ‘proper,’ and ‘singularized’ being: “Die Angst 
vereinzelt das Dasein auf sein eigenstes In-der-Welt-sein” (GA 2, 249). At first glance, it 
would seem that anxiety for Lacan blurs and obliterates all attempts of drawing up borders 
between me and the Other, whereas for Heidegger anxiety would serve to do just that; 
separate and singularize the anxious one by exposing it to its own being. However, from 
our discussion of Vereinzelung in Chapter II, we should recall that the singularization of 
anxiety has very little to do with the isolation of an identical subject from others—“so 
wenig ein isoliertes Subjektding” (GA 2, 250). Rather, in anxiety our ‘everyday’ 
confidence in and familiarity (alltägliche Vertrautheit) with ourselves and others breaks 
down including the borders that delimit ourselves from others, and Dasein is singularized 
only in the sense of its unhomely exposure to being-with-others without common grounds 
(cf. GA 2, 251).  Moreover, the solitude to which anxiety exposes Dasein, does not 
concern a retreat from others into some personal or private space of one’s own; instead it 
would be closer to the ‘solitude of not being able to be alone,’ which we have outlined in 
the previous chapters, and perhaps even to an ‘other solitude’ with which we will be 
engaging shortly.  
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apparent that disorganization and fragmentation is where and how the ego 
comes to be in the first place. Anxiety is a presentiment that the symbolic 
subject senses as the threat of becoming re-consumed by that part of itself 
from which it cut itself off in order to position itself as such. The resonance 
of Freud becomes clearly audible when Lacan continues the passage above 
as follows:  
 
Le sujet est précipité dans un affrontement avec quelque chose qui ne peut être 
aucunement confondu avec l’expérience quotidienne de la perception, quelque 
chose que nous pourrions nommer un id, et que nous appellerons simplement, pour 
ne pas faire de confusion, un quod, un qu’est-ce que c’est?651  
 
This quod, this something that elusively insists somewhere beyond or behind 
the ego unbeknownst yet strangely familiar to the I, is precisely the subject 
whose murmuring voice psychoanalysis tries to hear in between the 
statements of the speaking subject (l’interdit), or rather in between the 
subject of enunciation and the enunciating subject. Lacan therefore poses a 
challenging question to his fellow analysts: “Une interrogation est-elle 
seulement soutenable sur ce quod ultime, qui est celui de l’expérience du 
sujet inconscient en tant que tel, dont nous ne savons plus qui il est?”652  
One way to sustain an interrogation with such an unknown would be 
through the anxiety by which the conscious I is affected in its imminence and 
to look more closely at what happens to the function of specular 
identification in such affectedness. In anxiety, something disturbs the 
mediatory relation to the other by way of which I gain some access to myself 
as more or less identical to myself. Anxiety is when I look into the gaze of 
the mirroring other and what I see in reflection is no longer what I took to be 
myself but instead a “passage de l’image spéculaire à ce double qui 
m’échappe.”653 
With this turning of the specular image of identification and recognition 
into the estranging and dissimulating image of the double,654 one can say that 
the double is the appearance of the subject’s own disappearance. In other 
words, the double is a sort of negative autoscopy in the appearance of which 
one sees oneself disappear. This is also why the double is more like an 
apparition than an actual appearance, in the double sense in which Derrida 
understands ‘apparition’ as belonging to both the phenomenological and the 
phantomatic, to the appearing of something and to the dissimulation of 
                                           
651 Sem II,  210/178. 
652 Sem II, 210/178. 
653 Sem X, 104/88. 
654 Cf. Sem X, 60/47. 
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appearance as the simulacrum of ‘mere appearance.’ An apparition is neither 
present nor absent as such or in itself; it is rather a manifestation of non-
presence, and an appearance of disappearance since as Derrida writes in 
Spectres de Marx: “Il y a du disparu dans l’apparition même comme 
réapparition du disparu.”655 We shall return to this appearance of the 
apparition with respect to Blanchot later in this chapter, but for now we will 
continue with the apparition of the double.  
As we saw in the previous chapter, the figure of the double returns to 
remind me that there is something in the constitution of myself that escapes 
me and that there is something in my mirror reflection that I cannot see, or 
that I can only see turning away from me in the increasing dissolution of 
myself. In Lacan’s words: “Il s’agit d’un dissemblable essentiel, qui n’est ni 
le supplément ni le complément du semblable, qui est l’image même de la 
dislocation, du déchirement essentiel du sujet.”656 As we have seen, Lacan’s 
rendering of the mirror stage shows how in the very moment when I 
recognize myself as ‘one,’ I have already lost my oneness. One does not 
come before two, just as two does not come before three and so on endlessly, 
and this is why caesural rhythm is already there in the beginning.657 
However, due to the essential misrecognition of the mirror stage the I 
continually, yet illusory, succeeds in masking its originary duplicity (masque 
sa duplicité).658  
The anxiety-provoking apparition of the double reintroduces a radical 
doubt in the anxious one about its own oneness, yet this doubt is actually a 
defense against that of which anxiety is certain, namely, that the one is never 
first and never just itself—never simply alone with itself. The double 
represents that which must disappear in order for me to appear, so that when 
the double reappears I am threatened with disappearance. The double is 
themanifestation of something more intimate and more central to me than 
myself, which therefore threatens to disperse and dissipate me from the 
outside of my ‘within.’ The double comes not to redouble the ‘original’ me 
but rather returns as someone or something more ‘originary’ and more ‘real’ 
than myself and my own origin. This is what happens when one begins no 
longer seeing oneself in the mirror, and instead sees something that can only 
be see in its perpetual turning away—a specter rather than a specular image. 
                                           
655 SM, 25/5. On the many aspects of apparition in Derrida, see also Saghafi 2010. 
656 Sem II, 209/177. 
657 I am here paraphrasing Lacoue-Labarthe, who in his essay “L’echo du sujet” 
speculates on the following proposition from von Bülow: “Au commencement était la 
rhythm” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1979, 199). 
658 Écrits, 685/809.  
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However, as Lacan stresses, “quand le fantôme se retourne, il [i.e. the subject 
named Maupassant] voit que c’est lui.”659 This is because the turning away 
that makes the real spectral and the specter real is the outcome of the cut 
that produces the I in the mirror stage, but it also serves as its condition, since 
the specular image of identification only functions against the background 
of the specter that turns away behind it.  
Hence, anxiety is when I see myself disappear in the other from whence I 
first came about. This is why Lacan affiliates anxiety with the ‘primitive 
object par excellence,’ which he furthermore associates with none other than 
“l’abîme de l’organe féminin d’où sort toute vie, que le gouffre de la bouche, 
où tout est englouti, et aussi bien l’image de la mort où tout vient se 
terminer.”660 Yet this abyssal object is still an object and as such it still allows 
the anxious subject a certain distance to it; as long as I have a presentiment 
of the other, I haven’t been swallowed up entirely since I am still there in 
front of the object that horrifies me. What is so suffocating in the culmination 
of anxiety, however, is precisely that all distance, but thereby also all 
intimacy, diminishes until there is no more gap, no interval, no separation, 
and thus no space for breathing between who would be the subject and what 
would be the object of anxiety. Rather, the anxious one, who is already 
becoming no one, is stuck in an interval between nothing and nothing that 
leaves no room for anything but a pressing and paralyzing vacuity; a hyper-
proximity without nearness; an implosive merger of the outside with inside; 
an interdiction of movement and speech.  
In anxiety, the subject becomes the object that anxiety does not lack, 
which, in turn, is nothing other than the apparition of the subject’s own 
disappearance: “Vision d’angoisse, identification d’angoisse, dernière 
révélation du tu es ceci—Tu es ceci, qui est le plus loin de toi, ceci qui est le 
plus informe.”661 This ‘formlessness of the flesh,’ as Lacan also calls it, is 
the ultimate danger to the organization of the ego insofar as in its exposure 
“il n’y a plus personne qui puisse dire je.”662 Anxiety is an encounter with 
myself as an ‘it,’ that is, as a strange and disorganized ‘thing’ over which I 
have no authority or possession, but which on the other hand can come to 
fascinate and possess me like the petrifying gaze of Medusa.663   
                                           
659 Sem X, 116/99. 
660 Sem II, 196/164. 
661 Sem II, 186/154–155. 
662 Sem II, 196/164. 
663 The etymological heritage of fascination stems from the Latin fascinum, which can 
mean ‘bewitching,’ ‘enchantment,’ and ‘witchcraft,’ and which in turn is derived from 
the Greek βάσκανον, designating ‘one who bewitches,’ ‘a sorcerer,’ or ‘someone who is 
slanderous or malicious.’ The gaze is one of Lacan’s several objet petit a’s and references 
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This leads us to Lacan’s second supplement to the distinction between desire 
and drive in the tenth seminar, which is that anxiety is a signal of an 
imminence or a hyper-proximity that threatens to extinguish desire by 
eliminating the distance to its object. Anxiety is a signal of the hyper-
proximity of a repressed desire that threatens the relative stability of the I, 
which is stabilized precisely on the grounds of such repression. Since the lost 
object is the very cause of desire, which sustains desire in its metonymous 
substitutions of object that are not it, the return of the object that would be it 
threatens to destroy the very constitution of desire. What makes the subject 
of desire anxious is the imminent collapse of the symbolic gap separating the 
imaginary from the real, which also explains why the object of anxiety often 
causes simultaneous attraction and repulsion to the subject of desire:664 “Car 
le désir est une défense, défense d’outre-passer une limite dans la 
jouissance.”665  
This second supplement is perhaps the most surprising with regard to 
Freud, insofar as Lacan seems to be inverting the relation of anxiety to its 
object so that anxiety is no longer anxious of losing its object, as in castration 
or separation anxiety, but rather of gaining its object, or rather of being 
smothered by its object. However, even though Lacan at a first glance 
appears to be contradicting Freud on this matter, we must nevertheless return 
to Freud’s text and his definition of anxiety as a signal of something that 
threatens the organization of the I with disorganization in order to understand 
what Lacan is getting at with this apparent inversion. In brief, Lacan’s point 
is that there is no I without the support of an originary loss, and when this 
loss comes to be threatened by an imminence that might cancel it out, the I 
becomes anxious. Accordingly, Lacan reduplicates the anxiety of losing by 
turning it into an anxiety of losing loss, which is therefore also an anxiety of 
gaining or receiving something that would make the loss that I live off 
                                           
to the bewitching Medusa are frequent throughout his work. In the seminar on anxiety, 
for instance, Lacan refers to one of Freud’s most famous analysands, the so-called ‘wolf 
man,’ who as a child was petrified by both horror and fascination by what he saw, which 
in French is ‘médusé par ce qu’il voit,’gazing back at him in his dream of five wolves in 
a tree that gave him his moniker. Cf. Sem X, 301/260.  
664 Here again, Lacan might have looked to Kierkegaard who, in his Concept of Anxiety, 
writes precisely of the ambiguous relation that anxiety has to its object, which is no-thing 
(Intet)—because of which Kierkegaard defines anxiety as “a sympathetic Antipathy and 
a antipathetic sympathy [en sympathetisk Antipathie og en antipathetisk Sympathie]” 
(SKS 4, 348/42). This ambiguity is similar to the ambiguity of desire and dread pertaining 
to the phantasm of sovereign solitude that we outlined in Chapter II, that is, the phantasm 
that the lack of absence would be the fulfillment of presence, which is both the object of 
desire and anxiety for the subject who lives by this distinction.  
665 Écrits, 825/699.   
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become lost. Allow me to offer a lengthy passage from the tenth seminar 
where Lacan very clearly unfolds what is at stake in this seemingly inverse, 
but in fact reduplicative reading of Freud:  
 
Ne savez-vous pas que ce n’est pas la nostalgie du sein maternel qui engendre 
l’angoisse, mais son imminence? Ce qui provoque l’angoisse, c’est tout ce qui nous 
annonce, nous permet d’entrevoir, qu’on va rentrer dans le giron. Ce n’est pas, 
contrairement à ce qu’on dit, le rythme ni l’alternance de la présence-absence de la 
mère. La preuve en est que ce jeu présence-absence, l’enfant se complaît à le 
renouveler. La possibilité de l’absence, c’est ça, la sécurité de la présence. Ce qu’il 
y a de plus angoissant pour l’enfant, c’est justement quand le rapport sur lequel il 
s’institue, du manque qui le fait désir, est perturbé, et il est le plus perturbé quand 
il n’y a pas de possibilité de manque.666 
 
Hence, seeing that desire only functions against the backdrop of an original 
loss and its perpetual lack, anxiety is a signal that must be conceived of at 
this reduplicated level, namely, as the signal of “le défaut de l’appui que 
donne le manque.”667  
There are several things at stake on several levels in this definition of 
anxiety: first, it becomes apparent that it is the function of lack as a hiatus 
that allows the subject to keep both a distance from and a relation to the 
other, who provides the object of desire. This distance-in-relation is what 
protects the subject from dissolving in the other and from letting the specular 
image that constitutes me in the division of myself turn into a double who 
threatens to usurp my space by effacing this originary division between me 
and myself, and as such also between me and the other.668 Second, the 
desiring subject becomes anxious when the lack supporting its independent 
existence in relation to the other is threatened, not only because a ‘lack of 
lack’ would mean the death, even if only momentary, of desire in the 
aneconomic expenditure of drives, but also because it signals the lack of lack 
as the lack of support of the subject as such.  
At the reduplicated level, anxiety signals not only that the support of the 
subject is withdrawn from underneath it, it also signals the nature of this 
support, which was based on a phantasm to begin with. Yet, this is not all. 
                                           
666 Sem X, 67/53.  
667 Sem X, 66–67/53. 
668 In this respect, Lacan’s admiration for Kierkegaard and his understanding of anxiety 
might be precipitated by Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the effacement of the difference, and 
the distance between me and the other related to anxiety. In the Concept of Anxiety, 
Kierkegaard, somewhat in anticipation of psychoanalysis, writes: “Anxiety is a 
qualification of dreaming spirit, and as such it has its place in psychology. Awake, the 
difference between myself and my other is posited; sleeping, it is suspended; dreaming, 
it is an intimated nothing [et antydet Intet]” (SKS 4, 347/41-42). 
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There is a third moment to Lacan’s analysis of anxiety, which I find the 
hardest moment to grasp not least because it apparently undermines the 
whole Lacanian discourse from within. In order to conceive of this third 
moment, we will therefore look more closely at this Lacanian discourse and 
some of the criticism it has faced.  
As emphasized by Lacoue-Labarthe, Nancy, and Derrida—each in their 
own way—, Lacan has a tendency of arranging his entire discourse around 
the function of a lack or a gap, which thereby becomes the transcendental 
signifier upon which his theory of the subject hinges.669 Accordingly, Lacan 
actually ends up ascribing a place to that which has no place—the lack or the 
gap—which would be precisely the same place or the place of the same in 
the theory of the subject that orients his entire discourse. Despite its 
presumed emptiness, like the void gravity of a black hole, lack thus comes 
to function as a sort of zero point, which, as the theoretical Archimedean 
point of the discourse, draws everything around it and gives everything its 
proper place in the order it holds together—whereby lack turns into ‘an 
apodicticity.’ In other words, as Nancy writes it in Ego Sum, Lacan ends up 
deciding the undecidable as such and thus endows it with “l’étrange indentité 
de son indécidabilité, c’est-à-dire véritablement de le constituer en 
substance, et en Sujet.”670 
Yet, even if I subscribe to certain respects of this reading, the question 
that, in my view, still remains unanswered is what happens with this 
discourse of a central “place du manque circonscriptible”671 when it begins 
to speak, not only of a ‘lack of lack’—which is still to some extent a lack—
but also of the great ‘psychoanalytic secret’ that ‘there is no lack’ or that ‘it 
is not lacking’ (ça ne manque pas). Would it not appear, then, that a sort of 
auto-deconstruction of its own discourse is taking place in Lacan’s tenth 
seminar? Moreover, the question also remains as to what happens to the 
galactic order of symbolic desire held together by the black hole of a lack, 
when this black hole implodes/explodes. What happens to Lacan’s discourse 
on the subject of desire when ‘lack comes to be lacking’ (manque vient à 
                                           
669 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1973, 119ff./116ff.; RES, 76ff./57ff. 
670 ES, 21/9. As Nancy further shows in his reading of Lacan, “la théorie qui prétend 
s’enforcer, comme telle, dans cet écart, se ramène immanquablemet à se poser elle-même 
comme l’identification (la reduction) de l’écart (ou comme son sujet)” (ibid. 19/8). Via 
this lack, the subject of the theory is thereby allowed to fold back on itself and to (re)turn 
to itself in “cette auto-fondation de l’abîme, cette façon de porter l’abîme à son comble et 
ce le combler du même coup” (ibid. 20/8). However, this is the movement par excellence 
of the absolute Subject, which is precisely what Lacan is trying to distance himself from 
with the subject of the unconscious.  
671 RES, 76/57.  
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manquer), or rather, when there is no more lack? To respond to such 
questions, we must try to read closely and see what Lacan’s text offers with 
respect to this repeated ‘ça ne manque pas’ denoting the way in which the 
hyper-proximity of the ‘it’ that is not lacking—which is precisely the object 
that anxiety is not without—disrupts the desirable play of presence and 
absence sustaining the subject who can say I. 
In this respect, it is therefore important to remark that the threatening 
imminence or hyper-proximity of the object of anxiety is not to be confused 
with a pure presence that would actually come to fill out a previous absence, 
because, as Lacan emphasizes, the very possibility of presence already 
depends on the possibility of absence and vice versa. In contrast, the object 
of anxiety undoes the very opposition between presence and absence and 
along with it the whole structure that the dialectic play between them upholds 
and sustains, that is, to speak with both Heidegger and Lacan, the presencing-
absencing of the being (sein/Sein) by which everything that exists is 
nurtured.672 Anxiety is experienced in the syncopes of the Fort:da, where the 
self-conscious subject faints in the caesura’s of this rhythm of presence and 
absence, subject and object. But what is this syncope of the Fort:Da if not 
the Thing in the form of a wooden reel on a string, or more precisely, la chose 
freudienne as yet another name for the unconscious “qui vacille dans une 
coupure du sujet”?673  
For Lacan, anxiety reveals to us the heteronomy or the “non-autonomie 
du sujet,”674 not only to the extent that it reveals that the desire of the subject 
is the desire of the other; it also goes so far as to show the subject of this 
desire “sous la forme de l’objet que je suis en tant qu’il m’exile de ma 
subjectivité, en résolvant par lui-même tous les signifiants à quoi elle est 
attaché.”675 Hence, what we have called the reversal of the mirror stage may 
be discerned as a sort of collapse of the imaginary I, with the real of the 
                                           
672 This is why, in the seminar subsequent to the one on anxiety, Lacan can say that the 
truly atheist formula is not ‘God is dead,’ which would allow everything to proceed as 
usual, continuing to obey the law of presence–absence and even strengthening it, but 
rather ‘God is unconscious,’ which would entail the absolute upheaval of law whereby 
nothing would be permitted because nothing would inter-dicted. According to Lacan, 
rather than doing away with the Father, Freud instead protects him when he locates 
“l’origine de la fonction du père sur son meurtre” (Sem XI, 58/59). Derrida makes a 
similar point when, in his text “Préjugés. Devant la loi,” he writes that the murder of the 
Father fails because it only result in bestowing him more power. Therefore Derrida 
rhetorically asks: “La meilleure manière de le tuer, n’est-ce pas de le garder vivant (fini)? 
et la meilleure manière de le garder en vie, n’est-ce pas l’assassinat?” (P, 116/198) 
673 Sem XI, 29/28. 
674 Sem X, 60/48. 
675 Sem X, 61/48. 
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unconscious subject S/Es leaving no gap for symbolic mediation.676 This is 
because anxiety is provoked by the hyper-proximity of an apparition, which, 
as Lacan explains   
 
résume ce que nous pouvons appeler la révélation du réel dans ce qu’il a de moins 
pénétrable, du réel sans aucune méditation possible, du réel dernier, de l’objet 
essentiel qui n’est plus un objet, mais ce quelque chose devant quoi tous les mots 
d’arrêtent et toutes les catégories échouent, l’objet d’angoisse par excellence.677  
 
What happens in this anxious reversal of the mirror stage is that the 
impossibility of the real is turned into the real of impossibility. The interval 
of anxiety involves no space in which the I can come to be in place of the It; 
rather, anxiety is the usurpation of this space where It returns in the place of 
the I. According to Lacan, one of the most significant insights of Freudian 
psychoanalysis is that in anxiety “dans l’irréel, c’est le réel qui les 
tourmente.”678 In other words, the anxious one is not troubled by the unreal 
in reality, such as phantoms, phantasms, or nightmares, but inversely, by the 
real of the unreal. This real of the unreal also designates phantoms, 
phantasms, and nightmares, albeit no longer in clear contrast to reality; 
rather, it designates that which is ‘beyond’ the reality principle but which 
nevertheless remains very real. Anxiety is a signal of the irreducibility of the 
real that falls outside of reality and in this very falling outside constitutes 
reality, which is precisely the irreducible remainder that ought to have 
remained secret but that keeps returning to haunt the homes of the anxious.679 
Indeed, one might understand the uncanny as a return of the real in the reality 
of the symbolic, which is also a return of the doubles whose ‘veiled faces’ 
normally hide in the ‘penumbra of symbolic effectiveness.’680 
What somehow returns to the fore in anxiety, then, is what desire had left 
behind it as its cause, namely, the point “où le sujet recontre l’expérience de 
                                           
676 For a literary scene of such reversal in Rilke, see Excursus IV.   
677 Sem II, 196/164. 
678 Sem X, 95/79. 
679 Cf. Sem X, 188/160. With a reference to Schelling’s Über das Wesen der menschlichen 
Freiheit (1809), one could say that anxiety signals “die unergreifliche Basis der Realität, 
der nie aufgehende Rest” (SW VII, 360), which supports existence only in its withdrawal 
from existence and which therefore threatens existence with its haunting return. For, as 
Schelling in his anticipatory psychoanalytic style writes, “immer liegt noch im Grunde 
das Regellose, als könnte es einmal wieder durchbrechen, und nirgends scheint es, als 
wären Ordnung und Form das Ursprüngliche, sondern als wäre ein anfänglich Regelloses 
zur Ordnung gebracht worden” (ibid. 359). 
680 Écrits, 95/77. 
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son déchirement, de son isolement par rapport au monde.”681 Yet, the solitary 
and anxious experience of such dismemberment does not leave the world 
untouched, since the subject of desire is always already a subject of the world 
as the world is always that of a subject. Therefore, anxiety exposes the 
anxious one to the immemorial fact that “[l]e rapport humaine au monde a 
quelque chose de profondément, initialement, inauguralement lésé.”682 In 
what follows, we shall therefore take a closer look at this relation of the 
human subject to its world. 
 
 
V.5 THE FRAMING OF REALITY, THE UNCANNY OUTSIDE, THE OTHER SCENE 
As indicated, when lack comes to be lacking in the tenth seminar on anxiety 
we, as readers, also seem to encounter a certain limit in and of Lacan’s 
writing. As I read it, however, this limit is also a place in which Lacan’s 
writing brushes up against another writing, namely, the writing of the 
impersonal or ‘the neuter’ as we find it in Blanchot. In what follows, we will 
therefore attempt to co-read these two writings under the signatures of Lacan 
and Blanchot, at the limit where they stand together apart—which, as we 
shall see, as a limit also constitutes a point of passage from one solitude into 
another. 
In Lacan’s text, when ‘it is not lacking’ in anxiety something appears in 
place of a lack— something that in its apparition signals towards a ‘presence 
elsewhere’ (présence ailleurs), which makes the place where the apparition 
takes place, which is the reality of the subject, appears as an absence (fait 
cette place comme absence).683 Here the proximity of Lacan’s writing to that 
of Blanchot is already evident, insofar as Blanchot in L’espace littéraire 
from 1955 discerns a difference between what we can call an operative lack 
of being, which Blanchot associates with the dialectic negativity in Hegel 
and which in Lacan’s writing would be the support of desire, and an 
inoperative being of lack, which in Lacan brings on anxiety. Blanchot 
explains the difference, which is really more of a différance, as follows:   
 
Quand l’être manque, quand le néant devient pouvoir, l’homme est pleinement 
historique. Mais quand l’être manque, l’être manque-t-il? Quand l’être manque, 
cela signifie-t-il que ce manque ne doive rien à l’être ou bien ne serait-il pas l’être 
qui est au fond de l’absence d’être, ce qu’il y a encore d’être quand il n’y a rien? 
Quand l’être manque, l’être n’est encore que profondément dissimulé. Pour celui 
qui s’approche de ce manque, tel qu’il est présent dans ‘la solitude essentielle,’ ce 
                                           
681 Sem II, 199/167. 
682 Sem II, 199/167. 
683 Sem X, 60/47.  
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qui vient à sa recontre, c’est l’être que l’absence d’être rend présent, non plus l’être 
dissimulé, mais l’être en tant que dissimulé: la dissimulation elle-même.”684 
 
This appearance of dissimulative concealment makes everything that 
depends upon the concealedness of concealment in order to appear 
disappear, and, as Blanchot continues, this appearance of disappearance is 
“qu’on appelle apparition est cela même: est le ‘tout a disparu’ devenu à son 
tour apparence.”685 In Lacan, this apparition of what should have remained 
concealed or lacking designates the uncanny in more ways than one. First, it 
exposes the subject to the realization that “un miroir ne s’étend pas à 
l’infini,”686 and that there is something unknown and ungraspable beyond or 
behind the frame of the mirror—‘a presence elsewhere’—which is 
nevertheless operative in the constitution of the subject as its abject 
remainder. Second, it reveals the unhomely circumstance that, as Lacan 
writes, “[l]’homme trouve sa maison en un point situé dans l’Autre au-delà 
de l’image dont nous sommes faits.”687  
Again, anxiety makes manifest that there is something in the constitution 
of the subject and its world that eludes it. There is something, which is 
anterior to everything that can be elaborated on and analyzed by the subject; 
there is the anteriority of alterity; there is the relation with the other which 
precedes the grasp, knowledge, and understanding of the autonomous 
subject, wherefore Lacan states: “Il n’y a pas d’auto-analyse, même quand 
on se l’imagine. L’Autre est là.”688 To return to the distinction between desire 
and anxiety with regard to their object, we might say that desire is a relation 
with the anteriority of the elusive yet constitutive Other as lacking, whereas 
anxiety is a certain relationship with the there is of this other. Yet this elusive 
other, which is ‘normally’ experienced as a lack of something, is also what 
supports the constitution of the subject and frames the reality of its world. 
Should this constitutive lack, which makes both for normality and for 
anomaly by providing the very norm for such a distinction, therefore all of a 
sudden happen not to be lacking, “c’est à ce moment-là que commence 
l’angoisse.”689 
                                           
684 EL, 265/252. 
685 EL, 265/253. 
686 Sem X, 89/72. 
687 Sem X, 47/60. As Lacan later explains: “L’unheimlich est ce qui apparaît à la place où 
devrait être le moins-phi. Ce dont tout part en effet, c’est de la castration imaginaire, car 
il n’y a pas, et pour cause, d’image du manque. Quand quelque chose apparaît là, c’est 
donc, si je puis m’exprimer ainsi, que le manque vient à manquer” (Sem X, 53/42).  
688 Sem X, 32/22. 
689 Sem X, 53/42. 
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Anxiety is the experience of the heteronomy of the autos as of the alterity of 
its home, wherefore it is also a relation of the subject with the fading of itself 
as of its reality. In various ways, Lacan therefore repeats that ‘reality is 
precarious,’690 which is not the same as declaring that reality is ‘merely’ an 
illusion nor the same as denying the reality of reality, so to speak, as in some 
not particularly sophisticated form of ‘idealism’ versus a naive ‘realism.’ 
Rather, what I take Lacan to be conveying is that ‘reality’ cannot be 
conceived as some common and stable ground on which we may 
immediately find our bearings, and to which we may all refer knowing 
without a doubt exactly what we are referring to. Neither is ‘reality’ some 
enclosed territory protected against all that would not be real by clearly 
drawn, solid borders. Rather, the borders of reality are fragile and not 
uncontaminated by that which they are bordered up against, because reality 
is not simply given— it is artificial, constructed, ‘symbolic’ and therefore 
not impervious to what might threaten the frames of its construction. 
Alongside the dissolution of the subject who can say ‘I,’ what becomes 
disclosed in anxiety is precisely the framing of reality, which is one reason 
why Lacan states that “l’angoisse est encadrée.”691 Let us therefore try to 
better understand this anxious disclosure of framing.  
According to Derrida, a frame always relates that which is framed and 
appears to be inside of it to that which is outside and excluded from the 
framed vision. As such, the frame is a parergon insofar as it designates 
something outside of, besides, or around a work (ergon), which nevertheless 
cooperates with the constitution of the inside of this work. Therefore, the 
parergonal frame is “[n]i simplement dehors ni simplement dedans”692 the 
                                           
690 Cf. Sem VII, 27/30.  
691 Cf. Sem X, 92/73. In this regard, Derrida’s claim in “Pour l’amour de Lacan” that 
Lacan along with the failure to take notice of the literary structure of narration also 
misrecognizes—and here Derrida uses the word méconnaissance, which is undoubtedly 
not a fortuitous choice of words—‘the frame’ (cadre), and in particular its parergonal 
effects, which does indeed seem somewhat odd considering the frequent references to 
frames and framings, not to mention all the other liminal phenomena such as borders, 
rims, and threshold, swarming the texts of Lacan (cf. RES, 77/59). As Johnson suggests 
in her reading of Lacan’s text on The Purloined Letter and Derrida’s text on both Poe and 
on Lacan on Poe, one may at times suspect Derrida of framing Lacan’s texts in his 
readings of them. As Johnston explains, “one of the major crimes for which Lacan is 
being framed by Derrida is precisely the psychoanalytical reading’s elimination of the 
literary text’s frame” (Johnson 1977, 479). Yet, according to Derrida’s ‘parergonal logic’ 
of framing, this crime at the same time corresponds to eliminating “not the frame but the 
Unframability of the literary text” (ibid. 481). For us, the question is whether Derrida is 
framing Lacan so as to leave Lacan’s engagement with framing out of the frame. 
692 VEP, 63/53. 
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work; it is rather a borderline or a threshold between the inside and the 
outside, which at the same time constitutes and destabilizes the very status 
of this dichotomy. 
Now, as we saw in the preceding section, to Lacan the reality of the world 
is sustained only by the extraction of something that must remain on its 
‘outside’ in order to maintain its frame; yet in anxiety this ‘outside’ appears 
‘within’ the frame, thus endangering the very function of framing. Anxiety 
is the premonition or presentiment of that which cannot be seen inside the 
frame of reality but that nevertheless conditions it from elsewhere. However, 
there is a ‘catastrophe,’ a disastrous turning point, at which this presentiment 
of anxiety may turn into the uncanny and sudden apparition of this 
‘elsewhere’ inside the frame as that which remains outside of it. The liminal 
phenomenon of the uncanny is precisely the appearing inside of what should 
have remained outside in order to uphold and sustain the untainted separation 
of both, but that now makes the borders vacillate. In other words, uncanny 
apparitions happen when the liminal space of the spectral, which should 
merely function as the dark background against which the specular 
constitution of the subject instituted in the world of recognition, suddenly 
appears within the frame of the mirror. Thus, what is experienced in anxiety 
is not so much a simple loss of reality in the revelation of its unreality, as 
rather the reality of unreality. 
Anxiety reveals the framing of reality, its artificiality, and exposes the 
infinite depths of its surface. In such anxious experience, the world may 
manifest itself as neither more nor less than a construction of shallow 
coulisses and set pieces amongst which the one who experiences this mise-
en-scène turns into a hollow mask “derrière lequel il n’y a personne, derrière 
lequel il n’y a rien d’autre que justement le rien.”693  
In this anxious experience, however, there is still someone who 
experiences the world dissolving, and who sees herself disappearing. In other 
words, there is still a perspective, but is this perspective still a first-person 
perspective? Is it still a personal perspective in any sense? Who sees, who 
experiences, when the one who sees and experiences has become no one? As 
I read it, this is precisely one of the limit-questions where Lacan’s writing 
comes to an end and the writing of Blanchot begins. And while one must 
admit that this is the limit where a certain Lacanian discourse reaches its end, 
it is also the very place where another begins, namely the discourse 
beginning with the question “Qui parle? quand il s’agit du sujet de 
                                           
693 This is a quote from Eugen Fink, which Deleuze repeats in Le Pli (Deleuze 1988, 
90/76). 
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l’inconscient”694—a question that, moreover, is not entirely foreign to the 
question of the ‘Who?’ that haunts the writing of Blanchot and to which we 
will return shortly. 
At this limit point, we therefore begin to discern how the trajectory of the 
‘solitude of not being able to be alone,’ which we have been following from 
the very beginning, has led us towards an ‘other solitude’ (l’autre solitude), 
which escapes the solitude of what one calls oneself since it is a solitude 
where “précisément manquent toute solitude personelle.”695 In L’espace 
littéraire, Blanchot calls this other solitude ‘the essential solitude,’ in 
contrast to ‘the solitude of the world,’ because what is at stake in it is 
precisely a certain disappearance of the world. Yet, as we learned in our 
reading of Tournier’s Robinson in Chapter II, the disappearance of the world 
is the consequence of an abandonment of the structure-other whose 
countenance grants us the secrets that make us into somebody, without which 
we turn into nobody and dissolve into an otherness other than what we call 
our fellow others.696  
As Blanchot renders it, mundane solitude is associated with the attempt of 
a subject who supposes itself to be autonomous and authoritative subject to 
break “la tension dialectique par laquelle elle [i.e. la solitude] se réalise,” in 
order to cultivate its own unique separateness as “l’absolu d’un Je suis qui 
veut s’affirmer sans les autres.”697 In contrast, the solitude that is no longer 
in or of the world discloses the nothingness that founds this supposedly 
sovereign solitude of the ‘I am,’ whereby the ‘I’ still considers itself to be 
separated from the others “mais n’est plus capable de reconnaître dans cette 
séparation la condition de son pouvoir.”698 
Hence, in the first solitude the separation from others serves to strengthen 
the personal identity of the solitary one as ‘the only one,’ whereas the other 
solitude, as Blanchot writes in L’entretien infini, delivers the solitary ones 
over to “un rapport de non-identification avec eux-mêmes.”699 When 
entering the essential solitude ‘I’ therefore do not approach a more intimate, 
personal, or profound essence of myself; instead, I am approached by 
something that “n’est pas que je sois un peu moins moi-même, c’est ce qu’il 
y a ‘derrière moi,’ ce que moi dissimule pour être à soi.”700  
                                           
694 Écrits, 800/677. 
695 LV, 48/32. 
696 Cf. Deleuze 1969, 370/319. 
697 EL, 264/251. 
698 EL, 264/251. 
699 IC, 478/384–85. 
700 EL, 263/251. 
234 
 
In this respect, something happens in the passage from the solitude of the 
world to the solitude of the impersonal, which resembles what happens when 
the psychoanalytic subject of desire encounters the uncanny in anxiety, that 
is, “quelque chose leur arrive, qu’ils ne peuvent ressaisir qu’en se 
dessaisissant de leur pouvoir de dire ‘je’, et ce qui leur arrive leur est toujours 
déjà arrive.”701  
Prolonging this resemblance between two writings, Blanchot discerns a 
certain anteriority of alterity, which, similarly to the impossibility of auto-
analysis discerned by Lacan, makes the solitary one inaccessible to itself in 
the passage from one solitude to the other. This inaccessibility is accentuated 
in writing because of the impossibility on the part of the writer of any auto-
lecture, which may be read as the impossibility both of reading and of 
gathering oneself. Blanchot writes:  
 
[L]’écrivain ne lit jamais son oeuvre. Elle est, pour lui, l’illisible, un secret, en face 
de quoi il ne demeure pas. Un secret, parce qu’il en est séparé (…) La solitude de 
l’écrivain, cette condition qui est son risque, viendrait alors de ce qu’il appartient, 
dans l’oeuvre, à ce qui est toujours avant l’oeuvre.”702 
 
So, what is it that precedes the work in such a way that it separates the writer 
from it as from herself? What is this anteriority ‘behind me’ that ‘I’ must 
conceal in order to be able to say ‘I’ in the first place? Or, are we perhaps 
asking the wrong question? Should we rather ask, with Blanchot, who this 
someone is who, “regardant par-dessus mon épaule (moi peut-être)”703 asks 
the question of the who? The difficulty in deciding on how to properly ask 
these questions is partly due to the undecidable ambiguity pertaining both to 
the French qui, which can mean both ‘who,’ ‘what,’ and ‘which,’ and to the 
French il, which can signify both ‘him’ and ‘it,’ which is difficult to 
reproduce in English. Nevertheless, it is precisely this undecidability 
between the personal (who, him) and the impersonal (what, it) that is at issue 
at this limit shared between one writing and another, as in the passage from 
one solitude to an other, which we are trying to envisage here.  
The solitude that must be concealed in order for personal solitude and self-
relation to arise in the world of others is precisely that which appears in the 
disappearance of all possibility of preserving oneself in solitude. It belongs 
to what Blanchot calls ‘the outside’ (le dehors) or ‘the neutral’ (le neutre), 
designating a pressing vastness entirely deprived of intimacy, and therefore 
belongs to an experience without any personal subject, that is, an experience 
                                           
701 IC, 478/384–85. 
702 EL, 15/22–23. 
703 ASQV, 49/58. 
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of anonymity read in the double genitive. It is an improper experience 
because it properly belongs to no one, and yet a solitude still remains there 
where, as Blanchot writes in Celui qui m’accompagnait pas, “le dehors est 
vide, le secret est sans profondeur, ce qui est répété est le vide de la 
répétition, cela ne parle pas et cependant cela a toujours été déjà dit.”704 
Hence, the essential solitude is the solitude that remains in the dissolution of 
oneself in the world; it is “[l]a solitude ou la non-intériorité, l’exposition au 
dehors, la dispersion hors clôture, l’impossibilité de se tenir ferme, fermé.”705  
With this ‘exposure to the outside,’ we will return with Blanchot to Lacan, 
who states that the field of anxiety with its spectral phenomena of the 
uncanny is always somehow involved with borders and with framing, in that, 
more specifically, it concerns “le rapport de la scène au monde.”706 In calling 
forth this relation between the world and the scene, Lacan is of course 
alluding to ‘der andere Schauplatz,’707 which Freud at times refers to as the 
place of the unconscious. In revealing the framing of the world that should 
have remained concealed, anxiety thereby lifts the veil on this other stage as 
well, which however is not exactly  ‘beyond’ (pas au-delà) this world; rather, 
anxiety exposes the anxious subject to this ‘other scene’ as being far more 
intimate to its world than it might have believed.708 As Lacan explains: 
“L’angoisse, c’est quand apparaît dans cet encadrement ce qui était déjà là, 
beaucoup plus près, à la maison, Heim. C’est l’hôte […] cet hôte inconnu qui 
apparaît de façon inopinée a tout à fait affaire avec ce qui se rencontre dans 
l’unheimlich.”709  
As Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy have pointed out in their essay “La 
panique politique,” this ‘other scene’ of the unconscious therefore rather 
designates an ‘off-stage’ (hors-scène) or the ‘ob-scene’ (ob-scène), than it 
constitutes another scene understood as a delimitable space behind or beyond 
                                           
704 CAP, 136/72. 
705 EdD, 53/30. 
706 Sem X, 90/75. 
707 Cf. GW II/III, 51; 541. 
708 Here we may once again recall Heidegger, who in Sein und Zeit explains how that 
which anxiety is anxious about comes from ‘nowhere’ (nirgends). Yet, as Heidegger 
specifies, this ‘nowhere’ “bedeutet nicht nichts, sondern darin liegt Gegend überhaupt, 
Erschlossenheit von Welt überhaupt für das wesenhaft räumliche In-Sein.” In other 
words, anxiety is anxious about the ‘nowhere’ in which our very world is constituted, or 
‘framed,’ and which permeates everything that surrounds us including ourselves since, as 
Heidegger writes, “es ist schon ‘da’—und doch nirgends, es ist so nah, daß es beengt und 
einem den Atem verschlägt—und doch nirgends” (GA 2, 248. My italics). 
709 Sem X, 91/75. 
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the stage of the world.710 This ‘other scene’ is therefore not really a scene at 
all but rather the place where the staging of the world is revealed and as such 
becomes unstaged, where the frame of the mirror appears against the 
background of the unframeable, and where everything familiar and 
recognizable goes incognito. The other scene is the unknown habitat of that 
Freudian ‘inner abroad,’ which is where the It resides and from whence the 
death drive inoperatively disorganizes the reality of the subject, but which 
may ‘itself’ only be discerned as “un point de fuite de toute réalité possible 
à atteindre.”711 
Returning, in turn, to Blanchot with Lacan, one can perhaps say that the 
passage from one solitude to the other may be discerned as a shifting of 
perspectives, since—speaking in psychoanalytic terms—in the ‘other 
solitude’ it is no longer the anxious ‘I’ who trembles in the elusive approach 
of the foreign alterity of the ‘it’ that threatens its constitution or organization 
from within. Rather, the other solitude is when the ‘I’ gazes out at its own 
disappearance and dissolution into otherness from the impersonal 
perspective of the ‘it’ already outside within itself.  
In approaching an end of this reading together-yet-apart of Lacan and 
Blanchot, a final question therefore remains as to whether anxiety remains 
in the experience of essential solitude, which is without a personal subject? 
Blanchot might give us an answer to this question in his consistent 
engagement with writing, which, in his view, is essentially bound up with 
this impersonal solitude. We will not go into detail about the significance of 
writing in Blanchot’s work, but merely note that part of this essential bond 
between the impersonal, solitude, and writing has to do with the paradoxical 
fact that the act of writing is that which gives a writer her authoritative 
identity and disrobes her of it at the same time. Moreover, writing designates 
an extremely solitary occupation that is nonetheless entirely occupied by 
multiple ‘others’ in more than one sense. 
Perhaps, some of the most finely attuned voices of this anonymous or 
impersonal solitude is to be found in Beckett—since, as Blanchot asks: “Qui 
parle dans les livres de Samuel Beckett?”712 The unnamable voices in 
Beckett may use the word or the linguistic sign ‘I,’ but only disbelievingly 
so. As empty linguistic subjects, they are wandering voices that do not 
                                           
710 As the authors explain, the ‘other scene’ is “une scène plus autre, ce qui ne voudrait 
pas dire, surtout pas, ‘tout Autre,’ mais, de manière bien plus simple et bien plus 
complexe, [...]  plus primitive qu’aucune scène primitive, et peut-être hors-scène ou ob-
scène, ne s’agirait-il pas de la scène d’autrui?” (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 2013, 12–
14/4). 
711 Sem VII, 29/21.  
712 LV, 286/210. 
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belong to anyone in particular, deprived as they are of any authenticity, 
interiority, personality, or substantiality. Even so, these voices also appear 
endlessly solitary, cut off as they are from all relations that would endow 
them with a personal existence, they continue to exist as absolved from 
themselves. The voice of the unnamable appears in the disappearance of 
itself, it appears as an exhausted (infatigable) voice, which even if it is 
deprived of itself, nonetheless cannot get rid of itself, cannot stop speaking. 
Thus, Blanchot associates both writing and anxiety with the essential 
solitude of the impersonal—they both constitute a strange relation without 
relation because it is a relation with what not only withdraws from but also 
undoes relation. Accordingly, both writing and anxiety maintain a relation 
with that which “me perd en m’empêchant de me perdre.”713 Thus, in the 
first part of Faux Pas from 1943, entitled “De l’angoisse au langage,” 
Blanchot writes:  
 
L’existence de l’écrivain apporter la preuve que, dans le même individu, à côté de 
l’homme angoissé subsiste un homme de sang-froid, à côté du fou un être 
raisonnable et, uni étroitement à un muet qui a perdu tous les mots, un rhéteur maître 
du discours. Le cas de l’écrivain est privilégie pour cette raison qu’il représente 
d’une manière privilégiée le paradoxe de l’angoisse. L’angoisse met en cause toutes 
les réalités de la raison, ses méthodes, ses possibilités, sa possibilité, ses fins, et 
cependant elle lui impose d’être là: elle lui intime d’être raison aussi parfaitement 
qu’elle le peut; elle-même n’est possible que parce que demeure dans toute sa 
puissance la faculté qu’elle rend impossible et anèantit.714  
 
Perhaps this strange relation without relation with the very thing that 
annihilates relation, is the fate which the arts of psychoanalysis and writing 
share. Moreover, perhaps this shared fate of maintaining a relation with that 
which escapes relation is what Lacan has in mind when, in his eleventh 
seminar, he compares the situation of the psychoanalyst with that of 
Orpheus: “Pour me laisser aller à quelque métaphore, Eurydice deux fois 
perdue, telle est l’image la plus sensible que nous puissions donner, dans le 
mythe, de ce qu’est le rapport de l’Orphée analyst à l’inconscient.715  
By way of closing this chapter, we can return to the thought that this other 
solitude, which we have here chosen to call a ‘solitude of dissolution,’ can 
be discerned almost as if ‘behind’ the initially outlined ‘solitude of not being 
able to be alone.’ This is because, when alone, one is also “[s]eul pour 
s’exposer à la pensée du désastre qui défait la solitude et déborde toute 
espèce de pensée, comme l’affirmation intense, silencieuse et désastreuse du 
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dehors.”716 At the risk of simplifying, we might say that our personal 
solitude, the solitude that make us appear as who we are, is given to us in our 
exposure to others. Inversely, in the abandonment of others we are delivered 
over to a solitude of the impersonal in which we disappear as ourselves, and 
as such, we share the unshareable solitude of not being able to be alone. 
Therefore, the solitary awareness of the dependency of ‘my-’self upon others 
can also lead to the elusive presentiment that were I to be abandoned to 
myself entirely, I would also be delivered over to a solitude in which I turn 
into someone else, who would be no one in particular. Since, as Blanchot 
writes: “Là où je suis seul, je ne suis pas là, il n’y a personne, mais 
l’impersonnel est là.”717 
                                           
716 EdD, 14/5. 
717 EL, 22/30.   
  
CLOSING REMARKS  
A SOLITUDE OF RESPONSIBILITY AND THE FRIENDS OF SOLITUDE 
 
 
Die Welt ist fort, ich muß dich tragen 
–  Paul Celan, ‘Große, Glühende Wölbung,’ Atemwende 
 
 
 
“WHERE NOW? WHEN NOW? WHO NOW?”  
While we began this thesis by asking—echoing Nancy’s question from 
1986—‘who or what remains in the auto-deconstruction of the self?’ we 
might now, in approaching the end, ask whether we have come across an 
answer to this question. For instance, by supposing that ‘solitude’ or ‘a 
solitary self’ is what or who remains as though subtracted from the 
abandonment of the self.  
In my view, we have not encountered such an answer, and for essential 
reasons, since it would run the risk of reestablishing the place of the definite 
article whose calling into question was the very departure point of our 
inquiry. In other words, we would have simply replaced ‘the self’ with ‘a 
solitary self,’ or ‘solitude,’ whereas the intention of this thesis was to put the 
function of the ‘the,’ as the placeholder for such replacement, on trial. 
Moreover, answering in such a manner would not only turn the question 
of ‘who’ into a question of ‘what’—which Derrida calls ‘the instituting 
question of philosophy’718 because it always asks for the essential, 
fundamental, or substantial aspect of whatever it questions, thus paving the 
way for a movement of thought to proceed via systematic exclusion of 
differences and divergences towards some unified core of meaning—it 
would also ignore the destabilization that surreptitiously lies at the basis of 
the distinction between the ‘who’ and the ‘what’—indeed, between the auto 
of the autonomous and the auto of the automatic—which has been a concern 
throughout this study.  
This does not mean, however, that the risk of reestablishing, 
reinstitutionalizing, or reappropriating (hidden in the words we use) that 
which we have been trying to expose in its auto-deconstructive dismantling, 
destabilization, and dispropriation has been consistently avoided. Indeed, 
such confidence in a successful avoidance of the risk of reappropriation 
would itself risk presuming the overcoming of a risk that, as elaborated in 
the methodological considerations, is inherent to deconstruction insofar as 
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deconstruction is always an auto-deconstruction, and as such, is never in a 
position beyond contamination by what is under deconstruction. 
As Derrida points to in “Comment ne pas parler. Dénégations” from 1986, 
deconstruction is not so much a question of avoiding something in an attempt 
to stay untainted, as a question of avoiding the avoidance of avoidance, 
because as soon as one speaks one has in a certain sense already avoided that 
of which one speaks. Again, as mentioned in the introduction, deconstruction 
is an incessant negotiation between the unspeakable or inexpressible and the 
expressions of speech, between the unthinkable and thought, between the 
impossible and the possibility of experiencing the impossible taking place as 
soon as one speaks. Yet, as Derrida underlines, this negotiation does not 
amount to the endeavor of a negative theology—if one thereby understands 
an attempt to guard and preserve the purity of some essentiality, with respect 
to which all predicative language can only be considered inadequate and 
insufficient. Instead, trying not to avoid avoidance means engaging with the 
unavoidability that the inexpressible and the expressible, the singular and the 
general, the idiom and the repeatable have always already intermingled and 
intersected with one another, and that “le croisement lui-même, ou la 
symplokè, n’appartienne proprement à aucun des deux modes et sans doute 
précède même leur distribution.”719  
In this regard, we might say that it is not a deconstructive concern to avoid 
speaking improperly about something in order to preserve its propriety and 
keep it safe from contamination or corruption—for how does one speak 
properly or improperly of that which owns neither property nor propriety? 
How does one speak appropriately or inappropriately of the disproportionate 
and auto-heterogeneous? How does one speak rightly or wrongly of that 
which differs in itself and thus infinitely defers its own definition? For this 
reason, the concern is, rather, to try to expose the undecidable and 
disproportionate intersections of the proper and the improper, and, in the 
necessity of speaking, to try to speak along with the experience of the 
inexpressible interruptions of speech, since, as Derrida writes:  
 
Même si l’idiomaticité doit nécessairement se perdre ou se laisser contaminer par 
la répétition qui lui confère un code et une intelligibilité, même si elle n’arrive qu’à 
s’effacer, si elle n’advient qu’en s’effaçant, l’effacement aura eu lieu, fût-il de 
cendre.720  
 
Accordingly, this thesis has sought to be attentive toward the auto-
deconstructive gestures of the texts with which it has engaged—gestures that 
                                           
719 PSY, 557/(II) 162.  
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displace, defer, and disrupt the effort of gathering answers in advance. 
Undoubtedly, this engagement has made the task of writing a conclusion all 
the more difficult—or differently difficult at least—than that of writing an 
introduction. No least because it has been an exploration into different 
experiences of the impossibility of determining, locating, or naming the 
remains of a self—even if it cannot get rid of itself—, wherefore any 
conclusive answer to the question of such remains would make manifest a 
betrayal of the opening that this impossibility signals. Thus, I have tried to 
avoid (unsuccessfully, no doubt) answering the opening question of the 
thesis as though it were a methodical questioning striving to gather 
something together by closing it off from something else in order to make it 
accessible for the essential grasping and handling of conceptuality—and yet, 
we have tried responding to it otherwise.  
Where does this leave us, then? In a certain sense, it leaves us where we 
left off; by the interminable auto-deconstruction of the self, which does not 
transpose us to another determinable place but rather exposes how our 
starting place is already a trace of somewhere else. In another sense, 
however, it therefore leaves us elsewhere inasmuch as we are no longer in 
the same place, if there ever was such a place. Perhaps, then, our concern 
with the remains has left us ‘nowhere,’ because of their circumvention or 
diversion of the coordinates that would allow us to locate and determine their 
place. Let us therefore try to retrace our steps, in order to see how this 
dislocation occurred. 
In the first chapter, we began our inquiry into the remains of a self with 
the sense of solitude that may arise from an experience of not being able to 
be alone with oneself. This solitary experience brought into focus, on the one 
hand, a sense of being bereft or abandoned by oneself because of the alterity 
between one and oneself, and, on the other hand, the risk of autoimmunity 
inherent to the attempt of purging oneself of this alterity in order to gain 
access to a solitude of one’s own. 
In the second chapter, this ambiguity gave rise to a further exploration into 
the equiprimordiality of solitude and being-with-others, which conferred the 
sense of being delivered over to and dependent on others upon us, resulting 
in the ambivalent desire for an ‘absolute’ or ‘sovereign’ solitude, which, 
however, is also dreaded seeing as its achievement would amount to an 
annihilation of itself. Thus, it became clear that the solitary one in fact 
depends on others for a sense of personal solitude, because without others 
the solitary one would cease to exist as such, and instead disperse into an 
anonymous otherness that is no longer that of one’s ‘fellow’ others.  
In Chapter III, this emergence of an anonymous solitude spurred us to 
proceed with an inquiry into the German pronoun ‘es’ as it figures in the 
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writings Freud, by focusing on two crucial sentences: ‘wo Es war soll Ich 
werden’ and ‘das Ich ist nur ein Stück vom Es.’ We conducted this inquiry 
through a reading of Freud’s Jenseits, which made the importance of the 
notions of repetition and (counter-)rhythm conspicuous with regard to the 
relation between the ‘It’ and the ‘I’ as well as between the drive and desire.  
This repetitive and caesural relation between I and It drew us into a 
reading of Das Unheimliche in Chapter IV, where we undertook a 
specification of various differences and resemblances between Freud’s and 
Heidegger’s understandings of the uncannily unhomely in relation to the 
human ‘ethos.’ This specification came about through an analysis of the 
notion of the ‘daemonic’ in both Freud and Heidegger, understood as an 
originary separation of the human being from itself, which in the apparition 
of the double could turn out to be disastrous. In turn, the notion of originary 
separation made us aware of the various psychoanalytic ‘scenes of cutting’ 
in Freud and Lacan.  
In Chapter V, we tried to interlace some threads from the previous 
chapters in a reading of Lacan’s tenth seminar on anxiety, aiming to elucidate 
the relation between the uncanny and anxiety. Through an analysis of what 
we called a ‘reversal of the mirror stage,’ I demonstrated how, in Lacan’s 
view, the distance between the ‘I’ and ‘It’ collapses in anxiety, whereby the 
reality of the symbolic subject becomes threatened not only by the apparition 
of the double but also by the exposition of the ‘other scene.’ Finally, this 
exposure to the ‘other scene,’ designating the exterior intimacy (extimacy) 
of the unconscious ‘It’ to the ‘I,’ prompted us towards a reading together—
yet apart—of Lacan and Blanchot, in particular with regard to the latter’s 
notion of an ‘other solitude’ as a solitude of the impersonal. In my view, 
what Blanchot calls the essential solitude, which we in turn have called a 
‘solitude of the impersonal’ or a ‘solitude of dissolution,’ may appear almost 
as if ‘behind’ the initially outlined ‘solitude of not being able to be alone.’ 
This is because the solitary awareness of the dependency of the ‘my’-self 
and my ‘own’ solitude upon others may also lead to the elusive experience 
that if I were to be abandoned to myself alone, I would also be delivered over 
to a solitude which would no longer belong to me insofar as I would be 
without a relation to myself, since, as Derrida writes in Politique de l’amitié, 
“l’autre est la condition de mon immanence.”721  
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A SOLITUDE OF RESPONSIBILITY 
As we have seen in the previous chapters, deconstruction and 
psychoanalysis—each in their different ways—call into question the notion 
of solitude, obligating us to ‘revaluate’ its significance, that is, to overturn 
and displace the significance(s) of solitude without thereby devaluating it. It 
is for this reason that we conceived of a solitary self who is unable to be 
alone with itself inasmuch as it is bound up with plural others from its very 
coming into being. Yet the question of solitude as a remainder of the ongoing 
auto-deconstruction of the self is not only an ‘ontological’ question since, as 
Nancy stresses in Être singulier pluriel, “[i]l n’y a de différence entre 
l’éthique et l’ontologique: l’‘éthique’ expose ce que l’‘ontologie’ 
dispose.”722  
In light of Nancy’s understanding of the ontological question as the sense 
of being shared out between us, it became evident that our questioning of 
solitude also called into question, not only the notions of ‘authority,’ 
‘autonomy,’ and ‘identity,’ but also the notion of ‘responsibility.’ However, 
calling these notions into question is not the same as overthrowing them; on 
the contrary, it is an attempt to pay rigorous attention to what they mean to 
signify, historically and in the specific contexts in which they appear, thereby 
also exposing the moments where they might differ from their own 
signification, and testing their ability to survive their own deconstruction 
instead of solidifying them into fossilized sedimentations.  
Hence, as promised in the introduction and in approaching the end, we 
will finally bring to the fore the question of responsibility, which has been 
the more or less inconspicuous and silent travelling companion to the 
question of solitude, which we will now try to bring into the discussion. For, 
how does one take responsibility for oneself if this self is never merely one’s 
own? What does it mean to ‘be responsible’ if the notions not only of 
‘authority’ and ‘autonomy,’ but also of ‘auto-affection,’ ‘self-presence,’ and 
‘self-transparency’ have already been marked and called into question by an 
anterior heterogeneity?  
One way of thinking about responsibility under these conditions is to try 
to take into consideration the originary irresponsibility that comes along 
with, and even preconditions, any attempt at being responsible. Accordingly, 
the responsibility which this thesis have called into question concerns, as 
mentioned in the introduction, a sense and an experience of being 
‘responsible without and before autonomy’ because the very autos of 
whomever is called into question only arises as a response to the other on 
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which it depends.723 Hence, the question remains as to how one ‘takes’ 
responsibility for the irresponsible response to the other that one always 
already is. This requires further explanation, but first, let me be clear that it 
is not the intention of these closing remarks to pursue the question of 
responsibility in detail, as this would require a lengthy study of its own, but 
rather to open it up in an indicatory manner by recourse to some of our 
previous findings.  
Thus, for Lacan the Freudian imperative of the ‘Wo Es war, soll Ich 
werden’ marks an ethical experience,724 which we now may understand both 
as the exposure to an ethos (a daemonic ethos, a divided ethos) and as an 
ethical injunction. The I that must come to be in the place where It was is 
obliged to make a home for itself in the field of the Other, which destines me 
in advance, and as such will always already be responsible for this 
unconscious space at which it will have arrived only belatedly. In other 
words, the symbolic subject is always already responsible for its unconscious 
symptoms, even if it has never consciously chosen to be. This also means 
that ‘I’ must try to take into account the unaccountable, namely, the 
unconsciousness of ‘my’ consciousness and the automatism of ‘my’ 
autonomy, just as ‘I’ must respond to the irresponsibility of ‘my’ 
responsibility. One has never chosen to be born, neither has one chosen by 
whom or under what circumstances one was brought into the world—
whether born or thrown—nor how one will be perceived and judged by 
others. Moreover, according to Lacan, one has not even chosen one’s own 
desires since they are always the desires of the other; and, finally, one has 
never chosen to be dying. 
Yet, despite all of these ‘unchosens’ one is still responsible for that which 
one has never chosen, if nothing else, then for the simple reason that no one 
else is responsible in my place. Therefore, one must (il faut), or rather one 
cannot avoid trying to, reappropriate the originary dispropriation of oneself 
by reactively responding to the ill-timed and discontinuous other that was 
the cause of one—even if this is an impossible and infinite task. This is, at 
least, one way of reading Lacan’s statement that “le statut de l’inconscient 
est éthique, non point ontique.”725  
Accordingly, the attempt to take into account the originary irresponsibility 
of responsibility does not amount to a renunciation of responsibility; on the 
contrary, it makes its injunction even more relentless and restless, since it 
awakens us to a “responsabilité de cela même dont on se tient pour 
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irresponsable.”726 As Derrida points out in La carte postale, it is 
psychoanalysis that, in the wake of Nietzsche, made inevitable the thought 
that “[o]n peut être coupable de ce dont on se croit par essence innocent, 
endetté de ce dont on se sent toujours d’avance acquitté. Nietzsche a osé lier 
la responsabilité, la dette et la culpabilité à l’inconscient.”727 Thus, it is 
precisely because I am originally irresponsible—because originally 
heteronomous—that I am also preoriginally responsible for the fact that in 
the abyss of my being I am already a response to the trace of the other, which 
also entails that I can never be responsible in advance, but always only after 
the fact. As such, nothing is given in advance for responsibility, meaning that 
no criteria, no norms, no rules may serve as a guarantee of good ethical 
conduct or as foundation for acting responsibly because it is precisely the 
abyss of irresponsibility that conditions the unconditionality of 
responsibility.728 
Thinking about responsibility in this way is therefore not so much a matter 
of thinking up prescriptions of what to say or how to act in order to be 
responsible, nor is it a matter of providing determinate answers, whether in 
the form of a fixed proposition, a dogma, or a conviction.729 Instead, as 
Nancy suggests, it may be that it is not the reponse in itself but rather “la 
seule obligation de répondre”730 that is called responsibility.  
Responsibility as the obligation to respond unconditionally—without 
premises or presumptions about how or what to respond—requires that the 
response must be re-invented every time the responsible one is called into 
question by the singular appeal of the other. One can never measure up to 
this responsibility, simply because it is without measure, wherefore the 
experience of being responsible for a self that never simply belongs to itself 
but only ever relates to itself in the response to another is also a solitary 
experience of being finite over against the exposure to a responsibility that 
infinitely exceeds this finitude.731 By way of closing these remarks, I shall 
briefly consider how such an infinite responsibility may be at work and how 
it may be related to the question of solitude. 
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FRIENDS OF SOLITUDE? 
In the chapters preceding these concluding remarks, our main concern has 
been with the experiences of solitude and responsibility of a self that remains 
in the auto-deconstruction of the self and in the exposure to the other. 
However, in Chapter II we also engaged with a community without 
community, which is the community that remains when the metaphysical or 
universal warranties that assure us of having something other than nothing 
in common have been withdrawn. Above all, the retreat of all commonalities 
and universalities entails that ‘the world,’ understood as a common ground 
or space of whatever exists, has disappeared—if indeed it has ever been 
present.  
Accordingly, the community without community is the community of that 
which remains in this worldly abandonment, leaving behind an irremediable 
solitude of those who are absolutely separated from one another because of 
“l’absence sans recours de tout monde, c’est-à-dire de tout sens commun du 
mot ‘monde,’”732 but who nevertheless have no place of their own. We 
therefore examined this community without community as the community 
of solitary beings who share nothing but their inability to be alone by 
themselves and who are thus dependent on each other for a solitude of their 
own. Hence, as Blanchot reminds us in La communauté inavouable, even 
while we remain solitary, we are not alone in our incapability of being alone 
with ourselves, wherefore the solitude that is shared out (partage) between 
us also binds us to “une responsabilité inconnue,”733 understood as an 
“attention infinie à Autrui.”734  
Celan’s epigraph to these remarks discloses that “Die Welt ist fort ich muss 
dich tragen,”735 whereto we read: in the abandonment of the world as the 
common ground under our feet, we are delivered over to one another, and on 
this lack of ground and in this void we are obliged to carry each other. Yet, 
since we are all others for each other, this infinite responsibility of finitude 
makes us doubly responsible: we are responsible for ourselves as traces of 
others, which at the same time means that we are responsible for the traces 
of others.  
‘Death’ may be the name we give to the utmost other to whose call we 
must all respond, but at the arrival of this other called death, the remains of 
the other will fall into my hands just as my remains will eventually fall into 
the hands of others. This is perhaps the utmost sense in which we can 
understand the solitude of not being able to be alone as a solitude also of 
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being delivered over to others. Indeed, in or after what is called ‘my’ death I 
have no authority, no control, and no say in what happens to ‘my’ remains 
or to the remains of what was called ‘my’ life. Therefore, Derrida asserts: 
 
[S]i peu que je sache de ce que veut dire l’altérité de l’autre ou des autres, j’ai bien 
dû présupposer que l’autre, les autres, ce sont précisément ceux qui peuvent 
toujours mourir après de moi, me survivre et disposer ainsi de ce qui reste de moi, 
de mes restes.736  
 
The ‘others’ are those who may always possibly come to have ‘my’ remains 
at their disposal, and this disposal of my remains in a certain sense already 
takes place while I am still breathing, since, as Derrida continues, “l’autre 
peut m’enterrer vif, me manger ou m’avaler vif, me brûler vif, etc. Il peut me 
mettre à mort vivant, et excercer ainsi sa souveraineté.”737 In other words, 
even before the arrival of ‘my’ death, I am already surviving on the account 
of others who may survive me, since ‘I’ am already a trace of the other, and 
“c’est la qu’il y a de l’autre qui dispose de moi, c’est là que tout moi est sans 
défense. Voilà ce qu’est le moi, voilà ce que je suis, ce que le je est, que je 
sois là ou pas.”738  
In this double responsibility, we are therefore exposed to an irresolvable 
tension between survival and inheritance, according to which I inherit the 
remains of others even if I am neither more nor less than a remainder of the 
other. Yet, such responsibility does not amount to a reciprocal relationship 
in which we can take shifts in carrying one another or rest our feet on 
common grounds in order to catch our breaths. Rather, the breath of the other 
is in my hands even though I breathe only insofar as the other carries me; 
and yet we do not breathe the same air or carry on the same grounds, 
suggesting that the only remaining reciprocity is a reciprocity of non-
reciprocity. Accordingly, others are responsible for our remains just as we 
ourselves are responsible for the remains of others, not only in the sense of 
“un corpus, un tas de cendre in soucieux de garder sa forme”739 but also in 
the sense of the remains that are already there when there is… Since, as 
Derrida writes in Feu la cendre, “[a] la place d’autres, au pluriel déjà, de 
leurs noms et non d’eux-mêmes, il y a là cendre, ‘d’autres, il y a là 
cendre.’”740  
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In his readings of Celan and others, Derrida contemplates the trope of cinders 
as “le meilleur paradigme de la trace,”741 because a trace is always “destinée, 
comme toute, à disparaître d’elle-même,”742 and as such, it is already a mark 
of its own effacement. A cinder names what remains of a singularity, an 
event, an other that only leaves a trace in the effacement of itself and as such 
keeps its secret in the dispersion of itself. On this understanding, every other 
is already a cinder, because every other already bears the mark of its own 
disappearance, and as such is already the remains of itself understood as that 
which “ne pas rester auprès de soi, ne pas être à soi.”743 That is to say, 
everybody is responsible for the remains of every other—and not only 
‘human’ others—because no-body belongs to itself.  
The cinders and ashes scattered throughout the writings of Celan and 
Derrida in the effacement of their own traces are, for both writers, associated 
with “ce qui reste sans rester de l’holocauste, du brûlé-tout, de l’incendie 
l’encens.”744 In this regard, however, we should draw a distinction. For it is 
one thing to speculate, like Freud, on the ‘I’ in general as a ‘Stück’ of the ‘It,’ 
or to experience oneself as a ‘Stück’ in the abandonment of oneself to an 
anonymous other, but it is another thing entirely to regard others as 
anonymous, impersonal Stücke with no solitude of their own.  
As is known from the testimonies handed down to us in Claude 
Lanzmann’s Shoah, and reenacted in László Nemes’ Son of Saul, the SS 
officers of the concentration camps developed a custom of referring to the 
bodily remnants of the gas chambers precisely as ‘Stücke’—that is, as mere 
pieces to be hobbled together and stacked in piles in order for the cremation 
process to run more efficiently.745 Perhaps the gravest responsibility that we 
all carry in the irresolvable tension between survival and inheritance is the 
responsibility towards the possibility of reducing each other to nothing but 
‘Stücke,’ which is a possibility inherent to the very independency of the 
beings we call ‘our’-selves. In trying to avoid letting any-body ‘fall into 
pieces,’ we must therefore acknowledge and beware of the unavoidable risk 
of doing so—whether intentionally or not. This does not entail that we must 
                                           
741 FC, 43. 
742 FC, 57.  
743 FC, 61. 
744 FC, 43.  
745 For instance, in Shoah Filip Müller who was a member of the Sonderkommando in 
Auschwitz recounts an incident that took place when he was on a night shift at one of the 
crematoria: “I fetched the kapos—kapo Schloime, and kapo Wacek. They came in, and 
he [Oberscharführer Voss] asked them: ‘How many pieces are left?’ By ‘pieces’ he meant 
bodies. They told him: ‘Around five hundred pieces.’ He said: ‘By morning those five 
hundred pieces must be reduced to ashes’” (Lanzmann 1985, 158). 
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affirm the idea of some inviolable kernel of identity or some unshakeable 
sense of self in order to be responsible; rather, it is precisely because of a 
fundamental violability of the remains of a self whose aseity and ipseity have 
withdrawn that we are infinitely responsible toward each other.746  
By way of resuming, though at the risk of over-simplifying, we can say 
that our personal solitude, which is the solitude that make us appear as who 
we are, is given to us only in our exposure to others. Inversely, in the 
abandonment of others, I am delivered over to a solitude of anonymity in 
which ‘I’ disappear and every sense of ‘property’ regarding myself dissolves 
because “personne n’accompagne personne.”747 We share, then, the 
unshareable solitude of not being able to be alone that is also a mark of the 
unshareable finitude that ‘I’ as an other is exposed to in the infinite 
responsibility to carry the remains of the other. Hence, we will close by 
opening up to some questions that are not unrelated to the concerns of this 
thesis but whose responses exceeds its scope, wherefore we will have to 
restrict ourselves to some tentative suggestions that may invite further 
studies still to come. For does the sharing of the unshareable bring us closer 
or further away from one another? Does it make us enemies or friends of 
each other’s solitude?  
As Artaud writes in L’ombilic de limbes, he considers his enemies “ceux 
qui me prennent pour l’ombre que je me sens si bien être.”748 Yet how do we 
avoid turning each other into the shadows we might already feel ourselves to 
be and to which we are always at a risk of being reduced? Perhaps we should 
strive to become the ‘Freunde der Einsamkeit’ that Nietzsche called upon in 
Jenseits von Gut und Böse749—a call that, according to Derrida, is precisely 
“à partager ce qui ne se partage pas, la solitude.”750 Nietzsche also calls these 
friends of solitude the philosophers of the future and of the dangerous 
perhaps, but the question remains how such solitary friends would be 
amongst each other. Here we can only speculate: perhaps the friends of 
solitude would be those who do not precipitate the death of the other for 
whose remains they are already responsible. Perhaps they would be those 
who leave the future of the other open by not deciding the undecidable or 
closing the abyss that separates one from the other. Perhaps they would be 
those responsible for providing the time and the space for the other to remain 
there where it has no proper place or property. Perhaps they would be those 
responsible for the secrecy of the other who is never closest to itself, 
                                           
746 Cf. V, 71/ 45–46. 
747 EI, 30/22. 
748 OC I, 82/SW, 69 
749 KSA 5, 63. 
750 PA, 53/35. 
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guarding it like a secret without secret. Finally, perhaps the friends of 
solitude would be those responsible for giving the other who is unable to be 
alone a solitude of its own.  
Perhaps, but for now we will let the always incomparable words of 
Blanchot bring us to a close: “Ainsi est, ainsi serait l’amitié qui découvre 
l’inconnu que nous sommes nous-mêmes, et la rencontre de notre propre 
solitude que précisément nous ne pouvons être seuls à éprouver.”751 
                                           
751 CI, 46/25. 
  
SUMMARY 
 
The overall aim of this study is to show how instances of otherness can be 
said to be at work in the construal of self as a relation taking place in the 
relation to itself, thereby deferring the determination of such a relationship 
through interminable displacements. The opening question of the thesis 
concerning ‘what or who remains in the ongoing auto-deconstruction of the 
self?’ introduces the thought of a deconstruction in terms of which one can 
longer speak of ‘the self,’ wherefore a retreat of this definite article 
constitutes the departure point for an inquiry into a self-relation that remains 
under deconstruction. 
With a view to deconstructive gestures of reading and writing, the study 
sets out not to reconstruct a new concept, model, or theory of ‘the self’ or 
‘selfhood,’ but rather to undertake an in-depth investigation of the various 
contexts and experiences in which the construal of ‘the self’ appears to 
tremble, vacillate, and deconstruct itself, thus exposing the destabilizing 
otherness already roaming the foundations of this construction. The thesis 
therefore seeks to offer a reconsideration of the displaced topos of an autos, 
as it were, which, in the wake of psychoanalysis and deconstruction, no 
longer appears conceivable as the stable reference point of self-
consciousness, self-reflection, and self-presence. Yet, it is also the 
suggestion of this study that some sort of self-relation still remains in the 
auto-deconstruction of the self, even if such a relation may only be 
experienced in the abandonment of itself. For this reason, the thesis discusses 
various indications of such dispropriated self that occurs along with a certain 
sense of solitude and responsibility.  
The exploration into the remains of a self is carried out in five chapters 
whose main concern is the question of solitude, which, however, is 
consistently and significantly bound up with the calling into question of 
responsibility. The first chapter takes up an experience of solitude confronted 
with the challenge of ‘not being able to be alone with oneself,’ because of an 
otherness that, as becomes evident in the writings of Artaud, perpetually 
interrupts the relation to oneself. The second chapter proceeds with an 
inquiry into a double-bind, according to which others constitute both a 
condition of possibility and of impossibility for the solitary one and for the 
sense of a solitude of one’s own. Through readings of Heidegger, Derrida, 
and Nancy, it will be argued that this intimate dependency on others implies 
that that which one might call one’s ‘own’ is never simply owned by oneself 
alone. By going into detail with the German pronoun ‘Es’ as it figures in the 
writings of Freud, the third and fourth chapters explore the various 
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experiences and situations in which the sense of personal self and solitude is 
exposed to the threat of disappearing into what we shall call ‘a solitude of 
the impersonal.’ The fifth chapter continues the psychoanalytic trajectory by 
examining how the distance between the ‘I’ and ‘It’ collapses in Lacan’s 
seminar on anxiety, whereby the solitary self comes to experience a threat of 
dissolution as it sees itself disappear into the ‘other.’ This exposure to one’s 
own dissolution leads on to a reading together—yet apart—of Lacan and 
Blanchot, with regard to the latter’s notion of an ‘other solitude,’ which is to 
be understood precisely as a solitude where no personal solitude remains. To 
a certain extent, the closing remarks shift the focus from oneself to that of 
the others upon whom every solitary self depends, wherefore the thesis ends 
by opening up to the question of responsibility that ensues from this 
dependency on others at the heart of solitude. 
  
RESUMÉ 
 
Formålet med denne afhandling er at bidrage til en forståelse af, hvorledes 
momenter af en andethed kan siges at være på spil i konstruktionen af et selv 
som en relation, der finder sted i relationen til sig selv således, at 
bestemmelsen af forholdet bestandigt udsættes gennem ubestemmelige 
forskydninger. Spørgsmålet, som denne afhandling indledningsvis rejser, 
angående ’hvad eller hvem der resterer i den fortsatte autodekonstruktion af 
selvet?’ medfører, at man ikke uden videre kan opretholde en diskurs om 
’selvet.’ Afhandlingen tager derfor udgangspunkt i tilbagekaldelsen af denne 
bestemte artikel knyttet til selvet for at åbne undersøgelsen af et selvforhold, 
der forbliver under dekonstruktion.  
Med afsæt i en række dekonstruktive tankebevægelser er det ikke så meget 
en rekonstruktion af et nyt begreb, en model eller teori om ’selvet,’ der er 
indeværendes interessefelt, som det er et forsøg på at undersøge de 
erfaringssammenhænge, hvori konstruktionen af ’selvet’ synes at vakle og 
dekonstruere sig selv således, at den destabiliserende andethed, der allerede 
huserer i selvkonstruktionens grundlag, blotlægges. Disse betragtninger 
fører til en genovervejelse af selvets forskudte sted, som i kølvandet på 
psykoanalysen og dekonstruktionen ikke længere kan konciperes i form af et 
selvnærværets holdepunkt. Det foreslås dog, men netop med afsæt i en 
autodekonstruktion af selvet, at et art selvforhold endnu resterer i selvets 
autodekonstruktion, skønt et sådant forhold måske kun lader sig erfare ved 
at forlade sig selv. Følgelig anføres og diskuteres en række forskelligartede 
indikationer på et sådant disproprieret selv, med særligt henblik på en vis 
betydning af ensomhed og ansvar. 
Undersøgelsen af selvets rester falder i fem kapitler, hvis hovedanliggende 
angår spørgsmålet om ensomhed. Første kapitel bringer den ensomhed i 
erfaring, som mødes i det ’ikke at kunne være alene med sig selv,’ da en 
andethed, hvis udtryk vi møder i Artauds skrifter, uafladeligt afbryder 
selvforholdet. Det andet kapitel fortsætter med spørgsmålet om ensomhed 
ved at tage den dobbeltbinding i betragtning, i medfør af hvilken ’det andet’ 
eller ’de andre’ konstituerer både muligheds- og umulighedsbetingelsen for 
den ensomme og dennes erfaring af en ’egen’ ensomhed. Gennem læsninger 
af Heidegger, Derrida og Nancy fremsættes en af afhandlingens bærende 
teser om, at den af andre afhængige samværen indebærer, at det, der kaldes 
’ens eget,’ imidlertid aldrig kun er ejet af en selv. Afhandlingens tredje og 
fjerde kapitel tager afsæt i en detaljeret analyse af det tyske pronomen ’Es,’ 
sådan som det kommer til udtryk i Freuds skrifter, for på den baggrund at 
tage de mange erfaringer og situationer i øjesyn, i hvilke betydningen af det 
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personlige selv og dettes ensomhed er udsat for truslen om at forsvinde ind i 
det, der i afhandlingen kaldes for ’en upersonlighedens ensomhed.’ I femte 
kapitel fortsættes den psykoanalytiske kurs frem mod en undersøgelse af, 
hvorledes afstanden mellem ’Jeg’ og ’Det’ synes at kollapse i Lacans 
angstseminar, hvorved det ensomme selv bringes i en truende erfaring af 
opløsning, idet det ser sig selv blive opløst i den ’anden.’ Denne udsættelse 
for ens egen opløsning fører til en samlæsning—ihvorvel brudt—af Lacan 
og Blanchot med særlig henblik på sidstnævntes forståelse af en ’anden 
ensomhed,’ hvor ingen personlig ensomhed forbliver. Afhandlingens 
afsluttende betragtninger over de tematikker, der er sammensat undervejs, 
skifter i en vis forstand fokus fra en selv til de andre, af hvem det ensomme 
selv er afhængig. Således bringes afhandlingen til ende med en åbning af 
spørgsmålet om det ansvar, der opstår ud fra det i ensomheden iboende andet.
  
EXCURSUS I 
 
KAFKA ON THE SENSE OF BEING-DELIVERED-OVER TO OTHERS IN THE MIDST 
OF ONE’S SOLITUDE 
As we saw and sensed in the chapter on Artaud’s writing, the heteronomous 
dependency of one’s most intimate being can seem quite invasive, intrusive, 
to the point of a suffocating claustrophobia that can make one sick to the 
stomach. Another writer who has his difficulties with the solitude of not 
being able to be alone, Franz Kafka, complains in a letter to his fiancée of 
the time, Felice Bauer, about his insufficiently solitary and sovereign 
existence, and about being inescapably bound up with others by the simple 
fact of descending from them. At the sight of his parent’s conjugal bed—
which all-too literally and all-too vulgarly indicates the inappropriable yet 
inescapable Urszene from whence he comes—this dependency upon others 
becomes nauseatingly obvious to Kafka, who in October 1916 writes: 
 
[D]er Anblick des Ehebettes zuhause, der gebrauchten Bettwäsche, der sorgfältig 
hingelegten Nachthemden kann mich bis nahe zum Erbrechen reizen, kann mein 
Inneres nach außen kehren, es ist, als wäre ich nicht endgiltig geboren, käme immer 
wieder aus diesem dumpfen Leben in dieser dumpfen Stube zur Welt, müsse mir 
dort immer wieder Bestätigung holen, sei mit diesen widerlichen Dingen, wenn 
nicht ganz und gar, so doch zum Teil unlöslich verbunden, noch an den 
laufenwollenden Füßen hängt es wenigstens, sie stecken noch im ersten formlosen 
Brei.752  
 
In light of what we have considered so far, one cannot help but take this 
nausea very literally: Perhaps Kafka wants to pull all his insides out, because 
the obscure room of his parent’s bedroom all too clearly confirms to him a 
familiar sense of foreignness, or of foreign familiarity, already unknowingly 
known to him like the Freudian Unheimliche. That is, the unfamiliarly 
familiar sense that his utmost intimate inside is already outside, as the outside 
is already inside, as well as the sense that his very sense of self only comes 
to him because of his originary self-estrangement in the heteronomy of the 
first formless brew where all simple origin dissolves. And perhaps what both 
Artaud and Kafka encounter in their nauseating and intrusive experiences of 
being originally stolen or secreted away from themselves is a solitude of 
absolute dependency that hollows out any being of their own. 
                                           
752 Kafka 1967, 729.  
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Thus, in an earlier letter to Felice, the perhaps most solitary of writers 
complains of not being able to be alone in his solitude and phantasizes about 
a solitude that would be ever more uninterrupted, ever more solitary:  
 
Deshalb kann mann nicht genug allein sein, wenn mann schreibt, deshalb kann es 
nicht genug still um einen sein, wenn man schreibt, die Nacht ist noch zu viel Nacht 
[…]. Oft dachte ich schon daran, dass es die beste Lebensweise für mich wäre, mit 
Schreibzeug und einer Lampe im innersten Raume eines ausgedehnten, 
abgesperrten Kellers zu sein. Das Essen brächte man mir, stellte es immer weit von 
meinen Raum entfernt hinter der Äußersten Tür des Kellers nieder. Der Weg um 
das Essen, im Schlafrock, durch alle Kellergewölbe hindurch wäre mein einziger 
Spaziergang. Dann kehrte ich zu meinem Tisch zurück, würde langsam und mit 
Bedacht essen und wieder gleich zu schreiben anfangen. Was ich dann schreiben 
würde!753 
 
Reading this passage, one cannot help noticing that even in his most solitary 
phantasies Kafka is still not capable of imagining a solitude in which he 
would be entirely independent of others and absolutely alone in order to 
write. Yet, what would writing be without the other? As Nancy emphasizes 
even the most solitary writer writes only for the other insofar as “la littérature 
inscrit l’être-en-commun, l’être pour autrui et par autrui.”754 
 
                                           
753 Kafka 1967, 250. 
754 CD, 165/66. 
  
EXCURSUS II 
 
SADE ON THE INTRIGUE OF SOVEREIGN SOLITUDE 
Perhaps some of the most extreme literary phantasies of the desire for 
sovereign solitude are to be found in the writings of Sade. There are a great 
many characters from the Sadean corpus that could be considered in this 
regard, but we shall restrict ourselves to one character whom, on my reading, 
embodies the desire for sovereign solitude taken to its absolute extreme. In 
his Histoire de Juliette ou les prospérités du vice, Sade tells us a tale of the 
giant Count Minski, a Muscovite by birth, who dreams of creating a world 
entirely purged of the otherness of others and in which he would be able to 
be absolutely and independently alone with himself. As Minski himself 
formulates it, “je suis un être unique dans mon espèce”755 and the goal of his 
desire is to “assez puissant pour n’avoir besoin de personne, assez sage pour 
me plaire dans ma solitude, pour détester tous les hommes.”756  
In order to obtain this goal of absolute autonomous solitude, Minski does 
everything in his power to demonstrate his utmost disdain for sociality by 
way of altrucide but also by way of humiliating and torturous practices 
designed to make a nothing of the other by breaking all forms social bonds, 
norms, or taboos, e.g. cannibalism, incest, sodomy, pedophilia, necrophilia, 
and, as always with Sade, the list goes on.  
Having performed these various deeds in great numbers—the rapes and 
murders of his own mother and sister constituting a significant step in the 
settling of his affairs—the one last outstanding but decisive deed that 
remains necessary for Minski to obtain his absolute independence of other is 
the murder of his own father. Yet, since his father died when Minski was still 
a child, this last and most decisive deed, which would allow him to annihilate 
the other half of his parental origins, remains impossible for him to 
accomplish. So Minski laments his unfortunate situation: “Hélas! j’ai 
manqué mon père, c’est ce qui me désole: j’étais trop jeune quand il 
mourut.”757 The premature death of his father thus becomes an emphatic 
insignia of the constitutive belatedness of Minski with regard to his own past, 
which perpetually prevents him from ever completing his future masterpiece 
of absolute, independent, and sovereign solitude insofar as it impedes him 
from negating and sublating his heteronomous origin into himself by killing 
and devouring his paternal originator. Preceded by his father’s premature 
death, Minski’s object of desire will remain forever unattainable to him, and 
                                           
755 Sade 1987, 598/583. 
756 Sade 1987, 598/583. 
757 Sade 1987, 613/598. 
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Minski is left to suffer the hauntings of regretting what could never have 
come to be and the despair of not being able to escape his engendered 
existence. Sinking into hopelessness, he sighs, “je suis assez malheureux 
maintenant pour ne pouvoir plus sacrifier que des victimes ordinaires; mon 
cæur se blasé, je ne jouis plus.”758 The enjoyment has vanished from 
Minski’s mutilating and murderous practices, which have become nothing 
but empty repetitions of the same, dealing only apathetically with 
insignificant others whom he can no longer meaningfully negate or 
annihilate since they already mean nothing to him.759 The ever-deferred 
object of Minski’s desire, indeed of most of the Sadean Libertines, is 
precisely the phantasm of solitary sovereignty by which “on fait ce que 
personne ne fait; on est donc unique dans son genre. Voilà la pâture de 
l’orgueil.”760  
The tale of the great count Minski exemplifies the Sadean aporia, which—
in a manner similar to that of the Hegelian dialectics of slave and master761—
exhibits the impossibility of absolute solitude, seeing as Minski is perhaps 
the most solitary offspring to have sprung from Sade’s imagination. Minski 
operates alone, he has no need of fellows or friends, and he refuses to become 
                                           
758 Sade 1987, 614/598. 
759 Remarkably, the phenomenon of repetition in Sade’s writings has received two 
seminal interpretations, one by Klossowski the other by Blanchot, which are quite similar 
in terms of their thematic movement but which precisely on the theme of apathetic 
repetition differ and assume almost contradictory perspectives. In Sade mon Prochain, 
Klossowski renders the endless repetitions of murders, mutilations, orgies, etc., in Sade 
as signs of impotency and powerlessness on the part of the libertines and their desires 
signaling their dependence on dialectic negativity for attaining their satisfaction. 
Klossowski thus describes the repetitive movement of negativity as a “pathos de 
l’emprisonnement et de l’impuissance, de l’impatience d’être une créature,” which 
incessantly aspires “la liberté du non-être, la liberté de Dieu que l’on accuse d’enfermer 
ses créatures dans la prison de l’être” (Klossowski 1947, 99–100/99). By contrast, in 
Lautrémont et Sade Blanchot considers the dialectical repetitions as demonstrating the 
sovereignty of the Sadean human being, precisely by virtue of his mastering the 
transcendence of negativity to the point of transforming the whole world into a desert of 
his apathetical desires, wherein “les êtres qu’il y recontre sont moins que des choses, 
moins que des ombres et, en les tourmentant, en les détruisant, ce n’est pas de leur vie 
qu’il s’empare, mais c’est leur néant qu’il vérifie, c’est leur inexistence dont il se rend 
maître et de laquelle il tire sa plus grande jouissance” (LS, 33/25). 
760 Sade 1987, 209. 
761 On the possibility of reading Sade with and against Hegel, Blanchot in L’entretien 
infini writes: “Sade n’est pas Hegel, il s’en faut. Toutefois, je ne vois nul anachronism à 
appeler dialectique au sense modern la prétention essentiellement sadique de fonder la 
souveraineté raisonable de l’homme sur un pouvoir transcendant de negation, pouvoir 
qu’il ne manque pas de reconnaître au principe de la plus claire et de la plus simple raison 
positive” (EI, 327/220).   
259 
 
a member of the Society of the Friends of Crime (Société des Amis du Crime) 
to which Juliette and the rest of the libertines belong. Nevertheless, no matter 
how hard and how violently Minski tries to cut or untie all bonds of otherness 
in order to become unique in his kind, even he cannot absolve himself from 
his natality, that is, from his descendance from others and from his originary 
belatedness regarding the matter of choosing to come into existence or not. 
Moreover, even if the condition of mortality does not appear to be as 
problematic an issue as the condition of natality to Minski, one might add 
that Minski will never be able to absolve himself from the traces he will leave 
behind after his death either, and that these remains of him will become 
scattered around in the hands and memories, traumatic or not, of others, out 
of his power. In other words, despite himself, Minski will not be able to avoid 
the survival of himself after his death, a death that can never be his own 
anymore than his coming into existence. Finally, even in annihilating, 
murdering, or torturing the others, Minski still remains dependent on the 
dependency of his victim’s upon him and on their affirmations of his absolute 
indifference towards them.762  
                                           
762 Blanchot formulates the paradox of solitary sovereignty in Sade as follows: “Du 
moment qu’‘être maître de moi’signifie ‘être maître des autres,’ du moment que mon 
indépendance ne vient pas de mon autonomie, mais de la dépendance des autres à mon 
ègard, il est visible que je demeure lié aux autres et que j’ai besoin des autres, fût-ce pour 
les réduire à rien” (LS, 31/23).  
  
EXCURSUS III  
HEIDEGGER ON THE SOLITARY IMPERSONALITY OF BOREDOM AND ANXIETY 
 
Le passé compris des sa race qui pèse sur lui en la sensation de fini, 
l’heure de la pendule precipitant cet ennui en temps lourd, étouffant, 
et son attente de l’accomplissement du future, forment du temps pur, 
out de lénnui, rendu instable par la maladie d’idéalité […] comme 
menacé par le supplice d’être éternel qu’il present vaguement, se 
cherchant dans la glace devenue ennui et se voyant vague et près de 
disparaître comme s’il allait s’évanouir en le temps   
– Stéphane Mallarmé, Igitur ou la folie d’Elbehnon 
 
Lang ist 
Die Zeit, es ereignet sich aber 
Das Wahre  
– Hölderlin, ‘Mnemosyne’ (2. Fassung) 
 
III.1 INTRODUCTION: A BORING SOLITUDE 
The linkage of solitude and boredom is by no means a new discovery. 
Indeed, already the stoic Epictetus spoke of solitude763 as a form of becoming 
bored with oneself that makes grown men behave like infants, which is even 
worse than children who—like the child-god of Heraclitus764—are at least 
capable of entertaining themselves with deconstructive play in their solitude. 
Solitude is something that should be avoided but that nevertheless appears 
difficult to steer clear of; wherefore Epictetus poses a series of questions to 
his fellow men:  
 
What solitude [ἐρημία] is there then left; what destitution [ἀπορία]? Why do we 
make ourselves worse than children? What do they do when they are left alone? 
They take up shells and dust; they build houses, then pull them down; then build 
something else; and thus never want amusement. Suppose you were all to sail away; 
am I to sit and cry because I am left alone [μόνος] and solitary [ἔρημος]? Am I so 
                                           
763 According to Epictetus, “solitude [ἐρημία] is a certain condition of a helpless human 
being [ἀβοήθητος],” and this state of helplessness is in part due to the dependency of the 
solitary one upon the companionship and kindness of others; when this dependency is felt 
but its demand not met, one is the most solitary. Cf. EPI, III.13. 
764 I am here thinking of Heraclitus’ fragment: “Time is a child playing draughts, the 
kingly power is a child’s [αἰὼν παῖς ἐστι παίζων, πεττεύων παιδὸς ἡ βασιληίη]” (DK 52; 
Burnet 1908, 153). See also Nietzsche’s comment on the fragment in Die Philosophie im 
tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen: “Ein Werden und Vergehen, ein Bauen und Zerstören, 
ohne jede moralische Zurechnung, in ewig gleicher Unschuld, hat in dieser Welt allein 
das Spiel des Künstlers und des Kindes” (KSA 1, 830). 
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unprovided with shells and dust? But children do this from folly; and shall we be 
wretched through wisdom [ὑπὸ φρονήσεως δυστυχοῦμεν]?765 
 
Grown men, and especially men who are philosophically inclined, should be 
capable of entertaining and sustaining themselves independently of others, 
and if they become bored with themselves it is simply because they have 
failed in making themselves interesting enough—meaning that men who 
become bored with themselves have not exercised their imagination or their 
thinking well enough to provide themselves interminably with intriguing 
subjects to be played around with. Grown men should be self-propelled and 
self-sufficient; they should not be in need of inspiration or stimulus from 
others in order to keep themselves busy and away from the impasses of 
boredom. Such a dependency on others would only expose a weakness on 
the part of the solitary subject. In principle, then, solitude should not even be 
possible for the properly mature subject, but only a ‘being alone’ or a ‘being 
one with oneself’ (μόνον εἶναι) in which the subject, like Zeus, would enjoy 
his own company in the dialogue of his soul without the need of others. 
Consequently, Epictetus discerns an intimate relation between helplessness, 
boredom, and solitude.766  
In this line of thought—which with some variation extends all the way up 
today—a tendency to consider boredom as a sign of insufficiency, or even 
deficiency, on the part of the bored one appears to prevail. Quite frequently, 
then, boredom is interpreted as an inability to play, to think, to sense, or even 
                                           
765 EPI, III.13,18–19.  
766 It is interesting to note that the distinction between ‘solitude’ and ‘being alone’ is by 
no means exceptional to Epictetus. Rather, in the Greek context it appears that a 
distinction prevails between a ‘good,’  ‘creative,’ or ‘productive’ kind of solitary living 
on the one hand, and a ‘bad’ or ‘destitute’ kind of solitude on the other. The term 
frequently employed to describe the non-pejorative or ‘positive’ kind of solitude is 
precisely μόνος, or an inclination thereof, which can indeed confer the sense of being 
solitary but also of being singled out, being one, being the only one, etc. An example of 
such productive solitude is to be found in the depiction given by Diogenes Laertius of 
Thales as “having always lived in solitude [μονήρης]” (DIO I,1.25) and in the final words 
of the Enneads, where Plotinus prasises the life of blessed men delivered from worldly 
troubles through an “escape in solitude to the solitary [φυγὴ μόνου πρὸς μόνον]” (ENN 
VI. 6–9, 345). In contrast, when there is talk of solitude in a pejorative or ‘negative’ sense, 
the term often employed is ἐρημία in one of its differing inclinations. Besides Epictetus, 
we have Aristotle’s description in the Eudemian Ethics of a solitude, and here the term is 
ἐρημίαν, which is not associated with an ability to be alone or to be one with oneself, but 
rather as a state of destitute friendlessness (ἀφιλίαν), which according to Aristotle is “a 
very terrible thing [δεινότατον]” (Eud.Eth. VII, 1234b18). Accordingly, the distinction of 
τὸ μόνον εἶναι and τὸ ἔρημον εἶναι appears also to yield another distinction, namely, the 
distinction between a voluntary seclusion and an involuntary isolation.  
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to experience deeply or intensely enough, and for this reason boredom is 
associated with a certain shallowness or hollowness of existence. However, 
as we shall see in the following, Heidegger—who is one of the first thinkers 
of Western philosophy, though Kierkegaard and especially Nietzsche are 
important predecessors here, to carefully and elaborately engage with the 
phenomenon of boredom as a matter for serious thought767—will come to 
show how the tendency to regard boredom as a sign of superficial 
shallowness is itself a shallow and ‘vulgar’ way of approaching the matter.768  
Making a leap in chronological time, for there is no easy passage here, we 
find another philosophical linkage of solitude and boredom in the Grecophile 
German Nietzsche who is less disapproving of boredom than Epictetus, and 
even observes some affirmative aspects in its sting, but who in line with the 
Greeks still denotes an intimate relation between solitude and boredom.Thus, 
in a passage from “Der Wanderer und sein Schatten” entitled “Der Einsame 
spricht,” Nietzsche consolingly reassures his readers that in return for much 
disgust (Ueberdruss), discontent (Missmuth), and boredom (Langeweile) 
brought on by a long-term solitude (Einsamkeit), the bored and solitary one 
earns the wage (Lohn) of the deepest immersion (Einkehr) into the nature of 
herself. Accordingly, Nietzsche warns: “Wer sich völlig gegen die 
Langeweile verschanzt, verschanzt sich auch gegen sich selber.”769 After this 
short introductory note, let us now return to Heidegger and his 1929/1930 
lecture course, which contains his most elaborate analysis of the 
phenomenon of boredom.   
 
 
III.2 THE FUNDAMENTAL ATTUNEMENT OF BOREDOM  
According to Heidegger’s thought on destinal being (Seinsgeschick), every 
epoch has its predominant attunements (Stimmungen) towards the grounds 
of its historical being. In Ancient Greece, for instance, one such fundamental 
attunement was astounded wondering (τὸ θαυμάζειν), which Socrates 
                                           
767 By this I do not mean to say that boredom was not tematized in the history of Western 
thought before Heidegger. Undoubtedly, one can think of many significant instances of 
boredom throughout philosophy and beyond; Pascal’s ennui, Schopenhauer’s bored 
suffering, Baudelaire’s spleen, Mallarmé’s Igitur and his ‘heures vides,’ to mention but a 
few. Yet to my knowledge Heidegger is one of the first thinkers to engage philosophically 
with the phenomenon of boredom in such detail and breadth.  
768 As Heidegger writes: “Die Langeweile ist im vulgären Sinne störend, unangenehm 
und unerträglich. All dergleichen ist für das vulgäre Verständnis auch schon geringwertig, 
unwürdig, zu verwerfen. Gelangweiltwerden ist ein Zeichen der Oberflächlichkeit und 
der Äußerlichkeit. Wer seinem Leben eine rechte Aufgabe stellt und ihm Inhalt gibt, 
braucht die Langeweile nicht zu fürchten und ist vor ihr sicher” (GA 29/30, 238). 
769 KSA 2, 641. 
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designated as the proper attunement of philosophy because of its exposure 
to the openness of being, that is to say, the exposure to the wonder that there 
is something rather than nothing.770 To the misfortune of Heidegger and his 
contemporaries, however, some of the most prevailing ‘attunements of 
ground’ or ‘fundamental attunements’ (Grundstimmungen) of ‘our situation’ 
(unsere Lage) are anxiety, which Heidegger pays special attention in his 
writings of the late twenties,771 and boredom, the analysis of which occupies 
the majority of the first part of the 1929/1930 lectures.772  
In order to come to an understanding of why Heidegger gives prominence 
to anxiety and boredom as the fundamental attunements, if not for Dasein in 
general (for it is indeed problematic to speak of a Dasein in general), then at 
least for the Dasein of ‘our situation’—which at the time of Heidegger’s 
lecturing was not only the beginning of the end of the Weimar republic, of 
the great depression, and the atrocities of the 1930s and 1940s to come, but 
also an era of industrial landmarks of technology—we must first try to grasp 
what is meant by ‘fundamental’ with respect to the attunements of anxiety 
and boredom, and especially so with respect to our main focus here, namely, 
their relation to solitude.  
Like anxiety, boredom is rendered a fundamental attunement in an at least 
threefold manner. First, boredom can be said to be a fundamental attunement 
insofar as it exposes us to the abyssal grounds of our existence, that is, to the 
lack of ground that is the only grounding of (free) existence. Thus Heidegger 
discerns “eine tiefe Langeweile in den Abgründen des Daseins.”773 Second, 
boredom becomes a fundamental attunement when it grips and takes hold of 
us in our very essence (wesenhaften Ergriffenheit),774 in a way that ultimately 
leads to groundbreaking changes in our most basic self-understanding: 
                                           
770 Cf. Thea. 155d. See also, GA 45, §§36–38.  
771 Some of Heidegger’s most seminal elaborations of anxiety are provided in §40 of Sein 
und Zeit and in the 1929 lecture Was ist Metaphysik?  
772 In §18 of the lecture course, Heidegger himself problematizes the use of such 
collective pronouns and their delimitation: who are ‘we,’ or ‘us,’ and who are ‘we’ 
referring to when talking about ‘our’ time? In order to answer such questions, it is not a 
matter of providing some metaphysical essence to our present existence; rather ‘we’ must 
first try to orientate ‘ourselves’ regarding the ‘our contemporary situation’ (unserer 
heutigen Lage), not so much in order to ask where ‘we’ are standing, but rather “how it 
stands with us [wie steht es mit uns],” that is, how we find ourselves situated (wie befinden 
wir uns)? Cf. GA 29/39, 103–4; 116. Thus, it is not a matter of observing and interpreting 
some present-at-hand place or state of the contemporary as such, as though it were a 
delimitable object of research, but of asking about and challenging the presumable 
existence of referents to such collective denominations.   
773 GA 29/30, 119. 
774 Cf. GA 29/30, 199. 
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“einen Wandel der Grundauffassung des Menschen.”775 In other words, an 
attunement of ground does not leave us unaffected but makes our 
foundations tremble and displaces our presupposed understanding of 
ourselves as human beings towards our naked being-there (Da-sein). Third, 
boredom can be rendered a fundamental attunement insofar as it offers an 
opening to the very grounding concepts of philosophy, that is, insofar as it 
brings about the question of beings as a whole or of the world, the question 
of time or of finitude, and the question of the singular being or of solitude. 
These three folds, which are characteristic of the fundamentality of an 
attunement, are intertwined in such a way that one fold cannot occur without 
the others, and vice versa. Accordingly, one cannot gain access to a 
philosophical questioning without having been fundamentally gripped, and 
as such attuned, in advance by something to which the philosophical 
questioning itself is a response. Inversely, however, neither can one gain 
access to the grounds of being without trying to understand this becoming 
fundamentally gripped or seized by way of philosophical questioning.776 
This is why Heidegger spends the entire first part of the 1929/1930 lecture 
course trying to awaken his listeners and readers to the possibility of 
becoming fundamentally gripped and as such attuned towards the grounding 
concepts of philosophy that question the grounds of our being there.  
One reason why Heidegger appoints boredom as one of the privileged 
Grundstimmungen of ‘our time’ is that it can (re)awaken the contemporary 
human being from its slumber in the hollow yet popular ‘philosophies of 
culture’ (Kulturphilosophien) to a more profound thinking of its Da-sein. 
Even if Heidegger admits that the diagnoses made by the popular 
philosophies of culture may to some extent describe our contemporary way 
of life “correctly,” they do so only in a naively anthropological, or even 
cybernetic, sense, and in an unfounded and postulating manner that only 
serves to unbind us from our own being rather than to obligate us towards 
our existence. Instead of sincerely trying to grasp (ergreifen) our historical 
being by its roots (even if this should lead only to an uprooting), the 
philosophies of culture confer a role upon our contemporary Dasein to be 
acted out in the theatrical ‘history of the world.’ 
 For Heidegger, these more or less desperate and hasty attempts to cast 
meaningful and purposeful attributes or props onto our contemporary way of 
life can only be a symptom of the fact that our very being has ceased to 
concern us and to address us as a sign in need of considerate and thoughtful 
                                           
775 GA 29/30, 123. 
776 Thus Heidegger writes: “Das Philosophieren bestimmten wir als begreifendes Fragen 
aus einer wesenhaften Ergriffenheit des Daseins. Eine solche Ergriffenheit aber ist nur 
möglich aus und in einer Grundstimmung des Daseins” (GA 29/30, 199). 
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interpretation, in the sense of Besinnung, even if this interpretation should 
remain without resolution. Hence, Heidegger poses the following decisive 
questions to his contemporaries: 
 
Was liegt darin, daß wir uns diese Rolle geben und gar geben müssen? Sind wir uns 
selbst zu unbedeutend geworden, daß wir einer Rolle bedürfen? Warum finden wir 
für uns keine Bedeutung, d. h. keine wesentliche Möglichkeit des Seins mehr? Weil 
uns gar aus allen Dingen eine Gleichgültigkeit angähnt, deren Grund wir nicht 
wissen?777  
 
In this series of questions, we are already presented with several crucial 
terms indicatory of why the attunement that must be awakened in order to 
attune us to the abyssal depths of our cotemporary situation is boredom, 
namely, the italicized terms ‘must’ (müssen), ‘insignificance’ 
(unbedeutend), and ‘indifference’ (Gleichgültigkeit).778 These terms are 
crucial because, according to Heidegger, the greatest and most critical, yet 
also most secret, ‘need’ (Not) of our epoch is nothing less than the very 
absence of need and the default of any essential constraint or distress 
(Ausbleiben der wesenhaften Bedrängnis).779  
To be sure, Heidegger concedes that it is not that ‘our’ time is entirely 
without its particular concerns and needs; there is social misery, political 
confusion, an erosion of both the sciences and the arts, an impotence of 
religion, and so on. Neither does Heidegger deny that ‘our’ time lacks 
anything in terms of programmatic and technological means to resolve these 
                                           
777 GA 29/30, 115. A few years later, in his lectures on Hölderlins’s hymns, Heidegger 
will cite the first verses of Hölderlin’s poem “Mnemosyne”: “Ein Zeichen sind wir, 
deutungslos / Schmerzlos sind wir, und haben fast / Die Sprache in der Fremde verloren” 
(HSW 10, 81). These verses obtain a crucial significance for Heidegger’s thinking in 
years to come. Cf. Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein,” GA 39, 135ff.; 
Hölderlins Hymne “Der Ister,” GA 53, 31ff.; Was heisst Denken?, GA 8, 11ff. 
778 In 1927 Heidegger was already attentive towards such ‘unattuned indifference‘ 
(Ungestimmtheit der Gleichgültigkeit), which in Sein und Zeit he associated with the 
everyday fallenness of Dasein: “die an nichts hängt und zu nichts drängt und sich dem 
überläßt, was je der Tag bringt, und dabei in gewisser Weise doch alles mitnimmt, 
demonstriert am eindringlichsten die Macht des Vergessens in den alltäglichen 
Stimmungen des nächsten Besorgens. Das Dahinleben, das alles ‘sein läßt,’ wie es ist, 
gründet in einem vergessenden Sichüberlassen an die Geworfenheit” (GA 2, 345; my 
emphasis). In retrospect, one cannot help but wonder how such indifferent ‘letting be’ 
differs from the Gelassenheit promoted as a listening response to the very gift of being 
(es gibt) in the later writings, but unfortunately we do not have space to explore this here.   
779 Cf. GA 29/30, §38. This motif of thought will remain of great import and significance 
in Heidegger’s writings throughout the thirties and forties, where he will come to write 
of a ‘needlessness’ (Notlösigkeit) constituting the ‘greatest need’ (höchste Not) of our 
epoch. See for example GA 65, 125.  
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needs. Still, Heidegger maintains that none of the particular needs and their 
means explain the indifference and the insignificance that permeate the 
grounds of our contemporary being. 
Therefore, the question that Heidegger consistently and repeatedly poses 
to his contemporaries concerns whether or not the human being, in all its 
technological superiority, has ultimately become boring to itself: Ist der 
Mensch am Ende sich selbst langweilig geworden? Has the human being 
exhausted its own possibilities and thus brought itself to its own end(s)? Is 
our entire Dasein today permeated by an all-encompassing emptiness (Leere 
im Ganzen) and, if so, how so? Is it because we human beings have lost 
something that we used to possess? But then again what could we possibly 
be lacking with all these new possibilities and resources available to us? 
What is our lack and what is our need (Not), if not the very lack of need? 
As Heidegger renders it, the problem with the contemporary human being 
is that it narrows down the expanse of its concealed and most profound need 
to those particular needs in the face of which some programmatic means of 
self-defense (Notwehr) may be employed for their appeasement. However, 
the insistence of a more urgent need betrays itself in the abrupt and hasty 
restlessness with which the human being tries to escape the profound 
boredom hovering over the abysses of its Dasein, wherefore Heidegger 
argues that the utmost need of our epoch is, in fact, the default of an essential 
need. Moreover, if the human being fails to become attuned to this need of 
needlessness in the profound boredom of its time it will remain a prisoner of 
its own insignificant restlessness, bored unto death like a sickness.  
Hence, Heidegger’s appeal to his contemporaries is thoughtfully to 
consider how this needlessness (Notlosigkeit) is actually the greatest need 
(Not) of our time insofar as such consideration is necessary (Notwendig) in 
order to return (wenden) and reopen ourselves to the abyssal freedom of our 
existence. The contemporary human being must free itself from its fixation 
in boredom precisely by way of the attunement of this boredom itself, which 
signals towards the impoverished state of its Dasein, which has lost its 
mystery and secrecy to itself. As Heidegger clarifies: “Das Geheimnis fehlt 
in unserem Dasein, und damit bleibt der innere Schrecken aus, den jedes 
Geheimnis bei sich trägt und der dem Dasein seine Größe gibt.”780 No 
greatness without secrets, but then again, no greatness without terror either, 
which is why the reawakening of the fundamental attunement of boredom 
demands a courage of heart (Mut des Gemüths).  
Thus disencouraged, let us proceed with Heidegger’s analysis of boredom, 
which as the German word Langeweile indicates, concerns a certain relation 
                                           
780 GA 29/30, 244. 
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to or a ‘sensing of time’ (Zeitgefühl). In order to further investigate this 
relation between boredom and time, Heidegger distinguishes three moments 
or forms of boredom, passing from superficiality to increasing profundity, 
which, as Michel Haar has pointedly observed, “are like three concentric 
circles of tormented temporality.”781  
 
 
III.3 THE PROFOUND BOREDOM OF HEIDEGGER 
The three forms of boredom are epitomized by Heidegger in three 
corresponding headings: 1) a “becoming bored by something” 
(Gelangweiltwerden von etwas), corresponding to the most superficial form 
of boredom; 2) a “boring oneself with something” (Sichlangweilen bei 
etwas), which is already well on its way toward the depths; 3) and finally, 
the most profound form of boredom, which reaches its crescendo in the 
sentence “it is boring for one” (es ist einem langweilig).  
As the text proceeds, however, the superficial form of boredom will come 
to reveal itself as having already harbored the more profound—(die 
oberflächige soll sich als die tiefe Langeweile offenbaren).782 This 
movement of exposing the profundity of the superficial will lead us to ponder 
whether inversely, profound boredom may also come to expose itself as 
superficial or, in other words, whether the becoming exposed in boredom 
coheres with an exposure to a certain superficiality of the profound 
belonging to the abyssal depths of the surface. We will return to this question 
later in this excursus, but for now we shall proceed stepwise with 
Heidegger’s analysis of boredom—of which we will have to restrict 
ourselves to a selective, and sometimes even cyclopean, reading, seeing as it 
is extremely rich and carefully elaborated over more than 130 pages.783  
In our present context of trying to map out the intercrossings of solitude 
and boredom, of particular interest to us is the way in which the different 
temporal moments of boredom pass, not only from the most superficial to 
the most profound, but also from the determinate to indeterminate as well as 
from the personal to the impersonal. The question to be kept in mind is 
therefore how we are to understand these movements of increasing 
profundity, indeterminacy, and impersonality and how to understand their 
interferences with one another. Since the second and third form of boredom 
will probably provide us with the most food for thought in responding to 
                                           
781 Haar 1999, 303.  
782 Cf. GA 29/30, 122. 
783 In passing, one cannot help wondering if his talking so lengthily about the long 
duration of boredom was an ironic gesture on Heidegger’s part pointing indirectly to the 
performativity of language.  
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these questions, we will linger the longest with them, which means that we 
will also to some extent neglect the five paragraphs devoted to the first form 
of boredom.  
To open up the various discussions of boredom and its relation to solitude, 
we will begin by giving a somewhat schematic rendition of the three 
epitomized forms of boredom with reference to their different temporalities. 
Before becoming too schematic, however, it should be noted that the three 
forms of boredom have two structural moments or movements in common, 
which, according to Heidegger, are definitive of boredom: On the one hand, 
a certain ‘detainment’ or a ‘being-held-in-suspense’ (Hingehaltenheit),784 
and, on the other hand, a certain ‘emptying out’ or a ‘being-left-empty’ 
(Leergelassenheit). Whomever becomes bored—whether by something 
determinate or indeterminate, whether by oneself or someone else, whether 
by something or nothing—does so because she gets caught and is left 
hanging some way or another in a limbo of these two structural moments, 
that is, she is being detained, withheld, or held in suspension by or with 
something, someone, or nothing, which nevertheless leaves her empty: 
“Langweilige ist das Hinhaltende und doch Leerlassende.”785 On this note, 
let us proceed with the overview. 
1) Starting from the surface down, the first form of boredom concerns 
someone in particular becoming bored by something determinate (etwas 
bestimmtes) in a specific situation. Heidegger’s main example of this most 
superficial moment of boredom is the situation of getting involuntarily 
detained on a train station because of delays or cancellations. Because of this 
being-held-in-suspense by the delay, the train station becomes boring 
inasmuch as it fails to function in the way it should, that is, it fails to work 
as a place of transition and instead turns in to a place of detainment where 
the bored one is held back from transit and thus forced to wait out the slow 
passing of time, which seems wasteful seeing as it was intended for some 
other purpose, which Heidegger refers to as ‘the ideal time’ (die Idealzeit).786 
Thus, it is only because we expect (erwarten) something particular from a 
specific situation at a certain time that it can become disappointingly boring 
to us and leave us with a sense of emptiness.  
                                           
784 To employ the English term ‘detainment’ in this translational context has advantages 
insofar as it derives from the Old French détenir, which again refers back to the Latin dē-
tinēre, -tinēre being a combining form of tenēre, meaning ‘to delay,’ ‘to keep from 
proceeding,’ ‘to hold off,’ or ‘to hold back,’ reflecting, as it were, the ‘halten’ of the 
German Hingehaltenheit. 
785 GA 29/30, 131. 
786 Cf. GA 29/30, 159. 
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What occurs in boredom, then, is first and foremost that time befalls one as 
long and languid (Lange-weile), dragging itself along, leaving us empty, and 
making the passing of time seem unbearably wasteful while we are not able 
to fill it out in order to make it pass as quickly as possible, or even to ‘kill 
time,’ as one says. Inversely, when time does not require passing, but passes 
by on its own without making itself noticeable as such, we say that time goes 
‘too fast’ or that time is ‘too short.’ What boredom makes manifest, however, 
is precisely the emptiness of the ‘pure’ passing of time, which in boredom 
seems to slow down and stretch itself unendingly, weighing down on us with 
its wasteful emptiness and making us heavyhearted to the point of depression 
(Schwermut). Most of us may want to live long lives but we also want them 
to feel short, and when time begins to feel too lengthy, we instead begin to 
wish for a shortening of time; to have it come to an end in order to have 
passed the gravity of languid time. This is why Heidegger can say that there 
is actually something to the ‘everyday’ expression of ‘being bored to death,’ 
in that the more deep draught of boredom becomes the more fatal (tödlicher) 
also: “Denn wir sehen, die Langeweile ist, je tiefer sie wird, um so völliger 
in der Zeit verwurzelt—in der Zeit, die wir selbst sind.”787 
 In the first and most superficial boredom, then, time lasts (dauern) and 
hesitates (zögern) for a long while providing us with nothing (nichts bieten) 
to fill it out and therefore leaves us deserted: “Öde besagt: es füllt uns nicht 
aus, wir sind leer gelassen.”788 Whatever we become bored with forsakes 
(versagen) us, it abandons us in the absence of anything to fill out the 
presence of time, and as such, time itself becomes present in its empty 
passing. This leads us toward the second and more ‘originary’ 
(ursprünglicheres) form of boredom, which occurs when the bored one is 
not held in suspense and left empty by something or somewhere in particular 
but rather by oneself as emptied time.  
2) Passing on to the second and increasingly profound form of boredom, 
time no longer appears unbearably slow and languid but rather to have been 
brought to a halt or a standstill (die stehende Zeit/Stehen der Zeit). 
Heidegger’s example of such a stagnated time is given in the rather 
humorous illustration of a dinner party where everything is perfectly 
pleasant, the food and wine are delicious, the conversation is flowing 
unproblematically; nothing is out of the ordinary, everything is as could be 
expected and yet it is terribly boring. Heidegger’s premise for this illustrative 
example is that one has given oneself the time to attend this dinner, so that 
the time spent on it is not experienced as wasted on it but, quite the contrary, 
                                           
787 Cf. GA 29/30, 201. 
788 GA 29/30, 131. 
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has been specifically reserved for it in advance. Nevertheless, when one 
returns home from such an evening out and thinks back on it one might find, 
slightly to one’s surprise, that one had in fact been trying to suppress a 
yawning and drumming one’s fingers on the table throughout the whole 
evening, pausing only to smoke a cigar in order to pass the time in a civilized 
manner.  
Despite these signs of boredom, Heidegger maintains that one fails to find 
anything particularly boring about the event. Rather, it is because the very 
duration (während) of the entire evening, including oneself, is experienced 
as boring that it now seems as though time had stagnated in some 
immoveable present. In this ‘extended’ (ausgedehntes) present, the duration 
of time itself and our own boredom have become conflated to such an extent 
that we are unable to find any routes of escape that would allow us ways of 
distracting ourselves by passing the time. During this increasingly profound 
boredom, a sort of unremarkable and uneventful collapse of the ecstasies of 
time into a statically dilated present occurs and thus cut off (abgeschnitten) 
from its past and its future, time no longer appears in its pure passing but 
rather in the lasting duration of an empty present with no horizon of 
possibility: “Das Jetzt hat keine Möglichkeit als die, das derzeitige Jetzt der 
Jetzt zu sein.”789  
Hence, in its second form boredom no longer arises because of some 
determinate object or situation, such as a delayed train on a station, which 
one would be able to escape simply by departing from it, shifting one’s 
attention, or seeking out new distractions of passing the time. Instead, in the 
unsuccessful attempt to find any ‘external’ cause, boredom now arises 
because one is enchained to oneself as time, thus making the relation to 
solitude more distinct insofar as one is thrown back on oneself as the very 
origin of boredom: “es steigt auf dem Dasein selbst aus.”790 Stuck with 
oneself as the source of one’s own boredom, and caught in a standstill that 
offers no possibilities of engaging or distracting oneself, one bores oneself 
(Sichlangweilen). In this more profound boredom, then, we are abandoned 
by the possibility of passing time and delivered over to ourselves in the 
restlessness of a stagnate present: “gestellt werden von dem stehenden Jetzt, 
das unser eigenes, aber aufgegebenes und leeres Selbst ist, langweilen wir 
uns.”791 
Thus delivered over and abandoned to ourselves in an extended yet 
stagnated now, what the increasingly indeterminate and profound boredom 
                                           
789 GA 29/30, 188. 
790 GA 29/30, 193. 
791 GA 29/30, 185. 
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reveals to the human Dasein is that it might not be bound by anything or 
anyone in particular, but that it is nonetheless bound to this unboundedness, 
which weighs on it as the burden of an abyssal freedom. In boredom, as in 
anxiety, Dasein is therefore called to respond to this fundamentally 
unfounded freedom in and as which it must overtake its ‘there’ of existence.  
In this respect, Rudi Visker’s suggestion that boredom, in a similar way to 
anxiety, functions as “a kind of purgatory in which Dasein is ultimately 
forced to come to terms with the kind of being that it is and has to be”792 does 
sound appealingly fitting. However, as always when something presents 
itself as almost too fitting or too close to purgatory, we must hold such an 
appeal in skeptical suspense rather than surrendering ourselves too readily to 
a hasty resolve or resolution, in order to try to pay attention to the possibly 
poisonous and unfitting side effects of such a purgatory. We must therefore 
ask, exactly what kind of being Dasein is being exposed as in boredom?  
In the hollowing out of time in boredom something happens to our self 
(Selbst), once so familiar (bekannt) and close (nähe) to itself in busying itself 
with something. Stripped of all its quotidian attributes and distractions and 
abandoned to its naked Da-sein, the self no longer recognizes itself, but 
rather finds that it has become so “unbestimmt und unbekannt, so dass es als 
dieses merkwürdige Unfassliche uns bedrängt.”793 In boredom, one is 
reflected as ‘no one’ (Niemand), and thrown back upon one’s own ‘being 
there’ as ‘being gone,’ that is, as the Wegsein which, according to Heidegger, 
originally belongs to Dasein as the absolute otherness of its ownmost 
intimacy, and which keeps it from ever becoming entirely present to itself.794 
If anxiety discloses the nothingness of the world to an anxious Dasein, 
boredom, as Igitur experienced it the in the vacated reflection of the 
mirror,795 exposes the bored one to the untimely and impersonal vacuity of 
oneself.  
So, returning to Visker’s suggestion, how does one ‘come to terms’ with 
such an abandoned being that one ‘is and has to be’? Heidegger’s urgent 
request to his contemporaries, who are bored to death without even knowing 
it, is that we must learn how to move in these abyssal depths of our being 
                                           
792 Visker 2004, 215.  
793 GA 29/39, 185. 
794 Accordingly, being-gone is neither the negation nor an annihilation of being, but 
instead a certain way of being-there (eine Weise des Da-seins, GA 29/30, 96) which can 
only present itself to itsef in its absencing. Regarding the being-gone as a constitutive 
(im)possibility of being-there see also sections 201–202 of Heidegger’s Beiträge zur 
Philosophie; GA 65, 323–325. 
795 Cf. “une glace d’ennui où, suffoquant et étoufflé, je suppliais de rester un vague figure 
qui disparaissait complètement dans la glace confondue” (Mallarmé 1976,  53).  
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(verstehen lernen, sich in der Tiefe des Daseins zu bewegen).796 In order to 
somehow approach an understanding of such an abyssal movement, we must 
therefore continue with the final and most profound form of boredom that 
Heidegger outlines for us.  
3) Whereas time hesitatingly dragged itself along in the first form of 
boredom, and the second form of boredom seemed to remove the bored one 
from the flow of time into the stagnation of an eternally empty and solitary 
now, time in the third form of boredom strangely enough comes to remark 
itself in its absence. Hence, in the most profound, indeterminate, and 
impersonal boredom of ‘es ist einem langweilig,’ time is experienced as 
timelessness (zeitlos zumute).797 
Yet, as in anxiety, where the distancing of beings as a whole refers the 
anxious one to the very being of these beings in its uncanny nothingness, so 
the remoteness of the flow of time testifies to a sort of blindness on the part 
of the bored one due to the very nearness of a more originary temporality in 
boredom—“gleich als seien wir von der Nähe des Wesens der Langeweile 
geblendet.”798 In its apparent timelessness, then, profound boredom conceals 
the very essence of time (Wesen der Zeit), which, as Heidegger insists, 
remains essentially abyssal, dark, and enigmatic (rätselhaft).799 In genuine 
thinking, however, it is precisely a matter of not being afraid of the dark and 
of freeing the enigmatic grounds of being from the constraint of the all too 
narrow ray of reason’s light.  
What happens in profound boredom, then, is that time begins to weigh on 
the bored one as that which in its intimate remoteness and strangeness 
conditions and constitutes its very existence. In profound boredom, one can 
no longer flee the passing of time by passing the time and thus finds no 
escape from time; one is caught in the impasses of time insofar as one exists. 
In this regard, Heidegger plays on the multifaceted German verb bannen, 
when in the Gebanntsein of boredom he designates both a being bound up 
with time, which spellbinds the bored one, and as such bans its access to the 
‘customary’ (gewöhnliche) temporality of the day in which one can pursue 
distractions and go about one’s business as dictated by the watch whereas in 
                                           
796 Cf. GA 29/39, 198. 
797 Cf. GA 29/30, 213. 
798 GA 29/30, 213. 
799 For instance, Heidegger says that “die Langeweile überhaupt ist dann offenbar ganz in 
diesem rätselhaften Wesen der Zeit verwurzelt” (GA 29/30, 149), which is why we must 
proceed towards “die Abgründe des Wesens der Zeit” (GA 29/30, 220) by way of a path 
that goes “direkt ins Dunkle” (GA 29/30, 225).  
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the entrancing time of profound boredom, “das Auf-die-Uhr-sehen verliert 
hier jeden Sinn.”800  
Hence, the empty time of boredom binds the bored one by forbidding it to 
break loose from its constraint. As Haar formulates it, a sort of inversion 
therefore takes place in which: “The absence of constraint in emptiness and 
boredom is itself constraining. Time is pressing. Boredom reveals the time 
at the depths of Dasein to be essentially pressing, as distress and 
constraint.”801 Furthermore, not only does time become pressing in boredom, 
profound boredom also exposes a temporality of time that forces the bored 
one to confront the timeliness (Zeitlichkeit) that oneself is, insofar as it makes 
manifest the law of time that outlaws802 Dasein by excommunicating it from 
any common time of being. Thus profound boredom exposes the bored one 
to its singular possibility of existing: “diese bannende Zeit ist selbst diese 
Spitze, die das Dasein wesentlich ermöglicht.“803  
According to Heidegger, this exposure comes about insofar as boredom 
calls into question and puts on trial the conception of the individual subject, 
or of the subjectivity of the subject, conceived primarily as consciousness. 
In fact, such a conception of subjectivity designates nothing less than ‘the 
chief obstacle’ (das Haupthindernis) that prevents (versperrt) our access to 
original time,804 that is, to the originary time of our ‘proper’ (egentliche) 
Dasein to which boredom somehow allows us access. But how, more 
specifically, does profound boredom pave the way towards a more original 
understanding of time, and how does this paving challenge the traditional 
presuppositions and inhibitions of the conscious subject?  
For Heidegger, from early till late, originary time is ecstatic, meaning that 
the temporality of Dasein concerns “die Zeitlichkeit als das ἐκστατικόν 
schlechthin. Zeitlichkeit ist das ursprüngliche ‘Außer-sich’ an und für sich 
selbst.”805 That Dasein is originally outside itself in and for itself is a sign—
dare I say a symptom—that the overreaching transmission (Überlieferung) 
of the ecstasies, which constitutes its historical being, remains unfathomable 
to it. As Heidegger has it in Sein und Zeit, the past of Dasein remains 
enigmatic (rätselhaft), the future is still to come (noch-nicht) and as such is 
principally unknown in its remaining default (der ständige Ausstand), and 
the present is divided from itself as an repetition of itself and as such always 
                                           
800 GA 29/30, 217. 
801 Haar 1999, 310. 
802 “Jemanden in Acht und Bann tun” means to make someone an outlaw by law. 
803 Cf. GA 29/30, 223. 
804 Cf. GA 29/30, 201. 
805 GA 2, 329. 
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absent in its very presence.806 Because of its discordant temporal 
constitution, Dasein therefore cannot be designated primarily as self-
consciousness insofar at it is never simply present to itself but always already 
exceeds and escapes itself. This does not imply, however, that Dasein cannot 
become conscious of its own excessiveness, but it does imply that 
consciousness remains conditioned by what principally exceeds it. In 
boredom this principal excessiveness, which is the pure autoheteroaffection 
of time, comes to remark itself in all its enigmatic emptiness as what 
constitutes the very being of Dasein, thus making the intransparency of 
existence to itself apparent.807  
In order to further unfold these intricacies, we must try to open ourselves 
up to a more loosely elaborated discussion of boredom and its movements of 
increasing profundity, indeterminacy, and depersonalization in which we no 
longer keep ourselves rigidly within the confines of its three demarcated 
forms, which, as Heidegger himself points out are fixed neither by category 
nor by chronology. In this discussion, we will focus on two moments that 
figure in the aforementioned crescendo of profound boredom, namely, on the 
es and the einem of the ‘es ist einem langweilig.’ 
 
 
                                           
806 Regarding the temporal ecstacies in Sein und Zeit, see §§46–48 on the default of the 
future, §69 on the presence (Gegenwart) as Wiederholung, and §74 on the enigma of the 
destinal past or Geschichtlichkeit of Dasein. See also, “Zeit und Sein” from 1962 (GA 14, 
3–31). For a further discussion of ecstatic time in Heidegger, see McNeill 1999a. 
807 With respect to the challenge that ecstatic time poses to the primacy of (self-) 
consciousness, it is of interest already here to note that, according to Freud, our abstract 
representation of time as a one-directional succession of now points is derived from the 
way in which the system of perception-conscioussness works: “Unsere abstrakte 
Zeitvorstellung scheint vielmehr durchaus von der Arbeitsweise des Systems W-Bw 
hergeholt zu sein und einer Selbstwahrnehmung derselben zu entsprechen” (GW XIII, 
28). In other words, our predominant representation of time is constructed solely on the 
basis of the relation between preconscious perception and consciousness without 
consideration for the unconscious, which is therefore said to be ‘timeless’ (zeitlos) since 
it does not follow the rules of such chronology. One could therefore ask whether or not 
the timelessness of the unconscious might have some affinity to another experience of 
time like the ecstatic temporality of Dasein or the almost timeless time of profound 
boredom where time is neither unidirectional nor dominated by presence? If nothing else, 
then we might at least consider this question in terms of a resistance to the hegemony of 
chronological time that seems to be shared by both thinkers. This indeed seems to be 
Derrida’s suggestion when in “Freud et la scène de l’écriture” he writes: “Il faudrait peut-
être lire Freud comme Heidegger a lu Kant: comme le je pense, l’inconscient n’est sans 
doute intemporel qu’au regard d’un certain concept vulgaire du temps” (ED, 318/215). 
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III.4 WHEN ONE BECOMES IT AND IT BECOMES ONE: HEIDEGGER 
APPROACHING FREUD? 
In the most profound moment of boredom everything has become so 
indeterminate and impersonal that is drawn into a vortex of insignificant 
indifference (Gleichgültigkeit), including the one who is bored. The time of 
this all-consuming boredom is overpowering (übermächtig) and 
disempowering insofar as it makes impotent every possibility of passing time 
(Zeitvertrieb). With one blow (mit einem Schlag), every possibility of 
making a choice, taking action, or somehow engaging with the world seems 
to fade and withdraw (ausweichen); all becomes insignificant except “diese 
merkwürdige Inhaltslosigkeit.”808 In other words, when everything has 
become unremarkable nothing becomes remarkable, when one’s entire being 
is permeated (durchstimmt) with the indifference of boredom nothing stands 
out. In contrast to the more superficial moments of boredom where ‘I,’ ‘you,’ 
‘we,’ or ‘they’ become bored with or by something determinate or someone 
in particular, profound boredom is entirely bereft of personal pronouns or 
indexes of any sort, indicating that it is a radically impersonal experience, or 
an experience of the anonymous. Heidegger explains:  
 
Wir sprechen jetzt nicht mehr von diesem Sichlangweilen bei…, sondern sagen: es 
ist einem langweilig. Es— einem—nicht mir als mir, nicht dir als dir, nicht uns als 
uns, sondern einem. Name, Stand, Beruf, Rolle, Alter und Geschick als das Meinige 
und Deinige fällt von uns ab.809 
 
At this point, there is a slippage from the second moment of boredom, where 
the bored one is delivered over to itself in the abandonment of possibilities 
of passing the time, to the third moment of boredom, where the bored one is 
abandoned by itself leaving only an anonymous experience of einem, that is, 
of someone who is no one in particular to remain. According to Heidegger, 
what is decisive (Entscheidende) in this slippage is therefore “daß wir dabei 
zu einem indifferenten Niemand werden.”810  
What the bored one encounters in the transition from the second to the 
third moment of boredom is precisely the yawning sur-face of itself, because 
whomever experiences it to be boring is turned into an impersonal someone 
and the personal is exposed as a mask through the holes of which a voice 
may sound (per-sonare), but beneath which no original authority of this 
voice may be revealed. In profound boredom, then, the mask of the personal 
is exposed, not as the surface of some hidden yet disclosable depths of 
                                           
808 Cf. GA 29/39, 216. 
809 GA 29/30, 203. 
810 GA 29/30, 203.  
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authenticity, but rather as an infinite profundity of superficiality.811 With this 
slipping transition, we are returned yet again to Nietzsche, who in his linkage 
of solitude and boredom not only discerns the deepest immersion of the 
bored one into itself but also into confrontation with a certain horror vacui 
“weil ihm die Langeweile ihr gähnendes Gesicht entgegenhält.”812 
Accordingly, the indeterminate es and the impersonal einem of the 
utterance ‘es ist einem langweilig’ are exposed as two sides of the same 
Möbius strip, belonging together neither in their unity nor in their difference 
but only in their profound indifference.813  
Despite the abandonment of oneself in this abysmally superficial 
boredom, Heidegger nevertheless maintains that it is still boring to someone. 
Someone remains there who encounters the yawning surface of profound 
boredom and to whom boredom still appears to have some kind of appeal or 
calling (Anspruch) concerning its being there. Yet, one cannot help 
wondering how an appeal could even stand out and make itself heard as such 
when everything and everyone have become entirely absorbed in the utter 
insignificance of boredom? How can something shine through the density of 
indifference in order to summon an indifferent nobody when “nicht einmal 
mehr etwas am Seienden lockt”?814  
Perhaps it is more comprehensible that the anxious one would be sensitive 
or attuned towards an appeal concerning its being or being as such, if nothing 
else, then at least because the experience of anxiety is so unbearable that it 
cries out for something, anything, to happen. Yet, boredom is not unbearable 
to the bored one, it is rather indifferent and insignificant. Can one who has 
become utterly unconcerned with everything including one’s own being, still 
be said to be attuned at all—fundamentally orotherwise? Is boredom not 
                                           
811 I am here thinking of Nancy’s interpretation of the unum quid who, in the Cartisian 
articulation ego cogito existo,  makes an I take place where there was no I before through 
the hollow of an open mouth with nothing or no one ‘behind’ it: “Imagine une bouche 
sans visage (c’est-à-dire à nouveau la structure du masque: l’ouverture des trous, et la 
bouche qui s’ouvre au milieu de l’æil; le lieu de la vision, de la théorie, traversé, ouvert 
et clos simultanément, diaphragmé d’une profération)—une bouche sans visage, donc, 
faisant l’anneau de sa contracture autour du bruit: je. ‘Tu’ fais cette expérience tous les 
jours, chaque fois que tu prononces ou que tu conçois dans ton esprit ego, chaque fois—
cela t’arrive tous les jours—que tu formes l’o de la première (première, avant de elle il 
n’y a rien) personne: ego cogito existo” (ES, 157/107).  
812 KSA 2, 138. 
813 As Lacan has shown, it is only by way of cutting the Möbius strip that an ‘inside’ and 
an ‘outside,’ a ‘subject’ and an ‘object’ become discernible. However, such a cut will 
leave the trace of an inaccessible exteriority at the innermost interiority of the subject 
which it constitutes. Cf. Sem X, 97ff./114ff.   
814 GA 29/30, 221. 
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‘unattunement’ par excellence? How and towards what might boredom still 
be able to attune the bored one, who is not only left indifferent to everything 
but who has also been abandoned by itself?  
According to Heidegger, boredom can and does attune the bored one, for 
it is precisely there, where it appears as though there were nothing more to 
be experienced, seen, or comprehended (gerade da, wo es so aussieht, als 
gäbe es nichts mehr zu sehen und zu fassen)815 that the there first appears as 
such, or rather, it appears that ‘there is a there there’ where there is 
nothing.816 Therefore, it would be mistaken to ask what boredom gives the 
bored one to understand or to hear in its attuning appeal, for, like anxiety, 
boredom does not have some specific message or content to deliver. Instead, 
boredom says nothing inasmuch as it only makes its announcement 
(Ansagen) in its silent renouncement (Versagen) of everything. Hence, the 
self-renouncing withdrawal of beings as a whole (das Sichversagen des 
Seienden im Ganzen) in profound boredom might leave the bored one 
entirely empty (Leergelassenheit), but this emptiness is also where the 
openness of being there (Offensein) becomes remarkable.817  
On the one hand, then, profound boredom makes a referral (Hinweis) to 
the possibilities left fallow and idle (brachliegenden Möglichkeiten) in the 
indifference and insignificance of everything and, on the other hand, it makes 
an appeal to the bored one concerning the possibility of repeating these 
wasted possibilities as possibilities of its own.818 As such, the abandonment 
of everything in boredom is also a deliverance of the bored one to the 
unbounded freedom of its being there. 
                                           
815 Cf. GA 29/30, 213. 
816 I write this formulation in italics to emphasize its contrast to Gertrude Stein’s famous 
sentence from Everybody's Autobiography (1937) that “there is no there there” (Stein 
1993, 298). In my view, this contrast could open up the entire discussion concerning 
whether or not Heidegger still privileges a ‘metaphysics of presence,’ that is, a thinking 
that is oriented by a philosophical desire for authenticity, interiority, propriety, 
originality, transparency, and truth. However, seeing as this discussion is far too extensive 
to engage with here, we will restrict ourselves to noting that this contrast points to a 
significant risk, which, in my view, more or less permeates Heidegger’s thinking. That is, 
the risk of closing the openness of the ‘there’ by determining the indeterminable and 
deciding the undecidable.  
817 According to Heidegger, this openness is the very characteristic of the relation to 
beings of the human being, which, in contrast to the relation of animals, is one of freedom 
(Freisein). Heidegger therefore argues that the relation to the dis-closedness 
(Erschlossenheit) of beings implies an appeal of decisiveness (Entchlossenheit) to the free 
human being, or, as Heidegger alternatively formulates it near the end of the lecture 
course: “diese vorprädikative Offenbarkeit muß selbst ein solches Geschehen sein, darin 
ein bestimmtes Sich-bindenlassen geschieht” (GA 29/30, 496). 
818 Cf. GA 29/30, 212.  
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In profound boredom, the ‘it is’ (es ist) boring brings the bored ‘one’ (einem) 
before the naked and open ‘there’ of its existence in such a way that the ‘it 
is’—already pointing ahead to the ‘it gives’ (es gibt) of time and being in 
Heidegger’s later writings—is no longer a mere affidavit, no longer the 
initiation of a statement or a declaration of something. Rather it is a trembling 
of freedom, a caesura in successive time, a shaking of the grounds of being 
pointing to the fact that there is nothing preestablished, which also means 
that nothing is without ground.819 Thus, the silent fog (schweigender 
Nebel)820 of profound boredom hovers over the withdrawing foundation of 
Dasein, which prevents existence from ever becoming established on firm 
grounds, and exposes the bored one to the unfoundedness that keeps the 
abyss of freedom yawning in order for there to be anything, rather than 
nothing, in the first place. 
Heidegger’s reason for electing profound boredom as one of our time’s 
privileged attunements of ground appears to be that in the most suppressive, 
stifling, and suffocating of times, as when in the quotidian treadmill one 
thing seems to follow another with an indifferent necessity, time also has the 
potential of revealing itself as the most freeing, liberating, and opening. This 
is because when we are stuck in the heaviness of the stagnated time of 
boredom that seems to be dragging itself along in an endless duration, it is 
only an instant of time itself that has the power to interrupt its own stagnation 
and thereby provide us with a way out of the mud into which we have sunken. 
As Heidegger stresses, time is the only remedy against time: “Der Zeitbann, 
der offenbar wird in diesem ‘es ist einem langweilig,’ kann nur gebrochen 
werden durch die Zeit.”821  
Boredom is a temporality of Dasein which, in its exhausting duration, 
makes everything seem im-possible because indifferently necessary and 
insignificantly unavoidable, but which in the midst of this utter lack of 
                                           
819 I am here referring on the one hand to Heidegger’s reading of the Leibnizian principle 
of ground nihil est sine ratione, which, according to Heidegger, may be read both as 
saying that nothing, that is no being (Seinde), is without ground and as saying that 
nothing, that is no beings but being, is without ground meaning that the being of beings 
is groundless: “‘Nichts’, d. h. kein irgendwie Seiendes ‘ist—ohne Grund’ (GA 10, 73). 
On the other hand, I am referring to Nancy’s reading of Heidegger’s conception of 
freedom in the phrase es gibt (il y a), about which he writes “(ce n’est plus un constat, 
c’est un saisissement)—la libre dissémination de l’existence” (EL, 16/13). According to 
Nancy, the groundlessneess of being (freedom), which is the ground of beings, means the 
nothing is preestablished since: “il n’y a rien d’autre qu’une indéterminable chorâ (non 
pas lieu indéterminé, mais possibilité de lieux, ou plutôt pure matière-à-lieux) là où la 
foundation a lieu. Celle-ci est plutôt ce rien lui-même” (EL, 112-113/84). 
820 Cf. GA 29/30, 115. 
821 GA 29/30, 226. 
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possibility might also signal silently towards the possibility of the 
impossible. In the seemingly closed and paralyzed time of boredom, the 
bored one may in the blink of an eye (Augenblick) catch a glimpse of 
something other, something unknown, which dis-closes (Entschlossen) the 
horizons of a rigidly chronological time towards an ecstatic, yet 
fundamentally abyssal, time for a singular possibility of being there.822  
That something completely unexpected can happen in the suddenness of 
an instant, that something or someone can come, to borrow the words of 
Lévinas, “à partir du secret qui interrompt la continuité du temps 
historique”823 is the possibility of impossibility that frees Dasein from the 
oppressive necessity of chronology, but, at the same time, is also the greatest 
cause of anxiety. That time can instantaneously interrupt itself, and 
incessantly does so, is what makes accidents, coincidences, surprises, and 
wonders possible, but at the same time also risks, threats, and terrors. 
Accordingly, we seem to have yet another instance of the (hyperbo)logic 
of the ‘saving’ or the ‘freeing’ in the ‘dangerous,’ by which Heidegger risks 
deciding the undecidable and closing the disclosed, when the exhausted time 
of profound boredom somehow interrupts itself and forces the bored one to 
listen to what its silence gives to be heard. Still, one cannot help but be a 
little suspicious about this Heideggerian resolution, which seems to have 
something of a Baron von Münchhausen logic about it, for, after all, we still 
need to know how the one abandoned by herself and left indifferent in 
boredom can be summoned to pull herself back out of these muddy waters 
of indifferent insignificance. 
On my reading, one the of the most problematic aspects of this gesture in 
Heideggger’s thinking is its redemptive tone, which still seems to be 
conducted by some kind of ‘axiomatic certainty’824 hinging on some 
privileged idea of propriety or authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) despite the 
apparent disappearance of any grounds of certainty. In other words, even in 
the dissolution of all orientational markers or signposts some ‘call from 
nowhere’ seems to prevail, which somehow still manages to direct the one 
who, in the case of profound boredom, has been abandoned by itself in 
anonymous indifference towards an exit that would lead the lost one back to 
itself. But how does one distinguish between a proper and an improper way 
of relating to the abyssal opening existence? Where is the measure for 
judging when one has managed to respond properly or profoundly enough to 
                                           
822 Heidegger writes: “Der Augenblick ist nichts anderes als der Blick der 
Entschlossenheit, in der sich die volle Situation eines Handelns öffnet und offenhält” (GA 
29/30, 224). 
823 Lévinas 1971, 58/51. 
824 Cf. H, 419. 
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an appeal that demands nothing from one? Where are the markers of 
orientation to orient oneself in the groundlessness of all ground? 
 As we shall come to question in the later section on the solitude of 
responsibility, perhaps the most urgent question to be posed in situations of 
such radical exposure is rather how we are to respond to the impossibility of 
responding, that is, how we are to ‘take’ responsibility and make decisions 
in the withdrawal of all axiomatic grounds of certainty and in the dissolution 
of all orientational benchmarks to provide us with guidance, that is, how to 
be responsible to the originary irresponsibility of an existence without exit 
signs. For now, however, we will stay with the 1929/1930 lectures, and ask: 
what is it that boredom gives one to understand provided that the bored one 
knows how to listen? What is this curious and strange yet properly distinctive 
knowledge (eigenartiges Wissen) towards which we are vaguely attuned in 
boredom?825 What is it that we somehow already know when we are bored 
without, however, clearly knowing that we know it (ohne es deutlich zu 
wissen)?826 And to exactly what possibility is the bored one referred by 
profound boredom? Heidegger clarifies this as follows: 
 
Diese eigentümliche Verarmung, die mit diesem ‘es ist einem langweilig’ bezüglich 
unserer Person einsetzt, bringt das Selbst erst in aller Nacktheit zu ihm selbst als 
das Selbst, das da ist und sein Da-sein übernommen hat. Wozu? Es zu sein. Nicht 
mir als mir, sondern dem Dasein in mir versagt sich das Seiende im Ganzen, wenn 
ich weiß: es ist einem langweilig.827  
 
So, this is the answer Heidegger leaves us with: the self is first brought to 
itself in all its nakedness in the impersonal experience of boredom. 
Moreover, in profound boredom the abandoned self of the one to whom it is 
boring is called, not by my personal self, but literally to be it. Yet, how can 
a self come to itself in the nakedness of its own proper Da-sein as someone 
who is no one in particular? No passage appears passable here; rather, it 
seems we will have to persist in an impasse from which Heidegger himself 
is perhaps too eager to exit. The impasse here, has to do with a certain 
passage from the anonymous and indistinguishable ‘someone’ (einem) to the 
distinguished and singular being there of a self, which appears to take place 
via the appeal (Anspruch) of an impersonal it calling from nowhere.   
Following this less restrained discussion of Heidegger’s boredom, we now 
seem to have reached a point at which we can no longer keep a certain 
growing suspicion silent. Namely, the suspicion that not only do the two 
                                           
825 Cf. GA 29/30, 239. 
826 Cf. GA 29/30, 180. 
827 GA 29/30, 215. Italics in original.  
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fundamental attunements of profound boredom and anxiety appear to stand 
in some sort of relation with one another, but also that Heidegger’s thinking 
and linking of the two impersonal indexes es and einem both in profound 
boredom and in anxiety might resonate somehow with the indexes of Es and 
Ich of Freudian psychoanalysis.  
Why this growing suspicion? First, because in this increasingly profound 
boredom, which is also an increasing depersonalization finally plunging us 
into the depths of the ‘es ist einem langweilig,’ it is difficult not to hear 
reminisces of a certain Es, id, or it, brought to our attention by Freud in his 
writings of the late 1910s to the early 1920s. It is almost as though 
Heidegger, in his in-depht analysis of boredom, strips the quotidian ‘I’ of all 
its more or less conscious attributes right down, not to some authentic or 
original core, but to the abyssal and anonymous it, spreading like a fog across 
the grounds of Dasein, which must be ignored if one is to act as a unified 
‘ego’ or ‘subject,’ that is, as someone believing itself to be identical with 
itself. This encourages us to consider once more how close Heidegger, in his 
critical destruction of the ‘metaphysical egology’828 of modern philosophy 
elevating the subjectivity of consciousness to be the principal underlying 
substance of everything, at times comes to the discourse on the unconscious, 
which Freud called “das erste Schibboleth der Psychoanalyse.”829 Second, 
because we suspect that the elusive relation between two of the fundamental 
attunements of our time, boredom and anxiety, which Heidegger leaves us 
to ponder in abeyance of any explanatory guidance, might gain some 
elucidation from an encounter with psychoanalysis.  
To be more specific, the question to be pursued in what follows is whether 
or not the Freudian leitmotif the ‘wo Es war soll Ich werden,’ first 
pronounced in Freud’s 1933 lecture “Die Zerlegung der psychischen 
Persönlichkeit,”830 might not be of some significance to us in our reading, on 
                                           
828 According to Heidegger, modern metaphysics beginning with Descartes is 
characterised by its making the human being into the fundamental ὑποκείμενον or 
subiectum of everything, thus turning everything else into objects for this privileged 
subject. Or, as Heidegger writes in his lectures on Die Frage Nach dem Ding from 
1935/1936: “So wurde das ‘Ich’, die menschliche Subjektivität, zum Mittelpunkt des 
Denkens erklärt” (GA 41, 99). 
829 GW XIII, 239. 
830 Cf. XV, 62–86. Despite the fact that Freud does not subscribe to “die Illusion der freien 
Willens” (GW XII, 248), or to the illusion of self-mastery, he nevertheless does not give 
up this psychoanalytic imperative of an attempted, even if interminable, domestication 
and reappropriation of the unbounded forces of the It by the I. Accordingly, Freud 
describes the teleological aim of analysis as follows: “Ihre Absicht ist ja, das Ich zu 
stärken, es vom Überich unabhängiger zu machen, sein Wahrnehmungsfeld zu erweitern 
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the one hand, of Heidegger’s statement of profound boredom ‘es ist einem 
Langweilig,’ which we have already concerned ourselves with in the 
previous section, and, on the other hand, Heidegger’s statement of anxiety 
‘ist es einem unheimlich,’831 with which we will engage in the following 
section before proceeding to the Auseindersetzung with psychoanalysis.  
 
 
III.5 AN INTERMEZZO OF ANXIETY AND BOREDOM 
In his inaugural lecture Was ist Metaphysik?, delivered in Freiburg earlier in 
1929, Heidegger mentions several attunements that may be considered 
fundamental insofar as they provoke occurrences of and in the grounds of 
our being (Grundgeschehen unseres Da-seins).832 Both anxiety and boredom 
are mentioned as such fundamental attunements, but also love, or rather the 
presence of a beloved one, and as their common trait, Heidegger suggests 
that they all somehow make manifest beings as a whole (das Seiende im 
Ganzen).833 Furthermore, Heidegger maintains that even if we can never 
fathom beings as a whole as though they constituted an observable object, 
we are nevertheless situated in the midst of such a wholeness and the 
fundamental attunements can make us aware of this. Heidegger then 
proceeds with an account of the ‘proper’ (eigentlichen) and ‘profound’ (tiefe) 
attunement of boredom similar to the one that will follow in the 1929/1930 
lectures, albeit in a much abbreviated version.  
In Was ist Metaphysik?, both anxiety and boredom are said to obliterate 
all differences and nuances, pulling everything and everyone, including the 
anxious or bored ones themselves, together into the dense totality of a strange 
and remarkable indifference (merkwürdige Gleichgültigkeit). Yet, as Haar 
has underlined, “[t]he emptiness of boredom is not the nothingness of 
anxiety.”834 According to Heidegger, then, anxiety stands out from the other 
fundamental attunements because it is the only one which attunes us, not 
only toward beings as whole, but also toward the nothingness of this whole. 
Hence, even if boredom is regarded as a fundamental attunement insofar 
as it (dis)places us at a distance from beings as a whole by remarking their 
total indifference, it does not yet confront us with their nothingness as such. 
                                           
und seine Organisation auszuabuen, so dass es sich neue Stücke des Es aneignen kann. 
Wo Es war, soll Ich werden” (GW XV, 86). 
831 GA 9, 111. My italics. 
832 Cf. GA 9, 110. 
833 Cf. GA 9, 110. Think for example of how the mere proximity of a loved one can 
illuminate the entire world for the lover, or how, inversely, the loss of a loved can mean 
the ruin of a whole world. 
834 Haar 1999, 306. 
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Only anxiety exposes us to the vertiginous openness of the vain (nichtiges) 
grounds of being, making beings as a whole, including our own existence, 
appear uncannily unhomely. For, as Heidegger says, in anxiety “ist es einem 
unheimlich.”835 Thus, Heidegger leaves us with two instances of an 
impersonal sentence construction—in boredom ‘it is boring for one,’ 
whereas in anxiety ‘it is unhomely for one’—but barely tells us anything 
about how these two different experiences of impersonality might relate to 
one another.  
Nevertheless, if this difference still holds for the 1929/30 lecture course, 
we might in a preliminary manner ask whether or not the indifference of 
boredom could perhaps be understood as a last barrier against the terrible 
unhomeliness of anxiety, and whether or not the fundamental attunement 
which Heidegger is trying to awaken in ‘our’ contemporary Dasein is 
therefore not boredom after all but rather anxiety. Is Heidegger in fact trying 
to attune his listeners and readers through boredom towards the perhaps more 
unrelenting attunement of anxiety? Could the indifference towards beings as 
a whole be conceived as a last defense against the extreme confrontation with 
the nothingness of being, so that boredom could be seen as a final attempt to 
protect ourselves against what hides beneath its obfuscating mists? Could 
boredom be hovering over the grounds of our being like a fog preventing us 
from staring straight into its anxious groundlessness? Could it be the case 
that in our epoch one fundamental attunement is working as a defense 
mechanism against another?  
Let us take a step back and look again at some of the findings from our 
reading of Heidegger’s analysis of boredom in order to compare them with 
what we have now encountered in the face of anxiety. As we saw, Heidegger 
emphasized a slippage from the second to the third and most profound 
moment of boredom, in which the bored ones also appeared to slip away 
from themselves: “In diesem nichts weiter dabei Suchen, das für uns 
selbstverständlich ist, entgleiten wir uns in gewisser Weise selbst.”836  
Detained in the arrested time of boredom, the bored one is abandoned both 
by its past and by its future, and exposed to the abyssal superficiality of an 
expanded yet exhausted present without presence wherein the ecstasies of 
time appear to have collapsed in “something like an inverted ecstasy.”837 
Moreover, in this silent implosion of existence, another inversion seems to 
take place wherein a boring event (such as an evening dining out) turns into 
pure eventlessness. This pure eventlessness is perhaps the reason why 
                                           
835 GA 9, 111.  
836 GA 29/39, 180. 
837 Haar 1999, 296.  
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Heidegger has such difficulties in coming up with an appropriate example of 
the third and most profound form of boredom, insofar as this strange 
experience in which there is nothing to experience also concerns a 
phenomenological limit. This phenomenological limit has to do with a 
certain placelessness or ‘atopic’ threshold where the experience of non-
experience or the event of eventlessness somehow comes to appear. It is the 
threshold where absence becomes present and nothing happens to appear, 
or, in the words of Blanchot, echoing Mallarmé, it is the “apparition du ‘tout 
a disparu.’”838   
This is not to say that we have simply crossed a clearly demarcated line 
so that we are now situated somewhere ‘beyond’ phenomenology. As we 
know from Heidegger, the liminal is never that easy to delimit just as 
crossing lines is never a simple procedure.839 Rather, the phenomenological 
limit concerns an exposure of phenomenology to its own limit and to certain 
‘off-limits’ within itself. What is at stake here—at this limit exposed or 
turned back on itself, as it were—is an experience of that which cannot be 
experienced within experience, or of that which can only be given to 
experience in its turning away from experience; it is the experience of that 
which remains ‘outside’ within experience.  
Consequently, the phenomenological limit does not delimit the ‘inside’ of 
that which can be experienced phenomenologically and that would thereby 
be circumscribed and protected against its ‘outside.’ Instead, the 
phenomenological is itself affected by the exposure to its own limit in such 
a way that the delimination between phenomenology and its other begin to 
vacillate. In the appearance of disappearance, then, we are no longer moving 
safely within the domain of phenomenology, that is, the domain where 
something appears as something or as such (als solche)—whether this ‘as’ 
is understood apophantically or hermeneutically. Instead, we have passed on 
to the what Blanchot calls ‘the space of literature,’ which is a space of 
apparitions, doubles, phantasms, and phantoms, where the fundamental 
                                           
838 Cf. EL, 169/163. In this regard, Froment-Meurice has coined the word disparêtre, 
which can be read both as the ‘disappearance of being’ and as the ‘being of 
disappearance,’ a difference of meaning that in a similar way to Derrida’s différance is 
only discernible in writing. In reading Heidegger, Froment-Meurice comments: “the 
nothing (Nichts) ‘is’ the pronoun (or first name, pro-nom) of Being’s veil, that is to say, 
its only name, for lack of a proper name. It is the effaced Name—and its Face: Being can 
only disparêtre” (Froment 1995, 85). We could add here, I think, that the es is the pronoun 
of einem, that is, of the one who dis-appears in boredom or anxiety.  
839 On the difficult matter of crossing a line, see Heidegger’s essay Zur Seinsfrage first 
published in 1955 in commemoration of the sixtieth birthday of Ernst Jünger and partly 
as a response to Jünger’s own contribution entitled “Über die Linie.” The line under 
discussion in both texts, whether crossable or not, is the line of nihilism.  
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ontology of Dasein turns into the abyssal hauntology of the same and where 
the ‘as such’ (als solche) is only given in the shadow of the ‘as if’ (als ob). 
It is a space where nothing happens for the first time, freshly, innocently, 
purely, but always only as its own double, and as such a as haunted by the 
absent presence of reflections, repetitions, and returns. This is the experience 
of ‘the other night’ (l’autre nuit), which, according to Blanchot, is a night 
that no longer serves the day but rather exposes its unending madness. But 
for now a whole series of questions regarding the intermezzo of boredom 
and anxiety has arisen. 
Is this phenomenological limit not nothing being disclosed in boredom, or 
rather, is this not the disclosure that there is nothing to disclose? Is this not 
anxiety provoking? Does boredom not brush up against anxiety here? Is the 
indifference of boredom not bordering on, yet still obfuscating the anxious 
secret that there is no secret to be revealed? No hidden ground of being or 
secret kernel of truth to be revealed as belonging to Dasein, only the secret 
that there is no secret. And inversely, is such disclosure of non-disclosure 
not in turn exceedingly boring? Might we not at this appearance of the 
disappearance of everything discern a point of conflation between boredom 
and anxiety, at which boredom becomes anxious and anxiety becomes 
boring? Is there not a sort of tipping point where the eventless repetitions of 
the everyday turn into the anxiety-ridden compulsion to repeat also known 
as the ‘death drive’? Perhaps, but Heidegger tries to strengthen our nerves 
and to encourage us not to despair in the search for distractions but to 
confront the challenge to which such an anxiety of boredom exposes us:  
 
[D]as Beunruhigende dieser Inhaltslosigkeit, das zu diesem ‘es ist einem 
langweilig’ gehört, dürfen wir nicht beseitigen, wenn wir überhaupt imstande sind, 
diese Stimmung ‘es ist einem langweilig’ in ihrer ganzen Schwingungsweite in uns 
ausschwingen zu lassen.840 
 
Why should we stop trying to overcome the unnerving attunement of 
boredom and instead try to let ourselves be gripped and attuned towards its 
entire range of vibration? Because, Heidegger answers, in the radical 
emptiness of the exhausted time of boredom there is also the instantaneous 
possibility of a sheer openness and as such of a “Hingezwungenheit an die 
ursprüngliche Ermöglichung des Daseins.”841 Yet, again we must ask 
ourselves if the oscillations of boredom might not at some point come to 
interfere with the wavelengths of anxiety and whether this point is perhaps 
what Heidegger calls freedom or, later on, releasement (Gelassenheit)? The 
                                           
840 GA 29/30, 216. 
841 GA 29/30, 216. 
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question remains, then, as to when the nebulous fog of boredom dissipates 
enough to let the bored one encounter the abyss of freedom in anxiety; when 
does the ‘es ist einem langweilig’ turn into the ‘ist es einem unheimlich’?842  
  
                                           
842 Cf. GA 9, 111. 
  
EXCURSUS IV  
 
A SCENE FROM RILKE CONCERNING A REVERSAL OF THE MIRROR STAGE  
Embarking on this ocean of (his)stories, we encounter a scene from Rainer 
Maria Rilke’s novel Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge from 
1910, in which something like a reversal of the mirror stage, akin to the one 
we have tried to outline above, appears to take place. In what follows, we 
shall therefore attend at some length to this scene because it might elucidate 
something that remains very obscure in our reading of Lacan’s seminar on 
anxiety. Hence, what Lacan says in regard to Hoffmann’s tales and their 
depictions of the uncanny could in this context be said about Rilke’s novel 
with regard to the reversal of the mirror stage, namely that: “Dans la réalité, 
celle-ci [i.e. notre expérience de l’unheimlich] est trop fugitive. La fiction la 
démontre bien mieux.”843 
 The relevant scene takes place when Rilke’s protagonist Malte is still a 
young boy, recovering from a fever in his childhood home. Roaming the 
rooms of the attic that are normally secluded from sight, Malte discovers an 
old chest filled with clothes and costumes of different kinds. He begins to try 
on the costumes and look at himself in a tall trumeau mirror (Pfeilerspiegel) 
constructed out of dissimilar greenish pieces of glass. Suddenly, however, as 
Malte gazes at in the mirror—almost as if the mirror itself does not believe 
its own reflection (der Spiegel glaubte es gleichsam nicht)—he no longer 
sees his own reflection but something foreign (Fremdes) and independent 
(Selbständiges), which gradually takes Malte into its possession (in seine 
Macht bekam). The reflection of the mirror now begins to dictate Malte’s 
movements, his facial expressions, and even the thoughts and ideas that 
befall him (Einfälle). At first, however, these dissimulations (Verstellungen) 
of Malte’s reflection do not go so far as to entirely alienate or estrange 
(entfremden) him from himself; rather, they enforce his conviction in himself 
as a great actor and a master of disguise. In other words, a distance still 
remains to separate Malte from his strange image such that he does not yet 
feel anxious or threatened by it, but instead exhilarated by his playful 
mirroring.  
The catastrophe (Verhängnis), however, by which the mirror overturns the 
position of power between the Malte and his reflection, occurs when Malte 
unlocks the final chest, which harbor a plethora of masks and accessories 
(Maskenzeug). Discarding the too-conventional and obvious costumes, like 
the Dominos and Pierrots, Malte is drawn to and almost intoxicated (eine Art 
                                           
843 Sem X, 61/49. 
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von Rausch) by the more mysterious, subtle, and secretive ones; the large 
coats, cloths, scarves, and not least the veils (Schleier) in whose wonderful 
materials he imagines endless possibilities of disguise (freie und unendlich 
bewegliche Möglichkeiten), liberated from the figures with predetermined 
associations. 
Malte soon decides on a mask, places his face in its cavity, wraps some of 
the cloths around it as a kind of turban so that the edge of the mask is entirely 
covered, and then heads to the mirror to contemplate this new creation. Yet, 
the image returned to Malte in the mirror exceeds all of his expectations, and 
is so magnificent (großartig) and complete (vollkommen) that it almost 
becomes too convincing (zu überzeugend). In order to find out what or who 
he has become, Malte begins to make grandiose and enthralling 
(beschwörende) movements, which are the only movements that seem 
proper to this apparition in the mirror. Unfortunately, these monumental 
movements cause Malte to knock over a table, upon which a flacon of 
perfume and some other items are placed. The flacon breaks and the fluid 
begins to color the light flooring with dark stains. Malte tries to mop up the 
spill but the stains only grow darker and more discomforting (unangenehm).  
Agitated and in despair, Malte tries to free himself from his costume in 
order to be able to better move around and see what he is doing, but he only 
succeeds in drawing the layers of clothes closer together, making it more and 
more difficult for him to breath. Finding it increasingly hard to draw breath, 
Malte rushes to the mirror for assistance in his self-liberation, yet the 
moment of revenge (Vergeltung) has arrived and the mirror returns only an 
image, which is no longer a reassuring reflection of himself but a foreign and 
unbelievably monstrous reality (eine fremde, unbegreifliche monströse 
Wirklichkeit) that has become more powerful than his own. This monstrously 
real image leaves the horrified Malte with no other choice but to surrender 
to the fact of his experience that “jetzt war er der Stärkere, und Ich was der 
Spiegel.”844 A catastrophe has occurred and Malte no longer possesses but is 
instead possessed by his creation, which has become utterly unfamiliar 
(unbekannt) to him and which causes him to lose his senses and to literally 
fall out of himself (ich fiel einfach aus).  
For an instant, Malte experiences a profound longing for himself, a 
longing to regain himself, but retrieves nothing but the inner foreigner that 
has usurped him. So he decides to make a run for it in order to escape the 
unfamiliar and mesmerizing gaze staring at him from the mirror with his own 
eyes, to try to save whatever is left of himself and recover himself 
somewhere else in the familiar surroundings of his home. To his regret, 
                                           
844 Rilke 1979, 101–102.  
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however, Malte discovers that it is no longer himself who is running through 
the house, but instead the anonymous stranger who he is trying to escape but 
into whose possession Malte has now fallen, which causes him to no longer 
know his way around his own house. The disguised child, whose authority 
can only improperly be named Malte, stumbles down to the bottom of the 
stairs where the servants of the household are passing by. Instead of helping 
Malte in his distress, however, the servants merely laugh at him, since they 
observe only a playful child in his disguise and not a child possessed by his 
disguise. Malte tries to cry out, to plead, to scream, but he finds that he no 
longer has a voice of his own (Ich hatte keine Stimme mehr). Finally, Malte 
faints and collapses on the floor, and, at the sound of his silence the servants 
begin to uncover him from his possessive disguise to find him lying there 
unconscious “wie ein Stück in allen den Tüchern, rein wie ein Stück.”845 
                                           
845 Rilke 1979, 103.  
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